Network Time Security
draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-04
The information below is for an old version of the document.
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dieter Sibold , Stephen Roettger , Kristof Teichel | ||
| Last updated | 2014-07-04 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
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draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-04
NTP Working Group D. Sibold
Internet-Draft PTB
Intended status: Standards Track S. Roettger
Expires: January 5, 2015
K. Teichel
PTB
July 04, 2014
Network Time Security
draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-04.txt
Abstract
This document describes the Network Time Security (NTS) protocol that
enables secure authentication of time servers using Network Time
Protocol (NTP) or Precision Time Protocol (PTP). Its design
considers the special requirements of precise timekeeping, which are
described in Security Requirements of Time Protocols in Packet
Switched Networks [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements].
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. NTS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Symmetric and Client/Server Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Broadcast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Association Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1.1. Message Type: "client_assoc" . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1.2. Message Type: "server_assoc" . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Certificate Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2.1. Message Type: "client_cert" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2.2. Message Type: "server_cert" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Cookie Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3.1. Message Type: "client_cook" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3.2. Message Type: "server_cook" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.4. Unicast Time Synchronisation Messages . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4.1. Message Type: "time_request" . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4.2. Message Type: "time_response" . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.5. Broadcast Parameter Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5.1. Message Type: "client_bpar" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5.2. Message Type: "server_bpar" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.6. Broadcast Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.6.1. Message Type: "server_broad" . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Protocol Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. The Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1.1. The Client in Unicast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1.2. The Client in Broadcast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. The Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2.1. The Server in Unicast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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7.2.2. The Server in Broadcast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Server Seed Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Server Seed Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Server Seed Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.3. Server Seed Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Hash Algorithms and MAC Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. MAC Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11.1. Initial Verification of the Server Certificates . . . . 18
11.2. Revocation of Server Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.3. Usage of NTP Pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.4. Denial-of-Service in Broadcast Mode . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.5. Delay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Flow Diagrams of Client Behaviour . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Extension Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix C. TICTOC Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix D. Broadcast Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
D.1. Server Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
D.2. Client Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
D.3. Sending Authenticated Broadcast Packets . . . . . . . . . 29
D.4. Authentication of Received Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix E. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction
Time synchronization protocols are increasingly utilized to
synchronize clocks in networked infrastructures. The reliable
performance of such infrastructures can be degraded seriously by
successful attacks against the time synchronization protocol.
Therefore, time synchronization protocols applied in critical
infrastructures have to provide security measures to defeat possible
adversaries. Consequently, the widespread Network Time Protocol
(NTP) [RFC5905] was supplemented by the autokey protocol [RFC5906]
which shall ensure authenticity of the NTP server and integrity of
the protocol packets. Unfortunately, the autokey protocol exhibits
various severe security vulnerabilities as revealed in a thorough
analysis of the protocol [Roettger]. For the Precision Time Protocol
(PTP), Annex K of the standard document IEEE 1588 [IEEE1588] defines
an informative security protocol that is still in experimental state.
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Because of autokey's security vulnerabilities and the absence of a
standardized security protocol for PTP, these protocols cannot be
applied in environments in which compliance requirements demand
authenticity and integrity protection. This document specifies a
security protocol which ensures authenticity of the time server via a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and integrity of the time
synchronization protocol packets and which therefore enables the
usage of NTP and PTP in such environments.
The protocol is specified with the prerequisite in mind that precise
timekeeping can only be accomplished with stateless time
synchronization communication, which excludes the utilization of
standard security protocols like IPsec or TLS for time
synchronization messages. This prerequisite corresponds with the
requirement that a security mechanism for timekeeping must be
designed in such a way that it does not degrade the quality of the
time transfer [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements].
Note:
The intent is to formulate the protocol to be applicable to NTP
and also PTP. In the current state the draft focuses on the
application to NTP.
2. Security Threats
A profound analysis of security threats and requirements for NTP and
PTP can be found in the "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks" [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements].
3. Objectives
The objectives of the NTS specification are as follows:
o Authenticity: NTS enables the client to authenticate its time
server.
o Integrity: NTS protects the integrity of time synchronization
protocol packets via a message authentication code (MAC).
o Confidentiality: NTS does not provide confidentiality protection
of the time synchronization packets.
o Modes of operation: All operational modes of NTP are supported.
o Operational modes of PTP should be supported as far as possible.
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o Hybrid mode: Both secure and insecure communication modes are
possible for NTP servers and clients, respectively.
o Compatibility:
* Unsecured NTP associations shall not be affected.
* An NTP server that does not support NTS shall not be affected
by NTS authentication requests.
