Javascript disabled? Like other modern websites, the IETF Datatracker relies on Javascript. Please enable Javascript for full functionality.

Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules
draft-ietf-idr-rfc5575bis-06

Versions:

00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
RFC 8955

The information below is for an old version of the document.

Document	Type	This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8955.
	Authors	Susan Hares , Christoph Loibl , Robert Raszuk , Danny R. McPherson , Martin Bacher
	Last updated	2018-01-24 (Latest revision 2017-10-25)
	Replaces	draft-hr-idr-rfc5575bis
	RFC stream	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
	Formats	txt htmlized pdf bibtex bibxml
	Reviews	RTGDIR Telechat review (of -20) by Ines Robles Has nits TSVART Last Call review (of -20) by Jana Iyengar Ready SECDIR Last Call review (of -20) by Yoav Nir Ready GENART Last Call review (of -20) by Gyan Mishra Ready w/nits
	Additional resources	Mailing list discussion
Stream	WG state	WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up Doc Shepherd Follow-up Underway
	Document shepherd	Jie Dong
IESG	IESG state	Became RFC 8955 (Proposed Standard)
	Consensus boilerplate	Unknown
	Telechat date	(None)
	Responsible AD	(None)
	Send notices to	Jie Dong <jie.dong@huawei.com>

Email authors Email WG IPR References Referenced by Nits Search email archive

draft-ietf-idr-rfc5575bis-06

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Phillips
Request for Comments: 6167 P. Adams
Category: Informational IBM
ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Rokicki
Software AG
E. Johnson
TIBCO
April 2011

URI Scheme for Java(tm) Message Service 1.0

Abstract

This document defines the format of Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs) as defined in RFC 3986, for designating connections and
destination addresses used in the Java(tm) Messaging Service (JMS).
It was originally designed for particular uses, but applies generally
wherever a JMS URI is needed to describe the connection to a JMS
provider, and access to a JMS Destination. The syntax of this JMS
URI is not compatible with previously existing, but unregistered,
"jms" URI schemes. However, the expressiveness of the scheme
described herein should satisfy the requirements of all existing
circumstances.

Status of This Memo

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6167.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Requirements Notation ......................................4
2. URI Scheme Name .................................................5
3. Syntax of a JMS URI .............................................5
4. URI Scheme Semantics ............................................5
4.1. Shared Parameters ..........................................6
4.2. "jndi" Variant .............................................7
4.3. Vendor Destination Names -- Variants "queue" and "topic" ..11
4.4. Custom Parameters .........................................12
5. Encoding Considerations ........................................13
6. Applications/Protocols That Use the JMS URI ....................13
7. Interoperability Considerations ................................13
8. Security Considerations ........................................14
8.1. Reliability and Consistency ...............................14
8.2. Malicious Construction ....................................14
8.3. Back-End Transcoding ......................................15
8.4. Semantic Attacks ..........................................15
8.5. Other Security Concerns ...................................16
9. IANA Considerations ............................................16
9.1. URI Scheme Registration ...................................16
9.2. "jms" URI Scheme Registries ...............................17
10. Contributors ..................................................18
11. Acknowledgements ..............................................19
12. References ....................................................20
12.1. Normative References .....................................20
12.2. Informative References ...................................21

1. Introduction

The "jms" URI scheme is used to designate a javax.jms.Destination
object and an associated javax.jms.ConnectionFactory object [JMS],
and, optionally, to provide additional information concerning the way
that the Destination object is to be used. Probably the most common,
and certainly the most compatible, way in Java to retrieve such
Destinations is via Java Naming and Directory Information (JNDI)
[JNDI] methods. So as to extend compatibility to existing vendor
mechanisms beyond JNDI lookup, the JMS URI syntax allows variants on
the core syntax. The variant exists as an explicit part of the
syntax so that tools that are otherwise unfamiliar with the variant
can recognize the presence of a URI with an alternate interpretation.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 3]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

In its simplest and most interoperable form, this URI scheme starts
with "jms:jndi:" plus a JNDI name for a Destination. Since
interaction with some resources might require JNDI contextual
information or JMS header fields and properties to be specified as
well, the "jndi" variant of the "jms" URI scheme includes support for
supplying this additional JNDI information as query parameters.

