JSON Web Token (JWT)
draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-23
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7519.
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Authors | Michael B. Jones , John Bradley , Nat Sakimura | ||
Last updated | 2014-07-01 (Latest revision 2014-06-20) | ||
Replaces | draft-jones-json-web-token | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Reviews | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Hannes Tschofenig | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2014-05-08 | ||
IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 7519 (Proposed Standard) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | Kathleen Moriarty | ||
Send notices to | oauth-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token@tools.ietf.org |
draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-23
quot; in the new JOSE Header created in that step. 6. Otherwise, let the resulting JWT be the JWS or JWE. When validating a JWT, the following steps MUST be taken. The order of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of the listed steps fails then the JWT MUST be rejected for processing. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 13] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 1. The JWT MUST contain at least one period ('.') character. 2. Let the Encoded JOSE Header be the portion of the JWT before the first period ('.') character. 3. The Encoded JOSE Header MUST be successfully base64url decoded following the restriction given in this specification that no padding characters have been used. 4. The resulting JOSE Header MUST be completely valid JSON syntax conforming to [RFC7159]. 5. The resulting JOSE Header MUST be validated to only include parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and supported or that are specified as being ignored when not understood. 6. Determine whether the JWT is a JWS or a JWE using any of the methods described in Section 9 of [JWE]. 7. Depending upon whether the JWT is a JWS or JWE, there are two cases: * If the JWT is a JWS, all steps specified in [JWS] for validating a JWS MUST be followed. Let the Message be the result of base64url decoding the JWS Payload. * Else, if the JWT is a JWE, all steps specified in [JWE] for validating a JWE MUST be followed. Let the Message be the JWE Plaintext. 8. If the JOSE Header contains a "cty" (content type) value of "JWT", then the Message is a JWT that was the subject of nested signing or encryption operations. In this case, return to Step 1, using the Message as the JWT. 9. Otherwise, let the JWT Claims Set be the Message. 10. The JWT Claims Set MUST be completely valid JSON syntax conforming to [RFC7159]. 7.1. String Comparison Rules Processing a JWT inevitably requires comparing known strings to values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the algorithm is, the Unicode string encoding "alg" will be checked against the member names in the JOSE Header to see if there is a matching Header Parameter name. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 14] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed by comparing Unicode code points without normalization, as specified in the String Comparison Rules in Section 5.3 of [JWS]. 8. Implementation Requirements This section defines which algorithms and features of this specification are mandatory to implement. Applications using this specification can impose additional requirements upon implementations that they use. For instance, an application might require support for encrypted JWTs and Nested JWTs; another might require support for signing JWTs with ECDSA using the P-256 curve and the SHA-256 hash algorithm ("ES256"). Of the signature and MAC algorithms specified in JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA], only HMAC SHA-256 ("HS256") and "none" MUST be implemented by conforming JWT implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 with the SHA-256 hash algorithm ("RS256") and ECDSA using the P-256 curve and the SHA- 256 hash algorithm ("ES256"). Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL. Support for encrypted JWTs is OPTIONAL. If an implementation provides encryption capabilities, of the encryption algorithms specified in [JWA], only RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 with 2048 bit keys ("RSA1_5"), AES Key Wrap with 128 and 256 bit keys ("A128KW" and "A256KW"), and the composite authenticated encryption algorithm using AES CBC and HMAC SHA-2 ("A128CBC-HS256" and "A256CBC-HS512") MUST be implemented by conforming implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support using ECDH-ES to agree upon a key used to wrap the Content Encryption Key ("ECDH-ES+A128KW" and "ECDH-ES+A256KW") and AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) with 128 bit and 256 bit keys ("A128GCM" and "A256GCM"). Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL. Support for Nested JWTs is OPTIONAL. 9. URI for Declaring that Content is a JWT This specification registers the URN "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt" for use by applications that declare content types using URIs (rather than, for instance, MIME Media Types) to indicate that the content referred to is a JWT. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 15] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 10. IANA Considerations 10.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registry This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry for JWT Claim Names. The registry records the Claim Name and a reference to the specification that defines it. This specification registers the Claim Names defined in Section 4.1. Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jwt-reg-review. ]] Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the iesg@iesg.org mailing list) for resolution. Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, and whether the registration makes sense. IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert(s). Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 16] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 10.1.1. Registration Template Claim Name: The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this particular case. Claim Description: Brief description of the Claim (e.g., "Example description"). Change Controller: For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. Specification Document(s): Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required. 10.1.2. Initial Registry Contents o Claim Name: "iss" o Claim Description: Issuer o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "sub" o Claim Description: Subject o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "aud" o Claim Description: Audience o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "exp" o Claim Description: Expiration Time o Change Controller: IESG Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 17] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "nbf" o Claim Description: Not Before o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "iat" o Claim Description: Issued At o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.6 of [[ this document ]] o Claim Name: "jti" o Claim Description: JWT ID o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of [[ this document ]] 10.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt 10.2.1. Registry Contents This specification registers the value "token-type:jwt" in the IANA urn:ietf:params:oauth registry established in An IETF URN Sub- Namespace for OAuth [RFC6755], which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT. o URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt o Common Name: JSON Web Token (JWT) Token Type o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): [[this document]] 10.3. Media Type Registration 10.3.1. Registry Contents This specification registers the "application/jwt" Media Type [RFC2046] in the MIME Media Types registry [IANA.MediaTypes], which can be used to indicate that the content is a JWT. o Type Name: application o Subtype Name: jwt o Required Parameters: n/a o Optional Parameters: n/a o Encoding considerations: 8bit; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 18] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Security Considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this document ]] o Interoperability Considerations: n/a o Published Specification: [[ this document ]] o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect, Mozilla Persona, Salesforce, Google, numerous others o Additional Information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s): n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Intended Usage: COMMON o Restrictions on Usage: none o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Change Controller: IESG 10.4. Header Parameter Names Registration This specification registers specific Claim Names defined in Section 4.1 in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry defined in [JWS] for use by Claims replicated as Header Parameters in JWE objects, per Section 5.3. 10.4.1. Registry Contents o Header Parameter Name: "iss" o Header Parameter Description: Issuer o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]] o Header Parameter Name: "sub" o Header Parameter Description: Subject o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of [[ this document ]] o Header Parameter Name: "aud" o Header Parameter Description: Audience o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of [[ this document ]] 11. Security Considerations All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application must be faced by a JWT/JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric secret keys, Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 19] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 preventing various attacks, and helping avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message to the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is beyond the scope of this document. All the security considerations in the JWS specification also apply to JWT, as do the JWE security considerations when encryption is employed. In particular, the JWS JSON Security Considerations and Unicode Comparison Security Considerations apply equally to the JWT Claims Set in the same manner that they do to the JOSE Header. 11.1. Trust Decisions The contents of a JWT cannot be relied upon in a trust decision unless its contents have been cryptographically secured and bound to the context necessary for the trust decision. In particular, the key(s) used to sign and/or encrypt the JWT will typically need to verifiably be under the control of the party identified as the issuer of the JWT. 11.2. Signing and Encryption Order While syntactically, the signing and encryption operations for Nested JWTs may be applied in any order, normally senders should sign the message and then encrypt the result (thus encrypting the signature). This prevents attacks in which the signature is stripped, leaving just an encrypted message, as well as providing privacy for the signer. Furthermore, signatures over encrypted text are not considered valid in many jurisdictions. Note that potential concerns about security issues related to the order of signing and encryption operations are already addressed by the underlying JWS and JWE specifications; in particular, because JWE only supports the use of authenticated encryption algorithms, cryptographic concerns about the potential need to sign after encryption that apply in many contexts do not apply to this specification. 