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Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism
draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-14

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2015-09-30
14 (System) RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48
2015-09-22
14 (System) RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48 from RFC-EDITOR
2015-09-10
14 (System) RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from AUTH
2015-09-09
14 (System) RFC Editor state changed to AUTH from EDIT
2015-07-29
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor
2015-07-29
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from Waiting on Authors
2015-07-28
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress
2015-07-26
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors
2015-07-24
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress
2015-07-21
14 (System) RFC Editor state changed to EDIT
2015-07-21
14 (System) IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent
2015-07-21
14 (System) Announcement was received by RFC Editor
2015-07-20
14 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress
2015-07-20
14 Cindy Morgan IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent
2015-07-20
14 Cindy Morgan IESG has approved the document
2015-07-20
14 Cindy Morgan Ballot approval text was changed
2015-07-20
14 Cindy Morgan IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from Approved-announcement sent
2015-07-20
14 Brian Haberman Ballot approval text was generated
2015-07-20
14 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed
2015-07-20
14 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-14.txt
2015-07-20
13 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
2015-07-20
13 Amy Vezza IESG has approved the document
2015-07-20
13 Amy Vezza Closed "Approve" ballot
2015-07-20
13 Brian Haberman Ballot writeup was changed
2015-07-20
13 Brian Haberman Ballot approval text was generated
2015-07-16
13 Tero Kivinen Closed request for Last Call review by SECDIR with state 'No Response'
2015-07-09
13 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation::AD Followup from IESG Evaluation
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell [Ballot Position Update] Position for Stephen Farrell has been changed to No Objection from Discuss
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell [Ballot discuss]

- Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after
you've got a shared secret?
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell
[Ballot comment]


Thanks for getting this done.


- How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not
managed by the ISP …
[Ballot comment]


Thanks for getting this done.


- How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not
managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP
infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some
new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and
that is probably fine, but I do wonder.

- 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without
it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and
simpler == more-secure in general.

- 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP
credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be
better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe.

- 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be
worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the
message, you mean to not process it's content?  With a very
perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue
that I could process the message content first and only then
check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly
spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes
happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some
text on that, that's just fine.)
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell [Ballot Position Update] Position for Stephen Farrell has been changed to Discuss from No Objection
2015-07-09
13 Alia Atlas [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alia Atlas
2015-07-09
13 Kathleen Moriarty [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Kathleen Moriarty
2015-07-09
13 Spencer Dawkins [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Spencer Dawkins
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell
[Ballot comment]


Thanks for getting this done.

- Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after
you've got a shared secret? If the …
[Ballot comment]


Thanks for getting this done.

- Why didn't you choose to encrypt the PCP payloads after
you've got a shared secret? If the answer here is "oops, we
never thought about that," then this will likely turn into a
DISCUSS, but I expect the WG did think about it, in which case
I reckon my preference for confidentiality doesn't trump the WG
consensus.

- How would this work in a home network where the f/w is not
managed by the ISP and there'd otherwise be no EAP
infrastructure? That could be out-of-scope or require some
new/odd EAP implementation and no change to this protocol, and
that is probably fine, but I do wonder.

- 3.3: Is this really needed? I wonder if we could do without
it. The protocol would be simpler if this wasn't needed and
simpler == more-secure in general.

- 5.11: would s/issued the credentials/issued the EAP
credentials that will be used to authenticate the client/ be
better? As-is, it's a tiny bit confusing maybe.

