OSPF Cryptographic Authentication
draft-ietf-ospf-md5-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(ospf WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Fred Baker , Ran Atkinson | ||
| Last updated | 1995-03-17 (Latest revision 1994-10-14) | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Growth in the Internet has made us aware of the need for improved authentication of routing information. OSPF provides two authentication mechanisms for use in an area: 'No Authentication' and 'Simple Password'. Both are vulnerable to passive attacks currently widespread in the Internet. Well-understood security issues exist in routing protocols [4]. Clear text passwords, currently specified for use with OSPF, are no longer considered sufficient [5]. If authentication is disabled, then only simple misconfigurations are detected. Simple passwords transmitted in the clear will further protect against the honest neighbor, but are useless in the general case. By simply capturing information on the wire - straightforward even in a remote environment - a hostile process can learn the password and overcome the network.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)