12. References 12.1. Normative References [ECMAScript] Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification, 5.1 Edition", ECMA 262, June 2011. [IANA.MediaTypes] Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 20] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "MIME Media Types", 2005. [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress), June 2014. [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), June 2014. [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work in progress), June 2014. [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, November 1996. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005. [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. [RFC6755] Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth", RFC 6755, October 2012. [RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. 12.2. Informative References [CanvasApp] Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010. [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", September 2010. [MagicSignatures] Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Signatures", January 2011. [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 21] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- 2.0-os, March 2005. [RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, March 2002. [RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002. [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005. [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008. [SWT] Hardt, D. and Y. Goland, "Simple Web Token (SWT)", Version 0.9.5.1, November 2009. [W3C.CR-xml11-20021015] Cowan, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.1", W3C CR CR-xml11-20021015, October 2002. [W3C.REC-xml-c14n-20010315] Boyer, J., "Canonical XML Version 1.0", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-c14n-20010315, March 2001, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315>. Appendix A. JWT Examples This section contains examples of JWTs. For other example JWTs, see Section 6.1 and Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3 of [JWS]. A.1. Example Encrypted JWT This example encrypts the same claims as used in Section 3.1 to the recipient using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256. The following example JOSE Header declares that: o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key and Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 22] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm to produce the JWE Ciphertext. {"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256"} Other than using the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWT Claims Set from Section 3.1 as the plaintext value, the computation of this JWT is identical to the computation of the JWE in Appendix A.2 of [JWE], including the keys used. The final result in this example (with line breaks for display purposes only) is: eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0. QR1Owv2ug2WyPBnbQrRARTeEk9kDO2w8qDcjiHnSJflSdv1iNqhWXaKH4MqAkQtM oNfABIPJaZm0HaA415sv3aeuBWnD8J-Ui7Ah6cWafs3ZwwFKDFUUsWHSK-IPKxLG TkND09XyjORj_CHAgOPJ-Sd8ONQRnJvWn_hXV1BNMHzUjPyYwEsRhDhzjAD26ima sOTsgruobpYGoQcXUwFDn7moXPRfDE8-NoQX7N7ZYMmpUDkR-Cx9obNGwJQ3nM52 YCitxoQVPzjbl7WBuB7AohdBoZOdZ24WlN1lVIeh8v1K4krB8xgKvRU8kgFrEn_a 1rZgN5TiysnmzTROF869lQ. AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ. MKOle7UQrG6nSxTLX6Mqwt0orbHvAKeWnDYvpIAeZ72deHxz3roJDXQyhxx0wKaM HDjUEOKIwrtkHthpqEanSBNYHZgmNOV7sln1Eu9g3J8. fiK51VwhsxJ-siBMR-YFiA A.2. Example Nested JWT This example shows how a JWT can be used as the payload of a JWE or JWS to create a Nested JWT. In this case, the JWT Claims Set is first signed, and then encrypted. The inner signed JWT is identical to the example in Appendix A.2 of [JWS]. Therefore, its computation is not repeated here. This example then encrypts this inner JWT to the recipient using RSAES- PKCS1-V1_5 and AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256. The following example JOSE Header declares that: o the Content Encryption Key is encrypted to the recipient using the RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 algorithm to produce the JWE Encrypted Key, o the Plaintext is encrypted using the AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 algorithm to produce the JWE Ciphertext, and o the Plaintext is itself a JWT. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 23] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 {"alg":"RSA1_5","enc":"A128CBC-HS256","cty":"JWT"} Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JOSE Header yields this encoded JOSE Header value: eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5IjoiSldUIn0 The computation of this JWT is identical to the computation of the JWE in Appendix A.2 of [JWE], other than that different JOSE Header, Plaintext, JWE Initialization Vector, and Content Encryption Key values are used. (The RSA key used is the same.) The Payload used is the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWT at the end of Appendix A.2.1 of [JWS] (with all whitespace and line breaks removed), which is a sequence of 458 octets. The JWE Initialization Vector value used (using JSON array notation) is: [82, 101, 100, 109, 111, 110, 100, 32, 87, 65, 32, 57, 56, 48, 53, 50] This example uses the Content Encryption Key represented by the base64url encoded value below: GawgguFyGrWKav7AX4VKUg The final result for this Nested JWT (with line breaks for display purposes only) is: Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 24] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5IjoiSldU In0. g_hEwksO1Ax8Qn7HoN-BVeBoa8FXe0kpyk_XdcSmxvcM5_P296JXXtoHISr_DD_M qewaQSH4dZOQHoUgKLeFly-9RI11TG-_Ge1bZFazBPwKC5lJ6OLANLMd0QSL4fYE b9ERe-epKYE3xb2jfY1AltHqBO-PM6j23Guj2yDKnFv6WO72tteVzm_2n17SBFvh DuR9a2nHTE67pe0XGBUS_TK7ecA-iVq5COeVdJR4U4VZGGlxRGPLRHvolVLEHx6D