- 6.2: Maybe this is being overly paranoid, but would it be
worth saying that in all failure cases when you say discard the
message, you mean to not process it's content?  With a very
perverse reading of the current text, I might be able to argue
that I could process the message content first and only then
check the authentication afterwards. Yes, that'd be fairly
spectacularly dim, but that kind of thing does sometimes
happen. (If there's a better place in the draft to put some
text on that, that's just fine.)
2015-07-09
13 Stephen Farrell [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Stephen Farrell
2015-07-09
13 Alvaro Retana [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana
2015-07-09
13 Martin Stiemerling [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Martin Stiemerling
2015-07-09
13 Amanda Baber IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed
2015-07-08
13 Joel Jaeggli [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Joel Jaeggli
2015-07-08
13 Jari Arkko [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Jari Arkko
2015-07-08
13 Deborah Brungard [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard
2015-07-08
13 Alissa Cooper [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper
2015-07-07
13 Ben Campbell [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Ben Campbell
2015-07-07
13 Terry Manderson
[Ballot comment]
Thanks for addressing an aspect of security in relation to PCP, especially the Advanced Threat Model from RFC6887.

I have a few …
[Ballot comment]
Thanks for addressing an aspect of security in relation to PCP, especially the Advanced Threat Model from RFC6887.

I have a few comments

1) I'm sure the RFC editor will pick these up, however there is some comma usage in the document that caused me to re-read some of the paragraphs to understand. The Abstract is one example of this. I'm certainly no expert so perhaps have a skim over this: http://www.grammarbook.com/punctuation/commas.asp

2) s 3.1.1, please consider rewording the text "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format to have a result code." to something like "Section 5.1 updates the PCP request message format with result codes for the PCP Authentication mechanism" ...The wording as it stands seems a little non-specific.

3) Basic DoS attacks (such as state bloat) are mentioned in the security section, are there any complex DoS attacks that can be leveraged using the PCP authentication mechanism itself?
2015-07-07
13 Terry Manderson [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Terry Manderson
2015-07-07
13 Barry Leiba [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba
2015-07-06
13 Benoît Claise [Ballot comment]
Thanks for addressing Jouni's OPS DIR review.
2015-07-06
13 Benoît Claise [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Benoit Claise
2015-07-05
13 Paul Kyzivat Request for Telechat review by GENART Completed: On the Right Track. Reviewer: Paul Kyzivat.
2015-07-02
13 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed
2015-07-02
13 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-13.txt
2015-07-02
12 Jean Mahoney Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat
2015-07-02
12 Jean Mahoney Request for Telechat review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat
2015-07-02
12 Paul Kyzivat Request for Last Call review by GENART Completed: Ready with Issues. Reviewer: Paul Kyzivat.
2015-06-30
12 Jouni Korhonen Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR Completed: Has Nits. Reviewer: Jouni Korhonen.
2015-06-29
12 (System) IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman Placed on agenda for telechat - 2015-07-09
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman Ballot has been issued
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Brian Haberman
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman Created "Approve" ballot
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman Ballot writeup was changed
2015-06-29
12 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from Waiting for Writeup
2015-06-29
12 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA - Not OK
2015-06-29
12 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-12.txt
2015-06-29
11 (System) IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call
2015-06-25
11 (System) IANA Review state changed to IANA - Not OK from IANA - Review Needed
2015-06-25
11 Pearl Liang
(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed  draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11.  Authors should review the comments and/or questions below.  Please report any inaccuracies and respond to any …
(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed  draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11.  Authors should review the comments and/or questions below.  Please report any inaccuracies and respond to any questions as soon as possible.

IANA has a question about one action requested in the IANA Considerations section of this document.

We received the following comments/questions from the IANA's reviewer:

IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there are three actions which need to be completed.

First, in the PCP Opcodes subregistry of the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/

a new Opcode is to be registered from the standards action range as follows:

Value: [ TBA ]
Description: Authentication Opcode
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Second, in the PCP Options subregistry, also in the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/

the following nine options are to be registered from the standards action range in the mandatory to process range as follows:

