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Proxying UDP in HTTP
draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-15

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2022-08-24
15 (System) RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48
2022-08-09
15 (System) RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48
2022-08-04
15 (System) RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from EDIT
2022-08-01
15 Bernie Volz Request closed, assignment withdrawn: Ron Bonica Telechat INTDIR review
2022-08-01
15 Bernie Volz Closed request for Telechat review by INTDIR with state 'Overtaken by Events'
2022-06-23
15 (System) IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor
2022-06-23
15 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from In Progress
2022-06-23
15 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors
2022-06-23
15 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress
2022-06-22
15 (System) RFC Editor state changed to EDIT from MISSREF
2022-06-20
15 (System) RFC Editor state changed to MISSREF
2022-06-20
15 (System) IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent
2022-06-20
15 (System) Announcement was received by RFC Editor
2022-06-20
15 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress
2022-06-20
15 Cindy Morgan IESG has approved the document
2022-06-20
15 Cindy Morgan Closed "Approve" ballot
2022-06-20
15 Cindy Morgan Ballot approval text was generated
2022-06-18
15 Barry Leiba Request closed, assignment withdrawn: Spencer Dawkins Last Call ARTART review
2022-06-18
15 Barry Leiba Closed request for Last Call review by ARTART with state 'Overtaken by Events': Document has finished IESG processing
2022-06-17
15 Martin Duke IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent
2022-06-17
15 Martin Duke IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from Approved-announcement to be sent::AD Followup
2022-06-17
15 (System) Removed all action holders (IESG state changed)
2022-06-17
15 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed
2022-06-17
15 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-15.txt
2022-06-17
15 David Schinazi New version approved
2022-06-17
15 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-06-17
15 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-06-16
14 (System) Changed action holders to David Schinazi (IESG state changed)
2022-06-16
14 Cindy Morgan IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent::Revised I-D Needed from IESG Evaluation
2022-06-16
14 Roman Danyliw
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Catherine Meadows for the SECDIR review.

** Section 3.  The MASQUE charter says “The primary goal of this working group …
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Catherine Meadows for the SECDIR review.

** Section 3.  The MASQUE charter says “The primary goal of this working group is to develop mechanism(s) that allow configuring and concurrently running multiple proxied stream- and datagram-based flows inside an HTTPS connection.”  I’m not sure this is necessarily the right section, but the text should repeat the charter constraint somewhere  -- that this mechanism is only appropriate if the client sends it over HTTPS.

** Section 3.1.
  UDP proxies MUST NOT introduce fragmentation at the IP layer when
  forwarding HTTP Datagrams onto a UDP socket.  In IPv4, the Don't
  Fragment (DF) bit MUST be set if possible, to prevent fragmentation
  on the path. 

Why is the “if possible” caveat needed on the guidance to set the DF bit?

** Section 7.
  HTTP
  servers that support UDP proxying ought to restrict its use to
  authenticated users.

Did the WG discuss stronger guidance than “ought”, perhaps SHOULD?  If not, is there is reason why NOT to be more prescriptive?

** Section 7

Thanks for ongoing discussion around the SECDIR Review.  I had difficulty following the distinctions between the theory and the practice of the TCP vs. UDP.  I’m also not sure if everyone’s data would back-up the claim that only open ports are targeted.

I recommend replacing the paragraph starting with “UDP proxies have similar properties to TCP proxies …” with more narrow text around specific DoS attack behaviors.  Something roughly as follows (by all means edit it) …

NEW
UDP proxies share many similarities to TCP CONNECT proxies when considering them as infrastructure for abuse to enable denial-of-service attacks.  TCP CONNECT and UDP proxies can obfuscate the source address of the attack traffic (from the proxy client).  In the case of a stateless volumetric attack (e.g., TCP SYN flood or a UDP flood) both types of proxies pass the traffic to the target host.  With stateful volumetric attacks (e.g., HTTP flooding) being sent over a TCP CONNECT proxy, the proxy will only send data if it gets TCP SYN-ACKs from the target.  Once the path to the target_host or the target_host itself is flooded or otherwise resource exhausted, it will stop responding, and so the proxy will stop sending data for that connection. UDP doesn't have this session setup, so a UDP proxy could continue sending data to the target_host.
2022-06-16
14 Roman Danyliw Ballot comment text updated for Roman Danyliw
2022-06-16
14 Lars Eggert
[Ballot comment]
# GEN AD review of draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14

CC @larseggert

Thanks to Christer Holmberg for the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) review
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/gen-art/FOZ1oMqVJD5c0FQlSPgxnoG5qVE). …
[Ballot comment]
# GEN AD review of draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14

CC @larseggert

Thanks to Christer Holmberg for the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) review
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/gen-art/FOZ1oMqVJD5c0FQlSPgxnoG5qVE).