YyLpw30Ay9R6d68YCLi9FYTq3hIXPK_-dmPlOUlKvPr1GgJzRoeC9G5qCvdcHWsq JGTO_z3Wfo5zsqwkxruxwA. UmVkbW9uZCBXQSA5ODA1Mg. VwHERHPvCNcHHpTjkoigx3_ExK0Qc71RMEParpatm0X_qpg-w8kozSjfNIPPXiTB BLXR65CIPkFqz4l1Ae9w_uowKiwyi9acgVztAi-pSL8GQSXnaamh9kX1mdh3M_TT -FZGQFQsFhu0Z72gJKGdfGE-OE7hS1zuBD5oEUfk0Dmb0VzWEzpxxiSSBbBAzP10 l56pPfAtrjEYw-7ygeMkwBl6Z_mLS6w6xUgKlvW6ULmkV-uLC4FUiyKECK4e3WZY Kw1bpgIqGYsw2v_grHjszJZ-_I5uM-9RA8ycX9KqPRp9gc6pXmoU_-27ATs9XCvr ZXUtK2902AUzqpeEUJYjWWxSNsS-r1TJ1I-FMJ4XyAiGrfmo9hQPcNBYxPz3GQb2 8Y5CLSQfNgKSGt0A4isp1hBUXBHAndgtcslt7ZoQJaKe_nNJgNliWtWpJ_ebuOpE l8jdhehdccnRMIwAmU1n7SPkmhIl1HlSOpvcvDfhUN5wuqU955vOBvfkBOh5A11U zBuo2WlgZ6hYi9-e3w29bR0C2-pp3jbqxEDw3iWaf2dc5b-LnR0FEYXvI_tYk5rd _J9N0mg0tQ6RbpxNEMNoA9QWk5lgdPvbh9BaO195abQ. AVO9iT5AV4CzvDJCdhSFlQ Appendix B. Relationship of JWTs to SAML Assertions SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] provides a standard for creating security tokens with greater expressivity and more security options than supported by JWTs. However, the cost of this flexibility and expressiveness is both size and complexity. SAML's use of XML [W3C.CR-xml11-20021015] and XML DSIG [RFC3275] contributes to the size of SAML assertions; its use of XML and especially XML Canonicalization [W3C.REC-xml-c14n-20010315] contributes to their complexity. JWTs are intended to provide a simple security token format that is small enough to fit into HTTP headers and query arguments in URIs. It does this by supporting a much simpler token model than SAML and using the JSON [RFC7159] object encoding syntax. It also supports securing tokens using Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and digital signatures using a smaller (and less flexible) format than XML DSIG. Therefore, while JWTs can do some of the things SAML assertions do, JWTs are not intended as a full replacement for SAML assertions, but rather as a token format to be used when ease of implementation or compactness are considerations. SAML Assertions are always statements made by an entity about a subject. JWTs are often used in the same manner, with the entity making the statements being represented by the "iss" (issuer) claim, Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 25] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 and the subject being represented by the "sub" (subject) claim. However, with these claims being optional, other uses of the JWT format are also permitted. Appendix C. Relationship of JWTs to Simple Web Tokens (SWTs) Both JWTs and Simple Web Tokens SWT [SWT], at their core, enable sets of claims to be communicated between applications. For SWTs, both the claim names and claim values are strings. For JWTs, while claim names are strings, claim values can be any JSON type. Both token types offer cryptographic protection of their content: SWTs with HMAC SHA-256 and JWTs with a choice of algorithms, including signature, MAC, and encryption algorithms. Appendix D. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge that the design of JWTs was intentionally influenced by the design and simplicity of Simple Web Tokens [SWT] and ideas for JSON tokens that Dick Hardt discussed within the OpenID community. Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft. This specification is the work of the OAuth Working Group, which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording that influenced this specification: Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Yaron Y. Goland, Ben Laurie, James Manger, Prateek Mishra, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, David Recordon, Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Hannes Tschofenig and Derek Atkins chaired the OAuth working group and Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as Security area directors during the creation of this specification. Appendix E. Document History [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] -23 Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 26] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Replaced the terms JWS Header, JWE Header, and JWT Header with a single JOSE Header term defined in the JWS specification. This also enabled a single Header Parameter definition to be used and reduced other areas of duplication between specifications. -22 o Revised the introduction to the Security Considerations section. Also introduced subsection headings for security considerations items. o Added text about when applications typically would and would not use the "typ" header parameter. -21 o Removed unnecessary informative JWK spec reference. -20 o Changed the RFC 6755 reference to be normative. o Changed the JWK reference to be informative. o Described potential sources of ambiguity in representing the JSON objects used in the examples. The octets of the actual UTF-8 representations of the JSON objects used in the examples are included to remove these ambiguities. o Noted that octet sequences are depicted using JSON array notation. -19 o Specified that support for Nested JWTs is optional and that applications using this specification can impose additional requirements upon implementations that they use. o Updated the JSON reference to RFC 7159. -18 o Clarified that the base64url encoding includes no line breaks, white space, or other additional characters. o Removed circularity in the audience claim definition. o Clarified that it is entirely up to applications which claims to use. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 27] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Changed "SHOULD" to "MUST" in "in the absence of such requirements, all claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be ignored". o Clarified that applications can define their own processing rules for claims replicated in header parameters, rather than always requiring that they be identical in the JWT Header and JWT Claims Set. o Removed a JWT creation step that duplicated a step in the underlying JWS or JWE creation. o Added security considerations about using JWTs in trust decisions. -17 o Corrected RFC 2119 terminology usage. o Replaced references to draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis with RFC 7158. -16 o Changed some references from being normative to informative, per JOSE issue #90. -15 o Replaced references to RFC 4627 with draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis. -14 o Referenced the JWE section on Distinguishing between JWS and JWE Objects. -13 o Added Claim Description registry field. o Used Header Parameter Description registry field. o Removed the phrases "JWA signing algorithms" and "JWA encryption algorithms". o Removed the term JSON Text Object. -12 Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 28] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Tracked the JOSE change refining the "typ" and "cty" definitions to always be MIME Media Types, with the omission of "application/" prefixes recommended for brevity. For compatibility with legacy implementations, it is RECOMMENDED that "JWT" always be spelled using uppercase characters when used as a "typ" or "cty" value. As side effects, this change removed the "typ" Claim definition and narrowed the uses of the URI "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt". o Updated base64url definition to match JOSE definition. o Changed terminology from "Reserved Claim Name" to "Registered Claim Name" to match JOSE terminology change. o Applied other editorial changes to track parallel JOSE changes. o Clarified that the subject value may be scoped to be locally unique in the context of the issuer or may be globally unique. -11 o Added a Nested JWT example. o Added "sub" to the list of Claims registered for use as Header Parameter values when an unencrypted representation is required in an encrypted JWT. -10 o Allowed Claims to be replicated as Header Parameters in encrypted JWTs as needed by applications that require an unencrypted representation of specific Claims. -09 o Clarified that the "typ" header parameter is used in an application-specific manner and has no effect upon the JWT processing. o Stated that recipients MUST either reject JWTs with duplicate Header Parameter Names or with duplicate Claim Names or use a JSON parser that returns only the lexically last duplicate member name. -08 o Tracked a change to how JWEs are computed (which only affected the example encrypted JWT value). Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 29] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 -07 o Defined that the default action for claims that are not understood is to ignore them unless otherwise specified by applications. o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8 bit values. o Tracked encryption computation changes in the JWE specification. -06 o Changed the name of the "prn" claim to "sub" (subject) both to more closely align with SAML name usage and to use a more intuitive name. o Allow JWTs to have multiple audiences. o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges, Prateek Mishra, and Hannes Tschofenig. Many of these simplified the terminology used. o Explained why Nested JWTs should be signed and then encrypted. o Clarified statements of the form "This claim is OPTIONAL" to "Use of this claim is OPTIONAL". o Referenced String Comparison Rules in JWS. o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references. -05 o Updated values for example AES CBC calculations. -04 o Promoted Initialization Vector from being a header parameter to being a top-level JWE element. This saves approximately 16 bytes in the compact serialization, which is a significant savings for some use cases. Promoting the Initialization Vector out of the header also avoids repeating this shared value in the JSON serialization. o Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to RFC 6749's registry language to this specification. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 30] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 o Reference RFC 6755 -- An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth. -03 o Added statement that "StringOrURI values are compared as case- sensitive strings with no transformations or canonicalizations applied". o Indented artwork elements to better distinguish them from the body text. -02 o Added an example of an encrypted JWT. o Added this language to Registration Templates: "This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted." o Applied editorial suggestions. -01 o Added the "cty" (content type) header parameter for declaring type information about the secured content, as opposed to the "typ" (type) header parameter, which declares type information about this object. This significantly simplified nested JWTs. o Moved description of how to determine whether a header is for a JWS or a JWE from the JWT spec to the JWE spec. o Changed registration requirements from RFC Required to Specification Required with Expert Review. o Added Registration Template sections for defined registries. o Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values. o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section. o Numerous editorial improvements. -00 o Created the initial IETF draft based upon draft-jones-json-web-token-10 with no normative changes. Jones, et al. Expires December 22, 2014 [Page 31] Internet-Draft JSON Web Token (JWT) June 2014 Authors' Addresses Michael B. Jones Microsoft Email: mbj@microsoft.com URI: http://self-issued.info/ John Bradley Ping Identity Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ Nat Sakimura Nomura Research Institute Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ Jones, et al. 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