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Finding and Using Geofeed Data
draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-00

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9092.
Authors Massimo Candela , Randy Bush , Warren "Ace" Kumari , Russ Housley
Last updated 2021-01-19 (Latest revision 2020-11-15)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd George G. Michaelson
IESG IESG state Became RFC 9092 (Proposed Standard)
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Send notices to ggm@algebras.org
draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-00
Network Working Group                                         M. Candela
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Standards Track                                 R. Bush
Expires: May 19, 2021                                       IIJ & Arrcus
                                                               W. Kumari
                                                                  Google
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                       November 15, 2020

                     Finding and Using Geofeed Data
                 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-00

Abstract

   This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  inetnum: Class  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to
   customize those services based on the geographic location of the user
   of the service.  This is often done using the source IP address used
   to contact the service.  Also, infrastructure and other services
   might wish to publish the locale of their services.  [RFC8805]
   defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP
   addresses.  But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed
   data given an IP address.

   This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
   Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2622] inetnum: class [INETNUM] to
   refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them.  In all places
   inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [INET6NUM].

   An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed
   data is also defined.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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2.  Geofeed Files

   Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805].  They provide a facility
   for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to
   geographic locale(s).

   Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address
   to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data.  In
   Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed
   file given an IP address.

   Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale
   and high granularity can be quite large.  The size of a file can be
   even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many
   prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a
   different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces
   are represented, etc.

   This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to
   provide stronger authenticity to the data.

3.  inetnum: Class

   RPSL, [RFC2622], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs),
   has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num:
   [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and
   its attributes.

   Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed:
   attribute in the inetnum: class.  Until such time, this document
   defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an
   HTTPS URL of a geofeed file.  The format MUST be as in this example,
   "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary.

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
       remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv

   While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
   parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum:
   class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary.

       inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
       geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv

   Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have
   migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at
   inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the
   remarks: and geofeed: forms.  This not only implies that the RIRs

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   support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have
   migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s.

   Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed
   reference, whether a remark: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one
   is defined.

   inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1,
   Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects.  Geofeed references SHOULD be at the
   lowest applicable inetnum: object.  When fetching, the most specific
   inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.

   When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects
   which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on
   the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be
   preferred.

   It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than
   the inetnum: which refers to them.

   Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL
   as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP
   [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the
   "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the
   "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".

4.  Authenticating Geofeed Data

   The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is
   valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is
   authoritative in some sense.  The inetnum: which points to the
   geofeed file provides some assurance.  Unfortunately the RPSL in many
   repositories is weakly authenticated at best.  An approach where RPSL
   was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be
   deployed by all RPSL registries.

   An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file.  It
   would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by
   the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering
   address range.  One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI
   certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text.

   Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file
   canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC3852] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature
   which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer
   characters.

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   Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the
   inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address
   range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:.

   An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is
   identical to or a subset of A.  'Address range' is used here because
   inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix
   boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must.

   As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources
   relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum:
   object's address range would be included in the [RFC3852] CMS
   SignedData certificates field.

   Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and
   getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as
   an exercise for the implementor.  On the other hand, verifying the
   signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be
   validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key.

   Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it
   MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the
   geofeed file.  This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple
   example.  A correct and full example is in Appendix A.

       # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
       # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
       # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
       ...
       # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
       # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
       # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24

5.  Operational Considerations

   To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to
   register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with
   their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to
   them.  RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain
   inetnum: objects.  They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP
   address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data,
   including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files.

   The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https
   [RFC2818].

   When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of
   the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.

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   Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple
   inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer
   MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the
   address range of the inetnum: object they have followed.

   To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the
   RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access.  This
   also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers.

   Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all
   the RIRs.  An anonymized version of such data is openly available for
   all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization.  However, for
   users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with
   extra RDAP effort.  There is open source code to pass over such data
   across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them
   [geofeed-finder].

   An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do
   frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed
   servers.  [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP
   Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be
   refetched.  As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of
   such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently
   than weekly.  It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as
   midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others
   are likely to do the same.