## Comments

### Section 3.1, paragraph 0
```
  3.1.  UDP Proxy Handling
```
This section as well as Section 6 later in the document have some overlap with
the guidance in RFC8085, specifically, its Section 3. It might be good to align
the guidance.

## Nits

All comments below are about very minor potential issues that you may choose to
address in some way - or ignore - as you see fit. Some were flagged by
automated tools (via https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool), so there
will likely be some false positives. There is no need to let me know what you
did with these suggestions.

### Grammar/style

#### Section 3.1, paragraph 3
```
her the destination is reachable. Therefore it needs to respond to the reques
                                  ^^^^^^^^^
```
A comma may be missing after the conjunctive/linking adverb "Therefore".

#### Section 3.6, paragraph 2
```
located within a given HTTP namespace but MAY be allocated in any order. The
                                    ^^^^
```
Use a comma before "but" if it connects two independent clauses (unless they
are closely connected and short).

#### Section 9.1, paragraph 12
```
ke to thank Eric Rescorla for suggesting to use an HTTP method to proxy UDP.
                              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
```
The verb "suggesting" is used with the gerund form.

## Notes

This review is in the ["IETF Comments" Markdown format][ICMF], You can use the
[`ietf-comments` tool][ICT] to automatically convert this review into
individual GitHub issues. Review generated by the [`ietf-reviewtool`][IRT].

[ICMF]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md
[ICT]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments
[IRT]: https://github.com/larseggert/ietf-reviewtool
2022-06-16
14 Lars Eggert [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Lars Eggert
2022-06-16
14 Zaheduzzaman Sarker
[Ballot comment]
Based on this PR (https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp/pull/178), I am clearing my discuss but keeping the comments (hopefully the author will response to the …
[Ballot comment]
Based on this PR (https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp/pull/178), I am clearing my discuss but keeping the comments (hopefully the author will response to the comments as he promised :-)).

Thanks a lot for working on this specification. I think this specification will be very useful.

I don't have other major issues other than mentioned in the discuss points. Below are some comments which I believe will improve the document if addressed.

- Section 3: s/pct-encoding/percent-encoding and would be good to add a reference to pct-encoding (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986)

- Section 3.1: it took a bit of time for me to understand if we are redefining the "intermediaries" here again. We have already described what is an intermediary in the context of this document. Hence, I would suggest that we just write - if the recipient is an intermediary, it forwards ....

- Section 3.1: what exactly "fail the request" means? is it only a notification to some waiting processes/methods or sending the error message or both? can we be more specific here?

- Section 5 : reference to the QUIC DATAGRAM frame would be nicer.

- Section 5 : it says -

"Therefore, endpoints MUST NOT send HTTP Datagrams with a Payload field longer than 65527 using Context ID zero. An endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM capsule using Context ID zero whose Payload field is longer than 65527 MUST abort the stream. "

I assume the HTTP Datagram and a DATAGRAM capsule is referring to the same thing, but this is confusing. Can use HTTP DATAGRAM in the second sentence as well? The DATAGRAM capsule kind of appeared in this section all on a sudden.

In this section to me it seems HTTP DATAGRAM and DATAGRAM capsule is interchangeably used, if I am correct then I think it is worth mentioning this for the sake of better understanding.

- Section 5 : it says

"If a UDP proxy knows it can only send out UDP packets of a certain length due to its underlying link MTU, it SHOULD discard incoming DATAGRAM capsules using Context ID zero whose Payload field is longer than that limit without buffering the capsule contents."

    It is not clear why "SHOULD" is used here? what are the other option the UDP proxy has in this case?

- Section 3.6: if this section should be removed then [STRUCT-FIELD] must not be in the normative section, actually should be removed from the references. Either at this stage of this document we can remove this section or we can add a note to remove normative reference when this section is removed.
2022-06-16
14 Zaheduzzaman Sarker [Ballot Position Update] Position for Zaheduzzaman Sarker has been changed to No Objection from Discuss
2022-06-16
14 Andrew Alston
[Ballot comment]
Having reviewed this before reading through other positions, I did walk away with an uneasy feeling about the security section and was struggling …
[Ballot comment]
Having reviewed this before reading through other positions, I did walk away with an uneasy feeling about the security section and was struggling to find a way to articulate it.  Having said that, and having read the comments in other ballot positions however, I must support Erik's comments, though I to couldn't really find a way to formulate a discuss.  Sorry for this comment is a little obscure!  I think a wider description of the security issues around this though would make me more comfortable.
2022-06-16
14 Andrew Alston [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Andrew Alston
2022-06-16
14 Murray Kucherawy
[Ballot comment]
I support Zahed's DISCUSS.

