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IP-TFS: IP Traffic Flow Security Using Aggregation and Fragmentation
draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-06

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9347.
Author Christian Hopps
Last updated 2021-01-24 (Latest revision 2021-01-19)
Replaces draft-hopps-ipsecme-iptfs
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draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-06
Network Working Group                                           C. Hopps
Internet-Draft                                   LabN Consulting, L.L.C.
Intended status: Standards Track                        January 19, 2021
Expires: July 23, 2021

  IP-TFS: IP Traffic Flow Security Using Aggregation and Fragmentation
                      draft-ietf-ipsecme-iptfs-06

Abstract

   This document describes a mechanism to enhance IPsec traffic flow
   security by adding traffic flow confidentiality to encrypted IP
   encapsulated traffic.  Traffic flow confidentiality is provided by
   obscuring the size and frequency of IP traffic using a fixed-sized,
   constant-send-rate IPsec tunnel.  The solution allows for congestion
   control as well as non-constant send-rate usage.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology & Concepts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The IP-TFS Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Tunnel Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Data Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.2.  No Implicit End Padding Required  . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.3.  Fragmentation, Sequence Numbers and All-Pad Payloads    6
       2.2.4.  Empty Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.5.  IP Header Value Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.6.  IP Time-To-Live (TTL) and Tunnel errors . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.7.  Effective MTU of the Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Exclusive SA Use  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Modes of Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.1.  Non-Congestion Controlled Mode  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.2.  Congestion Controlled Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Congestion Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  ECN Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Fixed Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Congestion Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  USE_AGGFRAG Notification Message  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Packet and Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.1.1.  Non-Congestion Control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload Format  15
       6.1.2.  Congestion Control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload Format . .  15
       6.1.3.  Data Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.1.4.  IKEv2 USE_AGGFRAG Notification Message  . . . . . . .  19
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.1.  AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Sub-Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.2.  USE_AGGFRAG Notify Message Status Type  . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   Appendix A.  Example Of An Encapsulated IP Packet Flow  . . . . .  23
   Appendix B.  A Send and Loss Event Rate Calculation . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix C.  Comparisons of IP-TFS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     C.1.  Comparing Overhead  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       C.1.1.  IP-TFS Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       C.1.2.  ESP with Padding Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

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     C.2.  Overhead Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     C.3.  Comparing Available Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       C.3.1.  Ethernet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix D.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   Appendix E.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   Traffic Analysis ([RFC4301], [AppCrypt]) is the act of extracting
   information about data being sent through a network.  While one may
   directly obscure the data through the use of encryption [RFC4303],
   the traffic pattern itself exposes information due to variations in
   it's shape and timing ([I-D.iab-wire-image], [AppCrypt]).  Hiding the
   size and frequency of traffic is referred to as Traffic Flow
   Confidentiality (TFC) per [RFC4303].

   [RFC4303] provides for TFC by allowing padding to be added to
   encrypted IP packets and allowing for transmission of all-pad packets
   (indicated using protocol 59).  This method has the major limitation
   that it can significantly under-utilize the available bandwidth.

   The IP-TFS solution provides for full TFC without the aforementioned
   bandwidth limitation.  This is accomplished by using a constant-send-
   rate IPsec [RFC4303] tunnel with fixed-sized encapsulating packets;
   however, these fixed-sized packets can contain partial, whole or
   multiple IP packets to maximize the bandwidth of the tunnel.  A non-
   constant send-rate is allowed, but the confidentiality properties of
   its use are outside the scope of this document.

   For a comparison of the overhead of IP-TFS with the RFC4303
   prescribed TFC solution see Appendix C.

   Additionally, IP-TFS provides for dealing with network congestion
   [RFC2914].  This is important for when the IP-TFS user is not in full
   control of the domain through which the IP-TFS tunnel path flows.

1.1.  Terminology & Concepts

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
   as shown here.

   This document assumes familiarity with IP security concepts described
   in [RFC4301].

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2.  The IP-TFS Tunnel

   As mentioned in Section 1 IP-TFS utilizes an IPsec [RFC4303] tunnel
   (SA) as it's transport.  To provide for full TFC, fixed-sized
   encapsulating packets are sent at a constant rate on the tunnel.

   The primary input to the tunnel algorithm is the requested bandwidth
   used by the tunnel.  Two values are then required to provide for this
   bandwidth, the fixed size of the encapsulating packets, and rate at
   which to send them.

   The fixed packet size MAY either be specified manually or could be
   determined through the other methods such as the Packetization Layer
   MTU Discovery (PLMTUD) ([RFC4821], [RFC8899]) or Path MTU discovery
   (PMTUD) ([RFC1191], [RFC8201]).  PMTUD is known to have issues so
   PLMTUD is considered the more robust option.

   Given the encapsulating packet size and the requested tunnel used
   bandwidth, the corresponding packet send rate can be calculated.  The
   packet send rate is the requested bandwidth divided by the size of
   the encapsulating packet.

   The egress of the IP-TFS tunnel MUST allow for and expect the ingress
   (sending) side of the IP-TFS tunnel to vary the size and rate of sent
   encapsulating packets, unless constrained by other policy.

2.1.  Tunnel Content

   As previously mentioned, one issue with the TFC padding solution in
   [RFC4303] is the large amount of wasted bandwidth as only one IP
   packet can be sent per encapsulating packet.  In order to maximize
   bandwidth IP-TFS breaks this one-to-one association.

   IP-TFS aggregates as well as fragments the inner IP traffic flow into
   fixed-sized encapsulating IPsec tunnel packets.  Padding is only
   added to the the tunnel packets if there is no data available to be
   sent at the time of tunnel packet transmission, or if fragmentation
   has been disabled by the receiver.

   This is accomplished using a new Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP,
   [RFC4303]) type which is identified by the number AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   (Section 6.1).

   Other non-IP-TFS uses of this aggregation and fragmentation
   encapsulation have been identified, such as increased performance
   through packet aggregation, as well as handling MTU issues using
   fragmentation.  These uses are not defined here, but are also not
   restricted by this document.

