CMP Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9480.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Hendrik Brockhaus | ||
| Last updated | 2020-08-07 (Latest revision 2020-07-06) | ||
| Replaces | draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
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| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9480 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft Siemens
Updates: 4210, 6712 (if approved) August 7, 2020
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: February 8, 2021
CMP Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax and
transport of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This
document updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.
Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the
definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
endpoints on certification and registration authorities, and adds an
HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 3
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 6
2.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 9
2.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 9
2.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 10
2.8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.9. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 11
2.10. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.11. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations.
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In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP
to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words
are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
CA delegates certificate management functions such as
authorization checks.
KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of
an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate.
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
1.1 Changes since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
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o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management entity.
o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
o Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
EncryptedValue to extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that
according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of
completeness and consistency the exchange of EncryptedValue is
performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes the
protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
certificates, and revocation passphrases.
o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages.
< TBD: The specification of algorithm profiles seed to be moved to a
separate document. >
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection describes new extended key usages for
different CMP server types specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4.
4.5 Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI
management entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation
explained in this section offers zero-touch means to check the
authorization of such delegation. Such delegation could also be
expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.
To offer automatic validation means for the delegation of a role by a
CA, the certificates used by PKI management entities for CMP message
protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued
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by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This
proves the authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act
as the PKI management entity as described below.
The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same
OIDs SHALL be used for a CMP CA and a CMP RA.
< TBD: The Description of the OIDs for id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA
needs to be extended to avoid confusion as they currently only refer
to CMC. >
The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is
as follows:
CMP CA: CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA
equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in
the context of CMP management operations, especially CMP
message protection, need not be the same key that signs the
certificates. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the
entity acting as CMP CA is authorized to do so. Therefore,
the CMP CA MUST do one of the following,
* use the CA private key on the CMP endpoint, or
* explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
For automatic validation of such delegation it MUST be
indicated by the id-kp-cmcCA extended key usage. This
extended key usage MUST be placed into the certificate used
on the CA equipment and the CA that delegates this role MUST
issue the CMP CA certificate.
Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP
management operations at the CA decreases the number of
operations of the private key used to sign certificates.
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CMP RA: CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA
equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3. A CMP RA is
identified by the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage. This
extended key usage is placed into RA certificates. The CA
that delegated this role is identified by the CA that issued
the CMP RA certificate.
CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
cmKGA extended key usage. Though the CMP KGA knows the
private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This
is a very sensitive service and needs specific
authorization. This authorization is either with the CA
certificate itself, or indicated by placing the id-kp-cmKGA
extended key usage into the CMP RA or CMP CA certificate
used to authenticate the origin of the private key, and to
express the authorization to offer this service.
Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates,
CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280
Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used
for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP
message protection (CMP CA, CMP RA, CMP KGA) MUST NOT use indefinite
expiration date.
2.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document opens the usage of nested messages also for batch
transport of PKI messages between different PKI management entities.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA,
the RA MAY forward that message to a CA, adding its own protection
(which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). There are different
use cases for such multi protected messages.
o The RA confirms the validation and authorization of a message and
forwards the original message unchanged.
o The RA collects several messages and forwards them in a batch.
This can for instance be used to bridge an off-line connection
between two PKI management entities. In communication to the CA
request messages and in communication from the CA response or
announcement messages will be collected in such batch.
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o The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify
particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. In case the
changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP, the RA MUST
either set the POP RAVerified or include the original PKIMessage
from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of the nested
message (to force the CA to check POP on the original message).
The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see
Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is
PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in
PKIBody). For simplicity reasons, if batching is used in
combination with inclusion of the original PKIMessage in the
generalInfo field, all messages in the batch MUST be of the same
type (e.g., ir).
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the
PKI entity within a new PKI message. The structure used is as
follows.
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
(The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch
the requests of several EEs in a single new message.)
2.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either
private keys, certificates, or passwords) are sent in PKI messages,
the EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for
EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652]. Using the EncryptedKey data
structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward
compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered. The use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use
EnvelopedData.
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Note: As we reuse the EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF
[RFC4211], the update is backward compatible. Using the new syntax
with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bitwise compatible
with the old syntax.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows:
o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
encrypted only for one recipient.
o Contains a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure as
defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure as
specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation
Authority.
o Contains a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
encryptedContent field.
Note: To ensure explicit control of the encoding of the private key
according to the specific algorithm the new key pair in an asymmetric
key package structure as specified in [RFC5958].
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
management techniques.
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available for the recipient:
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].
o Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
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2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.1 above.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
the following text.
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] Certificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
}
Add the following paragraphs to the end of the section.
The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.
2.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
information as described in Section 2.1 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.
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2.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also to
outstanding p10cr transactions.
Replace all paragraphs in front of the state machine diagram with the
following text.
This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
client needs to poll the server in order to determine the status of
an outstanding ir, cr, p10cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when the
"waiting" PKIStatus has been received).
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
The following clauses describe when polling messages are used, and
how they are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can
be sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to
each ip, cp, or kup that contains a CertStatus for an issued
certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
certConf for all issued certificates and, following the ack, a
pollReq for all pending certificates.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it
will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as
the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.