I also concur with Paul's comment about MUST/SHOULD weirdness, and Rob's comment about the choice of the well-known name …
[Ballot comment]
I support Zahed's DISCUSS.

I also concur with Paul's comment about MUST/SHOULD weirdness, and Rob's comment about the choice of the well-known name registered here.
2022-06-16
14 Murray Kucherawy [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Murray Kucherawy
2022-06-15
14 Roman Danyliw
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Catherine Meadows for the SECDIR review.

** Section 3.  The MASQUE charter says “The primary goal of this working group …
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Catherine Meadows for the SECDIR review.

** Section 3.  The MASQUE charter says “The primary goal of this working group is to develop mechanism(s) that allow configuring and concurrently running multiple proxied stream- and datagram-based flows inside an HTTPS connection.”  I’m not sure this is necessarily the right section, but the text should repeat the charter constraint somewhere  -- that this mechanism is only appropriate if the client sends it over HTTPS.

** Section 3.1.
  UDP proxies MUST NOT introduce fragmentation at the IP layer when
  forwarding HTTP Datagrams onto a UDP socket.  In IPv4, the Don't
  Fragment (DF) bit MUST be set if possible, to prevent fragmentation
  on the path. 

Why is the “if possible” caveat needed on the guidance to set the DF bit?

** Section 7.
  HTTP
  servers that support UDP proxying ought to restrict its use to
  authenticated users.

Did the WG discuss stronger guidance than “ought”, perhaps SHOULD?  If not, is there is reason why NOT to be more prescriptive?

** Section 7

Thanks for ongoing discussion around the SECDIR Review.  I had difficulty following the distinctions between the theory and the practice of the TCP vs. UDP.  I’m also not sure if everyone’s data would back-up the claim that only open ports are targeted.

I recommend replacing the paragraph starting with “UDP proxies have similar properties to TCP proxies …” with more narrow text around specific DoS attack behaviors.  Something roughly as follows (by all means edit it) …

NEW
UDP proxies share many similarities to TCP CONNECT proxies when considering them as infrastructure for abuse to enable denial-of-service attacks.  TCP CONNECT and UDP proxies can obfuscate the source address of the attack traffic (from the proxy client).  In the case of a stateless volumetric attack (e.g., TCP SYN flood or a UDP flood) both types of proxies pass the traffic to the target host.  By design, TCP CONNECT and UDP proxies will not originate reflection attacks as the proxy clients cannot forge the source address (which will be set to that of the proxy).
In the case of stateful volumetric attacks (e.g., HTTP flooding) being sent over a TCP CONNECT proxy, the proxy will only send data if it gets TCP SYN-ACKs from the target.  Once the path to the target_host or the target_host itself is flooded or otherwise resource exhausted, it will stop responding, and so the proxy will stop sending data for that connection. UDP doesn't have this session setup, so a UDP proxy could continue sending data to the target_host.
2022-06-15
14 Roman Danyliw [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Roman Danyliw
2022-06-15
14 Cindy Morgan Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown
2022-06-15
14 John Scudder [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for John Scudder
2022-06-15
14 Paul Wouters
[Ballot comment]
Looks good, just two comments:

    [... MUST ....]
    Clients SHOULD validate the requirements above;

This is a rather odd …
[Ballot comment]
Looks good, just two comments:

    [... MUST ....]
    Clients SHOULD validate the requirements above;

This is a rather odd construct. The requirements contains MUST items,
which are now downgraded via a SHOULD encapsulation. Is this construct
really needed, or can it be removed?

    In IPv4, the Don't Fragment (DF) bit MUST be set if possible

When is this "not possible" ?
2022-06-15
14 Paul Wouters [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Paul Wouters
2022-06-15
14 Éric Vyncke
[Ballot comment]
# Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14
CC @evyncke

Thank you for the work put into this document.

Please find below some …
[Ballot comment]
# Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14
CC @evyncke

Thank you for the work put into this document.

Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated even if only for my own education).

Special thanks to Eric Kinnear for the shepherd's detailed write-up including the WG consensus and the justification of the intended status.

I hope that this helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-éric


## COMMENTS

### Non-explicit well-know

I second Rob's comment on the use of '.well-known/masque' rather than '.well-known/proxy/udp'. This also applies to the examples in section 2.

### Section 3.1 fragments

What happens when the UDP proxy cannot transmit a received UDP payload without fragmenting it ?

### Section 3.1 DNS

Should the UDP proxy prefers AAAA vs. A ?

### Section 8.1

This document leaves the door open to proxying other protocols, so why is "connect-udp" used if the specs could cover other protocols than UDP ?

### Section 8.2

As written above, I support Rob's point about using "masque".