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2.2.  Payload Content

   The AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload content defined in this document is
   comprised of a 4 or 24 octet header followed by either a partial, a
   full or multiple partial or full data blocks.  The following diagram
   illustrates this payload within the ESP packet.  See Section 6.1 for
   the exact formats of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload.

    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
    . Outer Encapsulating Header ...                                .
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
    . ESP Header...                                                 .
    +---------------------------------------------------------------+
    |   [AGGFRAG subtype/flags]    :           BlockOffset          |
    +---------------------------------------------------------------+
    :                  [Optional Congestion Info]                   :
    +---------------------------------------------------------------+
    |       DataBlocks ...                                          ~
    ~                                                               ~
    ~                                                               |
    +---------------------------------------------------------------|
    . ESP Trailer...                                                .
    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

                Figure 1: Layout of an IP-TFS IPsec Packet

   The "BlockOffset" value is either zero or some offset into or past
   the end of the "DataBlocks" data.

   If the "BlockOffset" value is zero it means that the "DataBlocks"
   data begins with a new data block.

   Conversely, if the "BlockOffset" value is non-zero it points to the
   start of the new data block, and the initial "DataBlocks" data
   belongs to a previous data block that is still being re-assembled.

   The "BlockOffset" can point past the end of the "DataBlocks" data
   which indicates that the next data block occurs in a subsequent
   encapsulating packet.

   Having the "BlockOffset" always point at the next available data
   block allows for recovering the next inner packet in the presence of
   outer encapsulating packet loss.

   An example IP-TFS packet flow can be found in Appendix A.

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2.2.1.  Data Blocks

    +---------------------------------------------------------------+
    | Type  | rest of IPv4, IPv6 or pad.
    +--------

                   Figure 2: Layout of IP-TFS data block

   A data block is defined by a 4-bit type code followed by the data
   block data.  The type values have been carefully chosen to coincide
   with the IPv4/IPv6 version field values so that no per-data block
   type overhead is required to encapsulate an IP packet.  Likewise, the
   length of the data block is extracted from the encapsulated IPv4 or
   IPv6 packet's length field.

2.2.2.  No Implicit End Padding Required

   It's worth noting that since a data block type is identified by its
   first octet there is never a need for an implicit pad at the end of
   an encapsulating packet.  Even when the start of a data block occurs
   near the end of a encapsulating packet such that there is no room for
   the length field of the encapsulated header to be included in the
   current encapsulating packet, the fact that the length comes at a
   known location and is guaranteed to be present is enough to fetch the
   length field from the subsequent encapsulating packet payload.  Only
   when there is no data to encapsulated is end padding required, and
   then an explicit "Pad Data Block" would be used to identify the
   padding.

2.2.3.  Fragmentation, Sequence Numbers and All-Pad Payloads

   In order for a receiver to be able to reassemble fragmented inner-
   packets, the sender MUST send the inner-packet fragments back-to-back
   in the logical outer packet stream (i.e., using consecutive ESP
   sequence numbers).  However, the sender is allowed to insert "all-
   pad" payloads (i.e., payloads with a "BlockOffset" of zero and a
   single pad "DataBlock") in between the packets carrying the inner-
   packet fragment payloads.  This possible interleaving of all-pad
   payloads allows the sender to always be able to send a tunnel packet,
   regardless of the encapsulation computational requirements.

   When a receiver is reassembling an inner-packet, and it receives an
   "all-pad" payload, it increments the expected sequence number that
   the next inner-packet fragment is expected to arrive in.

   Given the above, the receiver will need to handle out-of-order
   arrival of outer ESP packets prior to reassembly processing.  ESP
   already provides for optionally detecting replay attacks.  Detecting

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   replay attacks normally utilizes a window method.  A similar sequence
   number based sliding window can be used to correct re-ordering of the
   outer packet stream.  Receiving a larger (newer) sequence number
   packet advances the window, and received older ESP packets whose
   sequence numbers the window has passed by are dropped.  A good choice
   for the size of this window depends on the amount of re-ordering the
   user may normally experience.

   As the amount of reordering that may be present is hard to predict
   the window size SHOULD be configurable by the user.  Implementations
   MAY also dynamically adjust the reordering window based on actual
   reordering seen in arriving packets.  Finally, we note that as IP-TFS
   is sending a continuous stream of packets there is no requirement for
   timers (although there's no prohibition either) as newly arrived
   packets will cause the window to advance and older packets will then
   be processed as they leave the window.  Implementations that are
   concerned about memory use when packets are delayed (e.g., when an SA
   deletion is delayed) can of course use timers to drop packets as
   well.

   While ESP guarantees an increasing sequence number with subsequently
   sent packets, it does not actually require the sequence numbers to be
   generated with no gaps (e.g., sending only even numbered sequence
   numbers would be allowed as long as they are always increasing).
   Gaps in the sequence numbers will not work for this specification so
   the sequence number stream is further restricted to not contain gaps
   (i.e., each subsequent outer packet must be sent with the sequence
   number incremented by 1).

   When using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD in conjunction with replay detection,
   the window size for both MAY be reduced to share the smaller of the
   two window sizes.  This is b/c packets outside of the smaller window
   but inside the larger would still be dropped by the mechanism with
   the smaller window size.

   Finally, as sequence numbers are reset when switching SAs (e.g., when
   re-keying a child SA), an implementation SHOULD NOT send initial
   fragments of an inner packet using one SA and subsequent fragments in
   a different SA.

