Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11
Network File System Version 4 T. Myklebust
Internet-Draft Hammerspace
Updates: 5531 (if approved) C. Lever, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Oracle
Expires: 27 May 2021 23 November 2020
Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11
Abstract
This document describes a mechanism that, through the use of
opportunistic Transport Layer Security (TLS), enables encryption of
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transactions while they are in-transit.
The proposed mechanism interoperates with ONC RPC implementations
that do not support it. This document updates RFC 5531.
Note
Discussion of this draft takes place on the NFSv4 working group
mailing list (nfsv4@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nfsv4/. Working Group
information can be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/nfsv4/
about/.
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes
should be submitted as pull requests at
https://github.com/chucklever/i-d-rpc-tls. Instructions are on that
page as well.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Myklebust & Lever Expires 27 May 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPC-Over-TLS November 2020
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 May 2021.
Copyright Notice
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. RPC-Over-TLS in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Discovering Server-side TLS Support . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Using TLS with RPCSEC GSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Base Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Protected Operation on TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Protected Operation on UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.3. Protected Operation on Other Transports . . . . . . . 11
5.2. TLS Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.1. X.509 Certificates Using PKIX Trust . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.2. Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. DESY NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Hammerspace NFS server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. Linux NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.4. FreeBSD NFS server and client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. The Limitations of Opportunistic Security . . . . . . . . 16
7.1.1. STRIPTLS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.2. Privacy Leakage Before Session Establishment . . . . 17
7.2. TLS Identity Management on Clients . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Security Considerations for AUTH_SYS on TLS . . . . . . . 18
7.4. Best Security Policy Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. RPC Authentication Flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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