While the "jndi" variant provides compatibility, vendors can define
additional variants. This specification defines three variants:
"jndi", "queue", and "topic". Vendors defining additional variants
are strongly encouraged to register them with IANA as documented in
Section 9.2.1.

While the "jms" URI scheme allows the location of network resources,
it does not map to a single underlying protocol, unlike most other
URI schemes that do so. Instead, it achieves interoperability
through the use of a common Java-based API [JAVA] for messaging.
Because of this, interoperability is dependent upon the
implementation of the API and its capabilities; two implementations
of JMS might or might not interoperate in practice. Furthermore, it
might be impractical to use JMS URIs in non-Java environments.

As a consequence of building upon an API, rather than a protocol, the
utility of a JMS URI depends on the context in which it is used.
That context includes agreement on the same JMS provider or
underlying protocol; agreement on how to look up endpoints (JNDI);
and, when using serialized Java object messages, sufficiently similar
Java Class environments that serialized objects can be appropriately
read and written. Users of this scheme need to establish the
necessary shared-context parts as just enumerated -- a context that
can span the globe, or merely a small local network. With that
shared context, this URI scheme enables endpoint identification in a
uniform way, and the means to connect to those endpoints.

1.1. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

All syntax descriptions use the ABNF specified by [RFC5234],
"Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF".

Note that some examples in this document wrap long JMS URIs for
readability. The line breaks are not part of the actual URIs.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 4]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

2. URI Scheme Name

The name of the URI scheme is Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

The n-tuple consisting of the matching criteria defines an aggregate
traffic Flow Specification. The matching criteria can include
elements such as source and destination address prefixes, IP
protocol, and transport protocol port numbers.

This document defines a general procedure to encode flow
specification rules for aggregated traffic flows so that they can be
distributed as a BGP [RFC4271] NLRI. Additionally, we define the
required mechanisms to utilize this definition to the problem of
immediate concern to the authors: intra- and inter-provider
distribution of traffic filtering rules to filter (distributed)
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

By expanding routing information with Flow Specifications, the
routing system can take advantage of the ACL (Access Control List) or
firewall capabilities in the router's forwarding path. Flow
specifications can be seen as more specific routing entries to a
unicast prefix and are expected to depend upon the existing unicast
data information.

A Flow Specification received from an external autonomous system will
need to be validated against unicast routing before being accepted.
If the aggregate traffic flow defined by the unicast destination
prefix is forwarded to a given BGP peer, then the local system can
safely install more specific flow rules that may result in different
forwarding behavior, as requested by this system.

The key technology components required to address the class of
problems targeted by this document are:

1. Efficient point-to-multipoint distribution of control plane
information.

2. Inter-domain capabilities and routing policy support.

3. Tight integration with unicast routing, for verification
purposes.

Items 1 and 2 have already been addressed using BGP for other types
of control plane information. Close integration with BGP also makes
it feasible to specify a mechanism to automatically verify flow
information against unicast routing. These factors are behind the
choice of BGP as the carrier of Flow Specification information.

As with previous extensions to BGP, this specification makes it
possible to add additional information to Internet routers. These
are limited in terms of the maximum number of data elements they can
hold as well as the number of events they are able to process in a

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

given unit of time. The authors believe that, as with previous
extensions, service providers will be careful to keep information
levels below the maximum capacity of their devices.

In many deployments of BGP Flow Specification, the Flow Specification
information has replace existing host length route advertisements.

Experience with previous BGP extensions has also shown that the
maximum capacity of BGP speakers has been gradually increased
according to expected loads. Taking into account Internet unicast
routing as well as additional applications as they gain popularity.

From an operational perspective, the utilization of BGP as the
carrier for this information allows a network service provider to
reuse both internal route distribution infrastructure (e.g., route
reflector or confederation design) and existing external
relationships (e.g., inter-domain BGP sessions to a customer
network).