2.2.3.1.  Optional Extra Padding

   When the tunnel bandwidth is not being fully utilized, an
   implementation MAY pad-out the current encapsulating packet in order
   to deliver an inner packet un-fragmented in the following outer
   packet.  The benefit would be to avoid inner-packet fragmentation in
   the presence of a bursty offered load (non-bursty traffic will
   naturally not fragment).  An implementation MAY also choose to allow

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   for a minimum fragment size to be configured (e.g., as a percentage
   of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload size) to avoid fragmentation at the
   cost of tunnel bandwidth.  The cost with these methods is complexity
   and added delay of inner traffic.  The main advantage to avoiding
   fragmentation is to minimize inner packet loss in the presence of
   outer packet loss.  When this is worthwhile (e.g., how much loss and
   what type of loss is required, given different inner traffic shapes
   and utilization, for this to make sense), and what values to use for
   the allowable/added delay may be worth researching, but is outside
   the scope of this document.

   While use of padding to avoid fragmentation does not impact
   interoperability, used inappropriately it can reduce the effective
   throughput of a tunnel.  Implementations implementing either of the
   above approaches will need to take care to not reduce the effective
   capacity, and overall utility, of the tunnel through the overuse of
   padding.

2.2.4.  Empty Payload

   In order to support reporting of congestion control information
   (described later) on a non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SA, IP-TFS allows
   for the sending of an AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload with no data blocks
   (i.e., the ESP payload length is equal to the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD header
   length).  This special payload is called an empty payload.

2.2.5.  IP Header Value Mapping

   [RFC4301] provides some direction on when and how to map various
   values from an inner IP header to the outer encapsulating header,
   namely the Don't-Fragment (DF) bit ([RFC0791] and [RFC8200]), the
   Differentiated Services (DS) field [RFC2474] and the Explicit
   Congestion Notification (ECN) field [RFC3168].  Unlike [RFC4301], IP-
   TFS may and often will be encapsulating more than one IP packet per
   ESP packet.  To deal with this, these mappings are restricted
   further.  In particular IP-TFS never maps the inner DF bit as it is
   unrelated to the IP-TFS tunnel functionality; IP-TFS never IP
   fragments the inner packets and the inner packets will not affect the
   fragmentation of the outer encapsulation packets.  Likewise, the ECN
   value need not be mapped as any congestion related to the constant-
   send-rate IP-TFS tunnel is unrelated (by design!) to the inner
   traffic flow.  Finally, by default the DS field SHOULD NOT be copied
   although an implementation MAY choose to allow for configuration to
   override this behavior.  An implementation SHOULD also allow the DS
   value to be set by configuration.

   It is worth noting that an implementation MAY still set the ECN value
   of inner packets based on the normal ECN specification ([RFC3168]).

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2.2.6.  IP Time-To-Live (TTL) and Tunnel errors

   [RFC4301] specifies how to modify the inner packet TTL ([RFC0791]).

   Any errors (e.g., ICMP errors arriving back at the tunnel ingress due
   to tunnel traffic) should be handled the same as with non IP-TFS
   IPsec tunnels.

2.2.7.  Effective MTU of the Tunnel

   Unlike [RFC4301], there is normally no effective MTU (EMTU) on an IP-
   TFS tunnel as all IP packet sizes are properly transmitted without
   requiring IP fragmentation prior to tunnel ingress.  That said, an
   implementation MAY allow for explicitly configuring an MTU for the
   tunnel.

   If IP-TFS fragmentation has been disabled, then the tunnel's EMTU and
   behaviors are the same as normal IPsec tunnels ([RFC4301]).

2.3.  Exclusive SA Use

   It is not the intention of this specification to allow for mixed use
   of an AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SA.  In other words, an SA that has
   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled MUST NOT have non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payloads
   such as IP (IP protocol 4), TCP transport (IP protocol 6), or ESP pad
   packets (protocol 59) intermixed with non-empty AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   payloads.  Empty AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payloads (Section 2.2.4) are used to
   transmit congestion control information on non-IP-TFS enabled SAs, so
   intermixing is allowed in this specific case.  While it's possible to
   envision making the algorithm work in the presence of sequence number
   skips in the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload stream, the added complexity is
   not deemed worthwhile.  Other IPsec uses can configure and use their
   own SAs.

2.4.  Modes of Operation

   Just as with normal IPsec/ESP tunnels, IP-TFS tunnels are
   unidirectional.  Bidirectional IP-TFS functionality is achieved by
   setting up 2 IP-TFS tunnels, one in either direction.

   An IP-TFS tunnel can operate in 2 modes, a non-congestion controlled
   mode and congestion controlled mode.

2.4.1.  Non-Congestion Controlled Mode

   In the non-congestion controlled mode IP-TFS sends fixed-sized
   packets at a constant rate.  The packet send rate is constant and is

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   not automatically adjusted regardless of any network congestion
   (e.g., packet loss).

   For similar reasons as given in [RFC7510] the non-congestion
   controlled mode should only be used where the user has full
   administrative control over the path the tunnel will take.  This is
   required so the user can guarantee the bandwidth and also be sure as
   to not be negatively affecting network congestion [RFC2914].  In this
   case packet loss should be reported to the administrator (e.g., via
   syslog, YANG notification, SNMP traps, etc) so that any failures due
   to a lack of bandwidth can be corrected.

2.4.2.  Congestion Controlled Mode

   With the congestion controlled mode, IP-TFS adapts to network
   congestion by lowering the packet send rate to accommodate the
   congestion, as well as raising the rate when congestion subsides.
   Since overhead is per packet, by allowing for maximal fixed-size
   packets and varying the send rate transport overhead is minimized.

   The output of the congestion control algorithm will adjust the rate
   at which the ingress sends packets.  While this document does not
   require a specific congestion control algorithm, best current
   practice RECOMMENDS that the algorithm conform to [RFC5348].
   Congestion control principles are documented in [RFC2914] as well.
   An example of an implementation of the [RFC5348] algorithm which
   matches the requirements of IP-TFS (i.e., designed for fixed-size
   packet and send rate varied based on congestion) is documented in
   [RFC4342].

   The required inputs for the TCP friendly rate control algorithm
   described in [RFC5348] are the receiver's loss event rate and the
   sender's estimated round-trip time (RTT).  These values are provided
   by IP-TFS using the congestion information header fields described in
   Section 3.  In particular these values are sufficient to implement
   the algorithm described in [RFC5348].

