Extensions to DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) for Failure Reporting
draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting-16

[Ballot comment]
      rep-rr-tag = %x72.72 *WSP "=" *WSP rep-rr-type
                    *WSP 0* ( ":" *WSP rep-rr-type )

Bill's parser (http://tools.ietf.org/tools/bap/abnf.cgi) says:

stdin(1:28): error: No whitespace allowed between repeat and element.

There are two instances of this error in the draft.

[Ballot discuss]
Is the assumption here that the report-generator/DKIM-verifier also supports DKIM-signing and will send the report back DKIM-signed?  If that's true shouldn't there be some kind of requirement that the DKIM l= value MUST cover the entire report body?  Or, do you think folks will do that by default because that's the l= default in RFC 6376?  And, would it be better to state a requirement that returned reports MUST be DKIM-signed?

[Ballot discuss]
I only have one small Discuss issue with this document...

(Compare with Peter's Comment - I think "MUST" is appropriate since there is no way to know how to handle an unregistered tag, but...)

In Section 3.2 you have...

  Any tag found in the content of this record that is not registered
  with IANA as described in Section 7.3 MUST be ignored.

But adding a tag to the registry will not automatically update all the
implementations in the field!

So I think you need...

  Implementations MUST support all tags defined in this document and
  any tag found in the content of this record that is not recognized by
  an implementation MUST be ignored.

[Ballot comment]
It would be nice if the Introduction included an expansion of DKIM as
provided in the Abstract.

---

You should really include a reference to your ABNF definition and
point to it from Section 2.

---

Step 5 of Section 3 says

  5.  If the TXT content is syntactically invalid, terminate.

One might reasonably ask where to look for the definition of syntactic
validity.

[Ballot discuss]
Two things that should be quickly resolved.

- is rr=all a good default? If a bad-actor sends a supposedly signed
mail with a DKIM-Signature with 1000  fields then what happens if the
Signer's DNS has no rr tag? Maybe some special case for unknown
DKIM-Signature tokens or a max on the number of reports for a single
message? (Note: I'm assuming that a separate report can be, or is to
be, generated for each DKIM-Signature token that fails, clarifying
that only one report is ever sent for one inbound mail with a broken
signature would also fix this.)

- the secdir review lead to a bunch of suggested changes of which I
think Barry's comment was to go into a -13, so that's not happened
yet.

[Ballot comment]

- s1, maybe s/not forgeable/less easily forgeable/ ?

- s3.1 "in use by specific keys" is a bit odd, suggest "that ought to
be verifiable with specific public keys"

- s3.2, would it be better to say the signer MUST create this TXT RR,
rather than say "it also" does that?  (And MUST this be present &
good before a verifier is allowed to send a report?)

- s3.2, is there a missing "of" in "In the case a record..."

- s3.3, nit, maybe s/select a random/uniformly select a random/ or
somesuch (should be obvious though)

- s3.3, maybe provide a reference of some sort for the previous
pre-standards scheme?

- s8.2, point 1 - the attacker here modifies the DKIM-Signature
header field and not the "signature" (which is the b= bit of that
header field)

- s8.2, point 2 - is the term "invalid signature" right here?  Would
non-verifiable be better? (The valid/verified terms related to
signature checking have been mis-interpreted many times)

- Does the signature in the example verify or not? Either way, be
good to make that clear, given the topic of this draft. (If it does
verify giving the public key too would be good.)

[Ballot comment]
Section 3.2 states:

  Any tag found in the content of this record that is not registered
  with IANA as described in Section 7.3 MUST be ignored.

Does this really need to be "MUST", or is "SHOULD" sufficient? Saying MUST would prevent any further experimentation, which you might consider a good thing or a bad thing.

The MARF Working Group requests the publication of draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting as a Proposed Standard.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why
is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

The document, aimed at Proposed Standard, defines a standard way for DKIM signing domains to communicate abuse-reporting information to DKIM verifiers. The title page header specifies "Standards Track", as generated by xml2rfc.

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

Deployers of message authentication technologies are increasingly
seeking visibility into DKIM verification failures and conformance
failures involving the published signing practices (e.g., ADSP) of
an Administrative Management Domain.

This document extends DKIM and ADSP to add an optional reporting
address and some reporting parameters. Reports are generated using
the format defined in draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report.

Working Group Summary

There is nothing of real note in the working group discussion.
The document was not controversial, and in the normal process
of hammering out the details, everything went smoothly. The
document has very broad consensus in the MARF working group.

Document Quality

There is at least one open-source implementation now, from
the document editor. There is also an effort called DMARC,
which builds on DKIM, and some people involved with that work
plan to implement this protocol.

Personnel

Barry Leiba is the document shepherd; Pete Resnick is the
responsible AD.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

I have reviewed the final version of the document in detail, and I believe it is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard. (I also reviewed earlier versions, as it developed in the working group).

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No concerns.

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

No.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

No concerns. The document has broad consensus in the working group, and is solid.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

No IPR disclosures have been filed, and the editor is not aware of any IPR claims. I have also asked the working group as a whole about IPR claims, and no one has come forward.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

See 7.

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

There is broad consensus within the working group. That said, relatively few participants remain active at this point, so that consensus consists of about a half dozen individuals.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

None.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

None required.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

Yes.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

This document depends normatively on two other MARF WG documents:
draft-ietf-marf-as is ready for working-group last call.
draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report is in the RFC Editor queue.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the
Last Call procedure.

This document refers normatively to RFC 5598, "Internet Mail Architecture", which is Informational.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

This document makes no changes to existing RFCs.

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

I have checked the registrations in the IANA Considerations, and they are correct and clear. IANA should have no problem with them.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

This document creates a "specification required" registry for DKIM reporting tags. "Specification required" was chosen because significant documentation and some gatekeeping are required to ensure interoperability with respect to these tags. The document editor, Murray Kucherawy, would be a good choice as the designated expert for this registry. In any case, the expert should have a good understanding of DKIM, ADSP, and MARF, and be aware of what related work (such as DMARC) is being done in the field.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

I've run the stuff through the standard idnits and BNF checkers. The ABNF is simple.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG

To: IETF-Announce

CC:

Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org

Subject: Last Call:  (Extensions to DKIM for Failure Reporting) to Proposed Standard





The IESG has received a request from the Messaging Abuse Reporting Format

WG (marf) to consider the following document:

- 'Extensions to DKIM for Failure Reporting'

  as a Proposed Standard



The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits

final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the

ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-03-14. Exceptionally, comments may be

sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the

beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.



Abstract





  This memo presents extensions to the DomainKeys Identified Mail

  (DKIM) specification to allow for detailed reporting of message

  authentication failures in an on-demand fashion.



Note that this document has downward normative references: This document refers normatively to RFC 5598, "Internet Mail Architecture", which is Informational.



The file can be obtained via

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting/



IESG discussion can be tracked via

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting/ballot/





No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG

To: IETF-Announce

CC:

Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org

Subject: Last Call:  (Extensions to DKIM for Failure Reporting) to Proposed Standard





The IESG has received a request from the Messaging Abuse Reporting Format

WG (marf) to consider the following document:

- 'Extensions to DKIM for Failure Reporting'

  as a Proposed Standard



The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits

final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the

ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-03-14. Exceptionally, comments may be

sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the

beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.



Abstract





  This memo presents extensions to the DomainKeys Identified Mail

  (DKIM) specification to allow for detailed reporting of message

  authentication failures in an on-demand fashion.









The file can be obtained via

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting/



IESG discussion can be tracked via

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting/ballot/





No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.