While it is certainly possible to address this problem using other
mechanisms, this solution has been utilized in deployments because of
the substantial advantage of being an incremental addition to already
deployed mechanisms.

In current deployments, the information distributed by the flow-spec
extension is originated both manually as well as automatically. The
latter by systems that are able to detect malicious flows. When
automated systems are used, care should be taken to ensure their
correctness as well as to limit the number and advertisement rate of
flow routes.

This specification defines required protocol extensions to address
most common applications of IPv4 unicast and VPNv4 unicast filtering.
The same mechanism can be reused and new match criteria added to
address similar filtering needs for other BGP address families such
as IPv6 families [I-D.ietf-idr-flow-spec-v6],

2. Definitions of Terms Used in This Memo

NLRI - Network Layer Reachability Information.

RIB - Routing Information Base.

Loc-RIB - Local RIB.

AS - Autonomous System number.

VRF - Virtual Routing and Forwarding instance.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

PE - Provider Edge router

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]

3. Flow Specifications

A Flow Specification is an n-tuple consisting of several matching
criteria that can be applied to IP traffic. A given IP packet is
said to match the defined flow if it matches all the specified
criteria.

A given flow may be associated with a set of attributes, depending on
the particular application; such attributes may or may not include
reachability information (i.e., NEXT_HOP). Well-known or AS-specific
community attributes can be used to encode a set of predetermined
actions.

A particular application is identified by a specific (Address Family
Identifier, Subsequent Address Family Identifier (AFI, SAFI)) pair
[RFC4760] and corresponds to a distinct set of RIBs. Those RIBs
should be treated independently from each other in order to assure
non-interference between distinct applications.

BGP itself treats the NLRI as an opaque key to an entry in its
databases. Entries that are placed in the Loc-RIB are then
associated with a given set of semantics, which is application
dependent. This is consistent with existing BGP applications. For
instance, IP unicast routing (AFI=1, SAFI=1) and IP multicast
reverse-path information (AFI=1, SAFI=2) are handled by BGP without
any particular semantics being associated with them until installed
in the Loc-RIB.

Standard BGP policy mechanisms, such as UPDATE filtering by NLRI
prefix as well as community matching and manipulation, MUST apply to
the Flow Specification defined NLRI-type, especially in an inter-
domain environment. Network operators can also control propagation
of such routing updates by enabling or disabling the exchange of a
particular (AFI, SAFI) pair on a given BGP peering session.

4. Dissemination of IPv4 FLow Specification Information

We define a "Flow Specification" NLRI type (Figure 1) that may
include several components such as destination prefix, source prefix,
protocol, ports, and others (see Section 4.2 below). This NLRI is
treated as an opaque bit string prefix by BGP. Each bit string

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

identifies a key to a database entry with which a set of attributes
can be associated.

This NLRI information is encoded using MP_REACH_NLRI and
MP_UNREACH_NLRI attributes as defined in [RFC4760]. Whenever the
corresponding application does not require Next-Hop information, this
shall be encoded as a 0-octet length Next Hop in the MP_REACH_NLRI
attribute and ignored on receipt.

The NLRI field of the MP_REACH_NLRI and MP_UNREACH_NLRI is encoded as
a 1- or 2-octet NLRI length field followed by a variable-length NLRI
value. The NLRI length is expressed in octets.

+------------------------------+
| length (0xnn or 0xfn nn) |
+------------------------------+
| NLRI value (variable) |
+------------------------------+

Figure 1: Flow-spec NLRI for IPv4

Implementations wishing to exchange Flow Specification rules MUST use
BGP's Capability Advertisement facility to exchange the Multiprotocol
Extension Capability Code (Code 1) as defined in [RFC4760]. The
(AFI, SAFI) pair carried in the Multiprotocol Extension Capability
MUST be the same as the one used to identify a particular application
that uses this NLRI-type.

4.1. Length Encoding

o If the NLRI length value is smaller than 240 (0xf0 hex), the
length field can be encoded as a single octet.

o Otherwise, it is encoded as an extended-length 2-octet value in
which the most significant nibble of the first byte is all ones.