4. Terms and Abbreviations
MITM Man In The Middle
NTP Network Time Protocol
NTS Network Time Security
PTP Precision Time Protocol
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
5. NTS Overview
5.1. Symmetric and Client/Server Mode
NTS applies X.509 certificates to verify the authenticity of the time
server and to exchange a symmetric key, the so-called cookie. This
cookie is then used to protect authenticity and integrity of the
subsequent time synchronization packets by means of a Message
Authentication Code (MAC), which is attached to each time
synchronization packet. The calculation of the MAC includes the
whole time synchronization packet and the cookie which is shared
between client and server. It is calculated according to:
cookie = MSB_128 (HMAC(server seed, H(certificate of client))),
with the server seed as key, where H is a hash function, and where
the function MSB_128 cuts off the 128 most significant bits of the
result of the HMAC function. The server seed is a 128 bit random
value of the server, which has to be kept secret. The cookie never
changes as long as the server seed stays the same, but the server
seed has to be refreshed periodically in order to provide key
freshness as required in [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements].
See Section 8 for details on the seed refresh and Section 7.1.1 for
the client's reaction to it.
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The server does not keep a state of the client. Therefore it has to
recalculate the cookie each time it receives a request from the
client. To this end, the client has to attach the hash value of its
certificate to each request (see Section 6.4).
5.2. Broadcast Mode
Just as in the case of the client server mode and symmetric mode,
authenticity and integrity of the NTP packets are ensured by a MAC,
which is attached to the NTP packet by the sender. The verification
of the authenticity is based on the TESLA protocol, in particular on
its "Not Re-using Keys" scheme, see section 3.7.2 of [RFC4082].
TESLA is based on a one-way chain of keys, where each key is the
output of a one-way function applied on the previous key in the
chain. The last element of the chain is shared securely with all
clients. The server splits time into intervals of uniform duration
and assigns each key to an interval in reverse order, starting with
the penultimate. At each time interval, the server sends an NTP
broadcast packet appended by a MAC, calculated using the
corresponding key, and the key of the previous disclosure interval.
The client verifies the MAC by buffering the packet until the
disclosure of the key in its associated disclosure interval. In
order to be able to verify the validity of the key, the client has to
be loosely time synchronized to the server. This has to be
accomplished during the initial client server exchange between
broadcast client and server. For a more detailed description of the
TESLA protocol see Appendix D.
6. Protocol Messages
Note that this section currently describes the realization of the
message format of NTS only for its utilization for NTP, in which the
NTS specific data are enclosed in extension fields on top of NTP
packets. A specification of NTS messages for PTP would have to be
developed accordingly.
The steps described in Section 6.1 - Section 6.4 belong to the
unicast mode, while Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 explain the steps
involved in the broadcast mode of NTS.
6.1. Association Messages
In this message exchange, the hash and signature algorithms that are
used throughout the protocol are negotiated.
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6.1.1. Message Type: "client_assoc"
The protocol sequence starts with the client sending an association
message, called client_assoc. This message contains
o the NTS message ID "client_assoc",
o the version number of NTS that the client wants to use (this
SHOULD be the highest version number that it supports),
o the hostname of the client,
o a selection of accepted hash algorithms,
o a selection of accepted encryption algorithms, and
o a selection of accepted algorithms for the signatures.
For NTP, this message is realized as a packet with an extension field
of type "association", which contains all this data.
6.1.2. Message Type: "server_assoc"
This message is sent by the server upon receipt of client_assoc. It
contains
o the NTS message ID "server_assoc",
o the version number used for the rest of the protocol (which SHOULD
be determined as the minimum over the client's suggestion in the
client_assoc message and the highest supported by the server),
o the hostname of the server, and
o the server's choice of algorithm for encryption, for the
signatures and for cryptographic hashing , all of which MUST be
chosen from the client's proposals.
In the case of NTP, the data is enclosed in a packet's extension
field, also of type "association".
6.2. Certificate Messages
In this message exchange, the client receives the certification chain
up to a trusted anchor. With the established certification chain the
client is able to verify the server's signatures and, hence,
authenticity of future NTS messages from the server is ensured.
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Discussion:
Note that in this step the client validates the authenticity of
its immediate NTP server only. It does not recursively validate
the authenticity of each NTP server on the time synchronization
chain. Recursive authentication (and authorization) as formulated
in [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements] depends on the chosen
trust anchor.
6.2.1. Message Type: "client_cert"
This message is sent by the client, after it successfully verified
the content of the received server_assoc message (see Section 7.1.1).
It contains
o the NTS message ID "client_cert",
o the negotiated version number,
o the client's hostname, and
o the signature algorithm negotiated during the association
messages.
In the case of NTP, the data is enclosed in a packet's extension
field of type "certificate request".