6.  Security Considerations

   It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also
   use other sources to cross-validate the data.  All of the Security
   Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well.

   As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any
   authentication.  This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects
   pointing to malicious geofeed files.  Section 4 suggests an
   unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the
   RPKI.

   If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI-
   signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish a unsigned
   equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has
   weak authorization.

   The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers
   due to too-frequent queries.  Usually they throttle by the querying
   IP address or block.  Similar defenses will likely need to be
   deployed by geofeed file servers.

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7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in
   the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:

   Description             OID                         Specification
   -----------------------------------------------------------------
   id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF  1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47  [RFC-TBD]

8.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue.  George
   Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review.  Erik
   Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship.  Additionally, we
   express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno
   Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, and Kevin Pack.  Also to
   geolocation providers that are consuming geofeeds with this described
   solution, Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), and Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io).

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [INET6NUM]
              RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object",
              <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
              asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
              rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
              objects/4-2-3-description-of-the-inet6num-object>.

   [INETNUM]  RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object",
              <https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
              asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation/
              rpsl-object-types/4-2-descriptions-of-primary-
              objects/4-2-4-description-of-the-inetnum-object>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2622]  Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
              Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
              "Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2622, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622>.

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   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, DOI 10.17487/RFC3852, July 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3852>.

   [RFC5485]  Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft
              Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8805]  Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
              Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
              Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [geofeed-finder]
              Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder",
              <https://github.com/massimocandela/geofeed-finder>.

   [RFC0959]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
              STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.

   [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
              RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.

   [RFC7482]  Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
              Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.

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   [RFC7909]  Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy
              Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909>.

Appendix A.  Example

   This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA
   certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity
   certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a
   detached signature.

   The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate.  As
   usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4
   address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers.

       -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
       MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
       BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5
       MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
       AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ
       0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH
       XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe
       g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb
       O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq
       jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd
       BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU
       GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw
       GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI
       KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4
       YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u
       ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4
       YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD
       AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN
       BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe
       xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH
       cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM
       Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA
       rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a
       x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA==
       -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor.  This certificate
   grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two
   AS numbers (64496 and 64497).

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       -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
       MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
       BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5
       MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG
       QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc
       zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7
       6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo
       j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ
       liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n
       YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE
       TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R
       4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD
       VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr
       BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u
       ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz
       Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v
       cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr
       BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu
       bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz
       Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF
       hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH
       AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA
       +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0
       Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm
       cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09
       mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq
       V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY
       yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w==
       -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA.  This certificate
   grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24).
   Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data
   signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate.

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       -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
       MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
       BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC
       Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV
       BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi
       MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW
       yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c
       K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm
       BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp
       tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog
       qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB
       AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j
       BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B
       Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag
       VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF
       RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB
       AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv
       c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu
       Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH
       AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90
       aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP
       TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh
       6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b
       +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar
       Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO
       MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4
       5Q==
       -----END CERTIFICATE-----

   The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail.  For
   brevity, the other two certificates are not.

      0 1197: SEQUENCE {
      4  917:  SEQUENCE {
      8    3:   [0] {
     10    1:    INTEGER 2
            :     }
     13   20:   INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3
     35   13:   SEQUENCE {
     37    9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
     48    0:    NULL
            :     }
     50   51:   SEQUENCE {
     52   49:    SET {
     54   47:     SEQUENCE {
     56    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
     61   40:      PrintableString

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            :       '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    103   30:   SEQUENCE {
    105   13:    UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT
    120   13:    UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT
            :     }
    135   51:   SEQUENCE {
    137   49:    SET {
    139   47:     SEQUENCE {
    141    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
    146   40:      PrintableString
            :       '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    188  290:   SEQUENCE {
    192   13:    SEQUENCE {
    194    9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
            :      (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
    205    0:     NULL
            :      }
    207  271:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
    212  266:     SEQUENCE {
    216  257:      INTEGER
            :       00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
            :       40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
            :       B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
            :       57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
            :       74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
            :       9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
            :       E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
            :       95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
            :       F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
            :       16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
            :       BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
            :       88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
            :       6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
            :       67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
            :       78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
            :       FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
            :       EB
    477    3:      INTEGER 65537
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    482  439:   [3] {