4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
will be treated in the same way as the initial response.
Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo
data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
following messages of this transaction.
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2.8. IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new and updates two
existing Extended Key Usages, the IANA Considerations need to be
updated accordingly.
Add the following paragraphs between the first and second paragraph
of the section.
Within the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three
changes have been performed.
Two existing entries have been updated to also point to this
document:
Decimal Description References
------- ----------- ------------------
27 id-kp-cmcCA [RFC6402][thisRFC]
28 id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402][thisRFC]
One new entry has been added:
Decimal Description References
------- ----------- ----------
32 id-kp-cmKGA [thisRFC]
2.9. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text.
o The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210
[RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be
sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage
at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in
section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
initialization request or certificate request message.) This
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conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for
use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
the decrypted bytes of the encValue field) to the relevant CA/RA;
furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate
confidentiality characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text.
o When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.10. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly.
Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
section with the following text.
-- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document
-- * makes the behavioral clarification of specifying that the
-- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows
-- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
-- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211].
-- **********
2.11. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue to use
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
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Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text.
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP)
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
[RFC6712]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
1.1 Changes since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates:
o Add an HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.
3.2. New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This
document adds a discovery mechanism and extends the URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
Each PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS transport MUST
support the use of the path-prefix of '/.well-known/' as defined in
RFC 5785 [RFC5785] and the registered name of 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client MUST be configured with sufficient information to form
the CMP server URI. This MUST be at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operational path of
the PKI management entity. Additional arbitrary label, e.g.,
'profileLabel' and 'operationLabel', MAY be configured as a separate
component or as part of the full operational path to provide further
information. The 'profileLabel' MAY support addressing multiple CAs
or certificate profiles and the 'operationLabel' may support
addressing PKI management operation specific endpoints. A valid full
operational path can look like this:
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1 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
2 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
3 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
4 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel
The discovery of supported endpoints as defined above will provide
the information to the EE, how to contact the PKI management entity
and, if available, how to request enrolment for a specific
certificate profile or revoke a certificate at a specific CA.
Querying the PKI management entity, the EE will get a list of
potential endpoints supported by the PKI management entity.
Performing a GET on "/.well-known/cmp" to the default port MUST
return a set of links to endpoints available from the server. In
addition to the link also the expected format of the data object is
provided as content type (ct).
< TBD: It needs to be discussed if the discovery should be performed
using GET on "/.well-known/cmp" or GET on "/.well-known" only. >
The following provides an illustrative example for a PKI management
entity supporting different PKI management operations for different
certificate profiles and CAs.
Detailed message description:
REQ: GET /.well-known/cmp
RES: Content
</cmp/certprofile1/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile2/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile3/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile1/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile2/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile3/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/ca1/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/ca2/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp
4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations section
to be added to [RFC4210].
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< TBD: The existing description and information of id-kp-cmcRA and
id-kp-cmcCA need to be updated to reflect their extended usage. >
5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document I got from [RFC6402] that
updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas
Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on the
approvement of this document.
I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their
valuable feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-02
(work in progress), July 2020.
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[IEEE802.1AR]
IEEE, "802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", June 2018,
<http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-
2009.html>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this remains the normative module as
per the policy of the PKIX working group.
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000(16)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier,
UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
CertId, CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in this document
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
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FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- this document
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in this document
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate
}
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
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OPTIONAL
}
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
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cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody
}
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
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-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
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-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
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-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
}
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
-- Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- int INTEGER,
-- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
-- sender GeneralName
-- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
-- }
}
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POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
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newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
}
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
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CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
}
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
}
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- -- made in this document
-- -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- -- syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
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-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER
}
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
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certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
}
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END -- of CMP module
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The
module contains those changes that were done to update to 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made for this document.
< TBD: Dose this document then also updates [RFC5912]? >
< In case the working group sees a need to provide this ASN.1 module
in 2015 syntax, please let me know. >
PKIXCMP-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2000-02(50) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
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Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
CertId,CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- this document
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in this document
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
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-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
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freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text;
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
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header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
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-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16),
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-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
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OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
-- Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- int INTEGER,
-- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
-- sender GeneralName
-- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
-- }
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
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-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
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newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
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-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- -- made in this document
-- -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- -- the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
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ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END
Appendix B. History of changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document.
From version 02 -> 03:
o Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108
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o Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.4 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108
o Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
o Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 module
o Added Section 3Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712
[RFC6712] regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of
'/.well-known/' as discussed in IETF 108
o Updated the IANA Considerations section
o Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
o Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02:
o Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
o Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.4 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list
o Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.9
o Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01:
o Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00:
o Changes required to reflect WG adoption
From version 02 -> 03:
o Added some clarification in Section 2.1
From version 01 -> 02:
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o Added clarification to section on multiple protection
o Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
Gustavsson
o Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
IETF 106
o Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
a revocation passphrase
o Minor changes in wording
From version 00 -> 01:
o Added a section describing the new extended key usages
o Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
values
o Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
o Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22
o Minor changes in wording
Author's Address
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens AG
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
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