   At a minimum, the congestion information must be sent, from the
   receiver and from the sender, at least once per RTT.  Prior to
   establishing an RTT the information SHOULD be sent constantly from
   the sender and the receiver so that an RTT estimate can be
   established.  The lack of receiving this information over multiple
   consecutive RTT intervals should be considered a congestion event
   that causes the sender to adjust it's sending rate lower.  For
   example, [RFC4342] calls this the "no feedback timeout" and it is
   equal to 4 RTT intervals.  When a "no feedback timeout" has occurred
   [RFC4342] halves the sending rate.

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   An implementation MAY choose to always include the congestion
   information in it's IP-TFS payload header if sending on an IP-TFS
   enabled SA.  Since IP-TFS normally will operate with a large packet
   size, the congestion information should represent a small portion of
   the available tunnel bandwidth.  An implementation choosing to always
   send the data MAY also choose to only update the "LossEventRate" and
   "RTT" header field values it sends every "RTT" though.

   When an implementation is choosing a congestion control algorithm (or
   a selection of algorithms) one should remember that IP-TFS is not
   providing for reliable delivery of IP traffic, and so per packet ACKs
   are not required and are not provided.

   It's worth noting that the variable send-rate of a congestion
   controlled IP-TFS tunnel, is not private; however, this send-rate is
   being driven by network congestion, and as long as the encapsulated
   (inner) traffic flow shape and timing are not directly affecting the
   (outer) network congestion, the variations in the tunnel rate will
   not weaken the provided inner traffic flow confidentiality.

2.4.2.1.  Circuit Breakers

   In additional to congestion control, implementations MAY choose to
   define and implement circuit breakers [RFC8084] as a recovery method
   of last resort.  Enabling circuit breakers is also a reason a user
   may wish to enable congestion information reports even when using the
   non-congestion controlled mode of operation.  The definition of
   circuit breakers are outside the scope of this document.

3.  Congestion Information

   In order to support the congestion control mode, the sender needs to
   know the loss event rate and also be able to approximate the RTT
   ([RFC5348]).  In order to obtain these values the receiver sends
   congestion control information on it's SA back to the sender.  Thus,
   in order to support congestion control the receiver must have a
   paired SA back to the sender (this is always the case when the tunnel
   was created using IKEv2).  If the SA back to the sender is a non-
   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SA then an AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD empty payload
   (i.e., header only) is used to convey the information.

   In order to calculate a loss event rate compatible with [RFC5348],
   the receiver needs to have a round-trip time estimate.  Thus the
   sender communicates this estimate in the "RTT" header field.  On
   startup this value will be zero as no RTT estimate is yet known.

   In order for the sender to estimate it's "RTT" value, the sender
   places a timestamp value in the "TVal" header field.  On first

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   receipt of this "TVal", the receiver records the new "TVal" value
   along with the time it arrived locally, subsequent receipt of the
   same "TVal" MUST not update the recorded time.  When the receiver
   sends it's CC header it places this latest recorded value in the
   "TEcho" header field, along with 2 delay values, "Echo Delay" and
   "Transmit Delay".  The "Echo Delay" value is the time delta from the
   recorded arrival time of "TVal" and the current clock in
   microseconds.  The second value, "Transmit Delay", is the receiver's
   current transmission delay on the tunnel (i.e., the average time
   between sending packets on it's half of the IP-TFS tunnel).  When the
   sender receives back it's "TVal" in the "TEcho" header field it
   calculates 2 RTT estimates.  The first is the actual delay found by
   subtracting the "TEcho" value from it's current clock and then
   subtracting "Echo Delay" as well.  The second RTT estimate is found
   by adding the received "Transmit Delay" header value to the senders
   own transmission delay (i.e., the average time between sending
   packets on it's half of the IP-TFS tunnel).  The larger of these 2
   RTT estimates SHOULD be used as the "RTT" value.  The two estimates
   are required to handle different combinations of faster or slower
   tunnel packet paths with faster or slower fixed tunnel rates.
   Choosing the larger of the two values guarantees that the "RTT" is
   never considered faster than the aggregate transmission delay based
   on the IP-TFS tunnel rate (the second estimate), as well as never
   being considered faster than the actual RTT along the tunnel packet
   path (the first estimate).

   The receiver also calculates, and communicates in the "LossEventRate"
   header field, the loss event rate for use by the sender.  This is
   slightly different from [RFC4342] which periodically sends all the
   loss interval data back to the sender so that it can do the
   calculation.  See Appendix B for a suggested way to calculate the
   loss event rate value.  Initially this value will be zero (indicating
   no loss) until enough data has been collected by the receiver to
   update it.

3.1.  ECN Support

   In additional to normal packet loss information IP-TFS supports use
   of the ECN bits in the encapsulating IP header [RFC3168] for
   identifying congestion.  If ECN use is enabled and a packet arrives
   at the egress endpoint with the Congestion Experienced (CE) value
   set, then the receiver considers that packet as being dropped,
   although it does not drop it.  The receiver MUST set the E bit in any
   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload header containing a "LossEventRate" value
   derived from a CE value being considered.

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   As noted in [RFC3168] the ECN bits are not protected by IPsec and
   thus may constitute a covert channel.  For this reason ECN use SHOULD
   NOT be enabled by default.

4.  Configuration

   IP-TFS is meant to be deployable with a minimal amount of
   configuration.  All IP-TFS specific configuration should be able to
   be specified at the unidirectional tunnel ingress (sending) side.  It
   is intended that non-IKEv2 operation is supported, at least, with
   local static configuration.

4.1.  Bandwidth

   Bandwidth is a local configuration option.  For non-congestion
   controlled mode the bandwidth SHOULD be configured.  For congestion
   controlled mode one can configure the bandwidth or have no
   configuration and let congestion control discover the maximum
   bandwidth available.  No standardized configuration method is
   required.

