%% You should probably cite rfc8750 instead of this I-D.
@techreport{ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-11,
    number =    {draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-11},
    type =      {Internet-Draft},
    institution =   {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
    note =      {Work in Progress},
    url =       {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv/11/},
    author =    {Daniel Migault and Tobias Guggemos and Yoav Nir},
    title =     {{Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)}},
    pagetotal = 8,
    year =      2019,
    month =     oct,
    day =       22,
    abstract =  {Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined at the time this document was written. When used with IPsec, some algorithms, such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids sending the IV itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how to do this.},
}