OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-05
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7591.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Justin Richer , John Bradley , Michael B. Jones , Maciej Machulak | ||
| Last updated | 2013-02-06 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
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by Brian Carpenter
Almost ready
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||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 7591 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-05
Network Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: August 10, 2013 Ping Identity
M. Jones
Microsoft
M. Machulak
Newcastle University
February 6, 2013
OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-05
Abstract
This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic
registration of OAuth Clients at an Authorization Server.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Client Registration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Client Registration Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Client Update Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Client Update or Read Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Client Secret Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Rotate Secret Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Rotate Secret Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth authorization
server without requiring the two parties to interact before hand.
Nevertheless, in order for the authorization server to accurately and
securely represent to end-users which client is seeking authorization
to access the end-user's resources, a method for automatic and unique
registration of clients is needed. The OAuth2 authorization
framework does not define how the relationship between the Client and
the Authorization Server is initialized, or how a given client is
assigned a unique Client Identifier. Historically, this has happened
out-of-band from the OAuth protocol. This draft provides a mechanism
for a client to register itself with the Authorization Server, which
can be used to dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and
optionally a Client Secret.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to
the user during the authorization step. This draft provides a method
for the client to register and update this information over time.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token",
"Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client
Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server",
and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
This specification defines the following additional terms:
o Client Registration Endpoint: The OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which
a Client can request new registration.
o Client Update Endpoint: The OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which a
specific Client can manage its registration information, provided
by the Authorization Server to the Client.
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o Client Secret Rotation Endpoint: The OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through
which a specific Client can request refreshes of its Client Secret
and Registration Access Token.
o Registration Access Token: An OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the
Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint
which is used by the Client to authenticate itself during update
and secret rotation operations. This token is associated with a
particular Client.
2. Client Metadata
Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their
unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can
range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to
items that impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of
valid redirect URIs.
Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list,
but MUST at least accept all parameters on this list. The
Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by
the Client that it does not understand.
[[ Editor's note: normative language in the table below is meant to
apply to the *client* when sending the request. The paragraph above
is meant to say that the server must at least accept all parameters
and not fail with an error at an unknown parameter, especially if
it's in the list below. Also, extensions need to explicitly call out
if they're not going to do something with one of these basic
parameters instead of just ignoring their existence. This is meant
to be the *minimum set* of parameters for interoperability. ]]
redirect_uris
RECOMMENDED. A list of redirect URIs for use in the Authorization
Code and Implicit grant types. An Authorization Server SHOULD
require registration of valid redirect URIs for all clients that
use these grant types in order to protect against token and
credential theft attacks.
client_name
RECOMMENDED. Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to
the user. If omitted, the Authorization Server MAY display to the
user the raw "client_id" value instead.
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client_url
RECOMMENDED. URL of the homepage of the Client. If present, the
server SHOULD display this URL to the end user in a clickable
fashion.
logo_url
OPTIONAL. URL that references a logo for the Client. If present,
the server SHOULD display this image to the end user during
approval.
contacts
OPTIONAL. List of email addresses for people responsible for this
Client. The Authorization Server MAY make these addresses
available to end users for support requests for the Client. An
Authorization Server MAY use these email addresses as identifiers
for an administrative page for this client.
tos_url
OPTIONAL. URL that points to a human-readable Terms of Service
for the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL
to the End-User if it is given.
token_endpoint_auth_method
OPTIONAL. The requested authentication type for the Token
Endpoint. Valid values are:
* "none": this is a public client as defined in OAuth 2.0 and
does not have a client secret
* "client_secret_post": the client uses the HTTP POST parameters
defined in OAuth2.0 section 2.3.1
* "client_secret_basic": the client uses HTTP Basic defined in
OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1
* "client_secret_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile
with a symmetric secret issued by the server
* "private_key_jwt": the client uses the JWT Assertion profile
with its own private key
Other authentication methods may be defined by extension. If
unspecified or omitted, the default is "client_secret_basic",
denoting HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as specified in Section
2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0.
