Unknown Key-Share Attacks on Uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)
draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-07
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2021-01-14
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48 |
2020-05-22
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48 from RFC-EDITOR |
2020-03-16
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from REF |
2019-09-24
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to REF from EDIT |
2019-08-26
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07 | Gunter Van de Velde | Assignment of request for Last Call review by OPSDIR to Ron Bonica was marked no-response |
2019-08-19
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07 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor |
2019-08-19
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07 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from Waiting on Authors |
2019-08-16
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07 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2019-08-15
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07 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2019-08-15
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to EDIT from MISSREF |
2019-08-14
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07 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to MISSREF |
2019-08-14
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07 | (System) | IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent |
2019-08-14
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07 | (System) | Announcement was received by RFC Editor |
2019-08-13
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07 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent |
2019-08-13
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07 | Cindy Morgan | IESG has approved the document |
2019-08-13
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07 | Cindy Morgan | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2019-08-13
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07 | Cindy Morgan | Ballot approval text was generated |
2019-08-13
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07 | Adam Roach | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup |
2019-08-13
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07 | Adam Roach | RFC Editor Note was changed |
2019-08-13
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07 | Adam Roach | RFC Editor Note for ballot was generated |
2019-08-13
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07 | Adam Roach | RFC Editor Note for ballot was generated |
2019-08-12
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07 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot comment] Thank you for addressing my DISCUSS and COMMENTs. |
2019-08-12
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07 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Roman Danyliw has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2019-08-09
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07 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot comment] Thanks for these updates; they are a big improvement. In Section 3.2 The absence of an identity binding does not relax this … [Ballot comment] Thanks for these updates; they are a big improvement. In Section 3.2 The absence of an identity binding does not relax this requirement; if a peer provided no identity binding, a zero-length extension MUST be present to be considered valid. For some reason my brain keeps trying to tell me that this could be misinterpreted somehow, as implying that if the peer doesn't implement this extension it would be considered invalid. But I don't see any actual specific problems with this text, so it's probably fine. An "external_id_hash" extension that is any length other than 0 or 32 is invalid and MUST cause the receiving endpoint to generate a fatal "decode_error" alert. Very pedantic here, but the numbers aren't quite right, as the "external_id_hash" extension would be length 1 or 33 due to the length octet. We'd have to say that the "binding_hash" is length 0 or 32 to be pedantically correct. Section 6 Without identity assertions, the mitigations in this document prevent the session splicing attack described in Section 4. Defense against session concatenation (Section 5) additionally requires protocol peers are not able to claim the certificate fingerprints of other entities. nit: "requires that". |
2019-08-09
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07 | Benjamin Kaduk | Ballot comment text updated for Benjamin Kaduk |
2019-08-09
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07 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot comment] Thanks for these updates; they are a bit improvement. In Section 3.2 The absence of an identity binding does not relax this … [Ballot comment] Thanks for these updates; they are a bit improvement. In Section 3.2 The absence of an identity binding does not relax this requirement; if a peer provided no identity binding, a zero-length extension MUST be present to be considered valid. For some reason my brain keeps trying to tell me that this could be misinterpreted somehow, as implying that if the peer doesn't implement this extension it would be considered invalid. But I don't see any actual specific problems with this text, so it's probably fine. An "external_id_hash" extension that is any length other than 0 or 32 is invalid and MUST cause the receiving endpoint to generate a fatal "decode_error" alert. Very pedantic here, but the numbers aren't quite right, as the "external_id_hash" extension would be length 1 or 33 due to the length octet. We'd have to say that the "binding_hash" is length 0 or 32 to be pedantically correct. Section 6 Without identity assertions, the mitigations in this document prevent the session splicing attack described in Section 4. Defense against session concatenation (Section 5) additionally requires protocol peers are not able to claim the certificate fingerprints of other entities. nit: "requires that". |
2019-08-09
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07 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Benjamin Kaduk has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2019-08-09
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07 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed |
2019-08-09
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07 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed |
2019-08-09
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07 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-07.txt |
2019-08-09
