RADIUS Attributes for IEEE 802 Networks

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 11 and is now closed.

(Benoît Claise) Yes

(Jari Arkko) No Objection

(Alia Atlas) No Objection

Alissa Cooper No Objection

(Spencer Dawkins) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

Comment (2014-03-20 for -11)
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No objection, but surely it is time to stop "proposing" stuff. Don't you have IETF consensus and intend to publish an RFC?

(Stephen Farrell) No Objection

Comment (2014-03-24 for -11)
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While this spec doesn't really change the threat model as it
impacts on RADIUS, (so this is non blockng and not a
discuss) it might be no harm to state that confidentiality
would be a useful service to use when sending many of these
(or many other) RADIUS attributes since our conception of
the actual threat model (e.g. with operator networks) has
evolved in the last short while.  Given RADIUS/TLS is
experimental and radext is not done with a DTLS scheme you
probably can't simply point at a way to handle that, but
even so stating that some confidential channel is strongly
desirable would be usefui I think. (I'm assuming that IPsec
isn't used so much, or at least not to protect the entire
path over which the RADIUS message traverses.)

(Brian Haberman) No Objection

(Joel Jaeggli) No Objection

Barry Leiba No Objection

(Kathleen Moriarty) No Objection

Comment (2014-03-24 for -11)
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This has a good description of radius threats in the Security Considerations section.

(Pete Resnick) No Objection

(Martin Stiemerling) No Objection