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scope
OPTIONAL. Space separated list of scopes (as described in OAuth
2.0 Section 3.3 [RFC6749]) that the client will be allowed to
request tokens for. If omitted, an Authorization Server MAY
register a Client with a default set of allowed scopes.
grant_type
OPTIONAL. List of grant types that a client may use. These grant
types are defined as follows:
* "authorization_code": The Authorization Code Grant described in
OAuth2 Section 4.1.
* "implicit": The Implicit Grant described in OAuth2 Section 4.2.
* "password": The Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
described in OAuth2 Section 4.3
* "client_credentials": The Client Credentials Grant described in
OAuth2 Section 4.4
* "refresh_token": The Refresh Token Grant described in OAuth2
Section 6.
Authorization Servers MAY allow for other values as defined in
grant type extensions to OAuth2. The extension process is
described in OAuth2 Section 2.5, and the value of this parameter
MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type" parameter
defined in the extension.
policy_url
OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Client provides to the End-User
to read about the how the profile data will be used. The
Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it
is given.
jwk_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key [JWK] document that
is used for signing requests, such as requests to the Token
Endpoint using the "private_key_jwt" assertion client credential.
If the Client registers both "x509_url" and "jwk_url", the keys
contained in both formats MUST be the same.
jwk_encryption_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key [JWK] that the server
can use to encrypt responses to the Client. If the Client
registers both "jwk_encryption_url" and "x509_encryption_url", the
keys contained in both formats MUST be the same.
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x509_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or
Certificate chain that is used for signing requests, such as
requests to the Token Endpoint using the "private_key_jwt"
assertion client credential. If the Client registers both
"x509_url" and "jwk_url", the keys contained in both formats MUST
be the same.
x509_encryption_url
OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or
Certificate chain that the server can use to encrypt responses to
the Client. If the Client registers both "jwk_encryption_url" and
"x509_encryption_url", the keys contained in both formats MUST be
the same.
3. Client Registration Endpoint
The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself
with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/json" format. The Client
Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-layer security
mechanism, and the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246]
and/or TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
The Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an initial authorization
credential in the form of an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token in
order to limit registration to only previously authorized parties.
The method by which this access token is obtained by the registrant
is generally out-of-band and is out of scope of this specification.
In order to support open registration and facilitate wider
interoperability, the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow
initial registration requests with no authentication. These requests
MAY be rate-limited or otherwise limited to prevent a denial-of-
service attack on the Client Registration Endpoint.
In order to facilitate registered clients updating their information,
the Client Registration Endpoint issues a Request Access Token for
clients to securely identify themselves in future connections to the
Client Update Endpoint. As such, the Client Update Endpoint MUST
accept requests with OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens [RFC6750] for these
operations, whether or not the initial registration call requires
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authentication of some form.
The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does
not understand.
3.1. Client Registration Request
This operation registers a new Client to the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client
Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes any parameters described in Client Metadata
(Section 2) that the client wishes to specify for itself during the
registration. The Authorization Server MAY provision default values
for any items omitted in the Client Metadata.
The Client sends an HTTP POST to the Client Registration Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json" and all parameters as top-
level members of a JSON object.
For example, a client could send the following registration request
to the Client Registration Endpoint:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
{
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic",
"scope":"read write dolphin",
"logo_url":"https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwk_url":"https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk"
}
3.2. Client Registration Response
Upon successful registration, the Client Registration Endpoint
returns the newly-created Client Identifier and, if applicable, a
Client Secret.
Additionally, the Authorization Server SHOULD return all registered
metadata (Section 2) about this client, including any fields
provisioned by the Authorization Server itself. The Authorization
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Server MAY reject or replace any of the client's requested metadata
values submitted during the registration request and substitute them
with suitable values. If the Authorization Server performs any such
substitutions to the requested values, it MUST return these values in
the response.