6.2.2. Message Type: "server_cert"
This message is sent by the server, upon receipt of a client_cert
message, if the version number and choice of methods communicated in
that message are actually supported by the server. It contains
o the NTS message ID "server_cert",
o the version number as transmitted in client_cert,
o a signature, calculated over the data listed above, with the
server's private key and according to the signature algorithm
transmitted in server_cert,
o all the information necessary to authenticate the server to the
client. This is a chain of certificates, which starts at the
server and goes up to a trusted authority, where each certificate
MUST be certified by the one directly following it.
This message is realized for NTP as a packet with extension field of
type "certificate" which holds all of the data listed above.
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6.3. Cookie Messages
During this message exchange, the server transmits a secret cookie to
the client securely. The cookie will be used for integrity
protection during unicast time synchronization.
6.3.1. Message Type: "client_cook"
This message is sent by the client, upon successful authentication of
the server. In this message, the client requests a cookie from the
server. The message contains
o the NTS message ID "client_cook",
o the negotiated version number,
o the negotiated signature algorithm,
o the negotiated encryption algorithm,
o a 128-bit nonce,
o the negotiated hash algorithm H,
o the client's certificate.
For NTP, an extension field of type "cookie request" holds the listed
data.
6.3.2. Message Type: "server_cook"
This message is sent by the server, upon receipt of a client_cook
message. The server generates the hash of the client's certificate,
as conveyed during client_cook, in order to calculate the cookie
according to Section 5.1. This message contains a concatenated
datum, which is encrypted with the client's public key, according to
the encryption algorithm transmitted in the client_cook message. The
concatenated datum contains
o the NTS message ID "server_cook"
o the version number as transmitted in client_cook,
o the nonce transmitted in client_cook,
o the cookie, and
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o a signature, created with the server's private key, calculated
over
* all of the data listed above, and also
* the hash of the client's certificate.
This signature MUST be calculated according to the transmitted
signature algorithm from the client_cook message.
In the case of NTP, this is a packet with an extension field of type
"cookie transmit".
6.4. Unicast Time Synchronisation Messages
In this message exchange, the usual time synchronization process is
executed, with the addition of integrity protection for all messages
that the server sends. This message can be repeatedly exchanged as
often as the client desires and as long as the integrity of the
server's time responses is verified successfully.
6.4.1. Message Type: "time_request"
This message is sent by the client when it requests time exchange.
It contains
o the NTS message ID "time_request",
o the negotiated version number,
o a 128-bit nonce,
o the negotiated hash algorithm H,
o the hash of the client's certificate under H.
In the case of NTP the data is enclosed in the packet's extension
field of type "time request".
6.4.2. Message Type: "time_response"
This message is sent by the server, after it received a time_request
message. Prior to this the server MUST recalculate the client's
cookie by using the hash of the client's certificate and the
transmitted hash algorithm. The message contains
o the NTS message ID "time_response",
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o the version number as transmitted in time_request,
o the server's time synchronization response data,
o the nonce transmitted in time_request,
o a MAC (generated with the cookie as key) for verification of all
of the above data.
In the case of NTP, this is a packet with the necessary time
synchronization data and a new extension field of type "time
response". This packet has an appended MAC that is generated over
the time synchronization data and the extension field, with the
cookie as the key.
6.5. Broadcast Parameter Messages
In this message exchange, the client receives the necessary
information to execute the TESLA protocol in a secured broadcast
association. The client can only initiate a secure broadcast
association after a successful unicast run, see Section 7.1.2.
See Appendix D for more details on TESLA.
6.5.1. Message Type: "client_bpar"
This message is sent by the client in order to establish a secured
time broadcast association with the server. It contains
o the NTS message ID "client_bpar",
o the version number negotiated during association in unicast mode,
o the client's hostname, and
o the signature algorithm negotiated during unicast.
For NTP, this message is realized as a packet with an extension field
of type "broadcast request".
6.5.2. Message Type: "server_bpar"
This message is sent by the server upon receipt of a client_bpar
message during the broadcast loop of the server. It contains
o the NTS message ID "server_bpar",
o the version number as transmitted in the client_bpar message,
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o the one-way function used for building the one-way key chain,
o the last key of the one-way key chain, and
o the disclosure schedule of the keys. This contains:
* time interval duration,
* the disclosure delay (number of intervals between use and
disclosure of a key),
* the time at which the next time interval will start, and
* the next interval's associated index.
o The message also contains a signature signed by the server with
its private key, verifying all the data listed above.
It is realized for NTP as a packet with an extension field of type
"broadcast parameters", which contains all the given data.
6.6. Broadcast Message
Via this message, the server keeps sending broadcast time
synchronization messages to all participating clients.
