Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2 Protocol
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-05
Network Working Group V. Smyslov
Internet-Draft ELVIS-PLUS
Intended status: Standards Track September 10, 2020
Expires: March 14, 2021
Intermediate Exchange in the IKEv2 Protocol
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-intermediate-05
Abstract
This documents defines a new exchange, called Intermediate Exchange,
for the Internet Key Exchange protocol Version 2 (IKEv2). This
exchange can be used for transferring large amount of data in the
process of IKEv2 Security Association (SA) establishment.
Introducing Intermediate Exchange allows re-using existing IKE
fragmentation mechanism, that helps to avoid IP fragmentation of
large IKE messages, but cannot be used in the initial IKEv2 exchange.
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Smyslov Expires March 14, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Intermediate IKEv2 Exchange September 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Intermediate Exchange Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Support for Intermediate Exchange Negotiation . . . . . . 3
3.2. Using Intermediate Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. The IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchange Protection and
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. Protection of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE Messages . . . . . 5
3.3.2. Authentication of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges . . 5
3.4. Error Handling in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchange . . . . . 8
4. Interaction with other IKEv2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) defined in
[RFC7296] uses UDP as a transport for its messages. If size of a
message is large enough, IP fragmentation takes place, that may
interfere badly with some network devices. The problem is described
in more detail in [RFC7383], which also defines an extension to the
IKEv2 called IKE fragmentation. This extension allows IKE messages
to be fragmented at IKE level, eliminating possible issues caused by
IP fragmentation. However, the IKE fragmentation cannot be used in
the initial IKEv2 exchange (IKE_SA_INIT). This limitation in most
cases is not a problem, since the IKE_SA_INIT messages used to be
small enough not to cause IP fragmentation.
However, the situation has been changing recently. One example of
the need to transfer large amount of data before IKE SA is created is
using Quantum Computer resistant key exchange methods in IKEv2.
Recent progress in Quantum Computing has brought a concern that
classical Diffie-Hellman key exchange methods will become insecure in
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