Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices
draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-04
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Active Internet-Draft (opsawg WG)
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Authors |
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Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
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Dan Wing
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Blake Anderson
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Last updated |
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2021-01-17
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draft-reddy-opsawg-mud-tls
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Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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(None)
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draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-04.txt:
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iana-tls-profile@2020-11-02.yang:
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# read iana-tls-profile@2020-11-02.yang (CL)
yanglint SO 1.6.7: yanglint --verbose -p {tmplib} -p {rfclib} -p {draftlib} -p {ianalib} -p {cataloglib} {model} -i:
No validation errors
ietf-acl-tls@2020-11-02.yang:
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# module search path: a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/draftmod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/ianamod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/catalogmod/:.:/var/lib/wwwrun/yang/modules:/a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules
# read ietf-acl-tls@2020-11-02.yang (CL)
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# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/draftmod/ietf-crypto-types@2020-08-20.yang
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# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/ietf-interfaces@2018-02-20.yang
yanglint SO 1.6.7: yanglint --verbose -p {tmplib} -p {rfclib} -p {draftlib} -p {ianalib} -p {cataloglib} {model} -i:
No validation errors
ietf-mud-tls@2020-10-19.yang:
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# module search path: a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/draftmod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/ianamod/:/a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/catalogmod/:.:/var/lib/wwwrun/yang/modules:/a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules
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# read /a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules/ietf/ietf-packet-fields.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/ietf-packet-fields@2019-03-04.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules/ietf/ietf-inet-types.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/catalogmod/ietf-inet-types@2020-07-06.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules/ietf/ietf-ethertypes.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/ietf-ethertypes@2019-03-04.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-datatracker/7.25.0/env/share/yang/modules/ietf/ietf-interfaces.yang
# read /a/www/ietf-ftp/yang/rfcmod/ietf-interfaces@2018-02-20.yang
yanglint SO 1.6.7: yanglint --verbose -p {tmplib} -p {rfclib} -p {draftlib} -p {ianalib} -p {cataloglib} {model} -i:
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OPSAWG WG T. Reddy
Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: July 19, 2021 Citrix
B. Anderson
Cisco
January 15, 2021
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) (D)TLS Profiles for IoT Devices
draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-tls-04
Abstract
This memo extends the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
specification to incorporate (D)TLS profile parameters. This allows
a network security service to identify unexpected (D)TLS usage, which
can indicate the presence of unauthorized software or malware on an
endpoint.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Reddy, et al. Expires July 19, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft MUD (D)TLS Profile for IoT devices January 2021
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Overview of MUD (D)TLS profiles for IoT devices . . . . . . . 5
4. (D)TLS 1.3 Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Full (D)TLS 1.3 Handshake Inspection . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Encrypted DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. (D)TLS Profile of a IoT device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Tree Structure of the (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL
YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. The (D)TLS profile Extension to the ACL YANG Model . . . 10
5.3. IANA (D)TLS profile YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4. MUD (D)TLS Profile Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Processing of the MUD (D)TLS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. (D)TLS Profile YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. ACL TLS Version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.3. ACL DTLS version registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.4. ACL (D)TLS Parameters registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.5. MUD Extensions registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction
Encryption is necessary to enhance the privacy of end users using IoT
devices. TLS [RFC8446] and DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] are the
dominant protocols (counting all (D)TLS versions) providing
encryption for IoT device traffic. Unfortunately, in conjunction
with IoT applications' rise of encryption, malware authors are also
using encryption which thwarts network-based analysis such as deep
packet inspection (DPI). Other mechanisms are thus needed to help
detecting malware running on an IoT device.
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