Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional SHAKE Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA and ECDSA
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8692.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Panos Kampanakis , Quynh Dang | ||
| Last updated | 2018-02-16 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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GENART Last Call review
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Almost ready
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 8692 (Proposed Standard) | |
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draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
Expires: August 19, 2018 NIST
February 15, 2018
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional SHAKE Algorithms
and Identifiers for RSA and ECDSA
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions in the Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with
the RSA and ECDSA signature algorithms; the conventions for the
associated subject public keys are also described. Digital
signatures are used to sign messages, certificates and CRLs
(Certificate Revocation Lists).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Mask Generation SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. ECDSA with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Public Key Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01:
* Changed titles and section names.
* Removed DSA after WG discussions.
* Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.
* Updated RSASSA-PSS section.
* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:
* Initial version
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2. Introduction
This document describes several cryptographic algorithms which may be
used with the Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
It describes the OIDs for variable length SHAKE algorithms introduced
in [SHA3] and how they can be used in X.509 certificates. [ EDNOTE:
Update here. ]
3. Message Digest Algorithms
This section describes two one-way hash functions and digital
signature algorithms using these functions, which may be used to sign
certificates and CRLs, and identifies OIDs (Object Identifiers) for
public keys contained in certificates.
3.1. One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
document. SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output
lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions is defined by the
parameter d. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256). The
Object Identifiers (OIDs) for these two hash functions are defined in
[shake-nist-oids] and are included here for convenience:
id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 17 }
ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets
When using the id-shake128-len algorithm identifier, the parameters
MUST be present, and they MUST employ the ShakeOutputLen syntax that
contains an encoded positive integer value at least 32 in this
specification.
id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 18 }
ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets
When using the id-shake256-len algorithm identifier, the parameters
MUST be present, and they MUST employ the ShakeOutputLen syntax that
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contains an encoded positive integer value at least 64 in this
specification.
3.2. Mask Generation SHAKEs
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm uses a mask generation function.
A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
is defined in [RFC8017], but we include it here as well for
convenience:
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a
hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1. To use
SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id-
shake256-len as specified in Section 3.1 above.
4. Signature Algorithms
4.1. RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm identifier and its parameters are
specifed in [RFC4055]:
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm,
maskGenAlgorithm MaskGenAlgorithm,
saltLength INTEGER,
trailerField INTEGER }
This document adds two new hash algorithm choices and two new choices
for mask generation functions. These are the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
algorithm identifiers specified in Section 3.1.
When SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the hashAlgorithm, it MUST also
be used as the maskGenAlgorithm.
When used as the hashAlgorithm, the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output-
length must be either 32 or 64 bytes respectively. In these cases,
the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
of 32 or 64 for id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm
identifier respectively.
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When id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm identifier is used
as the id-mfg1 maskGenAlgorithm parameter, the ShakeOutputLen
parameter must be (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 respectively for
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. For
example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, ShakeOutputLen must be 223 or
191 when id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len is are used respectively.
The parameter saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively for the
SHAKE128 and SHA256 OIDs.
4.2. ECDSA with SHAKEs
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
"Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)" [X9.62]. The
ASN.1 OIDs of ECDSA signature algorithms using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256,
are below:
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)
id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) x }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)
id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) y }
[ EDNOTE: "x" and "y" will be specified by NIST later. ]
When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256, algorithm
identifier appears in the algorithm field as an AlgorithmIdentifier,
the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID
ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the hash algorithm
explicitly using the OIDs specified in Section 3.2 above when
encoding ECDSA/SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs.
Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA signatures with
any of the SHAKE hash algorithms when processing certificates and
CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs specified in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 above.
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Encoding rules for ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055],
Section 2.2.3, and [RFC5480].
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA signatures in
certificates or CRLs MUST generate such ECDSA signatures in
accordance with all the requirements specified in Sections 7.2 and
7.3 of [X9.62] or with all the requirements specified in
Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1]. They MAY also generate such ECDSA
signatures in accordance with all the recommendations in [X9.62] or
[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. These standards above may have not specified
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128
and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively
are subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
5. Public Key Algorithms
The conventions for RSA and ECDSA public keys are as specified in
[RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]. We include them here for
convenience.
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, [RFC4055] adds the corresponding RSASSA-PSS OID public
key identifier and parameters (also shown in Section 4 of this
document). The parameters may be either absent or present when
RSASSA-PSS OID is used as subject public key information.
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
If id-RSASSA-PSS is used in the public key identifier with
parameters, Section 3.3 of [RFC4055] describes that the signature
algorithm parameters MUST match the parameters in the key structure
algorithm identifier except the saltLength field. The saltLength
field in the signature parameters MUST be greater or equal to that in
the key parameters field. If the id-RSASSA-PSS parameters are NULL
no further parameter validation is necessary.
For ECDSA, [RFC5480] defines the EC public key identifier and its
parameters as
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id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain }
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
6. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sean Turner for his valuable contributions to
this document.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses several registries that were originally created in
[shake-nist-oids]. No further registries are required. [ EDNOTE:
Update here. ]
8. Security Considerations
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions. Their
output length depends on a required length of the consumming
application.
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties.
Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers
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is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
[SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic
algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to
regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
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[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
[SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
June 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 module
[ EDNOTE: More here. ]
Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
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Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
USA
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
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