Requirements for Labeled NFS
draft-ietf-nfsv4-labreqs-05

[Ballot comment]

- general: some systems have a requirement that some
labels are visible in clear, whereas others are
encrypted, when passed over the network at least. Is
that a requirement you want to impose/meet here?  Either
way, it might be good to say.

- 3.2: s/Privacy/Confidentiality/ would be better here
and elsewhere.

- 4.3: the term foreign label is not used in 3.3

- 5.3: Whis is a US-specific section included here?
Surely this ought be more international? This section
should really be generalised or deleted.

- 5.4: You could explain what "legal hold" means. I
assume its where someone is suing someone and a court
says "don't you go changing X" - is that right?

[Ballot comment]
Comments from mehmet during the ops dir review.

** The document lacks an IANA Considerations section.
http://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist#anchor4 says: “If there is no action for IANA, the section should say that, e.g., including something like "This document has no actions for IANA."

== Outdated reference: A later version (-20) exists of draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion2-19

Mehmet

[Ballot discuss]
1) There's some SHOULDs in s3.2 that I'm not sure I follow:

  MAC security labels and any related security state SHOULD always be
  protected by these security services when transferred over the
  network; as SHOULD the binding of labels and state to associated
  objects and subjects.

If a system doesn't provide the services to keep the binding between the label and the object or the user's identity and it's privileges how are you going to get MAC to work?

2) s3.3: I think it's noble that clients reject anything it doesn't understand, but I gotta admit that if I was a bad guy I'd kind of ignore that requirement and keep on accepting whatever data I wasn't supposed to get.  Would a better requirement be to check that before allowing access a common policy MUST be negotiated?  Oh wait that's in s3.4 - should the concept of before allowing access be worked in to s3.4?

3) s3.5: I don't follow why this isn't a MUST:

  The server is allowed to translate the label but SHOULD NOT change
  the semantic meaning of the label.

If the server changes the semantic meaning of the label will the client still know what it means and then doesn't that conflict with an earlier requirement:

a security label MUST always mean
exactly the same thing on every system.

Doesn't it have to be "MUST NOT change the semantic meaning of the label"?

[Ballot comment]
0) Note RFC 4949 has a definition for MAC that you might refer to.

1) In s3.1, there is a discussion about the security attribute of the subject.  Isn't this more commonly referred to as the client's privileges?  And it might make sense to add this to the Definitions section.

2) s3.1 #4: Ever heard of a SPIF or looked at ISO 15816?  The were attempts to do just that.

3) s4: Reads a little awkward:

  Labeled NFS SHOULD support that the following security services are
  provided for all NFSv4.2 messaging. These services may be provided
  by lower layers even if NFS has to be aware of and leverage them:

maybe:

  Labeled NFS or the underlying system on which the Labeled NFS operates
  SHOULD provide the following security services for all
  NFSv4.2 messaging:

4) s3.2: Could you better define strong mutual authentication - is that certificate-based mutual authentication?  Or is it that MD5-based security shouldn't be used ;)

Also: r/will be required/is required

5) s3.3: Instead of:

  MAC models base access decisions on security attributes bound to
  subjects and objects.

I would have said:

  MAC models base access decisions on security attributes and privileges
  bound to objects and subjects, respectively.

6) s3.3: I'd probably add the following to the end of this sentence:

  With a given MAC model, all systems have
  semantically coherent labeling - a security label MUST always mean
  exactly the same thing on every system.

add:

  because otherwise the label cannot be properly interpreted.

7) s3.3: What does the "this" in this sentence refer to the binding of stuff to objects/subjects or to having labels mean the same thing:

  While this may not be
  necessary for simple MAC models it is recommended that most label
  formats assigned an LFS incorporate this concept into their label
  format.

8) (no action required) s3.3: I think you're more likely to get weighed down by corner cases than a global scheme :)

[Ballot comment]
The case is well made without cases

    5.3.  International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) . . . . . 12
    5.4.  Legal Hold/eDiscovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Traditionally the IETF stays well away from such areas, are we sure we want to make any comment on them in this text?

IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-nfsv4-labreqs-04, which is currently in Last Call, and has the following comments:

IANA notes that this document does not contain a standard IANA
Considerations section.  After examining the draft, IANA understands
that, upon approval of this document, there are no IANA Actions that need completion.

If this assessment is not accurate, please respond as soon as possible.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Requirements for Labeled NFS) to Informational RFC


The IESG has received a request from the Network File System Version 4 WG
(nfsv4) to consider the following document:
- 'Requirements for Labeled NFS'
  as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-11-01. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This memo outlines high-level requirements for the integration of
  flexible Mandatory Access Control (MAC) functionality into the
  Network File System (NFS) version 4.2 (NFSv4.2).  It describes the
  level of protections that should be provided over protocol components
  and the basic structure of the proposed system.  The intent here is
  not to present the protocol changes, but to describe the environment
  in which they reside.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-labreqs/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-labreqs/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is
this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

        Informational RFC is being requested for this I-D.

        The purpose of this document was to capture requirements and
        context that is not usually associated with NFS.  The working
        group desired to desseminate the the context and requirements
        for file system labeling and the role which NFS has come to
        play in this space.


(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary:

        This Internet-Draft outlines high-level requirements for the
        integration of flexible Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
        functionality into NFSv4.  It describes the level of
        protections that should be provided over protocol components
        and the basic structure of the proposed system.  It also gives
        a brief explanation of what kinds of protections MAC systems
        offer.

Working Group Summary:

        After building the relavent use cases for labeling within
        the NFS protocol, there has been broad consensus in the
        working group for support of Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
        funtionality.

Document Quality:

The requirements and use cases captured in this Internet Draft
are built from a long history of operating systems security
structure and use.  This document captures the best method
through years of implementation in other file system contexts
along with the implementation in SELinux of an NFS feature set
much like what is captured in the requirements.  The content
of this document has received quality feedback and review
throughout its life.

Personnel:

Spencer Shepler (NFSv4 WG co-chair) is the document shepherd
Martin Stiemerling is the Responsible Area Director.


(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document shepherd has reviewed the document in full
(intermediate drafts and the final version).  This version is
ready for IETF review and publication.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

The Requirements for Labeled NFS I-D covers the topic in the
appropriate depth.  It provides the history of the feature set
and the applicability to the NFSv4 protocol.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

Given this document deals with a security feature set, the
security directorate should provide a review as part of its
normal review of I-Ds.  There are no concerns other than
raising awareness of the application of MAC labeling to the
NFSv4 protocol.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document
Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is
uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns
whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has
discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to
advance the document, detail those concerns here.

No outstanding concerns exist for this document.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP
78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why?

Yes.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If
so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

No.  No IPR disclosures have been filed in reference to this
document.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

There is solid working group consensus for this document.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

There is no threat of appeal in regards to this document or
its contents.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the
Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this
check needs to be thorough.

There are normative reference issues but they can be handled
during the IESG review process.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

Not applicable.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

There are minor issues with the normative references that will
be corrected during the initial IESG review process.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready
for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such
normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

See 13).

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC
3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure.

Not applicable.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are
not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to
the part of the document where the relationship of this document to
the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the
document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

Not applicable.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA
considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with
the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that
the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in
IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been
clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include
a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry,
that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and
a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC
5226).

IANA section has been reviewed and there will be a minor
change in the I-D removing the initially requested actions.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for
future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would
find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

Not applicable.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

Not applicable.