OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
Authors Daniel Fett  , Brian Campbell  , John Bradley  , Torsten Lodderstedt  , Michael Jones  , David Waite 
Last updated 2020-11-18
Replaces draft-fett-oauth-dpop
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Web Authorization Protocol                                       D. Fett
Internet-Draft                                                   yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track                             B. Campbell
Expires: 22 May 2021                                       Ping Identity
                                                              J. Bradley
                                                                  Yubico
                                                          T. Lodderstedt
                                                                 yes.com
                                                                M. Jones
                                                               Microsoft
                                                                D. Waite
                                                           Ping Identity
                                                        18 November 2020

  OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer
                                 (DPoP)
                        draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-02

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0
   tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level.
   This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access
   and refresh tokens.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 May 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Fett, et al.               Expires 22 May 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 OAuth DPoP                  November 2020

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  DPoP Proof JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  The DPoP HTTP Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  DPoP Proof JWT Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Checking DPoP Proofs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  DPoP Access Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Public Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  JWK Thumbprint Confirmation Method in Token
           Introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Protected Resource Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.1.  The DPoP Authorization Request Header Scheme  . . . . . .  16
     7.2.  The Bearer Authorization Request Header Scheme  . . . . .  18
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  DPoP Proof Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.2.  Signed JWT Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.3.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.4.  Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.5.  Public Key Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.1.  OAuth Access Token Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.2.  HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.3.  Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.4.  JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.5.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration  . . . . . . . . . . .  22
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