Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism
draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-14
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2015-09-30
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14 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48 |
2015-09-22
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14 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48 from RFC-EDITOR |
2015-09-10
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14 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from AUTH |
2015-09-09
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14 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH from EDIT |
2015-07-29
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor |
2015-07-29
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from Waiting on Authors |
2015-07-28
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2015-07-26
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2015-07-24
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2015-07-21
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14 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to EDIT |
2015-07-21
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14 | (System) | IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent |
2015-07-21
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14 | (System) | Announcement was received by RFC Editor |
2015-07-20
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14 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2015-07-20
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14 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent |
2015-07-20
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14 | Cindy Morgan | IESG has approved the document |
2015-07-20
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14 | Cindy Morgan | Ballot approval text was changed |
2015-07-20
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14 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from Approved-announcement sent |
2015-07-20
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14 | Brian Haberman | Ballot approval text was generated |
2015-07-20
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14 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed |
2015-07-20
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14 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-14.txt |
2015-07-20
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13 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup |
2015-07-20
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13 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2015-07-20
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13 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2015-07-20
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13 | Brian Haberman | Ballot writeup was changed |
2015-07-20
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13 | Brian Haberman | Ballot approval text was generated |
2015-07-16
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13 | Tero Kivinen | Closed request for Last Call review by SECDIR with state 'No Response' |
2015-07-09
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13 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation::AD Followup from IESG Evaluation |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Stephen Farrell has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot discuss] - Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after you've got a shared secret? |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot comment] Thanks for getting this done. - How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not managed by the ISP … [Ballot comment] Thanks for getting this done. - How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and that is probably fine, but I do wonder. - 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and simpler == more-secure in general. - 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe. - 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the message, you mean to not process it's content? With a very perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue that I could process the message content first and only then check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some text on that, that's just fine.) |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Stephen Farrell has been changed to Discuss from No Objection |
2015-07-09
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13 | Alia Atlas | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alia Atlas |
2015-07-09
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13 | Kathleen Moriarty | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Kathleen Moriarty |
2015-07-09
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13 | Spencer Dawkins | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Spencer Dawkins |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot comment] Thanks for getting this done. - Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after you've got a shared secret? If the … [Ballot comment] Thanks for getting this done. - Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after you've got a shared secret? If the answer here is "oops, we never thought about that," then this will likely turn into a DISCUSS, but I expect the WG did think about it, in which case I reckon my preference for confidentiality doesn't trump the WG consensus. - How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and that is probably fine, but I do wonder. - 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and simpler == more-secure in general. - 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe. - 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the message, you mean to not process it's content? With a very perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue that I could process the message content first and only then check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some text on that, that's just fine.) |
2015-07-09
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13 | Stephen Farrell | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Stephen Farrell |
2015-07-09
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13 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana |
2015-07-09
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13 | Martin Stiemerling | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Martin Stiemerling |
2015-07-09
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13 | Amanda Baber | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2015-07-08
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13 | Joel Jaeggli | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Joel Jaeggli |
2015-07-08
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13 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Jari Arkko |
2015-07-08
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13 | Deborah Brungard | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard |
2015-07-08
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13 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper |
2015-07-07
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13 | Ben Campbell | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ben Campbell |
2015-07-07
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13 | Terry Manderson | [Ballot comment] Thanks for addressing an aspect of security in relation to PCP, especially the Advanced Threat Model from RFC6887. I have a few … [Ballot comment] Thanks for addressing an aspect of security in relation to PCP, especially the Advanced Threat Model from RFC6887. I have a few comments 1) I'm sure the RFC editor will pick these up, however there is some comma usage in the document that caused me to re-read some of the paragraphs to understand. The Abstract is one example of this. I'm certainly no expert so perhaps have a skim over this: http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/commas.asp 2) s 3.1.1, please consider rewording the text "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format to have a result code." to something like "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format with result codes for the PCP Authentication mechanism" ...The wording as it stands seems a little non-specific. 3) Basic DoS attacks (such as state bloat) are mentioned in the security section, are there any complex DoS attacks that can be leveraged using the PCP authentication mechanism itself? |