The response contains a "_links" structure which contains fully
qualified URLs to the Client Update Endpoint and the Client Secret
Rotation Endpoint for this specific client. The response also
contains a Registration Access Token that is to be used by the client
to perform subsequent operations at the Client Update Endpoint and
the Client Secret Rotation Endpoint.
The response is an "application/json" document with the following
parameters in addition to any applicable client metadata fields as
top-level members of a JSON object [RFC4627] .
client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be currently
valid for any other registered Client.
client_secret
OPTIONAL. The Client secret. If issued, this MUST be unique for
each "client_id". This value is used by confidential clients to
authenticate to the Token Endpoint as described in OAuth 2.0
Section 2.3.1.
registration_access_token
REQUIRED. The Access token to be used by the client to perform
actions on the Client Update Endpoint and the Client Secret
Rotation Endpoint.
issued_at
OPTIONAL. Specifies the timestamp when the Client Identifier was
issued. The timestamp value MUST be a positive integer. The
value is expressed in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970
00:00:00 GMT.
expires_at
REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued. The number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC that the "client_secret" will
expire or "0" if it does not expire. See RFC 3339 [RFC3339] for
details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular.
_links
REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains references to the Client
Update Endpoint and Client Secret Rotation Endpoint, via the
following members:
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self REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains the member href which
contains the fully qualified URL of the Client Update Endpoint
for this client. This MAY be constructed using a URL Template
of the Client Registration Endpoint with the issued client_id.
rotate_secret REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains the member
href which contains the fully qualified URL of the Client
Secret Rotation Endpoint for this client. This MAY be
constructed using a URL Template of the Client Registration
Endpoint with the issued client_id.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
_links: {
"self": {
"href":
"https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
},
"rotate_secret": {
"href":
"https://server.example.com/register/rotate_secret/s6BhdRkqt3"
}
"redirect_uris":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"]
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_type": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_url": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwk_url": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk",
"registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
"expires_at":2893276800
}
3.3. Client Registration Error Response
When an OAuth error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the
OAuth 2.0 specification.
When a registration error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns a HTTP 400 status code including a JSON object
[RFC4627] describing the error in the response body.
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The JSON object contains two members:
error
The error code, a single ASCII string.
error_description
The additional text description of the error for debugging.
This specification defines the following error codes:
invalid_redirect_uri
The value of one or more "redirect_uris" is invalid.
invalid_client_metadata
The value of one of the client metadata (Section 2) fields is
invalid and the server has rejected this request. Note that an
Authorization server MAY choose to substitute a valid value for
any requested parameter of a client's metadata.
Following is a non-normative example of an error response (with line
wraps for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_redirect_uri",
"error_description":"The redirect URI of http://sketchy.example.com
is not allowed for this server."
}
4. Client Update Endpoint
The Client Update Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected endpoint that is
provisioned by the server for a specific client to be able to view
and update its registered information. It is RECOMMENDED that this
endpoint URL be formed through the use of a URL template which
combines the Client Registration Endpoint and the issued client_id
for this client, either as a path parameter
(https://server.example.com/register/client_id) or as a query
parameter (https://server.example.com/register/?update=client_id).
The Authorization Server MUST provide the client with the fully
qualified URL in the _links structure described in section 3 and MUST
NOT require the client to construct this URL on its own.
The Authorization Server MUST be able to determine the appropriate
client_id from the context of the request without requiring the
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Client to explicitly send its own "client_id" in the request.
Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of specific
HTTP verbs.
4.1. Client Update Request
This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the Authorization Server. This request is authenticated
by the Registration Access Token issued to the client.
The Client makes an HTTP PUT request to the Client Update Endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". This request MAY include
any fields described in Client Metadata (Section 2). If included in
the request, valid values of Client Metadata fields in this request
MUST replace, not augment, the values previously associated with this
Client. Any fields with the value of a JSON "null" in Client
Metadata MUST be taken as a request to clear any existing value of
that field. Omitted values in the Client Metadata MUST remain
unchanged by the Authorization Server. The Authorization Server MAY
replace any invalid values with suitable values, and it MUST return
any such fields to the Client in the response.
