Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11
Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (nfsv4 WG) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Authors | Trond Myklebust , Chuck Lever | |||
Last updated | 2020-11-23 | |||
Replaces | draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls | |||
Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | |||
Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | |||
Formats | plain text html xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | |||
Reviews | ||||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | ||
Document shepherd | David Noveck | |||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-02-12) | |||
IESG | IESG state | RFC Ed Queue | ||
Action Holders |
(None)
|
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Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | |||
Telechat date | ||||
Responsible AD | Magnus Westerlund | |||
Send notices to | David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com> | |||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | ||
IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | |||
IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK | |||
IANA expert review comments | "The terminology in the document is not quite aligned with RFC 5280. I'd like to work with the authors to fix it." | |||
RFC Editor | RFC Editor state | MISSREF | ||
Details |
Network File System Version 4 T. Myklebust Internet-Draft Hammerspace Updates: 5531 (if approved) C. Lever, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track Oracle Expires: 27 May 2021 23 November 2020 Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11 Abstract This document describes a mechanism that, through the use of opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS), enables encryption of Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transactions while they are in-transit. The proposed mechanism interoperates with ONC RPC implementations that do not support it. This document updates RFC 5531. Note Discussion of this draft takes place on the NFSv4 working group mailing list (nfsv4@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nfsv4/. Working Group information can be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/nfsv4/ about/. This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at https://github.com/chucklever/i-d-rpc-tls. Instructions are on that page as well. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Myklebust & Lever Expires 27 May 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft RPC-Over-TLS November 2020 This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 May 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. RPC-Over-TLS in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Discovering Server-side TLS Support . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1. Using TLS with RPCSEC GSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Base Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1.1. Protected Operation on TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1.2. Protected Operation on UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1.3. Protected Operation on Other Transports . . . . . . . 11 5.2. TLS Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.1. X.509 Certificates Using PKIX Trust . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.2. Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1. DESY NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. Hammerspace NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.3. Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.4. FreeBSD NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. The Limitations of Opportunistic Security . . . . . . . . 16 7.1.1. STRIPTLS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1.2. Privacy Leakage Before Session Establishment . . . . 17 7.2. TLS Identity Management on Clients . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.3. Security Considerations for AUTH_SYS on TLS . . . . . . . 18 7.4. Best Security Policy Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.1. RPC Authentication Flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Show full document text