2015-07-07
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13 | Terry Manderson | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Terry Manderson |
2015-07-07
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13 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba |
2015-07-06
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13 | Benoît Claise | [Ballot comment] Thanks for addressing Jouni's OPS DIR review. |
2015-07-06
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13 | Benoît Claise | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Benoit Claise |
2015-07-05
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13 | Paul Kyzivat | Request for Telechat review by GENART Completed: On the Right Track. Reviewer: Paul Kyzivat. |
2015-07-02
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13 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed |
2015-07-02
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13 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-13.txt |
2015-07-02
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12 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat |
2015-07-02
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12 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat |
2015-07-02
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12 | Paul Kyzivat | Request for Last Call review by GENART Completed: Ready with Issues. Reviewer: Paul Kyzivat. |
2015-06-30
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12 | Jouni Korhonen | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR Completed: Has Nits. Reviewer: Jouni Korhonen. |
2015-06-29
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12 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2015-07-09 |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | Ballot has been issued |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Brian Haberman |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | Created "Approve" ballot |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | Ballot writeup was changed |
2015-06-29
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12 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from Waiting for Writeup |
2015-06-29
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12 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA - Not OK |
2015-06-29
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12 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-12.txt |
2015-06-29
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11 | (System) | IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call |
2015-06-25
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11 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Not OK from IANA - Review Needed |
2015-06-25
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11 | Pearl Liang | (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11. Authors should review the comments and/or questions below. Please report any inaccuracies and respond to any … (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11. Authors should review the comments and/or questions below. Please report any inaccuracies and respond to any questions as soon as possible. IANA has a question about one action requested in the IANA Considerations section of this document. We received the following comments/questions from the IANA's reviewer: IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there are three actions which need to be completed. First, in the PCP Opcodes subregistry of the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/ a new Opcode is to be registered from the standards action range as follows: Value: [ TBA ] Description: Authentication Opcode Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Second, in the PCP Options subregistry, also in the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at: http://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/ the following nine options are to be registered from the standards action range in the mandatory to process range as follows: Value: [ TBA-130 ] Name: Nonce Purpose: A random 32 bit number which is transported within a PA- Initiation message and the corresponding reply message from the PCP server. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode. Length: 4 octets May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-131 ] Name: Authentication Tag for Common PCP Messages. Purpose: A variable-length field that carries the Message Authentication Code for the PCP message. The generation of the digest varies according to the algorithms specified in different PCP SAs. This field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary. Valid for Opcodes: MAP, PEER and ANNOUNCE Opcodes Length: Variable length May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-132 ] Name: Authentication Tag for PCP Auth Messages. Purpose: A variable-length field that carries the Message Authentication Code for the PCP message. The generation of the digest varies according to the algorithms specified in different PCP SAs. This field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with null characters when necessary. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Variable length May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-133 ] Name: EAP Payload Purpose: The EAP message transferred. Note this field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Variable length May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-134 ] Name: PRF Purpose: The Pseudo-Random Function which the sender supports to generate an MSK. This field contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform Type 2. A PCP implementation MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Option Length is 4 octets May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: as many as fit within maximum PCP message size Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-135 ] Name: MAC Algorithm Purpose: Indicate the MAC algorithm which the sender supports to generate authentication data. The MAC Algorithm ID field contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform Type 3. A PCP implementation MUST support AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Option Length is 4 octets May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: as many as fit within maximum PCP message size Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-136 ] Name: Session Lifetime Purpose: The lifetime of the PA Session, which is decided by the authorization result. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Option Length is 4 octets May appear in: response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-137 ] Name: Received Packet. Purpose: The sequence number of the last received PCP message. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode Length: Option Length is 4 octets May appear in: request and response Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA-138 ] Name: ID Indicator. Purpose: The identity of the authority that issued the credentials. The field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary. The ID indicator field is UTF-8 encoded Unicode string conforming to the "UsernameCaseMapped" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass. The PCP client validates that the ID indicator field conforms to the "UsernameCaseMapped" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass. The PCP client enforces rules to map the ID indicator field. The PCP client compares the resulting string with the ID indicators stored locally on the PCP client to pick the credentials for authentication. The two indicator strings are to be considered equivalent by the client if they are an exact octet-for-octet match. Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode. Length: Variable length. May appear in: response. Maximum occurrences: 1 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Third, in the PCP Result Codes subregistry, also in the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/ the following seven result codes are to be registered from the standards action range as follows: Value: [ TBA ] Name: INITIATION Description: The client indication to the server for authentication Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED Description: The server indication to the client that authentication is required Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: AUTHENTICATION-FAILED Description: This error response is signaled to the client if EAP authentication had failed Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: AUTHENTICATION-SUCCEEDED Description: This success response is signaled to the client if EAP authentication had succeeded Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: AUTHORIZATION-FAILED Description: This error response is signaled to the client if the EAP authentication had succeeded but authorization failed Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: SESSION-TERMINATED Description: This PCP result code indicates to the partner that the PA session must be terminated Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] Value: [ TBA ] Name: DOWNGRADE-ATTACK-DETECTED Description: This error response is signaled to the client if the server detects downgrade attack Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] QUESTION: 'Hyphens' are used in the above seven new Result Codes. Is 'hyphen' allowed? The existing Result Codes registrations listed in the registry all use underscores. IANA understood that the authors are requesting seven different values for the new Result Codes. IANA understands that these three actions are the only ones required to be completed upon approval of this document. Note: The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is only to confirm what actions will be performed. Please note that IANA cannot reserve specific values. However, early allocation is available for some types of registrations. For more information, please see RFC 7120. |
2015-06-24
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11 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Jouni Korhonen |
2015-06-24
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11 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Jouni Korhonen |
2015-06-24
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11 | Gunter Van de Velde | Assignment of request for Last Call review by OPSDIR to Sheng Jiang was rejected |
2015-06-23
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11 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Sheng Jiang |
2015-06-23
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11 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Sheng Jiang |
2015-06-18
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11 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat |
2015-06-18
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11 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat |
2015-06-18
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11 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to David Waltermire |
2015-06-18
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11 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to David Waltermire |
2015-06-15
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11 | Amy Vezza | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed |
2015-06-15
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11 | Amy Vezza | The following Last Call announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication … The following Last Call announcement was sent out: From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism) to Proposed Standard The IESG has received a request from the Port Control Protocol WG (pcp) to consider the following document: - 'Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-06-29. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract An IPv4 or IPv6 host can use the Port Control Protocol (PCP) to flexibly manage the IP address and port mapping information on Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls, to facilitate communication with remote hosts. However, the un-controlled generation or deletion of IP address mappings on such network devices may cause security risks and should be avoided. In some cases the client may need to prove that it is authorized to modify, create or delete PCP mappings. This document describes an in-band authentication mechanism for PCP that can be used in those cases. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is used to perform authentication between PCP devices. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. This document contains a normative reference to an Informational RFC (RFC 5281). This Last Call also requests the addition of RFC 5281 to the Downref registry (https://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/iesg/trac/wiki/DownrefRegistry). |
2015-06-15
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11 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | Last call was requested |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | Ballot approval text was generated |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | Ballot writeup was generated |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::AD Followup |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | Last call announcement was changed |
2015-06-15
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11 | Brian Haberman | Last call announcement was generated |
2015-06-15
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11 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed |
2015-06-15
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11 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11.txt |
2015-06-15
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10 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed from AD Evaluation::External Party |
2015-06-10
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10 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-10.txt |
2015-06-02
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09 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation::External Party from AD Evaluation |
2015-05-29
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09 | Brian Haberman | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? … (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? Proposed Standard, as indicated in the title page header This is part of the PCP protocol suite, of which all docs are PS (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary: An IPv4 or IPv6 host can use the Port Control Protocol (PCP) to flexibly manage the IP address and port mapping information on Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls, to facilitate communication with remote hosts. However, the un-controlled generation or deletion of IP address mappings on such network devices may cause security risks and should be avoided. In some cases the client may need to prove that it is authorized to modify, create or delete PCP mappings. This document describes an in-band authentication mechanism for PCP that can be used in those cases. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is used to perform authentication between PCP devices. Working Group Summary: Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough? There is strong consensus to use an EAP-based mechanism for security. There was, however, significant controversy about whether to use PANA. A consensus call was done on the list, and (rough) consensus was called by by the chairs in close cooperation with the responsible AD, following the advice outlined in what is now RFC 7282. The chairs reported the results at IETF 87, with slides at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/87/slides/slides-87-pcp-11.pdf where rough consensus was declared for not using PANA. Document Quality: Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? There is at least one implementation of this protocol, and eventually more are expected. Many individuals have reviewed various versions of this document over a long period of time. Personnel: Who is the Document Shepherd? Dave Thaler Who is the Responsible Area Director? Brian Haberman (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. Document shepherd did: 1) own technical review 2) verified id-nits, IANA considerations, etc. checks per proto writeup 3) verified that issue tracker tickets have been addressed in the document and closed 4) verified that WGLC comments have been addressed in the document (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? No (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. Three types of special review took place: 1) Security review, by several security experts (the authors of this document among them). 