## Notes

This review is in the ["IETF Comments" Markdown format][ICMF], You can use the
[`ietf-comments` tool][ICT] to automatically convert this review into
individual GitHub issues.

[ICMF]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments/blob/main/format.md
[ICT]: https://github.com/mnot/ietf-comments
2022-06-15
14 Éric Vyncke [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Éric Vyncke
2022-06-15
14 Warren Kumari
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Al Morton for the useful OpsDir review, and to the authors for working with Al to address the comments -- …
[Ballot comment]
Thank you to Al Morton for the useful OpsDir review, and to the authors for working with Al to address the comments -- I think that it noticeably improved the document.
I think that the document is both useful and clear -- but, while copying my ballot comments from my tablet into the tool I read Rob's comments, and strongly support his "what is this masque thing of which you speak?" (well, how will anyone understand this is 10 years, and would e.g: .well-known/udp-proxy be better?) and also his "a picture is worth a thousand words comment -- having a simple ASCII art diagram explaining the players would make this much much simpler for folk like myself to understand this mechanism.
2022-06-15
14 Warren Kumari [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Warren Kumari
2022-06-15
14 Zaheduzzaman Sarker
[Ballot discuss]
This is I think simply a oversight but I am putting a discuss so that this certainly gets addressed before the document proceeds …
[Ballot discuss]
This is I think simply a oversight but I am putting a discuss so that this certainly gets addressed before the document proceeds to the next stage.

Section 3.2 does not say what happens when the requirements are not met. There must be guidance on what to do in that case like there are in section 3.3, 3.4 an 3.5.
2022-06-15
14 Zaheduzzaman Sarker
[Ballot comment]
Thanks a lot for working on this specification. I think this specification will be very useful.

I don't have other major issues other …
[Ballot comment]
Thanks a lot for working on this specification. I think this specification will be very useful.

I don't have other major issues other than mentioned in the discuss points. Below are some comments which I believe will improve the document if addressed.

- Section 3: s/pct-encoding/percent-encoding and would be good to add a reference to pct-encoding (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986)

- Section 3.1: it took a bit of time for me to understand if we are redefining the "intermediaries" here again. We have already described what is an intermediary in the context of this document. Hence, I would suggest that we just write - if the recipient is an intermediary, it forwards ....

- Section 3.1: what exactly "fail the request" means? is it only a notification to some waiting processes/methods or sending the error message or both? can we be more specific here?

- Section 5 : reference to the QUIC DATAGRAM frame would be nicer.

- Section 5 : it says -

"Therefore, endpoints MUST NOT send HTTP Datagrams with a Payload field longer than 65527 using Context ID zero. An endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM capsule using Context ID zero whose Payload field is longer than 65527 MUST abort the stream. "

I assume the HTTP Datagram and a DATAGRAM capsule is referring to the same thing, but this is confusing. Can use HTTP DATAGRAM in the second sentence as well? The DATAGRAM capsule kind of appeared in this section all on a sudden.

In this section to me it seems HTTP DATAGRAM and DATAGRAM capsule is interchangeably used, if I am correct then I think it is worth mentioning this for the sake of better understanding.

- Section 5 : it says

"If a UDP proxy knows it can only send out UDP packets of a certain length due to its underlying link MTU, it SHOULD discard incoming DATAGRAM capsules using Context ID zero whose Payload field is longer than that limit without buffering the capsule contents."

    It is not clear why "SHOULD" is used here? what are the other option the UDP proxy has in this case?

- Section 3.6: if this section should be removed then [STRUCT-FIELD] must not be in the normative section, actually should be removed from the references. Either at this stage of this document we can remove this section or we can add a note to remove normative reference when this section is removed.
2022-06-15
14 Zaheduzzaman Sarker [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Zaheduzzaman Sarker
2022-06-15
14 Alvaro Retana [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana
2022-06-14
14 Al Morton Request for Telechat review by OPSDIR Completed: Ready. Reviewer: Al Morton. Sent review to list.
2022-06-14
14 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Telechat review by OPSDIR is assigned to Al Morton
2022-06-14
14 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Telechat review by OPSDIR is assigned to Al Morton
2022-06-13
14 Erik Kline
[Ballot comment]
# Internet AD comments for {draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14}
CC @ekline

## Comments

### S3.5

* Should the 2xx discussion here include additional reference …
[Ballot comment]
# Internet AD comments for {draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14}
CC @ekline

## Comments

### S3.5

* Should the 2xx discussion here include additional reference to the extended
  commentary in masque-h3-datagram#section-3.2?

### S7

* I *really* wish there could be more said about tunnel security.  I was
  tempted to try to formulate some DISCUSS on the matter, but I cannot
  seem to see where any more extensive text was ever written for the CONNECT
  method.