6.6.1. Message Type: "server_broad"
This message is sent by the server over the course of its broadcast
schedule. It is part of any broadcast association. It contains
o the NTS message ID "server_broad",
o the version number that the server's broadcast mode is working
under,
o time broadcast data,
o the index that belongs to the current interval (and therefore
identifies the current, yet undisclosed key),
o the disclosed key of the previous disclosure interval (current
time interval minus disclosure delay),
o a MAC, calculated with the key for the current time interval,
verifying
* the message ID,
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* the version number, and
* the time data.
For NTP, this message is realized as an NTP broadcast packet with the
time broadcast data and with an extension field of type "broadcast
message", which contains the rest of the listed data. The NTP packet
is then appended by a MAC verifying its contents.
7. Protocol Sequence
7.1. The Client
7.1.1. The Client in Unicast Mode
For a unicast run, the client performs the following steps:
1. It sends a client_assoc message to the server. It MUST keep the
transmitted values for version number and algorithms available
for later checks.
2. It waits for a reply in the form of a server_assoc message.
After receipt of the message it performs the following checks:
* The client checks that the message contains a conform version
number.
* It also has to verify that the server has chosen the signature
and hash algorithms from its proposal sent in the client_assoc
message.
If one of the checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.
3. The client then sends a client_cert message to the server.
Again, it MUST remember the transmitted values for version number
and algorithms for later checks.
4. It awaits a reply in the form of a server_cert message and
performs authenticity checks on the certificate chain and the
signature for the version number. If one of these checks fails,
the client MUST abort the run.
5. Next, it sends a client_cook message to the server. The client
MUST save the included nonce until the reply has been processed.
6. It awaits a reply in the form of a server_cook message; upon
receipt it executes the following actions:
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* It decrypts the message with its own private key.
* It checks that the decrypted message is of the expected
format: the concatenation of version number, a 128 bit nonce,
a 128 bit cookie and a signature value.
* It verifies that the received version number matches the one
negotiated before.
* It verifies that the received nonce matches the nonce sent in
the client_cook message.
* It verifies the signature using the server's public key. The
signature has to authenticate the version number, the nonce,
the cookie, and the hash of the client's certificate.
If one of those checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.
7. The client sends a time_request message to the server. The
client MUST save the included nonce and the transmit_timestamp
(from the time synchronization data) as a correlated pair for
later verification steps.
8. It awaits a reply in the form of a time_response message. Upon
receipt, it checks:
* that the transmitted version number matches the one negotiated
before,
* that the transmitted nonce belongs to a previous time_request
message,
* that the transmit_timestamp in that time_request message
matches the corresponding time stamp from the synchronization
data received in the time_response, and
* that the appended MAC verifies the received synchronization
data, version number and nonce.
If at least one of the first three checks fails (i.e. if the
version number does not match, if the client has never used the
nonce transmitted in the time_response message or if it has used
the nonce with initial time synchronization data different from
that in the response), then the client MUST ignore this
time_response message. If the MAC is invalid, the client MUST do
one of the following: abort the run or go back to step 5 (because
the cookie might have changed due to a server seed refresh). If
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both checks are successful, the client SHOULD continue time
synchronization by going back to step 7.
The client's behavior in unicast mode is also expressed in Figure 1.
7.1.2. The Client in Broadcast Mode
To establish a secure broadcast association with a broadcast server,
the client MUST initially authenticate the broadcast server and
securely synchronize its time to it up to an upper bound for its time
offset in unicast mode. After that, the client performs the
following steps:
1. It sends a client_bpar message to the server. It MUST remember
the transmitted values for version number and signature
algorithm.
2. It waits for a reply in the form of a server_bpar message after
which it performs the following checks:
* The message must contain all the necessary information for the
TESLA protocol, as listed in Section 6.5.2.
* Verification of the message's signature.
If any information is missing or the server's signature cannot be
verified, the client MUST abort the broadcast run. If all checks
are successful, the client MUST remember all the broadcast
parameters received for later checks.
3. The client awaits time synchronization data in the form of a
server_broadcast message. Upon receipt, it performs the
following checks:
1. Proof that the MAC is based on a key that is not yet
disclosed. This is achieved via a disclosure schedule and
requires the loose time synchronization. If verified, the
packet will be buffered for later authentication. Otherwise,
the client MUST discard it. Note that the time information
included in the packet will not be used for synchronization
until its authenticity could be verified.
2. The client checks whether it already knows the disclosed key.
If so, the client SHOULD discard the packet to avoid a buffer
overrun. If not, the client verifies that the disclosed key
belongs to the one-way key chain by applying the one-way
function until equality with a previous disclosed key is
verified. If falsified, the client MUST discard the packet.
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3. If the disclosed key is legitimate the client verifies the
authenticity of any packet that it received during the
corresponding time interval. If authenticity of a packet is
verified it is released from the buffer and the packet's time
information can be utilized. If the verification fails
authenticity is no longer given. In this case the client
MUST request authentic time from the server by means of a
unicast time request message.