2) EAP review, to determine what should be mandatory to implement. Input from various EAP experts (e.g., Alan DeKok, Gabriel Montenegro, and Bernard Aboba) across multiple implementations were consulted, and the draft contains the resulting advice. 3) Precis review, to determine what precis profile should be used. This was done by Peter St.Andre. (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. No concerns. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. Yes. (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? No IPR disclosures have been filed. (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? There is strong consensus that a solution is needed. As noted earlier, the consensus for this particular solution was rough, after long discussion among many people. (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No appeals threatened to my knowledge. (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. == Outdated reference: A later version (-18) exists of draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-17 This one is due to -18 being submitted just after this document. ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5281 This is intentional. See discussion under question 15 below. ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5996 (Obsoleted by RFC 7296) This one should be updated. In the doc shepherd's opinion, this could be done in AUTH48 or in response to AD review or IETF Last Call comments and does not warrant a new version just for that update prior to AD review or IETF Last Call. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. None relevant. (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? Yes. (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? All but one reference is to an RFC. There is a normative dependency on draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis which was on the 5/28/2015 IESG telechat and we believe it should be unblocked shortly. (15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)? Yes. The WG agreed that having a mandatory-to-implement EAP method was required for interoperability. The WG surveyed EAP implementers/experts as noted in Q5 above and found that there is no standards track EAP method that is available in all the relevant EAP implementations. As such, the EAP expert reviewers advice was followed, which was to require RFC 5281 (widely implemented but only an Informational RFC) while making the new RFC 7170 (proposed standard, but not implemented) a SHOULD. The alternative would be to require RFC 7170, which the feedback indicated would block deployment of this draft for some time to come. Having security for PCP sooner than later was determined to be important, and so the WG would like to request approval for this downward reference. (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? No (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). No new registries are defined. Confirmed requirements for new entries in existing registries are met. (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. No new registries are defined. (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. None relevant. |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | Responsible AD changed to Brian Haberman |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | IETF WG state changed to Submitted to IESG for Publication from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | IESG state changed to Publication Requested |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | IESG process started in state Publication Requested |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | Tag Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway cleared. |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC cleared. |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | Changed document writeup |
2015-05-29
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09 | Dave Thaler | Changed document writeup |
2015-05-27
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09 | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-09.txt |
2015-05-22
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08 | Dave Thaler | Document shepherd check found: 1) the current IANA considerations section is missing some information IANA would require to add entries for the various fields. 2) … Document shepherd check found: 1) the current IANA considerations section is missing some information IANA would require to add entries for the various fields. 2) a bunch of references in the informative references section are used normatively and should be moved up into the normative references section. Also one thing idnits complains about: -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 4306 (Obsoleted by RFC 5996) |
2015-05-22
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08 | Dave Thaler | Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC set. |
2015-05-22
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08 | Dave Thaler | IETF WG state changed to Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up |
2015-05-22
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08 | Dave Thaler | Intended Status changed to Proposed Standard from None |
2015-05-22
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08 | Dave Thaler | Changed document writeup |
2015-05-22
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08 | Margaret Cullen | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-08.txt |
2015-04-28
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07 | Dave Thaler | Tag Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway set. |
2015-04-28
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07 | Dave Thaler | IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from In WG Last Call |
2015-04-28
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07 | Dave Thaler | Notification list changed to "Dave Thaler" <dthaler@microsoft.com> |
2015-04-28
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07 | Dave Thaler | Document shepherd changed to Dave Thaler |
2014-12-30
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07 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-07.txt |
2014-10-27
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06 | Dave Thaler | IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document |
2014-10-13
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06 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-06.txt |
2014-08-23
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05 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-05.txt |
2014-07-21
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04 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-04.txt |
2014-02-08
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03 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-03.txt |
2013-11-06
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02 | Dave Thaler | Set of documents this document replaces changed to draft-wasserman-pcp-authentication from None |
2013-10-01
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02 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-02.txt |
2012-10-19
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01 | Dacheng Zhang | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-01.txt |
2012-06-29
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00 | Margaret Cullen | New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-00.txt |