  Nevertheless, there are plenty of concerns that could be mentioned, like
  what should a proxy do if the target_host is one if its own IP addresses,
  or a link-local address, and so on.

  I'm not entirely convinced that it suffices to claim that because the
  tunnel is not an IP-in-IP tunnel certain considerations don't apply.
  Anything and everything can be tunneled over UDP, especially if RFC 8086
  GRE-in-UDP is what the payloads carry (or ESP, of course).  It seems like
  most of the points raised in RFC 6169 apply; perhaps worth a mention.

  But as I said, I think all these concerns apply equally to CONNECT (in
  principle, anyway), and the text here is commensurate with the text for
  its TCP cousin (that I could find, anyway).
2022-06-13
14 Erik Kline [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Erik Kline
2022-06-13
14 Robert Wilton
[Ballot comment]
[Updated with a further comment after reviewing the HTTP Datagram draft.]

Hi David,

Thank you for document.  I have only two minor comments: …
[Ballot comment]
[Updated with a further comment after reviewing the HTTP Datagram draft.]

Hi David,

Thank you for document.  I have only two minor comments:

(1) I note that MASQUE turns up in the WG name, but not in the draft name, and yet it is used in the example URLs and the also the .well-known protocol name.  Hence, I was wondering whether in future, once the MASQUE WG is no more, whether folks will find it harder to connect the .well-known/masque definition back to the protocol spec, and whether choosing a name like udp-proxy might be better?  Of course, the IANA .well-known registry can link the protocol name back to the RFC that defines it.

(2)
  target_host supports using DNS names, IPv6 literals and IPv4
  literals.  Note that this URI Template expansion requires using pct-
  encoding, so for example if the target_host is "2001:db8::42", it
  will be encoded in the URI as "2001%3Adb8%3A%3A42".

Am I right to presume zone-identifier allowed in the IPv4/6 literals?  Is it worth explicitly mentioning this?

(3) They say that a picture is worth a thousand words.  I wonder whether a simple diagram in the introduction to show the relationship between the client, proxy and server may be beneficial to help quickly align the casual reader?

(4)
  To allow negotiation of a tunnel for UDP over HTTP, this document
  defines the "connect-udp" HTTP Upgrade Token.  The resulting UDP
  tunnels use the Capsule Protocol (see Section 3.2 of [HTTP-DGRAM])
  with HTTP Datagram in the format defined in Section 5.

This text implies that it using "connect-udp" will always make use of the Capsule protocol (say, even when proxying over HTTP/3).  Is this correct, or should this text perhaps be clarified?

All of these are just suggestions and I'm happy to leave it to the authors/WG on how they want to treat them.

Regards,
Rob
2022-06-13
14 Robert Wilton Ballot comment text updated for Robert Wilton
2022-06-10
14 Robert Wilton
[Ballot comment]
Hi David,

Thank you for document.  I have only two minor comments:

(1) I note that MASQUE turns up in the WG name, …
[Ballot comment]
Hi David,

Thank you for document.  I have only two minor comments:

(1) I note that MASQUE turns up in the WG name, but not in the draft name, and yet it is used in the example URLs and the also the .well-known protocol name.  Hence, I was wondering whether in future, once the MASQUE WG is no more, whether folks will find it harder to connect the .well-known/masque definition back to the protocol spec, and whether choosing a name like udp-proxy might be better?  Of course, the IANA .well-known registry can link the protocol name back to the RFC that defines it.

(2)
  target_host supports using DNS names, IPv6 literals and IPv4
  literals.  Note that this URI Template expansion requires using pct-
  encoding, so for example if the target_host is "2001:db8::42", it
  will be encoded in the URI as "2001%3Adb8%3A%3A42".

Am I right to presume zone-identifier allowed in the IPv4/6 literals?  Is it worth explicitly mentioning this?

(3) They say that a picture is worth a thousand words.  I wonder whether a simple diagram in the introduction to show the relationship between the client, proxy and server may be beneficial to help quickly align the casual reader?

All of these are just suggestions and I'm happy to leave it to the authors/WG on how they want to treat them.

