Multipoint LDP (mLDP) In-Band Signaling with Wildcards
draft-ietf-mpls-mldp-in-band-wildcard-encoding-03

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 02 and is now closed.

(Adrian Farrel; former steering group member) Yes

Yes (2014-10-28 for -02)
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The Sec Dir review from Olafur Gu­mundsson suggests adding a reference to RFC 5036 in the Security Considerations section.

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It may be appropriate to update Eric's coordinates

(Alia Atlas; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Alissa Cooper; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Barry Leiba; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Benoît Claise; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Brian Haberman; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Joel Jaeggli; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Kathleen Moriarty; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection (2014-11-24 for -02)
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For reference, here is the SecDir review, which is pretty clean.

Thanks.

(Martin Stiemerling; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Pete Resnick; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Richard Barnes; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Spencer Dawkins; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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(Stephen Farrell; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection (2014-11-23 for -02)
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Let's imagine that someone defines a way to encrypt MPLS
traffic. At that point ought one recommend that the
encoding of the IP addresses into the opaque value ought
also be secure as otherwise that encoding might help an
attacker to decide which nodes to attack when or what
traffic to attack how. I guess this is not really caused by
this wildcard handling at all so I'm not asking that
anything be fixed here. But it might be good to look at
this cross-layer leakage issue when/if we do start working
on MPLS confidentiality.

(Ted Lemon; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ( for -02)
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