See RFC 4082[RFC4082] for a detailed description of the packet
verification process.
The client MUST restart the broadcast sequence with a client_bpar
message Section 6.5.1 if the one-way key chain expires.
The client's behavior in broadcast mode can also be seen in Figure 2.
7.2. The Server
7.2.1. The Server in Unicast Mode
To support unicast mode, the server MUST be ready to perform the
following actions:
o Upon receipt of a client_assoc message, the server constructs and
sends a reply in the form of a server_assoc message as described
in Section 6.1.2.
o Upon receipt of a client_cert message, the server checks whether
it supports the given signature algorithm. If so, it constructs
and sends a server_cert message as described in Section 6.2.2.
o Upon receipt of a client_cook message, the server checks whether
it supports the given cryptographic algorithms. It then
calculates the cookie according to the formula given in
Section 5.1. With this, it MUST construct a server_cook message
as described in Section 6.3.2.
o Upon receipt of a time_request message, the server re-calculates
the cookie, then computes the necessary time synchronization data
and constructs a time_response message as given in Section 6.4.2.
The server MUST refresh its server seed periodically (see
Section 8.1).
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7.2.2. The Server in Broadcast Mode
A broadcast server MUST also support unicast mode, in order to
provide the initial time synchronization which is a precondition for
any broadcast association. To support NTS broadcast, the server MUST
additionally be ready to perform the following actions:
o Upon receipt of a client_bpar message, the server constructs and
sends a server_bpar message as described in Section 6.5.2.
o The server follows the TESLA protocol in all other aspects, by
regularly sending server_broad messages as described in
Section 6.6.1, adhering to its own disclosure schedule.
It is also the server's responsibility to watch for the expiration
date of the one-way key chain and generate a new key chain
accordingly.
8. Server Seed Considerations
The server has to calculate a random seed which has to be kept
secret. The server MUST generate a seed for each supported hash
algorithm, see Section 9.1.
8.1. Server Seed Refresh
According to the requirements in
[I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements] the server MUST refresh each
server seed periodically. As a consequence, the cookie memorized by
the client becomes obsolete. In this case the client cannot verify
the MAC attachted to subsequent time response messages and has to
respond accordingly by re-initiating the protocol with a cookie
request (Section 6.3).
8.2. Server Seed Algorithm
8.3. Server Seed Lifetime
9. Hash Algorithms and MAC Generation
9.1. Hash Algorithms
Hash algorithms are used at different points: calculation of the
cookie and the MAC, and hashing of the client's certificate. Client
and server negotiate a hash algorithm H during the association
message exchange (Section 6.1) at the beginning of a unicast run.
The selected algorithm H is used for all hashing processes in that
run.
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In broadcast mode, hash algorithms are used as pseudo random
functions to construct the one-way key chain. Here, the utilized
hash algorithm is communicated by the server and non-negotiable.
The list of the hash algorithms supported by the server has to
fulfill the following requirements:
o it MUST NOT include SHA-1 or weaker algorithms,
o it MUST include SHA-256 or stronger algorithms.
Note
Any hash algorithm is prone to be compromised in the future. A
successful attack on a hash algorithm would enable any NTS client
to derive the server seed from their own cookie. Therefore, the
server MUST have separate seed values for its different supported
hash algorithms. This way, knowledge gained from an attack on a
hash algorithm H can at least only be used to compromise such
clients who use hash algorithm H as well.
9.2. MAC Calculation
For the calculation of the MAC, client and server are using a Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) approach [RFC2104]. The HMAC
is generated with the hash algorithm specified by the client (see
Section 9.1).
10. IANA Considerations
11. Security Considerations
11.1. Initial Verification of the Server Certificates
The client has to verify the validity of the certificates during the
certification message exchange (Section 6.2). Since it generally has
no reliable time during this initial communication phase, it is
impossible to verify the period of validity of the certificates.
Therefore, the client MUST use one of the following approaches:
o The validity of the certificates is preconditioned. Usually this
will be the case in corporate networks.
o The client ensures that the certificates are not revoked. To this
end, the client uses the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
defined in [RFC6277].
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o The client requests a different service to get an initial time
stamp in order to be able to verify the certificates' periods of
validity. To this end, it can, e.g., use a secure shell
connection to a reliable host. Another alternative is to request
a time stamp from a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) by means of the
Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) defined in [RFC3161].
11.2. Revocation of Server Certificates
According to Section 8.1, it is the client's responsibility to
initiate a new association with the server after the server's
certificate expires. To this end the client reads the expiration
date of the certificate during the certificate message exchange
(Section 6.2). Besides, certificates may also be revoked prior to
the normal expiration date. To increase security the client MAY
verify the state of the server's certificate via OCSP periodically.