Value: [ TBA-130 ]
Name: Nonce
Purpose: A random 32 bit number which is transported within a PA- Initiation message and the corresponding reply message from the PCP server.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode.
Length: 4 octets
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-131 ]
Name: Authentication Tag for Common PCP Messages.
Purpose: A variable-length field that carries the Message Authentication Code for the PCP message. The generation of the digest varies according to the algorithms specified in different PCP SAs. This field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary.
Valid for Opcodes: MAP, PEER and ANNOUNCE Opcodes
Length: Variable length
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-132 ]
Name: Authentication Tag for PCP Auth Messages.
Purpose: A variable-length field that carries the Message Authentication Code for the PCP message. The generation of the digest varies according to the algorithms specified in different PCP SAs. This field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with null characters when necessary.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Variable length
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-133 ]
Name: EAP Payload
Purpose: The EAP message transferred. Note this field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Variable length
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-134 ]
Name: PRF
Purpose: The Pseudo-Random Function which the sender supports to generate an MSK. This field contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform Type 2. A PCP implementation MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Option Length is 4 octets
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: as many as fit within maximum PCP message size
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-135 ]
Name: MAC Algorithm
Purpose: Indicate the MAC algorithm which the sender supports to generate authentication data. The MAC Algorithm ID field contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform Type 3. A PCP implementation MUST support AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Option Length is 4 octets
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: as many as fit within maximum PCP message size
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-136 ]
Name: Session Lifetime
Purpose: The lifetime of the PA Session, which is decided by the authorization result.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Option Length is 4 octets
May appear in: response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-137 ]
Name: Received Packet.
Purpose: The sequence number of the last received PCP message.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode
Length: Option Length is 4 octets
May appear in: request and response
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA-138 ]
Name: ID Indicator.
Purpose: The identity of the authority that issued the credentials. The field MUST end on a 32-bit boundary, padded with 0's when necessary. The ID indicator field is UTF-8 encoded Unicode string conforming to the "UsernameCaseMapped" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass. The PCP client validates that the ID indicator field conforms to the "UsernameCaseMapped" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass. The PCP client enforces rules to map the ID indicator field. The PCP client compares the resulting string with the ID indicators stored locally on the PCP client to pick the credentials for authentication. The two indicator strings are to be considered equivalent by the client if they are an exact octet-for-octet match.
Valid for Opcodes: Authentication Opcode.
Length: Variable length.
May appear in: response.
Maximum occurrences: 1
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Third, in the PCP Result Codes subregistry, also in the Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters registry located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/

the following seven result codes are to be registered from the standards action range as follows:

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: INITIATION
Description: The client indication to the server for authentication
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED
Description: The server indication to the client that authentication is required
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: AUTHENTICATION-FAILED
Description: This error response is signaled to the client if EAP authentication had failed
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: AUTHENTICATION-SUCCEEDED
Description: This success response is signaled to the client if EAP authentication had succeeded
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: AUTHORIZATION-FAILED
Description: This error response is signaled to the client if the EAP authentication had succeeded but authorization failed
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: SESSION-TERMINATED
Description: This PCP result code indicates to the partner that the PA session must be terminated
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Value: [ TBA ]
Name: DOWNGRADE-ATTACK-DETECTED
Description: This error response is signaled to the client if the server detects downgrade attack
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

QUESTION: 'Hyphens' are used in the above seven new Result Codes.  Is 'hyphen'
allowed?  The existing Result Codes registrations listed in the registry all use
underscores. 

IANA understood that the authors are requesting seven different values for
the new Result Codes.

IANA understands that these three actions are the only ones required to be completed upon approval of this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is only to confirm what actions will be performed. 