Regards,
Rob
2022-06-10
14 Robert Wilton [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Robert Wilton
2022-06-09
14 Amanda Baber IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed
2022-06-09
14 Carlos Jesús Bernardos Request for Telechat review by INTDIR is assigned to Ron Bonica
2022-06-09
14 Carlos Jesús Bernardos Request for Telechat review by INTDIR is assigned to Ron Bonica
2022-06-08
14 Éric Vyncke Requested Telechat review by INTDIR
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke Placed on agenda for telechat - 2022-06-16
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke Ballot has been issued
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Martin Duke
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke Created "Approve" ballot
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup
2022-06-08
14 Martin Duke Ballot writeup was changed
2022-06-08
14 (System) IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed
2022-06-08
14 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-14.txt
2022-06-08
14 David Schinazi New version approved
2022-06-08
14 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-06-08
14 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-06-08
13 (System) IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call
2022-06-07
13 Catherine Meadows Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Catherine Meadows. Sent review to list.
2022-06-07
13 Michelle Thangtamsatid IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed
2022-06-07
13 Michelle Thangtamsatid IANA Experts State changed to Expert Reviews OK
2022-06-02
13 (System) IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA - Not OK
2022-06-02
13 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-13.txt
2022-06-02
13 (System) New version approved
2022-06-02
13 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-06-02
13 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-06-01
12 (System) IANA Review state changed to IANA - Not OK from IANA - Review Needed
2022-06-01
12 Michelle Thangtamsatid
(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-12. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let …
(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-12. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

The IANA Functions Operator understands that, upon approval of this document, there are two actions which we must complete.

First, in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-tokens/

a new token will be registered as follows:

Value: connect-udp
Description: Proxying of UDP Payloads
Expected Version Tokens: [ none ]
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Second, in the Well-Known URIs registry located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/

a new URI is to be registered as follows:

URI Suffix: masque/udp
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]
Status: permanent
Related Information: Includes all resources identified with the path prefix "/.well-known/masque/udp/"

As this document requests registrations in an Expert Review (see RFC 8126) registry, we will initiate the required Expert Review via a separate request. This review must be completed before the document's IANA state can be changed to "IANA OK."

The IANA Functions Operator understands that these are the only actions required to be completed upon approval of this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed.

For definitions of IANA review states, please see:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/help/state/draft/iana-review

Thank you,

Michelle Thangtamsatid
IANA Services Specialist
2022-05-31
12 Al Morton Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR Completed: Has Nits. Reviewer: Al Morton. Sent review to list.
2022-05-31
12 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Al Morton
2022-05-31
12 Gunter Van de Velde Request for Last Call review by OPSDIR is assigned to Al Morton
2022-05-28
12 Christer Holmberg Request for Last Call review by GENART Completed: Almost Ready. Reviewer: Christer Holmberg. Sent review to list.
2022-05-27
12 Tero Kivinen Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Catherine Meadows
2022-05-27
12 Tero Kivinen Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Catherine Meadows
2022-05-27
12 Barry Leiba Request for Last Call review by ARTART is assigned to Spencer Dawkins
2022-05-27
12 Barry Leiba Request for Last Call review by ARTART is assigned to Spencer Dawkins
2022-05-27
12 Jean Mahoney Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Christer Holmberg
2022-05-27
12 Jean Mahoney Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Christer Holmberg
2022-05-25
12 Cindy Morgan IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed
2022-05-25
12 Cindy Morgan
The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2022-06-08):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp@ietf.org, ekinnear@apple.com, martin.h.duke@gmail.com, masque-chairs@ietf.org, masque@ietf.org …
The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2022-06-08):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp@ietf.org, ekinnear@apple.com, martin.h.duke@gmail.com, masque-chairs@ietf.org, masque@ietf.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Proxying UDP in HTTP) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Multiplexed Application Substrate
over QUIC Encryption WG (masque) to consider the following document: -
'Proxying UDP in HTTP'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2022-06-08. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document describes how to proxy UDP in HTTP, similar to how the
  HTTP CONNECT method allows proxying TCP in HTTP.  More specifically,
  this document defines a protocol that allows HTTP clients to create a
  tunnel for UDP communications through an HTTP server that acts as a
  proxy.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.




2022-05-25
12 Cindy Morgan IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke Last call was requested
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke Last call announcement was generated
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke Ballot approval text was generated
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke Ballot writeup was generated
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation
2022-05-25
12 (System) Changed action holders to Martin Duke (IESG state changed)
2022-05-25
12 Martin Duke IESG state changed to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood
# Document Shepherd Writeup

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or did …
# Document Shepherd Writeup

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

This document reached broad agreement across the group.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough?

Like the HTTP/3 datagram document, there was some initial controversy around the role of HTTP intermediaries in the protocol (are they explicit? what role do they play? what are they allowed to do or not do with messages sent up or downstream?), though these concerns were resolved as a byproduct of a Design Team that worked on the document.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere, either in the document itself (as RFC 7942 recommends) or elsewhere (where)?

Yes, there are several interoperable implementations of the document. Some of them are open source [1,2] whereas others are closed source. An incomplete and outdated collection of implementations is available at [3].