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    486  435:    SEQUENCE {
    490   29:     SEQUENCE {
    492    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
    497   22:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    499   20:       OCTET STRING
            :        91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
            :        F0 53 A1 87
            :        }
            :       }
    521   31:     SEQUENCE {
    523    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
    528   24:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    530   22:       SEQUENCE {
    532   20:        [0]
            :         3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
            :         B3 77 86 42
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    554   12:     SEQUENCE {
    556    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
    561    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    564    2:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    566    0:       SEQUENCE {}
            :        }
            :       }
    568   14:     SEQUENCE {
    570    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
    575    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    578    4:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    580    2:       BIT STRING 7 unused bits
            :        '1'B (bit 0)
            :        }
            :       }
    584   24:     SEQUENCE {
    586    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
    591    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    594   14:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    596   12:       SEQUENCE {
    598   10:        SEQUENCE {
    600    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :          resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    610   97:     SEQUENCE {
    612    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)

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    617   90:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    619   88:       SEQUENCE {
    621   86:        SEQUENCE {
    623   84:         [0] {
    625   82:          [0] {
    627   80:           [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F'
            :          'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
            :            }
            :           }
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    709  108:     SEQUENCE {
    711    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess
            :       (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
    721   96:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    723   94:       SEQUENCE {
    725   92:        SEQUENCE {
    727    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
    737   80:         [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F'
            :          'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    819   33:     SEQUENCE {
    821    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
    831    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    834   18:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    836   16:       SEQUENCE {
    838    6:        SEQUENCE {
    840    2:         OCTET STRING 00 01
    844    0:         NULL
            :          }
    846    6:        SEQUENCE {
    848    2:         OCTET STRING 00 02
    852    0:         NULL
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    854   69:     SEQUENCE {
    856    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess
            :       (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11)
    866   57:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {

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    868   55:       SEQUENCE {
    870   53:        SEQUENCE {
    872    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13'
    882   41:         [6]
            :          'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml'
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
            :    }
    925   13:  SEQUENCE {
    927    9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption
            :    (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
    938    0:   NULL
            :    }
    940  257:  BIT STRING
            :   05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C
            :   0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94
            :   EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D
            :   2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB
            :   EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45
            :   1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06
            :   7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9
            :   84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F
            :   1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D
            :   9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29
            :   E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6
            :   9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93
            :   9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32
            :   40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3
            :   B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E
            :   D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5
            :   }

   To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity
   private key is provided.  For brevity, the other two private keys are
   not.

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   -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW
   /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP
   Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1
   zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/
   eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm
   gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo
   18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio
   pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z
   ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ
   mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651
   IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF
   t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt
   MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M
   Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg
   26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l
   nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm
   FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6
   O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo
   Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz
   vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc
   DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf
   taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc
   PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ
   E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV
   iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y=
       -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

   Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF),
   yields the following detached CMS signature.

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   # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
   # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
   # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
   # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
   # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx
   # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
   # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
   # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
   # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
   # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
   # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
   # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ
   # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R
   # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI
   # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg
   # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ
   # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5
   # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5
   # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0
   # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE
   # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo
   # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki
   # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi
   # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2
   # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a
   # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa
   # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc
   # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR
   # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx
   # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY
   # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA
   # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7
   # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91
   # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE
   # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3
   # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
   # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
   # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24

Authors' Addresses

   Massimo Candela
   NTT
   Siriusdreef 70-72
   Hoofddorp  2132 WT
   Netherlands

   Email: massimo@ntt.net

Candela, et al.           Expires May 19, 2021                 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft              Finding Geofeeds               November 2020

   Randy Bush
   IIJ & Arrcus
   5147 Crystal Springs
   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110
   United States of America

   Email: randy@psg.com

   Warren Kumari
   Google
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: warren@kumari.net

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   516 Dranesville Road
   Herndon, VA  20170
   USA

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

Candela, et al.           Expires May 19, 2021                 [Page 18]