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07 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-08-09
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07 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Eric Rescorla , Martin Thomson |
2019-08-09
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07 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-09
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07 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-08
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06 | Jean Mahoney | Assignment of request for Last Call review by GENART to Jari Arkko was marked no-response |
2019-08-08
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06 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed from IESG Evaluation |
2019-08-07
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06 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba |
2019-08-07
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06 | Warren Kumari | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Warren Kumari |
2019-08-07
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06 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Suresh Krishnan |
2019-08-06
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06 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana |
2019-08-06
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06 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot comment] Section 2.3: s/This attack/The unknown key share attack/ Section 3: s/Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity providers are not required/Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity … [Ballot comment] Section 2.3: s/This attack/The unknown key share attack/ Section 3: s/Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity providers are not required/Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity providers are required/ |
2019-08-06
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06 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper |
2019-08-05
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06 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot discuss] (1) Section 3.2. There are a few places where further clarity on error handling would be helpful: -- Per “A peer that receives … [Ballot discuss] (1) Section 3.2. There are a few places where further clarity on error handling would be helpful: -- Per “A peer that receives an "external_id_hash" extension that does not match the value of the identity binding from its peer MUST immediately fail the TLS handshake with an error”, which TLS error alert? -- Per “A peer that receives an identity binding, but does not receive an ‘external_id_hash’extension MAY choose to fail the connection”, if it does “fail the connection”, with which error alert? |
2019-08-05
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06 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot comment] (2) I support Ben’s DISCUSS on the clarity of Section 3.2. I would add a few additional observations: ** Per the sentence, “The … [Ballot comment] (2) I support Ben’s DISCUSS on the clarity of Section 3.2. I would add a few additional observations: ** Per the sentence, “The resulting string is then encoded using UTF-8”, shouldn’t this JSON text already be UTF-8 per Section 8.1 of RFC8259 -- what’s the new encoding to be done? ** Recommend a citation for the WebRTC identity assertion, SDP identity attribute and PASSPoRT formats earlier than the last sentence of the relevant paragraph (3) Section 3.2. The second “Note” in this section likely is meant to be generic guidance regardless of whether SDP or PASSPoRT is used. However, since the first “Note” only applies to SDP, it could be read that this crypto agility guidance only applies to PASSPoRT. Recommend using a different convention. (4) Section 3. Per “Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity providers are not required to perform this validation”, this sentence has a triple negative (i.e., neither, nor and not). Please rephrase to clarify that these providers are required to validate. |
2019-08-05
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06 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Roman Danyliw |
2019-08-05
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06 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot discuss] There are both pretty minor points, in the grand scheme of things, but I do think it would be hazardous to publish the … [Ballot discuss] There are both pretty minor points, in the grand scheme of things, but I do think it would be hazardous to publish the document without addressing them. The semantics surrounding the "external_id_hash" TLS extension seem insufficiently specified to admit interoperable implementation. In Section 3.2 we read that it "carries a hash of the identity assertion that communicating peers have exchanged", as if there was a single distinguished identity assertion for the session. But, if we read on, we learn that there is not one identity assertion, but (in the general case) two, one for each party, and that what seems to actually be intended is that each party sends the hash of the identity assertion corresponding to the sender's identity, with the requirements to send an empty external_id_hash if the party in question is not providing identity bindings. Additionally, the text about having an empty "external_id_hash" extension in ClientHello or ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions is written in a way that implies that all parties generate a ClientHello and all parties generate a ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions message, whereas these are actually conditional on whether the party is acting as (D)TLS client or server. Similarly, the current text for the last sentence of Section 3.2 ("In TLS 1.3, the "external_id_hash" extension MUST be sent in the EncryptedExtensions message.") can be (mis)read as implying that all EncryptedExtensions messages sent by TLS servers that implement this specification must include this extension, which would violate the TLS extension-negotiation model since it mandates the server sending an extension without regard to the client having indicated support for the extension. Perhaps "MUST NOT be sent in the TLS 1.3 ServerHello message" conveys the restriction more clearly? (A similar comment applies to the corresponding statement in Section 4.3, which interestingly enough already has a "In TLS 1.3, the "external_session_id" extension MUST NOT be included in a ServerHello." disclaimer in addition to the problematic sentence.) |
2019-08-05