11.3. Usage of NTP Pools
The certification based authentication scheme described in Section 6
is not applicable to the concept of NTP pools. Therefore, NTS is not
able to provide secure usage of NTP pools.
11.4. Denial-of-Service in Broadcast Mode
TESLA authentication buffers packets for delayed authentication.
This makes the protocol vulnerable to flooding attacks, causing the
client to buffer excessive numbers of packets. To add stronger DoS
protection to the protocol, client and server use the "Not Re-using
Keys" scheme of TESLA as pointed out in section 3.7.2 of RFC 4082
[RFC4082]. In this scheme the server never uses a key for the MAC
generation more than once. Therefore the client can discard any
packet that contains a disclosed key it knows already, thus
preventing memory flooding attacks.
Note, an alternative approach to enhance TESLA's resistance against
DoS attacks involves the addition of a group MAC to each packet.
This requires the exchange of an additional shared key common to the
whole group. This adds additional complexity to the protocol and
hence is currently not considered in this document.
11.5. Delay Attack
In a packet delay attack, an adversary with the ability to act as a
MITM delays time synchronization packets between client and server
asymmetrically [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements]. This
prevents the client to measure the network delay, and hence its time
offset to the server, accurately [Mizrahi]. The delay attack does
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not modifiy the content of the exchanged synchronization packets.
Therefore cryptographic means are not feasible to mitigate this
attack. However, serveral non-cryptographic precautions can be taken
in order to detect this attack.
o Usage of multiple time servers: this enables the client to detect
the attack provided that the adversary is unable to delay the
synchronizations packets between the majority of servers. This
approach is commonly used in NTP to exclude incorrect time servers
[RFC5905].
o Multiple communication paths: The client and server are utilizing
different paths for packet exchange as described in the I-D
[I-D.shpiner-multi-path-synchronization]. The client can detect
the attack provided that the adversary is unable to manipulate the
majority of the available paths [Shpiner]. Note, that this
approach is not yet available, neither for NTP nor for PTP.
o The introduction of a threshold value for the delay time of the
synchronization packets. The client can discard a time server if
the packet delay time of this time server is larger than the
threshold value.
o Usage of an encrypted connection: the client exchanges all packets
with the time server over an encrypted connection (e.g. IPsec).
This measure does not mitigate the delay attack but it makes it
more difficult for the adversary to identify the time
synchronization packets.
12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Steven Bellovin, David Mills and Kurt
Roeckx for discussions and comments on the design of NTS. Also,
thanks to Harlan Stenn for his technical review and specific text
contributions to this document.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[IEEE1588]
IEEE Instrumentation and Measurement Society. TC-9 Sensor
Technology, "IEEE standard for a precision clock
synchronization protocol for networked measurement and
control systems", 2008.
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[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.
[RFC4082] Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, June 2005.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC5906] Haberman, B. and D. Mills, "Network Time Protocol Version
4: Autokey Specification", RFC 5906, June 2010.
[RFC6277] Santesson, S. and P. Hallam-Baker, "Online Certificate
Status Protocol Algorithm Agility", RFC 6277, June 2011.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements]
Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks", draft-ietf-tictoc-security-
requirements-10 (work in progress), July 2014.
[I-D.shpiner-multi-path-synchronization]
Shpiner, A., Tse, R., Schelp, C., and T. Mizrahi, "Multi-
Path Time Synchronization", draft-shpiner-multi-path-
synchronization-03 (work in progress), February 2014.
[Mizrahi] Mizrahi, T., "A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks
against time synchronization protocols", in Proceedings of
Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement Control
and Communication, ISPCS 2012, pp. 1-6, September 2012.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
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[Roettger]
Roettger, S., "Analysis of the NTP Autokey Procedures",
February 2012.
[Shpiner] Shpiner, A., Revah, Y., and T. Mizrahi, "Multi-path Time
Protocols", in Proceedings of Precision Clock
Synchronization for Measurement Control and Communication,
ISPCS 2013, pp. 1-6, September 2013.
Appendix A. Flow Diagrams of Client Behaviour
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+---------------------+
|Association Messages |
+----------+----------+
|
v
+---------------------+
|Certificate Messages |
+----------+----------+
|
+------------------------------>o
| |
| v
| +---------------+
| |Cookie Messages|
| +-------+-------+
| |
| o<------------------------------+
| | |
| v |
| +-------------------+ |
| |Time Sync. Messages| |
| +---------+---------+ |
| | |
| v |
| +-----+ |
| |Check| |
| +--+--+ |
| | |
| /------------------+------------------\ |
| v v v |
| .-----------. .-------------. .-------. |
| ( MAC Failure ) ( Nonce Failure ) ( Success ) |
| '-----+-----' '------+------' '---+---' |
| | | | |
| v v v |
| +-------------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ |
| |Discard Data | |Discard Data | |Sync. Process | |
| +-------------+ +------+------+ +------+-------+ |
| | | | |
| | | v |
+-----------+ +------------------>o-----------+
Figure 1: The client's behavior in NTS unicast mode.