4.2.  Fixed Packet Size

   The fixed packet size to be used for the tunnel encapsulation packets
   MAY be configured manually or can be automatically determined using
   other methods such as PLMTUD ([RFC4821], [RFC8899]) or PMTUD
   ([RFC1191], [RFC8201]).  As PMTUD is known to have issues, PLMTUD is
   considered the more robust option.  No standardized configuration
   method is required.

4.3.  Congestion Control

   Congestion control is a local configuration option.  No standardized
   configuration method is required.

5.  IKEv2

5.1.  USE_AGGFRAG Notification Message

   As mentioned previously IP-TFS tunnels utilize ESP payloads of type
   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD.

   When using IKEv2, a new "USE_AGGFRAG" Notification Message is used to
   enable use of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on a child SA pair.  The
   method used is similar to how USE_TRANSPORT_MODE is negotiated, as
   described in [RFC7296].

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   To request using the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload on the Child SA pair,
   the initiator includes the USE_AGGFRAG notification in an SA payload
   requesting a new Child SA (either during the initial IKE_AUTH or
   during non-rekeying CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges).  If the request is
   accepted then response MUST also include a notification of type
   USE_AGGFRAG.  If the responder declines the request the child SA will
   be established without AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload use enabled.  If this
   is unacceptable to the initiator, the initiator MUST delete the child
   SA.

   The USE_AGGFRAG notification MUST NOT be sent, and MUST be ignored,
   during a CREATE_CHILD_SA rekeying exchange as it is not allowed to
   change use of the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload type during rekeying.  A
   new child SA due to re-keying inherits the use of AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   from the re-keyed child SA.

   The USE_AGGFRAG notification contains a 1 octet payload of flags that
   specify any requirements from the sender of the message.  If any
   requirement flags are not understood or cannot be supported by the
   receiver then the receiver should not enable use of AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   payload type (either by not responding with the USE_AGGFRAG
   notification, or in the case of the initiator, by deleting the child
   SA if the now established non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD using SA is
   unacceptable).

   The notification type and payload flag values are defined in
   Section 6.1.4.

6.  Packet and Data Formats

6.1.  AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload

   ESP Payload Type: 0x5

   An IP-TFS payload is identified by the ESP payload type
   AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD which has the value 0x5.  The first octet of this
   payload indicates the format of the remaining payload data.

     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
    |   Sub-type    | ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Sub-type:
      An 8 bit value indicating the payload format.

   This specification defines 2 payload sub-types.  These payload
   formats are defined in the following sections.

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6.1.1.  Non-Congestion Control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload Format

   The non-congestion control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload is comprised of a
   4 octet header followed by a variable amount of "DataBlocks" data as
   shown below.

                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Sub-Type (0) |   Reserved    |          BlockOffset          |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |       DataBlocks ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Sub-type:
      An octet indicating the payload format.  For this non-congestion
      control format, the value is 0.

   Reserved:
      An octet set to 0 on generation, and ignored on receipt.

   BlockOffset:
      A 16 bit unsigned integer counting the number of octets of
      "DataBlocks" data before the start of a new data block.
      "BlockOffset" can count past the end of the "DataBlocks" data in
      which case all the "DataBlocks" data belongs to the previous data
      block being re-assembled.  If the "BlockOffset" extends into
      subsequent packets it continues to only count subsequent
      "DataBlocks" data (i.e., it does not count subsequent packets
      non-"DataBlocks" octets).

   DataBlocks:
      Variable number of octets that begins with the start of a data
      block, or the continuation of a previous data block, followed by
      zero or more additional data blocks.

6.1.2.  Congestion Control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload Format

   The congestion control AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload is comprised of a 24
   octet header followed by a variable amount of "DataBlocks" data as
   shown below.

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                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Sub-type (1) |  Reserved   |E|          BlockOffset          |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                          LossEventRate                        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                      RTT                  |   Echo Delay ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
         ... Echo Delay   |           Transmit Delay                |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                              TVal                             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                             TEcho                             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |       DataBlocks ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Sub-type:
      An octet indicating the payload format.  For this congestion
      control format, the value is 1.

   Reserved:
      A 7 bit field set to 0 on generation, and ignored on receipt.

   E:
      A 1 bit value if set indicates that Congestion Experienced (CE)
      ECN bits were received and used in deriving the reported
      "LossEventRate".

   BlockOffset:
      The same value as the non-congestion controlled payload format
      value.

   LossEventRate:
      A 32 bit value specifying the inverse of the current loss event
      rate as calculated by the receiver.  A value of zero indicates no
      loss.  Otherwise the loss event rate is "1/LossEventRate".

   RTT:
      A 22 bit value specifying the sender's current round-trip time
      estimate in microseconds.  The value MAY be zero prior to the
      sender having calculated a round-trip time estimate.  The value
      SHOULD be set to zero on non-AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD enabled SAs.  If the
      value is equal to or larger than "0x3FFFFF" it MUST be set to
      "0x3FFFFF".

   Echo Delay:

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      A 21 bit value specifying the delay in microseconds incurred
      between the receiver first receiving the "TVal" value which it is
      sending back in "TEcho".  If the value is equal to or larger than
      "0x1FFFFF" it MUST be set to "0x1FFFFF".

   Transmit Delay:
      A 21 bit value specifying the transmission delay in microseconds.
      This is the fixed (or average) delay on the receiver between it
      sending packets on the IPTFS tunnel.  If the value is equal to or
      larger than "0x1FFFFF" it MUST be set to "0x1FFFFF".

   TVal:
      An opaque 32 bit value that will be echoed back by the receiver in
      later packets in the "TEcho" field, along with an "Echo Delay"
      value of how long that echo took.

   TEcho:
      The opaque 32 bit value from a received packet's "TVal" field.
      The received "TVal" is placed in "TEcho" along with an "Echo
      Delay" value indicating how long it has been since receiving the
      "TVal" value.

   DataBlocks:
      Variable number of octets that begins with the start of a data
      block, or the continuation of a previous data block, followed by
      zero or more additional data blocks.  For the special case of
      sending congestion control information on an non-IP-TFS enabled SA
      this value MUST be empty (i.e., be zero octets long).