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06 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot comment] Section 2 The attacker obtains an identity assertion for an identity it controls, but binds that to the fingerprint of one … [Ballot comment] Section 2 The attacker obtains an identity assertion for an identity it controls, but binds that to the fingerprint of one peer. The attacker is then able to cause a TLS connection to be established where two endpoints communicate. The victim that has its fingerprint copied by the attack correctly believes that it is communicating with the other victim; however, the other victim incorrectly believes that it is communicating with the attacker. nit: maybe this could be reworded for improved clarity. Perhaps, "two endponts other than the attacker communicate" or "two victim endpoints". A similar attack can be mounted without any communications established based on the SDP "fingerprint" attribute [FINGERPRINT]. At this point in the document, I don't know how to interpret "without any communications established based on". Section 2.1 1. An attacker can only modify the parts of the session signaling for a session that they are part of, which is limited to their own offers and answers. nit(?): the first part of the sentence suggests that the attacker can modify their peers' offers/answers, and it's not entirely clear (from a rhetorical sense) how the latter clause is supposed to relate to the first. The combination of these two constraints make the spectrum of possible attacks quite limited. An attacker is only able to switch its own certificate fingerprint for a valid certificate that is acceptable to its peer. Attacks therefore rely on joining two separate sessions into a single session. nit: It's not clear to me (at this point in the document) whether this is "victim A connects to attacker and also to victim B, and attacker merges the first session into the second", or "victim A connects to attacker and attacker connects to victim B, and attacker splices the two together and steps out of the way". (I assume the latter, but the text hasn't clarified it yet.) Section 2.3 Third-party call control (3PCC) [RFC3725] is a technique where a signaling peer establishes a call that is terminated by a different entity. This attack is very similar to the 3PCC technique, except where the TLS peers are aware of the use of 3PCC. nit: Rhetorically-wise, I don't know what "except" is intended to mean here. Is the attack like 3PCC but in normal 3PCC the peers are unaware of 3PCC use and in the attack they are? The other way around? ("except that in the 3PCC case the TLS peers are aware of its use" would disambiguate fine, I think.) It is understood that this technique will prevent the use of 3PCC if peers have different views of the involved identities, or the value of SDP "tls-id" attributes. nit: understood by whom? (I don't think that we need "It is understood that" at all.) Section 3 The identity assertions used for WebRTC (Section 7 of [WEBRTC-SEC]) and the SIP PASSPoRT using in SIP identity ([SIP-ID], [PASSPoRT]) are bound to the certificate fingerprint of an endpoint. An attacker nit: s/using/used/ causes an identity binding to be created that binds an identity they control to the fingerprint of a first victim. nit: I think we want "An attacker can cause" or "In an unknown-key-share attack, an attacker causes". really talking to the first victim. The attacker only needs to create an identity assertion that covers a certificate fingerprint of the first victim. Well, and actually cause the traffic to shuffle around so the victims are sending/receiving from each other. The problem might appear to be caused by the fact that the authority that certifies the identity binding is not required to verify that the entity requesting the binding controls the keys associated with the fingerprints. Neither SIP nor WebRTC identity providers are not required to perform this validation. However, validation of keys by the identity provided is not relevant because verifying control of the associated keys is not a necessary condition for a secure protocol, nor would it be sufficient to prevent attack [SIGMA]. nit: in the last sentence, I'm not sure that "validation of keys by the identity provided" is correct; "identity provider" would make more sense. This form of unknown key-share attack is possible without compromising signaling integrity, unless the defenses described in nit: I'd suggest s/possible/even possible/ Section 4 are used. Endpoints MUST use the "external_session_id" extension (see Section 4.3) in addition to the "external_id_hash" (Section 3.2) so that two calls between the same parties can't be altered by an attacker. nit(?): These normative requirements kind of come out of nowhere, in terms of the flow of language. Maybe "In order to prevent this attack, endpoints MUST", or just move the normative requirements closer to the mechanisms themselves? Section 3.2 A WebRTC identity assertion is provided as a JSON [JSON] object that is encoded into a JSON text. The resulting string is then encoded using UTF-8 [UTF8]. The content of the "external_id_hash" extension I don't really understand the separate UTF-8 step -- RFC 8259 already requires text to be UTF-8 encoded. I think this section would be easier to read if the different cases of identity encoding/transmission were broken out into a bulleted or enumerated list (the latter might make it easier to extend in the future): right now I think we have (1) pure WebRTC, (2) SDP "identity", and (3) SIP PASSPoRT, but I'm not 100% sure I'm reading the text properly. If that's done, it would also be a good opportunity to clarify that the note about hash agility applies to the TLS extension as a whole, not just the PASSPoRT case. Where a PASSPoRT is used, the compact form of the PASSPoRT MUST be expanded into the full form. The base64 encoding used in the SIP nit: this is written to assume that only compact PASSPoRTs will ever be used, which IIUC is not the case. This allows its peer to include a hash of its identity binding. An endpoint without an identity binding MUST include an empty "external_id_hash" extension in its ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions message, to indicate support for the extension. nit: and that it has validated the client's identity binding? A peer that receives an "external_id_hash" extension that does not match the value of the identity binding from its peer MUST immediately fail the TLS handshake with an error. This includes cases where the binding is absent, in which case the extension MUST be present and empty. nit: I'd suggest rewording the second sentence as follows (since the conditional logic on "extension present but binding absent" could be confusing: % The absence of an