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+-----------------------------+
|Broadcast Parameter Messages |
+--------------+--------------+
|
o<--------------------------+
| |
v |
+-----------------------------+ |
|Broadcast Time Sync. Message | |
+--------------+--------------+ |
| |
+-------------------------------------->o |
| | |
| v |
| +-------------------+ |
| |Key and Auth. Check| |
| +---------+---------+ |
| | |
| /----------------*----------------\ |
| v v |
| .---------. .---------. |
| ( Verified ) ( Falsified ) |
| '----+----' '----+----' |
| | | |
| v v |
| +-------------+ +-------+ |
| |Store Message| |Discard| |
| +------+------+ +---+---+ |
| | | |
| v +---------o
| +---------------+ |
| |Check Previous | |
| +-------+-------+ |
| | |
| /--------*--------\ |
| v v |
| .---------. .---------. |
| ( Verified ) ( Falsified ) |
| '----+----' '----+----' |
| | | |
| v v |
| +-------------+ +-----------------+ |
| |Sync. Process| |Discard Previous | |
| +------+------+ +--------+--------+ |
| | | |
+-----------+ +-----------------------------------+
Figure 2: The client's behaviour in NTS broadcast mode.
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Appendix B. Extension Fields
In Section 6, some new extension fields for NTP packets are
introduced. They are listed here again, for reference.
+------------------------+---------------+
| name | used in |
+------------------------+---------------+
| "association" | client_assoc |
| | server_assoc |
| | |
| "certificate request" | client_cert |
| | |
| "certificate" | server_cert |
| | |
| "cookie request" | client_cook |
| | |
| "cookie transmit" | server_cook |
| | |
| "time request" | time_request |
| | |
| "time response" | time_response |
| | |
| "broadcast request" | client_bpar |
| | |
| "broadcast parameters" | server_bpar |
| | |
| "broadcast message" | server_broad |
+------------------------+---------------+
Appendix C. TICTOC Security Requirements
The following table compares the NTS specifications against the
TICTOC security requirements [I-D.ietf-tictoc-security-requirements].
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| Section | Requirement from I-D tictoc | Requirement | NTS |
| | security-requirements-05 | level | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.1.1 | Authentication of Servers | MUST | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.1.1 | Authorization of Servers | MUST | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.1.2 | Recursive Authentication of | MUST | OK |
| | Servers (Stratum 1) | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.1.2 | Recursive Authorization of Servers | MUST | OK |
| | (Stratum 1) | | |
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+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.1.3 | Authentication and Authorization | MAY | - |
| | of Slaves | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.2 | Integrity protection. | MUST | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.4 | Protection against DoS attacks | SHOULD | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.5 | Replay protection | MUST | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.6 | Key freshness. | MUST | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| | Security association. | SHOULD | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| | Unicast and multicast | SHOULD | OK |
| | associations. | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.7 | Performance: no degradation in | MUST | OK |
| | quality of time transfer. | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| | Performance: lightweight | SHOULD | OK |
| | computation | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| | Performance: storage, bandwidth | SHOULD | OK |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.7 | Confidentiality protection | MAY | NO |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.9 | Protection against Packet Delay | SHOULD | NA*) |
| | and Interception Attacks | | |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| 5.10 | Secure mode | MUST | - |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
| | Hybrid mode | SHOULD | - |
+---------+------------------------------------+-------------+------+
*) See discussion in section Section 11.5.
Comparison of NTS sepecification against TICTOC security
requirements.
Appendix D. Broadcast Mode
For the broadcast mode, NTS adopts the TESLA protocol, which is based
on a one-way key chain. This appendix provides details on the
generation and usage of the one-way key chain collected and assembled
from [RFC4082]. Note that NTS is using the "not re-using keys"
scheme of TESLA as described in section 3.7.2. of [RFC4082].
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D.1. Server Preparations
Server setup:
1. The server determines a reasonable upper bound B on the network
delay between itself and an arbitrary client, measured in
milliseconds.
2. It determines the number n+1 of keys in the one-way key chain.
This yields the number n of keys that are usable to authenticate
broadcast packets. This number n is therefore also the number of
time intervals during which the server can send authenticated
broadcast messages before it has to calculate a new key chain.
3. It divides time into n uniform intervals I_1, I_2, ..., I_n.
Each of these time intervals has length L, measured in
milliseconds. In order to fulfill the requirement 3.7.2. of RFC
4082 the time interval L has to be smaller than the time interval
between the broadcast messages.
