Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (nfsv4 WG)
Authors Trond Myklebust  , Chuck Lever 
Last updated 2020-11-23
Replaces draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd David Noveck
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Send notices to David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
IANA action state RFC-Ed-Ack
IANA expert review state Expert Reviews OK
IANA expert review comments "The terminology in the document is not quite aligned with RFC 5280. I'd like to work with the authors to fix it."
RFC Editor RFC Editor state MISSREF
Details
Network File System Version 4                               T. Myklebust
Internet-Draft                                               Hammerspace
Updates: 5531 (if approved)                                C. Lever, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Oracle
Expires: 27 May 2021                                    23 November 2020

          Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
                      draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism that, through the use of
   opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS), enables encryption of
   Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transactions while they are in-transit.
   The proposed mechanism interoperates with ONC RPC implementations
   that do not support it.  This document updates RFC 5531.

Note

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the NFSv4 working group
   mailing list (nfsv4@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nfsv4/. Working Group
   information can be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/nfsv4/
   about/.

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub.  Suggested changes
   should be submitted as pull requests at
   https://github.com/chucklever/i-d-rpc-tls.  Instructions are on that
   page as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Myklebust & Lever          Expires 27 May 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                RPC-Over-TLS                 November 2020

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 May 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  RPC-Over-TLS in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Discovering Server-side TLS Support . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  Using TLS with RPCSEC GSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  TLS Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Base Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.1.  Protected Operation on TCP  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.2.  Protected Operation on UDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.1.3.  Protected Operation on Other Transports . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  TLS Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.1.  X.509 Certificates Using PKIX Trust . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.2.  Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  DESY NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Hammerspace NFS server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.4.  FreeBSD NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.1.  The Limitations of Opportunistic Security . . . . . . . .  16
       7.1.1.  STRIPTLS Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       7.1.2.  Privacy Leakage Before Session Establishment  . . . .  17
     7.2.  TLS Identity Management on Clients  . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Security Considerations for AUTH_SYS on TLS . . . . . . .  18
     7.4.  Best Security Policy Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  RPC Authentication Flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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