Using TLS to Secure QUIC
draft-ietf-quic-tls-23

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QUIC                                                     M. Thomson, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                          S. Turner, Ed.
Expires: March 15, 2020                                            sn3rd
                                                      September 12, 2019

                        Using TLS to Secure QUIC
                         draft-ietf-quic-tls-23

Abstract

   This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to
   secure QUIC.

Note to Readers

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
   mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic [1].

   Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg
   [2]; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
   https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/-tls [3].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 15, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Thomson & Turner         Expires March 15, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Using TLS to Secure QUIC          September 2019

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  TLS Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Carrying TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Interface to TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Handshake Complete  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.2.  Handshake Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.3.  Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages  . . . . . .  10
       4.1.4.  Encryption Level Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.5.  TLS Interface Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.3.  ClientHello Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  Enabling 0-RTT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.6.  Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.7.  HelloRetryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.8.  TLS Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.9.  Discarding Unused Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.9.1.  Discarding Initial Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.9.2.  Discarding Handshake Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       4.9.3.  Discarding 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Packet Protection Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Initial Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  AEAD Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.4.  Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       5.4.1.  Header Protection Application . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.4.2.  Header Protection Sample  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       5.4.3.  AES-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       5.4.4.  ChaCha20-Based Header Protection  . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.5.  Receiving Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.6.  Use of 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.7.  Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Frames . . . . . . . . .  26