4. The server generates a random key K_n.
5. Using a one-way function F, the server generates a one-way chain
of n+1 keys K_0, K_1, ..., K_{n} according to
K_i = F(K_{i+1}).
6. Using another one-way function F', it generates a sequence of n+1
MAC keys K'_0, K'_1, ..., K'_{n-1} according to
K'_i = F'(K_i).
7. Each MAC key K'_i is assigned to the time interval I_i.
8. The server determines the key disclosure delay d, which is the
number of intervals between using a key and disclosing it. Note
that although security is still provided for all choices d>0, the
choice still makes a difference:
* If d is chosen too short, the client might discards packets
because it fails to verify that the key used for their MAC has
not been yet disclosed.
* If d is chosen too long, the received packets have to be
buffered for a unnecessarily long time before they can be
verified by the client and subsequently be utilized for time
synchronization.
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The server SHOULD calculate d according to
d = ceil( 2*B / L) + 1,
where ceil gives the smallest integer greater than or equal to
its argument.
< - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Generation of Keys
F F F F
K_0 <-------- K_1 <-------- ... <-------- K_{n-1} <-------- K_n
| | | |
| | | |
| F' | F' | F' | F'
| | | |
v v v v
K'_0 K'_1 ... K'_{n-1} K'_n
[______________|____ ____|_________________|__________]
I_1 ... I_{n-1} I_n
Course of Time/Usage of Keys
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >
A Schematic explanation on the TESLA protocol's one-way key chain
D.2. Client Preparation
A client needs the following information in order to participate in a
TESLA broadcast.
o One key K_i from the one-way key chain, which has to be
authenticated as belonging to the server. Typically, this will be
K_0.
o The disclosure schedule of the keys. This consists of:
* the length n of the one-way key chain,
* the length L of the time intervals I_1, I_2, ..., I_n,
* the starting time T_i of an interval I_i. Typically this is
the starting time T_1 of the first interval;
* the disclosure delay d.
o The one-way function F used to recursively derive the keys in the
one-way key chain,
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o The second one-way function F' used to derive the MAC keys K'_0,
K'_1, ... , K'_n from the keys in the one-way chain.
o An upper bound D_t on how far its own clock is "behind" that of
the server.
Note that if D_t is greater than (d - 1) * L, then some authentic
packets might be discarded. If D_t is greater than d * L, then all
authentic packets will be discarded. In the latter case, the client
should not participate in the broadcast, since there will be no
benefit in doing so.
D.3. Sending Authenticated Broadcast Packets
During each time interval I_i, the server sends one authenticated
broadcast packet P_i. This packet consists of:
o a message M_i,
o the index i (in case a packet arrives late),
o a MAC authenticating the message M_i, with K'_i used as key,
o the key K_{i-d}, which is included for disclosure.
D.4. Authentication of Received Packets
When a client receives a packet P_i as described above, it first
checks that it has not received a packet with associated index i
before. This is done to avoid replay/flooding attacks. A packet
that fails this test is discarded.
Next, the client checks that, according to the disclosure schedule
and with respect to the upper bound D_t determined above, the server
cannot have disclosed the key K_i yet. Specifically, it needs to
check that the server's clock cannot read a time that is in time
interval I_{i+d} or later. Since it works under the assumption that
the server's clock is not more than D_t "ahead" of the client's
clock, the client can calculate an upper bound t_i for the server's
clock at the time when P_i arrived by
t_i = R + D_t,
where R is the client's clock at the arrival of P_i. This implies
that at the time of arrival of P_i, the server could have been in
interval I_x at most, with
x = floor((t_i - T_1) / L),
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where floor gives the greatest integer less than or equal to its
argument. The client now needs to verify that
x < i+d
is valid (see also section 3.5 of [RFC4082]). If falsified, it is
discarded.
Next the client verifies that a newly disclosed key K_{i-d} belongs
to the one-way key chain. To this end it verifies identity with some
earlier disclosed key by recursively applies the one-way function F
to K_{i-d} (see Clause 3.5 in RFC 4082, item 3).
If a packet P_i passes all tests listed above, it is stored for later
authentication. Also, if at this time there is a package with index
i-d already buffered, then the client uses the disclosed key K_{i-d}
to derive K'_{i-d} and uses that to check the MAC included in package
P_{i-d}. On success, it regards M_{i-d} as authenticated.
Appendix E. Random Number Generation
At various points of the protocol, the generation of random numbers
is required. The employed methods of generation need to be
cryptographically secure. See [RFC4086] for guidelines concerning
this topic.
Authors' Addresses
Dieter Sibold
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8420
Fax: +49-531-592-698420
Email: dieter.sibold@ptb.de
Stephen Roettger
Email: stephen.roettger@googlemail.com
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Kristof Teichel
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8421
Email: kristof.teichel@ptb.de
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