6.1.3.  Data Blocks

                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Type  | IPv4, IPv6 or pad...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Type:
      A 4 bit field where 0x0 identifies a pad data block, 0x4 indicates
      an IPv4 data block, and 0x6 indicates an IPv6 data block.

6.1.3.1.  IPv4 Data Block

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                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  0x4  |  IHL  |  TypeOfService  |         TotalLength         |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Rest of the inner packet ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   These values are the actual values within the encapsulated IPv4
   header.  In other words, the start of this data block is the start of
   the encapsulated IP packet.

   Type:
      A 4 bit value of 0x4 indicating IPv4 (i.e., first nibble of the
      IPv4 packet).

   TotalLength:
      The 16 bit unsigned integer "Total Length" field of the IPv4 inner
      packet.

6.1.3.2.  IPv6 Data Block

                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  0x6  | TrafficClass  |               FlowLabel               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |         PayloadLength         | Rest of the inner packet ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   These values are the actual values within the encapsulated IPv6
   header.  In other words, the start of this data block is the start of
   the encapsulated IP packet.

   Type:
      A 4 bit value of 0x6 indicating IPv6 (i.e., first nibble of the
      IPv6 packet).

   PayloadLength:
      The 16 bit unsigned integer "Payload Length" field of the inner
      IPv6 inner packet.

6.1.3.3.  Pad Data Block

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                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  0x0  | Padding ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

   Type:
      A 4 bit value of 0x0 indicating a padding data block.

   Padding:
      extends to end of the encapsulating packet.

6.1.4.  IKEv2 USE_AGGFRAG Notification Message

   As discussed in Section 5.1 a notification message USE_AGGFRAG is
   used to negotiate use of the ESP AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload type.

   The USE_AGGFRAG Notification Message State Type is (TBD2).

   The notification payload contains 1 octet of requirement flags.
   There are currently 2 requirement flags defined.  This may be revised
   by later specifications.

    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0|0|0|0|0|0|C|D|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   0:
      6 bits - reserved, MUST be zero on send, unless defined by later
      specifications.

   C:
      Congestion Control bit.  If set, then the sender is requiring that
      congestion control information MUST be returned to it periodically
      as defined in Section 3.

   D:
      Don't Fragment bit, if set indicates the sender of the notify
      message does not support receiving packet fragments (i.e., inner
      packets MUST be sent using a single "Data Block").  This value
      only applies to what the sender is capable of receiving; the
      sender MAY still send packet fragments unless similarly restricted
      by the receiver in it's USE_AGGFRAG notification.

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7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Sub-Type Registry

   This document requests IANA create a registry called "AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   Sub-Type Registry" under a new category named "ESP AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD
   Parameters".  The registration policy for this registry is "Standards
   Action" ([RFC8126] and [RFC7120]).

   Name:
      AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Sub-Type Registry

   Description:
      AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD Payload Formats.

   Reference:
      This document

   This initial content for this registry is as follows:

    Sub-Type  Name                           Reference
   --------------------------------------------------------
           0  Non-Congestion Control Format  This document
           1  Congestion Control Format      This document
       3-255  Reserved

7.2.  USE_AGGFRAG Notify Message Status Type

   This document requests a status type USE_AGGFRAG be allocated from
   the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types" registry.

   Value:
      TBD2

   Name:
      USE_AGGFRAG

   Reference:
      This document

8.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a mechanism to add Traffic Flow
   Confidentiality to IP traffic.  Use of this mechanism is expected to
   increase the security of the traffic being transported.  Other than
   the additional security afforded by using this mechanism, IP-TFS
   utilizes the security protocols [RFC4303] and [RFC7296] and so their
   security considerations apply to IP-TFS as well.

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   As noted previously in Section 2.4.2, for TFC to be fully maintained
   the encapsulated traffic flow should not be affecting network
   congestion in a predictable way, and if it would be then non-
   congestion controlled mode use should be considered instead.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [AppCrypt]
              Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
              Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 11 2017.

   [I-D.iab-wire-image]
              Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
              Network Protocol", draft-iab-wire-image-01 (work in
              progress), November 2018.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.

   [RFC1191]  Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.

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   [RFC2474]  Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.

   [RFC2914]  Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41,
              RFC 2914, DOI 10.17487/RFC2914, September 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2914>.

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

   [RFC4342]  Floyd, S., Kohler, E., and J. Padhye, "Profile for
              Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Congestion
              Control ID 3: TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC)", RFC 4342,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4342, March 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4342>.

   [RFC4821]  Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
              Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.

   [RFC5348]  Floyd, S., Handley, M., Padhye, J., and J. Widmer, "TCP
              Friendly Rate Control (TFRC): Protocol Specification",
              RFC 5348, DOI 10.17487/RFC5348, September 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5348>.

   [RFC7120]  Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
              Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.

   [RFC7510]  Xu, X., Sheth, N., Yong, L., Callon, R., and D. Black,
              "Encapsulating MPLS in UDP", RFC 7510,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7510, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7510>.

   [RFC8084]  Fairhurst, G., "Network Transport Circuit Breakers",
              BCP 208, RFC 8084, DOI 10.17487/RFC8084, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8084>.

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   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.

   [RFC8201]  McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
              "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.

   [RFC8899]  Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tuexen, M., Ruengeler, I., and
              T. Voelker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
              Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
              September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.

Appendix A.  Example Of An Encapsulated IP Packet Flow

   Below an example inner IP packet flow within the encapsulating tunnel
   packet stream is shown.  Notice how encapsulated IP packets can start
   and end anywhere, and more than one or less than 1 may occur in a
   single encapsulating packet.

