LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-19
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2019-07-23
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draft-maino-lisp-sec
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Network Working Group F. Maino
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track V. Ermagan
Expires: January 24, 2020 Google
A. Cabellos
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
D. Saucez
INRIA
July 23, 2019
LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-19
Abstract
This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that
provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection
to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup
process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID-
prefix claims in Map-Reply messages.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 24, 2020.
Maino, et al. Expires January 24, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft LISP-SEC July 2019
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. LISP-SEC Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. LISP-SEC Control Messages Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Encapsulated Control Message LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . 7
5.2. Map-Reply LISP-SEC Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Map-Register LISP-SEC Extentions . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. ITR Processing: Generating a Map-Request . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.1. PITR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Encrypting and Decrypting an OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5.1. Unencrypted OTK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.7. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7.1. Generating a LISP-SEC Protected Encapsulated Map-
Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.7.2. Generating a Proxy Map-Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.8. ETR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.9. ITR Processing: Receiving a Map-Reply . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.9.1. Map-Reply Record Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Mapping System Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3. Map-Server and ETR Colocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.4. Deploying LISP-SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.5. Shared Keys Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.6. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.7. Message Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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