Using TLS to Secure QUIC
draft-ietf-quic-tls-34
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Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (quic WG) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Martin Thomson , Sean Turner | ||
Last updated | 2021-02-03 (latest revision 2021-01-14) | ||
Replaces | draft-thomson-quic-tls | ||
Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
Formats | plain text html xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication (wg milestone: Jul 2020 - TLS 1.3 Mapping docu... ) | |
Document shepherd | Mark Nottingham | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-09-25) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Approved-announcement to be sent | |
Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Magnus Westerlund | ||
Send notices to | quic-chairs@ietf.org | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
QUIC M. Thomson, Ed. Internet-Draft Mozilla Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner, Ed. Expires: 19 July 2021 sn3rd 15 January 2021 Using TLS to Secure QUIC draft-ietf-quic-tls-34 Abstract This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure QUIC. Note to Readers Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic. Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/-tls. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 July 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Thomson & Turner Expires 19 July 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Using TLS to Secure QUIC January 2021 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. TLS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Carrying TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Interface to TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.1. Handshake Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.2. Handshake Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages . . . . . . 10 4.1.4. Encryption Level Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. ClientHello Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.6. 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.6.1. Enabling 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.6.2. Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.6.3. Validating 0-RTT Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.7. HelloRetryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.8. TLS Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.9. Discarding Unused Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.9.1. Discarding Initial Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.9.2. Discarding Handshake Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.9.3. Discarding 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5. Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Packet Protection Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. Initial Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.3. AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.4. Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.4.1. Header Protection Application . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.4.2. Header Protection Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.4.3. AES-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.4.4. ChaCha20-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . 30Show full document text