identity binding does not relax this requirement -- % an extension received when the peer has not provided an identity % binding on the signalling layer must still be validated to have the % zero-length extension body. A peer that receives an identity binding, but does not receive an "external_id_hash" extension MAY choose to fail the connection, though it is expected that implementations written prior to the definition of the extensions in this document will not support both for some time. nit: I don't think the comma after "binding" is needed. Also, is the "not" intended? I'm not entirely sure what "both" is intended to refer to. Section 4 nit(?): There's an annoying lack of parallelism in the Section titles for Sections 3 and 4, though I don't have a good suggestion for Section 4's title -- "Attack on Raw Fingerprints" is the best I can do right now. Even if the integrity session signaling can be relied upon, an nit: s/integrity session signaling/session signaling integrity/? Section 4.1 another honest endpoint. The attacker convinces the endpoint that their session has completed, and that the session with the other endpoint has succeeded. Even with the benfit of the figure, I'm not sure I am properly understanding the distinction between "completed" and "succeeded". Is the idea that the "completed" session finishes a DTLS handshake and then immediately hangs up? Or is this entirely at the signalling layer? For this reason, it might be necessary to permit the signaling from Patsy to reach Norma to allow Patsy to receive a call setup completion signal, such as a SIP ACK. Once the second session is established, Mallory might cause DTLS packets sent by Norma to Patsy to be dropped. It is likely that these DTLS packets will be discarded by Patsy as Patsy will already have a successful DTLS connection established. nit: Is this "it is likely these packets would be discarded even if Mallory lets them through"? This attack creates an asymmetry in the beliefs about the identity of peers. However, this attack is only possible if the victim (Norma) is willing to conduct two sessions nearly simultaneously, if the attacker (Mallory) is on the network path between the victims, and if the same certificate - and therefore SDP "fingerprint" attribute value - is used in both sessions. This is the same certificate used by Norma in both sessions, right? Section 4.3 Where RTP and RTCP [RTP] are not multiplexed, it is possible that the two separate DTLS connections carrying RTP and RTCP can be switched. This is considered benign since these protocols are designed to be distinguishable. RTP/RTCP multiplexing is advised to address this problem. What does "switched" mean? That Mallory could swap the data contents around as an active MITM? This defense is not effective if an attacker can rewrite "tls-id" values in signaling. Only the mechanism in "external_id_hash" is able to defend against an attacker that can compromise session integrity. Please help me check my understanding: in terms of just the operation of the TLS extensions, "external_id_hash" and "external_session_id" provide similar protection, in that they are just validating that what's in the TLS handshake matches what's in the signalling layer. The added protection from "external_id_hash" only comes when the endpoints actually go and contact the peers' IdP to validate the identity assertions that are transmitted in the signalling layer. If my understanding is correct, we should probably add a bit more text here indicating the need for more validation than just the validation of the TLS extension contents that this document describes. Section 5 In the absence of any higher-level concept of peer identity, the use of session identifiers does not prevent session concatenation if the attacker is able to copy the session identifier from one signaling session to another. This kind of attack is prevented by systems that enable peer authentication such as WebRTC identity [WEBRTC-SEC] or SIP identity [SIP-ID]. However, session concatenation remains possible at higher layers: an attacker can establish two independent sessions and simply forward any data it receives from one into the other. And in such a case the attacker has access to the media plaintext, too, right? Use of the "external_session_id" does not guarantee that the identity of the peer at the TLS layer is the same as the identity of the signaling peer. The advantage an attacker gains by concatenating sessions is limited unless it is assumed that signaling and TLS peers are the same. If a secondary protocol uses the signaling channel with the assumption that the signaling and TLS peers are the same then that protocol is vulnerable to attack unless they also validate the identity of peers at both layers. Is this paragraph describing a case like in draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch, where we do send (and verify) identity assertions at the signalling layer? That is, the verification at the IdP counts for validation at the "secondary protocol" layer and the verification that the TLS extension matches the signalling constitutes verification at the TLS layer, thereby achieving the validation "at both layers"? It is important to note that multiple connections can be created within the same signaling session. An attacker might concatenate only part of a session, choosing to terminate some connections (and optionally forward data) while arranging to have peers interact directly for other connections. It is even possible to have different peers interact for each connection. This means that the actual identity of the peer for one connection might differ from the peer on another connection. How do or could the mitigations specified in this document address these attacks? Section 8.2 I don't see how [BASE64] is only informative; we require base64-decoding for some of the procedures. |
2019-08-05
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06 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Benjamin Kaduk |
2019-08-05
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06 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Mirja Kühlewind |
2019-08-05
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06 | Deborah Brungard | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard |
2019-08-04
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06 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alexey Melnikov |
2019-08-01
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06 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2019-07-18
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06 | Adam Roach | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup::AD Followup |
2019-07-17