[1] https://github.com/google/quiche
[2] https://github.com/facebookincubator/mvfst
[3] https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp/wiki/Implementations

5. Does this document need review from other IETF working groups or external organizations? Have those reviews occurred?

This document is relevant to the HTTPBIS and WebTransport WGs, and both WGs were included on the WGLC thread, so we believe this review has occurred.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module been checked with any of the recommended validation tools for syntax and formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified in RFC 8342?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

Wire format details (such as that used to describe the datagram payloads and HTTP message headers) have been validated by multiple people.

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes, this document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designated, and ready to be handed off to the responsible AD.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled lists of common issues that their reviewers encounter. Do any such issues remain that would merit specific attention from subsequent reviews?

No.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream (Best Current Practice, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

Proposed Standard to match backing standards like RFC 9000. The Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent.

12. Has the interested community confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required by BCP 78 and BCP 79 have been filed? If not, explain why. If yes, summarize any discussion and conclusion regarding the intellectual property rights (IPR) disclosures, including links to relevant emails.

Yes. The author confirmed that they are not aware of any IPR related to this draft.

13. Has each Author or Contributor confirmed their willingness to be listed as such? If the number of Authors/Editors on the front page is greater than 5, please provide a justification.

Yes. The author is willing to be listed as such.

14. Identify any remaining I-D nits in this document. (See the idnits tool and the checkbox items found in Guidelines to Authors of Internet-Drafts). Simply running the idnits tool is not enough; please review the entire guidelines document.

There are some id-nits issues remaining but they are due to non-ASCII characters in names, so they can be resolved by the RPC.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa?

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did the community have sufficient access to review any such normative references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see RFC 3967, BCP 97)? If so, list them.

No.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If they exist, what is the plan for their completion?

Yes:

- draft-ietf-httpbis-h3-websockets-04
- draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19
- draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19
- draft-ietf-httpbis-proxy-status-08
- draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram (the companion document)
- draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-07
- draft-ietf-quic-http-34

All documents are moving ahead in the process and we don't expect them to be significant blockers.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents, allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see RFC 8126).

The IANA considerations of the document are simple, clear, and correct, as they only register a well-known URI and HTTP Upgrade Token in existing registries.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear? Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood Responsible AD changed to Martin Duke
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood IESG state changed to Publication Requested from I-D Exists
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood IESG process started in state Publication Requested
2022-05-23
12 Christopher Wood
# Document Shepherd Writeup

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or did …
# Document Shepherd Writeup

1. Does the working group (WG) consensus represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or did it reach broad agreement?

This document reached broad agreement across the group.

2. Was there controversy about particular points, or were there decisions where the consensus was particularly rough?

Like the HTTP/3 datagram document, there was some initial controversy around the role of HTTP intermediaries in the protocol (are they explicit? what role do they play? what are they allowed to do or not do with messages sent up or downstream?), though these concerns were resolved as a byproduct of a Design Team that worked on the document.

3. Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

4. For protocol documents, are there existing implementations of the contents of the document? Have a significant number of potential implementers indicated plans to implement? Are any existing implementations reported somewhere, either in the document itself (as RFC 7942 recommends) or elsewhere (where)?

Yes, there are several interoperable implementations of the document. Some of them are open source [1,2] whereas others are closed source. An incomplete and outdated collection of implementations is available at [3].

[1] https://github.com/google/quiche
[2] https://github.com/facebookincubator/mvfst
[3] https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp/wiki/Implementations

5. Does this document need review from other IETF working groups or external organizations? Have those reviews occurred?

This document is relevant to the HTTPBIS and WebTransport WGs, and both WGs were included on the WGLC thread, so we believe this review has occurred.

6. Describe how the document meets any required formal expert review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, YANG Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

N/A

7. If the document contains a YANG module, has the final version of the module been checked with any of the recommended validation tools for syntax and formatting validation? If there are any resulting errors or warnings, what is the justification for not fixing them at this time? Does the YANG module comply with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as specified in RFC 8342?

N/A

8. Describe reviews and automated checks performed to validate sections of the final version of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, CBOR's CDDL, etc.

Wire format details (such as that used to describe the datagram payloads and HTTP message headers) have been validated by multiple people.

9. Based on the shepherd's review of the document, is it their opinion that this document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designed, and ready to be handed off to the responsible Area Director?

Yes, this document is needed, clearly written, complete, correctly designated, and ready to be handed off to the responsible AD.

10. Several IETF Areas have assembled lists of common issues that their reviewers encounter. Do any such issues remain that would merit specific attention from subsequent reviews?

No.

11. What type of RFC publication is being requested on the IETF stream (Best Current Practice, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Do all Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent?

Proposed Standard to match backing standards like RFC 9000. The Datatracker state attributes correctly reflect this intent.

12. Has the interested community confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required by BCP 78 and BCP 79 have been filed? If not, explain why. If yes, summarize any discussion and conclusion regarding the intellectual property rights (IPR) disclosures, including links to relevant emails.