For example, a client could send the following request to the Client
Registration Endpoint to update the client registration in the above
example:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
{
"redirect_uri":["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"],
"client_name":"My New Example",
"logo_url":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png"
}
4.2. Client Read Request
In order to read the current configuration of the Client on the
Authorization Server, the Client makes an HTTP GET request to the
Client Update Endpoint with the Registration Access Token.
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Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
4.3. Client Update or Read Response
Upon successful update or read operation, the Client Update Endpoint
returns the Client ID. Additionally, the Authorization Server SHOULD
return all registered metadata (Section 2) about this client,
including any fields provisioned by the Authorization Server itself.
The Authorization Server MAY reject or replace any of the client's
requested metadata values submitted during an update request and
substitute them with suitable values. If the Authorization Server
performs any such substitutions to the requested values, it MUST
return these values in the response.
The Authorization Server MUST NOT include the Client Secret or
Request Access Token in this response.
The response is a JSON Document [RFC4627] with the following fields
as well as any applicable client metadata as top-level members of a
JSON object.
client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST equal the value of
the client_id returned in the original client_register request.
_links
REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains references to the Client
Update Endpoint and Client Secret Rotation Endpoint, via the
following members:
self REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains the member href which
contains the fully qualified URL of the Client Update Endpoint
for this client. This MAY be constructed using a URL Template
of the Client Registration Endpoint with the issued client_id.
rotate_secret REQUIRED. A JSON object that contains the member
href which contains the fully qualified URL of the Client
Secret Rotation Endpoint for this client. This MAY be
constructed using a URL Template of the Client Registration
Endpoint with the issued client_id.
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Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
_links: {
"self": {
"href": "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
},
"rotate_secret": {
"href": "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3/secret"
}
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_name": "My New Example",
"redirect_uri": ["https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"]
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_type": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_url": "https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
"jwk_url": "https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk",
}
4.4. Client Delete Request
In order to deprovision itself on the Authorization Server, the
Client makes an HTTP DELETE request to the Client Update Endpoint
with the Registration Access Token. This request is authenticated by
the Registration Access Token issued to the client.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the Authorization
Server responds with an HTTP 204 No Content message.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Cache-Control: no-store
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5. Client Secret Rotation
The Client Secret Rotation Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected
endpoint that is provisioned by the server for a specific client to
be able to request rotation of its Registration Access Token and, if
it has one, Client Secret. It is RECOMMENDED that this endpoint URL
be formed through the use of a URL template which combines the Client
Registration Endpoint and the issued client_id for this client,
either as a path parameter
(https://server.example.com/register/rotate_secret/client_id) or as a
query parameter
(https://server.example.com/register/?rotate_secret=client_id). The
Authorization Server MUST provide the client with the fully qualified
URL in the _links structure described in section 3, and MUST NOT
require the Client to construct this URL on its own.
The Authorization Server MUST be able to determine the appropriate
client_id from the context of the request without requiring the
Client to explicitly send its own "client_id" in the request.
5.1. Rotate Secret Request
This operation allows the client to rotate its current Registration
Access Token as well as its Client Secret, if it has one. The client
sends an HTTP POST with its current Registration Access Token. This
request is authenticated by the Registration Access Token issued to
the client.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register/rotate_secret/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
5.2. Rotate Secret Response
Upon successful rotation of the Registration Access Token, and
optionally the Client Secret, the Client Registration Endpoint
returns a JSON document [RFC4627] with the following fields as top-
level members of the root JSON object. This response MUST NOT
include any other client metadata.
client_id
REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST match the client_id
issued in the original registration request.