Please note that IANA cannot reserve specific values. However, early allocation is available for some types of registrations. For more information, please see RFC 7120.
2015-06-24
11 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Jouni Korhonen
2015-06-24
11 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Jouni Korhonen
2015-06-24
11 Gunter Van de Velde Assignment of request for Last Call review by OPSDIR to Sheng Jiang was rejected
2015-06-23
11 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Sheng Jiang
2015-06-23
11 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Sheng Jiang
2015-06-18
11 Jean Mahoney Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat
2015-06-18
11 Jean Mahoney Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Paul Kyzivat
2015-06-18
11 Tero Kivinen Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to David Waltermire
2015-06-18
11 Tero Kivinen Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to David Waltermire
2015-06-15
11 Amy Vezza IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed
2015-06-15
11 Amy Vezza
The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication …
The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Port Control Protocol WG (pcp)
to consider the following document:
- 'Port Control Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-06-29. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  An IPv4 or IPv6 host can use the Port Control Protocol (PCP) to
  flexibly manage the IP address and port mapping information on
  Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls, to facilitate
  communication with remote hosts.  However, the un-controlled
  generation or deletion of IP address mappings on such network devices
  may cause security risks and should be avoided.  In some cases the
  client may need to prove that it is authorized to modify, create or
  delete PCP mappings.  This document describes an in-band
  authentication mechanism for PCP that can be used in those cases.
  The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is used to perform
  authentication between PCP devices.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


This document contains a normative reference to an Informational RFC
(RFC 5281). This Last Call also requests the addition of RFC 5281 to the
Downref registry (https://trac.tools.ietf.org/group/iesg/trac/wiki/DownrefRegistry).
2015-06-15
11 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman Last call was requested
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman Ballot approval text was generated
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman Ballot writeup was generated
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::AD Followup
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman Last call announcement was changed
2015-06-15
11 Brian Haberman Last call announcement was generated
2015-06-15
11 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed
2015-06-15
11 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11.txt
2015-06-15
10 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed from AD Evaluation::External Party
2015-06-10
10 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-10.txt
2015-06-02
09 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to AD Evaluation::External Party from AD Evaluation
2015-05-29
09 Brian Haberman IESG state changed to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler
(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet
Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper
type of RFC? …
(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet
Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper
type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header?

    Proposed Standard, as indicated in the title page header
    This is part of the PCP protocol suite, of which all docs are PS

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary:

  An IPv4 or IPv6 host can use the Port Control Protocol (PCP) to
  flexibly manage the IP address and port mapping information on
  Network Address Translators (NATs) or firewalls, to facilitate
  communication with remote hosts.  However, the un-controlled
  generation or deletion of IP address mappings on such network devices
  may cause security risks and should be avoided.  In some cases the
  client may need to prove that it is authorized to modify, create or
  delete PCP mappings.  This document describes an in-band
  authentication mechanism for PCP that can be used in those cases.
  The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is used to perform
  authentication between PCP devices.

Working Group Summary:

Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there
controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus
was particularly rough?

  There is strong consensus to use an EAP-based mechanism for security.
  There was, however, significant controversy about whether to use PANA.
  A consensus call was done on the list, and (rough) consensus was called by
  by the chairs in close cooperation with the responsible AD, following the
  advice outlined in what is now RFC 7282.  The chairs reported the results
  at IETF 87, with slides at
  http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/87/slides/slides-87-pcp-11.pdf
  where rough consensus was declared for not using PANA.

Document Quality:

Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number
of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any
reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g.,
one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had
no substantive issues?

    There is at least one implementation of this protocol, and eventually
    more are expected.  Many individuals have reviewed various versions
    of this document over a long period of time.

Personnel:

Who is the Document Shepherd?

    Dave Thaler

Who is the Responsible Area Director?

    Brian Haberman

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the
Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for
publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG.

    Document shepherd did:
    1) own technical review
    2) verified id-nits, IANA considerations, etc. checks per proto writeup
    3) verified that issue tracker tickets have been addressed in the document
      and closed
    4) verified that WGLC comments have been addressed in the document

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of
the reviews that have been performed?

    No

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader
perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or
internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place.

    Three types of special review took place:
    1) Security review, by several security experts (the authors
      of this document among them).
    2) EAP review, to determine what should be mandatory to implement.
      Input from various EAP experts (e.g., Alan DeKok, Gabriel Montenegro,
      and Bernard Aboba) across multiple implementations were consulted,
      and the draft contains the resulting advice.
    3) Precis review, to determine what precis profile should be used.
      This was done by Peter St.Andre.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has
with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should
be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain
parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for
it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that
it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here.

    No concerns.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures
required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have
already been filed.