Yes. The author confirmed that they are not aware of any IPR related to this draft.

13. Has each Author or Contributor confirmed their willingness to be listed as such? If the number of Authors/Editors on the front page is greater than 5, please provide a justification.

Yes. The author is willing to be listed as such.

14. Identify any remaining I-D nits in this document. (See the idnits tool and the checkbox items found in Guidelines to Authors of Internet-Drafts). Simply running the idnits tool is not enough; please review the entire guidelines document.

There are some id-nits issues remaining but they are due to non-ASCII characters in names, so they can be resolved by the RPC.

15. Should any informative references be normative or vice-versa?

No.

16. List any normative references that are not freely available to anyone. Did the community have sufficient access to review any such normative references?

N/A

17. Are there any normative downward references (see RFC 3967, BCP 97)? If so, list them.

No.

18. Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If they exist, what is the plan for their completion?

Yes:

- draft-ietf-httpbis-h3-websockets-04
- draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19
- draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19
- draft-ietf-httpbis-proxy-status-08
- draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram (the companion document)
- draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-07
- draft-ietf-quic-http-34

All documents are moving ahead in the process and we don't expect them to be significant blockers.

19. Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? If so, does the Datatracker metadata correctly reflect this and are those RFCs listed on the title page, in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If not, explain why and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to these other RFCs is discussed.

No.

20. Describe the document shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all aspects of the document requiring IANA assignments are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that each newly created IANA registry specifies its initial contents, allocations procedures, and a reasonable name (see RFC 8126).

The IANA considerations of the document are simple, clear, and correct, as they only register a well-known URI and HTTP Upgrade Token in existing registries.

21. List any new IANA registries that require Designated Expert Review for future allocations. Are the instructions to the Designated Expert clear? Please include suggestions of designated experts, if appropriate.

N/A
2022-05-09
12 Christopher Wood Notification list changed to ekinnear@apple.com because the document shepherd was set
2022-05-09
12 Christopher Wood Document shepherd changed to Eric Kinnear
2022-05-09
12 Christopher Wood IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from In WG Last Call
2022-05-03
12 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-12.txt
2022-05-03
12 (System) New version approved
2022-05-03
12 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-05-03
12 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-05-02
11 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-11.txt
2022-05-02
11 (System) New version approved
2022-05-02
11 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-05-02
11 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-04-18
10 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-10.txt
2022-04-18
10 (System) New version accepted (logged-in submitter: David Schinazi)
2022-04-18
10 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-04-11
09 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-09.txt
2022-04-11
09 (System) New version approved
2022-04-11
09 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-04-11
09 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-03-29
08 Eric Kinnear Added to session: IETF-113: masque  Mon-1430
2022-03-21
08 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-08.txt
2022-03-21
08 (System) New version approved
2022-03-21
08 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-03-21
08 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2022-03-21
07 Christopher Wood IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document
2022-03-04
07 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-07.txt
2022-03-04
07 (System) New version approved
2022-03-04
07 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2022-03-04
07 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2021-11-05
06 Christopher Wood Added to session: IETF-112: masque  Mon-1200
2021-10-25
06 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-06.txt
2021-10-25
06 (System) New version approved
2021-10-25
06 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2021-10-25
06 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2021-10-06
05 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-05.txt
2021-10-06
05 (System) New version approved
2021-10-06
05 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2021-10-06
05 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2021-07-12
04 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-04.txt
2021-07-12
04 (System) New version approved
2021-07-12
04 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2021-07-12
04 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2021-07-09
03 (System) Document has expired
2021-01-30
03 Christopher Wood IETF WG state changed to WG Document
2021-01-05
03 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-03.txt
2021-01-05
03 (System) New version approved
2021-01-05
03 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2021-01-05
03 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2021-01-05
03 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2020-12-30
02 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-02.txt
2020-12-30
02 (System) New version approved
2020-12-30
02 (System) Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi
2020-12-30
02 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2020-12-30
02 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2020-12-12
01 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-01.txt
2020-12-12
01 (System) New version accepted (logged-in submitter: David Schinazi)
2020-12-12
01 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision
2020-09-09
00 Christopher Wood This document now replaces draft-schinazi-masque-connect-udp instead of None
2020-08-28
00 Henrik Levkowetz Failed submission, manual fixups
2020-08-28
00 David Schinazi New version available: draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-00.txt
2020-08-28
00 (System) WG -00 approved
2020-08-27
00 David Schinazi Set submitter to "David Schinazi ", replaces to draft-schinazi-masque-connect-udp and sent approval email to group chairs: masque-chairs@ietf.org
2020-08-27
00 David Schinazi Uploaded new revision