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client_secret
REQUIRED if the server initially issued this Client a Client
Secret, otherwise the server MUST NOT return a value. The value
MUST be unique for each "client_id".
registration_access_token
REQUIRED. The Access token to be used by the client to perform
subsequent "client_update" and "rotate_secret" requests.
issued_at
OPTIONAL. Specifies the timestamp when the identifier was issued.
The timestamp value MUST be a positive integer. The value is
expressed in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00
GMT.
expires_at
REQUIRED if the server issues a Client Secret. The number of
seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC that the
"client_secret" will expire or "0" if they do not expire. See RFC
3339 [RFC3339] for details regarding date/times in general and UTC
in particular.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "7fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
"registration_access_token": "reg-02348913-oieqer.983421",
"expires_at":2893276800
}
The Authorization Server SHOULD discard and invalidate the Request
Access Token and the Client Secret associated with this Client after
successful completion of this request.
6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests of IANA.
7. Security Considerations
[[ Editor's note: Following are some security considerations taken
from the UMA and OpenID Connect source drafts. These need to be
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massaged into a properly generic set of considerations. ]]
Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
As this endpoint is an OAuth2 Protected Resource, requests to the
Registration Endpoint SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to
prevent the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though
repeated access attempts.
The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as self-
asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the
legitimate Client, which it is trying to impersonate. An
Authorization Server needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing
risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking they're
logging in to the legitimate Client. For instance, an Authorization
Server could warn if the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the
domain/site of redirect URIs. An Authorization Server can also
present warning messages to end users about untrusted Clients in all
cases, especially if such clients have been dynamically registered
and have not been trusted by any users at the Authorization Server
before.
In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open
Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL
provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g.
"logo_url" and "policy_url"). A rogue Client could specify a
registration request with a reference to a drive-by download in the
"policy_url". The Authorization Server should check to see if the
"logo_url" and "policy_url" have the same host as the hosts defined
in the array of "redirect_uris".
While the Client Secret can expire, the Registration Access Token
should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If
this token were to expire, a Client could be left in a situation
where it has no means of updating itself and must register itself
anew. As the Registration Access Tokens are long-term credentials,
they MUST be protected by the Client as a secret. [[ Editor's note:
with the right error codes returned from client_update, the AS could
force the Client to call rotate_secret before going forward,
lessening the window for abuse of a leaked registration token. ]]
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Since the Registration Access Token is a Bearer token and acts as the
sole authentication for use at the Client Update Endpoint, it MUST be
protected by the Client as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer [RFC6750].
8. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler,
Thomas Hardjono, Christian Scholz, Nat Sakimura, George Fletcher,
Amanda Anganes, and Domenico Catalano.
9. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
- 05
o changed redirect_uri and contact to lists instead of space
delimited strings
o removed operation parameter
o added _links structure
o made client update management more RESTful
o split endpoint into three parts
o changed input to JSON from form-encoded
o added READ and DELETE operations
o removed Requirements section
o changed token_endpoint_auth_type back to
token_endpoint_auth_method to match OIDC who changed to match us
- 04
o removed default_acr, too undefined in the general OAuth2 case
o removed default_max_auth_age, since there's no mechanism for
supplying a non-default max_auth_age in OAuth2
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o clarified signing and encryption URLs
o changed token_endpoint_auth_method to token_endpoint_auth_type to
match OIDC
- 03
o added scope and grant_type claims
o fixed various typos and changed wording for better clarity
o endpoint now returns the full set of client information
o operations on client_update allow for three actions on metadata:
leave existing value, clear existing value, replace existing value
with new value
- 02
o Reorganized contributors and references
o Moved OAuth references to RFC
o Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity
o Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client
associate"
o Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent requests
o Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists
- 01
o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document
o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration
- 00
o Imported original UMA draft specification
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10. Normative References
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", May 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the
Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation
Phone:
Fax:
Email: jricher@mitre.org
URI:
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John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
Maciej Machulak
Newcastle University
Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
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