Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-02
Network File System Version 4 T. Myklebust
Internet-Draft Hammerspace
Updates: 5531 (if approved) C. Lever, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Oracle
Expires: October 27, 2019 April 25, 2019
Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-02
Abstract
This document describes a mechanism that, through the use of
opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS), enables encryption of
in-transit Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transactions while
interoperating with ONC RPC implementations that do not support this
mechanism. This document updates RFC 5531.
Status of This Memo
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Myklebust & Lever Expires October 27, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPC-Over-TLS April 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. RPC-Over-TLS in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Discovering Server-side TLS Support . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Using TLS with RPCSEC GSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Base Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Operation on TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Operation on UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.3. Operation on an RDMA Transport . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. TLS Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1. X.509 Certificates Using PKIX trust . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.2. X.509 Certificates Using Fingerprints . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.3. Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.4. Token Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. DESY NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Hammerspace NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3. Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Limitations of an Opportunistic Approach . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. STRIPTLS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. Implications for AUTH_SYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4. Multiple User Identity Realms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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