     Offset: 0        Offset: 100    Offset: 2900    Offset: 1400
    [ ESP1  (1500) ][ ESP2  (1500) ][ ESP3  (1500) ][ ESP4  (1500) ]
    [--800--][--800--][60][-240-][--4000----------------------][pad]

                   Figure 3: Inner and Outer Packet Flow

   The encapsulated IP packet flow (lengths include IP header and
   payload) is as follows: an 800 octet packet, an 800 octet packet, a
   60 octet packet, a 240 octet packet, a 4000 octet packet.

   The "BlockOffset" values in the 4 IP-TFS payload headers for this
   packet flow would thus be: 0, 100, 2900, 1400 respectively.  The
   first encapsulating packet ESP1 has a zero "BlockOffset" which points
   at the IP data block immediately following the IP-TFS header.  The
   following packet ESP2s "BlockOffset" points inward 100 octets to the
   start of the 60 octet data block.  The third encapsulating packet
   ESP3 contains the middle portion of the 4000 octet data block so the
   offset points past its end and into the forth encapsulating packet.
   The fourth packet ESP4s offset is 1400 pointing at the padding which
   follows the completion of the continued 4000 octet packet.

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Appendix B.  A Send and Loss Event Rate Calculation

   The current best practice indicates that congestion control SHOULD be
   done in a TCP friendly way.  A TCP friendly congestion control
   algorithm is described in [RFC5348].  For this IP-TFS use case (as
   with [RFC4342]) the (fixed) packet size is used as the segment size
   for the algorithm.  The main formula in the algorithm for the send
   rate is then as follows:

                                 1
      X = -----------------------------------------------
          R * (sqrt(2*p/3) + 12*sqrt(3*p/8)*p*(1+32*p^2))

   Where "X" is the send rate in packets per second, "R" is the round
   trip time estimate and "p" is the loss event rate (the inverse of
   which is provided by the receiver).

   In addition the algorithm in [RFC5348] also uses an "X_recv" value
   (the receiver's receive rate).  For IP-TFS one MAY set this value
   according to the sender's current tunnel send-rate ("X").

   The IP-TFS receiver, having the RTT estimate from the sender can use
   the same method as described in [RFC5348] and [RFC4342] to collect
   the loss intervals and calculate the loss event rate value using the
   weighted average as indicated.  The receiver communicates the inverse
   of this value back to the sender in the AGGFRAG_PAYLOAD payload
   header field "LossEventRate".

   The IP-TFS sender now has both the "R" and "p" values and can
   calculate the correct sending rate.  If following [RFC5348] the
   sender SHOULD also use the slow start mechanism described therein
   when the IP-TFS SA is first established.

Appendix C.  Comparisons of IP-TFS

C.1.  Comparing Overhead

C.1.1.  IP-TFS Overhead

   The overhead of IP-TFS is 40 bytes per outer packet.  Therefore the
   octet overhead per inner packet is 40 divided by the number of outer
   packets required (fractional allowed).  The overhead as a percentage
   of inner packet size is a constant based on the Outer MTU size.

      OH = 40 / Outer Payload Size / Inner Packet Size
      OH % of Inner Packet Size = 100 * OH / Inner Packet Size
      OH % of Inner Packet Size = 4000 / Outer Payload Size

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                        Type  IP-TFS  IP-TFS  IP-TFS
                         MTU     576    1500    9000
                       PSize     536    1460    8960
                      -------------------------------
                          40   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
                         576   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
                        1500   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
                        9000   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%

       Figure 4: IP-TFS Overhead as Percentage of Inner Packet Size

C.1.2.  ESP with Padding Overhead

   The overhead per inner packet for constant-send-rate padded ESP
   (i.e., traditional IPsec TFC) is 36 octets plus any padding, unless
   fragmentation is required.

   When fragmentation of the inner packet is required to fit in the
   outer IPsec packet, overhead is the number of outer packets required
   to carry the fragmented inner packet times both the inner IP overhead
   (20) and the outer packet overhead (36) minus the initial inner IP
   overhead plus any required tail padding in the last encapsulation
   packet.  The required tail padding is the number of required packets
   times the difference of the Outer Payload Size and the IP Overhead
   minus the Inner Payload Size.  So:

     Inner Paylaod Size = IP Packet Size - IP Overhead
     Outer Payload Size = MTU - IPsec Overhead

                   Inner Payload Size
     NF0 = ----------------------------------
            Outer Payload Size - IP Overhead

     NF = CEILING(NF0)

     OH = NF * (IP Overhead + IPsec Overhead)
          - IP Overhead
          + NF * (Outer Payload Size - IP Overhead)
          - Inner Payload Size

     OH = NF * (IPsec Overhead + Outer Payload Size)
          - (IP Overhead + Inner Payload Size)

     OH = NF * (IPsec Overhead + Outer Payload Size)
          - Inner Packet Size

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C.2.  Overhead Comparison

   The following tables collect the overhead values for some common L3
   MTU sizes in order to compare them.  The first table is the number of
   octets of overhead for a given L3 MTU sized packet.  The second table
   is the percentage of overhead in the same MTU sized packet.

           Type  ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad  IP-TFS  IP-TFS  IP-TFS
         L3 MTU      576     1500     9000     576    1500    9000
          PSize      540     1464     8964     536    1460    8960
        -----------------------------------------------------------
             40      500     1424     8924     3.0     1.1     0.2
            128      412     1336     8836     9.6     3.5     0.6
            256      284     1208     8708    19.1     7.0     1.1
            536        4      928     8428    40.0    14.7     2.4
            576      576      888     8388    43.0    15.8     2.6
           1460      268        4     7504   109.0    40.0     6.5
           1500      228     1500     7464   111.9    41.1     6.7
           8960     1408     1540        4   668.7   245.5    40.0
           9000     1368     1500     9000   671.6   246.6    40.2

                  Figure 5: Overhead comparison in octets

          Type  ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad   ESP+Pad  IP-TFS  IP-TFS  IP-TFS
           MTU      576     1500      9000     576    1500    9000
         PSize      540     1464      8964     536    1460    8960
        -----------------------------------------------------------
            40  1250.0%  3560.0%  22310.0%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
           128   321.9%  1043.8%   6903.1%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
           256   110.9%   471.9%   3401.6%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
           536     0.7%   173.1%   1572.4%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
           576   100.0%   154.2%   1456.2%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
          1460    18.4%     0.3%    514.0%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
          1500    15.2%   100.0%    497.6%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
          8960    15.7%    17.2%      0.0%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%
          9000    15.2%    16.7%    100.0%   7.46%   2.74%   0.45%

           Figure 6: Overhead as Percentage of Inner Packet Size

C.3.  Comparing Available Bandwidth

   Another way to compare the two solutions is to look at the amount of
   available bandwidth each solution provides.  The following sections
   consider and compare the percentage of available bandwidth.  For the
   sake of providing a well understood baseline normal (unencrypted)
   Ethernet as well as normal ESP values are included.