    Yes.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?

    No IPR disclosures have been filed.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the
strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the
WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

    There is strong consensus that a solution is needed.
    As noted earlier, the consensus for this particular solution was rough,
    after long discussion among many people.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email
messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email
because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

    No appeals threatened to my knowledge.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document.

  == Outdated reference: A later version (-18) exists of
    draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis-17

This one is due to -18 being submitted just after this document.

  ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5281

This is intentional.  See discussion under question 15 below.

  ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5996 (Obsoleted by RFC 7296)

This one should be updated.  In the doc shepherd's opinion, this
could be done in AUTH48 or in response to AD review or IETF Last Call
comments and does not warrant a new version just for that update
prior to AD review or IETF Last Call.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such
as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

    None relevant.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as either
normative or informative?

    Yes.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state?

    All but one reference is to an RFC.
    There is a normative dependency on draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis
    which was on the 5/28/2015 IESG telechat and we believe it should
    be unblocked shortly.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?

    Yes.  The WG agreed that having a mandatory-to-implement EAP method
    was required for interoperability.  The WG surveyed EAP implementers/experts
    as noted in Q5 above and found that there is no standards track EAP method that
    is available in all the relevant EAP implementations.  As such, the EAP expert
    reviewers advice was followed, which was to require RFC 5281 (widely implemented
    but only an Informational RFC) while making the new RFC 7170 (proposed
    standard, but not implemented) a SHOULD.  The alternative would be to
    require RFC 7170, which the feedback indicated would block deployment
    of this draft for some time to come.  Having security for PCP sooner than
    later was determined to be important, and so the WG would like to request
    approval for this downward reference.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs?

    No

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are
associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that
any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that
newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial
contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations
are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested
(see RFC 5226).

    No new registries are defined.
    Confirmed requirements for new entries in existing registries are met.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations.

    No new registries are defined.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd
to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as
XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

    None relevant.
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler Responsible AD changed to Brian Haberman
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler IETF WG state changed to Submitted to IESG for Publication from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler IESG state changed to Publication Requested
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler IESG process started in state Publication Requested
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler Tag Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway cleared.
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC cleared.
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler Changed document writeup
2015-05-29
09 Dave Thaler Changed document writeup
2015-05-27
09 Tirumaleswar Reddy.K New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-09.txt
2015-05-22
08 Dave Thaler
Document shepherd check found:
1) the current IANA considerations section is missing some information IANA would require to add entries for the various fields.
2) …
Document shepherd check found:
1) the current IANA considerations section is missing some information IANA would require to add entries for the various fields.
2) a bunch of references in the informative references section are used normatively and should be moved up into the normative references section.

Also one thing idnits complains about:
  -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 4306
    (Obsoleted by RFC 5996)
2015-05-22
08 Dave Thaler Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC set.
2015-05-22
08 Dave Thaler IETF WG state changed to Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up
2015-05-22
08 Dave Thaler Intended Status changed to Proposed Standard from None
2015-05-22
08 Dave Thaler Changed document writeup
2015-05-22
08 Margaret Cullen New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-08.txt
2015-04-28
07 Dave Thaler Tag Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway set.
2015-04-28
07 Dave Thaler IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from In WG Last Call
2015-04-28
07 Dave Thaler Notification list changed to "Dave Thaler" <dthaler@microsoft.com>
2015-04-28
07 Dave Thaler Document shepherd changed to Dave Thaler
2014-12-30
07 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-07.txt
2014-10-27
06 Dave Thaler IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document
2014-10-13
06 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-06.txt
2014-08-23
05 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-05.txt
2014-07-21
04 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-04.txt
2014-02-08
03 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-03.txt
2013-11-06
02 Dave Thaler Set of documents this document replaces changed to draft-wasserman-pcp-authentication from None
2013-10-01
02 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-02.txt
2012-10-19
01 Dacheng Zhang New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-01.txt
2012-06-29
00 Margaret Cullen New version available: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-00.txt