Shepherd writeup
rfc6862-07

This is the document shepherd writeup for the request by the KARP
  working group that draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-02 (The Threat
  Analysis and Requirements for Cryptographic Authentication of
  Routing Protocols' Transports) be published as an Informational
  RFC.

In accordance with <http://www.ietf.org/iesg/template/doc-
  writeup.html>, the following information is provided.

(1.a) Brian Weis, co-chair of the KARP working group, is the document
  shepherd for this document.  He has personally reviewed the most
  current version of this document, and believes it is ready for
  forwarding to the IESG for publication.

(1.b) The document has had sufficient review both inside and outside
  of the WG.

(1.c) I have no concerns that specific areas were under-reviewed.
  There were sufficient routing and security reviews of the document.

(1.d) I do not have any concerns or issues with this document.

(1.e) WG consensus behind this document was strong; no public opinions
  were expressed that it should not be published.

(1.f) There are no known threatened appeals.

(1.g) The document passes id-nits checks & there are no other reviews
  required.

(1.h) References are in good shape.

(1.i) There are no IANA issues in the document, and there is a
  placeholder section stating that.

(1.j) There is no formal language usage in the document.

(1.k) Draft Writeup:

Technical Summary
   Existing IAB work recommends the tightening of the security of the
  core routing infrastructure. This document provides a threat
  analysis for attacks against routing protocols' transports and the
  then enumerates the requirements for addressing the described
  threats. It is intended to be used by KARP design teams in their
  analysis of routing protocols, and will generally be useful in the
  analysis of routing protocols.

Working Group Summary:
  The working group support publication of this document as an
  informational document.

Document Quality:
   This informational document does not specify a protocol or other
  semantics that can be directly implemented, thus there are no
  machine implementations. However, in terms of quality it has been
  reviewed by a number of security experts.
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