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C.3.1.  Ethernet

   In order to calculate the available bandwidth the per packet overhead
   is calculated first.  The total overhead of Ethernet is 14+4 octets
   of header and CRC plus and additional 20 octets of framing (preamble,
   start, and inter-packet gap) for a total of 38 octets.  Additionally
   the minimum payload is 46 octets.

         Size  E + P  E + P  E + P  IPTFS  IPTFS  IPTFS  Enet   ESP
          MTU    590   1514   9014    590   1514   9014   any   any
           OH     74     74     74     78     78     78    38    74
        ------------------------------------------------------------
           40    614   1538   9038     45     42     40    84   114
          128    614   1538   9038    146    134    129   166   202
          256    614   1538   9038    293    269    258   294   330
          536    614   1538   9038    614    564    540   574   610
          576   1228   1538   9038    659    606    581   614   650
         1460   1842   1538   9038   1672   1538   1472  1498  1534
         1500   1842   3076   9038   1718   1580   1513  1538  1574
         8960  11052  10766   9038  10263   9438   9038  8998  9034
         9000  11052  10766  18076  10309   9480   9078  9038  9074

                      Figure 7: L2 Octets Per Packet

        Size  E + P  E + P  E + P  IPTFS  IPTFS  IPTFS  Enet   ESP
         MTU  590    1514   9014   590    1514   9014   any    any
          OH  74     74     74     78     78     78     38     74
       --------------------------------------------------------------
          40  2.0M   0.8M   0.1M   27.3M  29.7M  31.0M  14.9M  11.0M
         128  2.0M   0.8M   0.1M   8.5M   9.3M   9.7M   7.5M   6.2M
         256  2.0M   0.8M   0.1M   4.3M   4.6M   4.8M   4.3M   3.8M
         536  2.0M   0.8M   0.1M   2.0M   2.2M   2.3M   2.2M   2.0M
         576  1.0M   0.8M   0.1M   1.9M   2.1M   2.2M   2.0M   1.9M
        1460  678K   812K   138K   747K   812K   848K   834K   814K
        1500  678K   406K   138K   727K   791K   826K   812K   794K
        8960  113K   116K   138K   121K   132K   138K   138K   138K
        9000  113K   116K   69K    121K   131K   137K   138K   137K

               Figure 8: Packets Per Second on 10G Ethernet

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   Size   E + P   E + P   E + P   IPTFS   IPTFS   IPTFS    Enet     ESP
            590    1514    9014     590    1514    9014     any     any
             74      74      74      78      78      78      38      74
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
     40   6.51%   2.60%   0.44%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  47.62%  35.09%
    128  20.85%   8.32%   1.42%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  77.11%  63.37%
    256  41.69%  16.64%   2.83%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  87.07%  77.58%
    536  87.30%  34.85%   5.93%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  93.38%  87.87%
    576  46.91%  37.45%   6.37%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  93.81%  88.62%
   1460  79.26%  94.93%  16.15%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  97.46%  95.18%
   1500  81.43%  48.76%  16.60%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  97.53%  95.30%
   8960  81.07%  83.22%  99.14%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  99.58%  99.18%
   9000  81.43%  83.60%  49.79%  87.30%  94.93%  99.14%  99.58%  99.18%

             Figure 9: Percentage of Bandwidth on 10G Ethernet

   A sometimes unexpected result of using IP-TFS (or any packet
   aggregating tunnel) is that, for small to medium sized packets, the
   available bandwidth is actually greater than native Ethernet.  This
   is due to the reduction in Ethernet framing overhead.  This increased
   bandwidth is paid for with an increase in latency.  This latency is
   the time to send the unrelated octets in the outer tunnel frame.  The
   following table illustrates the latency for some common values on a
   10G Ethernet link.  The table also includes latency introduced by
   padding if using ESP with padding.

                        ESP+Pad  ESP+Pad  IP-TFS   IP-TFS
                        1500     9000     1500     9000

                 ------------------------------------------
                    40  1.14 us  7.14 us  1.17 us  7.17 us
                   128  1.07 us  7.07 us  1.10 us  7.10 us
                   256  0.97 us  6.97 us  1.00 us  7.00 us
                   536  0.74 us  6.74 us  0.77 us  6.77 us
                   576  0.71 us  6.71 us  0.74 us  6.74 us
                  1460  0.00 us  6.00 us  0.04 us  6.04 us
                  1500  1.20 us  5.97 us  0.00 us  6.00 us

                         Figure 10: Added Latency

   Notice that the latency values are very similar between the two
   solutions; however, whereas IP-TFS provides for constant high
   bandwidth, in some cases even exceeding native Ethernet, ESP with
   padding often greatly reduces available bandwidth.

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Appendix D.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Don Fedyk for help in reviewing and editing
   this work.  We would also like to thank Valery Smyslov for reviews
   and suggestions for improvements as well as Joseph Touch for the
   transport area review and suggested improvements.

Appendix E.  Contributors

   The following people made significant contributions to this document.

      Lou Berger
      LabN Consulting, L.L.C.

      Email: lberger@labn.net

Author's Address

   Christian Hopps
   LabN Consulting, L.L.C.

   Email: chopps@chopps.org

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