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06 | Cindy Morgan | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2019-08-08 |
2019-07-17
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06 | Adam Roach | Ballot has been issued |
2019-07-17
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06 | Adam Roach | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Adam Roach |
2019-07-17
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06 | Adam Roach | Created "Approve" ballot |
2019-07-17
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06 | Adam Roach | Ballot writeup was changed |
2019-07-17
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06 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed |
2019-07-17
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06 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA - Not OK |
2019-07-17
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06 | Cindy Morgan | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-06.txt |
2019-07-17
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06 | (System) | Secretariat manually posting. Approvals already received |
2019-07-17
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06 | Cindy Morgan | Uploaded new revision |
2019-07-12
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05 | Adam Roach | Needs a new version to address https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mmusic/fEa5P8rdGsR9-LIZIXFvBhTBdqs |
2019-07-12
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05 | Adam Roach | IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup::Revised I-D Needed from Waiting for Writeup |
2019-06-19
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05 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Not OK from IANA - Review Needed |
2019-06-19
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05 | Sabrina Tanamal | (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-05. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let … (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-05. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know. IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there is a single action which IANA must complete. In the TLS ExtensionType Values registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/, we'll add the following entries: TBD1 external_id_hash CH, EE [RFC-to-be] TBD2 external_session_id Encrypted [RFC-to-be] As this document requests registrations in a Specification Required (see RFC 8126) registry, the IESG-designated experts for the TLS ExtensionType Values have asked that you send a review request to the mailing list (see RFC 8447, Section 17). Expert review will need to be completed before your document can be approved for publication as an RFC. Note: The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed. Thank you, Sabrina Tanamal Senior IANA Services Specialist |
2019-06-19
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05 | (System) | IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call |
2019-06-08
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05 | Russ Housley | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Russ Housley. Sent review to list. |
2019-06-07
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05 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Ron Bonica |
2019-06-07
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05 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Ron Bonica |
2019-06-06
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05 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Jari Arkko |
2019-06-06
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05 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Jari Arkko |
2019-06-06
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05 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Russ Housley |
2019-06-06
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05 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Russ Housley |
2019-06-05
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05 | Cindy Morgan | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed |
2019-06-05
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05 | Cindy Morgan | The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2019-06-19): From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: mmusic-chairs@ietf.org, adam@nostrum.com, mmusic@ietf.org, draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks@ietf.org, Bo … The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2019-06-19): From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: mmusic-chairs@ietf.org, adam@nostrum.com, mmusic@ietf.org, draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks@ietf.org, Bo Burman , bo.burman@ericsson.com Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (Unknown Key Share Attacks on uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)) to Proposed Standard The IESG has received a request from the Multiparty Multimedia Session Control WG (mmusic) to consider the following document: - 'Unknown Key Share Attacks on uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-06-19. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract This document describes unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). Similar attacks are described on the use of DTLS-SRTP with the identity bindings used in Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) and SIP identity. These attacks are difficult to mount, but they cause a victim to be mislead about the identity of a communicating peer. Simple mitigation techniques are defined for each. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. |
2019-06-05
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05 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | Last call was requested |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | Last call announcement was generated |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | Ballot approval text was generated |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | Ballot writeup was generated |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | AD Review is at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mmusic/9ezwC218CghvH454X_qjOarXQRo |
2019-06-05
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05 | Adam Roach | IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from Publication Requested |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up. Changes are expected over time. This version is dated … As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up. Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? A Proposed Standard RFC is being requested. The document specifies normatively mitigation techniques for key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). The title page indicates "Standards Track". (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract or introduction. This document describes unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). Similar attacks are described on the use of DTLS-SRTP with the identity bindings used in Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) and SIP identity. These attacks are difficult to mount, but they cause a victim to be mislead about the identity of a communicating peer. Simple mitigation techniques are defined for each. Working Group Summary Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough? No. Document Quality Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review, what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type review, on what date was the request posted? The document was reviewed and discussed by a small group of key MMUSIC and RTCWEB members. No implementations are known. Personnel Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director? The Document Shepherd is Bo Burman. The Responsible AD is Adam Roach. (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. The document shepherd read the submitted version of the document fully and found no problems. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? There are no concerns. The described attacks and mitigations are rather intricate, but received careful review from a handful of experts in the field and the submitted text addresses all received comments. (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. No. (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. No concerns. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why. The authors have confirmed that they do not know of any IPR disclosures that would be required. (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. No IPR disclosures have been filed. (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? A handful of interested people (except the authors) have commented on the draft in MMUSIC and all those comments are addressed in the submitted draft. (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No. (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. There are no idnits, except for RFC 6234 being identified as a downref, which should be OK and RFC 6234 is already in the downref registry. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. Not applicable. (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? Yes. (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? This document has no normative references that are not ready for advancement: * draft-ietf-mmusic-dtls-sdp; in RFC Ed queue MISSREF. * draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch; in IESG Evaluation (15) Are there downward normative references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. Yes, RFC 6234 (already in DOWNREF registry). (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. The document updates RFC 8122, which is appropriately indicated. (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). The document shepherd reviewed the IANA section and its relation to and consistency with the document body, and found no issues. The suggested modifications of the existing IANA "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry are clearly described and consistent with current registry content. (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. Not applicable. (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. Not applicable. |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | Responsible AD changed to Adam Roach |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | IETF WG state changed to Submitted to IESG for Publication from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | IESG state changed to Publication Requested from I-D Exists |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | IESG process started in state Publication Requested |
2019-06-05
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05 | Bo Burman | As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up. Changes are expected over time. This version is dated … As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document Shepherd Write-Up. Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? A Proposed Standard RFC is being requested. The document specifies normatively mitigation techniques for key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). The title page indicates "Standards Track". (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract or introduction. This document describes unknown key-share attacks on the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security for the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (DTLS-SRTP). Similar attacks are described on the use of DTLS-SRTP with the identity bindings used in Web Real-Time Communications (WebRTC) and SIP identity. These attacks are difficult to mount, but they cause a victim to be mislead about the identity of a communicating peer. Simple mitigation techniques are defined for each. Working Group Summary Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For example, was there controversy about particular points or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough? No. Document Quality Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that merit special mention as having done a thorough review, e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review, what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type review, on what date was the request posted? The document was reviewed and discussed by a small group of key MMUSIC and RTCWEB members. No implementations are known. Personnel Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director? The Document Shepherd is Bo Burman. The Responsible AD is Adam Roach. (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. The document shepherd read the submitted version of the document fully and found no problems. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? There are no concerns. The described attacks and mitigations are rather intricate, but received careful review from a handful of experts in the field and the submitted text addresses all received comments. (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. No. (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. No concerns. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why. The authors have confirmed that they do not know of any IPR disclosures that would be required. (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. No IPR disclosures have been filed. (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? A handful of interested people (except the authors) have commented on the draft in MMUSIC and all those comments are addressed in the submitted draft. (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No. (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. There are no idnits, except for RFC 6234 being identified as a downref, which should be OK and RFC 6234 is already in the downref registry. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. Not applicable. (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? Yes. (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? This document has no normative references that are not ready for advancement: * draft-ietf-mmusic-dtls-sdp; in RFC Ed queue MISSREF. * draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch; in IESG Evaluation (15) Are there downward normative references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. Yes, RFC 6234 (already in DOWNREF registry). (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. The document updates RFC 8122, which is appropriately indicated. (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). The document shepherd reviewed the IANA section and its relation to and consistency with the document body, and found no issues. The suggested modifications of the existing IANA "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry are clearly described and consistent with current registry content. (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. Not applicable. (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. Not applicable. |
2019-06-04
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05 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-05.txt |
2019-06-04
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05 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-06-04
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05 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Eric Rescorla , Martin Thomson |
2019-06-04
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05 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-06-04
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05 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-05-22
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04 | Bo Burman | Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC cleared. |
2019-05-22
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04 | Bo Burman | IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from In WG Last Call |
2019-05-07
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04 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-04.txt |
2019-05-07
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04 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-05-07
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04 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Eric Rescorla , Martin Thomson |
2019-05-07
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04 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-05-07
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04 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2019-04-01
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03 | Bo Burman | Tag Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC set. |
2019-01-07
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03 | Flemming Andreasen | IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document |
2019-01-07
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03 | Flemming Andreasen | Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown |
2019-01-07
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03 | Flemming Andreasen | Intended Status changed to Proposed Standard from Informational |
2019-01-03
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03 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-03.txt |
2019-01-03
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03 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-01-03
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03 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Martin Thomson , mmusic-chairs@ietf.org, Eric Rescorla |
2019-01-03
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03 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2018-08-07
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02 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-02.txt |
2018-08-07
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02 | (System) | New version approved |
2018-08-07
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02 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Martin Thomson , Eric Rescorla |
2018-08-07
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02 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2018-08-07
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02 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2018-08-03
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01 | (System) | Document has expired |
2018-01-30
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01 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-01.txt |
2018-01-30
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01 | (System) | New version approved |
2018-01-30
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01 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Martin Thomson , Eric Rescorla |
2018-01-30
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01 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2018-01-30
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01 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |
2017-08-31
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00 | Bo Burman | Notification list changed to Bo Burman <bo.burman@ericsson.com> |
2017-08-31
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00 | Bo Burman | Document shepherd changed to Bo Burman |
2017-08-03
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00 | Bo Burman | Intended Status changed to Informational from None |
2017-08-03
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00 | Bo Burman | This document now replaces draft-thomson-mmusic-sdp-uks instead of None |
2017-08-01
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00 | Martin Thomson | New version available: draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-uks-00.txt |
2017-08-01
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00 | (System) | WG -00 approved |
2017-07-31
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00 | Martin Thomson | Set submitter to "Martin Thomson ", replaces to (none) and sent approval email to group chairs: mmusic-chairs@ietf.org |
2017-07-31
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00 | Martin Thomson | Uploaded new revision |