In figure 1 above, values less-than 240 are encoded using two hex
digits (0xnn). Values above 239 are encoded using 3 hex digits
(0xfnnn). The highest value that can be represented with this
encoding is 4095. The value 241 is encoded as 0xf0f1.

4.2. NLRI Value Encoding

The Flow Specification NLRI-type consists of several optional
subcomponents. A specific packet is considered to match the flow
specification when it matches the intersection (AND) of all the
components present in the specification.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

The encoding of each of the NLRI components begins with a type field
(1 octet) followed by a variable length parameter. Section 4.2.1 to
Section 4.2.12 define component types and parameter encodings for the
IPv4 IP layer and transport layer headers. IPv6 NLRI component types
are described in [I-D.ietf-idr-flow-spec-v6].

Flow Specification components must follow strict type ordering by
increasing numerical order. A given component type may or may not be
present in the specification, but if present, it MUST precede any
component of higher numeric type value.

All combinations of component types within a single NLRI are allowed,
even if the combination makes no sense from a semantical perspective.
If a given component type within a prefix in unknown, the prefix in
question cannot be used for traffic filtering purposes by the
receiver. Since a Flow Specification has the semantics of a logical
AND of all components, if a component is FALSE, by definition it
cannot be applied. However, for the purposes of BGP route
propagation, this prefix should still be transmitted since BGP route
distribution is independent on NLRI semantics.

The <type, value> encoding is chosen in order to allow for future
extensibility.

4.2.1. Type 1 - Destination Prefix

Encoding: <type (1 octet), prefix length (1 octet), prefix>

Defines: the destination prefix to match. Prefixes are encoded as
in BGP UPDATE messages, a length in bits is followed by enough
octets to contain the prefix information.

4.2.2. Type 2 - Source Prefix

Encoding: <type (1 octet), prefix-length (1 octet), prefix&"jms".

3. Syntax of a JMS URI

The following ABNF describes the "jms" scheme URI syntax:

jms-uri = "jms:" jms-variant ":" jms-dest
[ "?" param *( "&" param ) ]

jms-variant = segment-nz-nc

jms-dest = segment-nz ; specific meaning per variant

param = param-name "=" param-value

param-name = 1*(unreserved / pct-encoded)

param-value = *(unreserved / pct-encoded)

segment-nz-nc = <as defined in RFC 3986>

path-rootless = <as defined in RFC 3986>

unreserved = <as defined in RFC 3986>

pct-encoded = <as defined in RFC 3986>

The URIs are percent-encoded UTF-8 [RFC3629]. Please see Section 5
of this document for encoding considerations.

4. URI Scheme Semantics

JMS URIs are used to locate JMS [JMS] Destination resources and do
not specify actions to be taken on those resources. Operations
available on JMS Destinations are fully and normatively defined by
the JMS specification and as such are out of scope for this URI
specification.

The required portions of the syntax include the terminal of "jms" for
the URI scheme name; the <jms-variant> element to indicate the
variant of the scheme; and the <jms-dest> element, which identifies
the Destination based on the chosen variant. For the <jms-variant>
element, this document defines three values: "jndi", "queue", and
"topic". All the terminals resulting from <jms-variant> and
<jms-dest> production rules are case-sensitive.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 5]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Parameters further refine how to locate and use the Destination. The
parameter names and values are case-sensitive. They can occur in any
order, and each parameter name SHOULD NOT appear more than once. In
the event that a parameter appears multiple times, all but the last
instance of the parameter MUST be ignored. For comparison purposes,
the absence of a parameter does not mean the same thing as a URI with
a parameter set to a default value, due to the potential variation in
default values as determined by the context of a specific use.

Each variant can have query parameters specific to that variation.
All such variant-specific parameters SHOULD use the name of the
variant as the prefix to the parameters. For example, a vendor-
specific variant of "vnd.example.ex" might also define a parameter
with a name like "vnd.example.exParameter". Parameters that apply
across multiple variants -- perhaps because they are generally
applicable, such as JMS settings -- MUST NOT have a name that starts
with the name of any known variant. This pattern enables tools that
are otherwise unfamiliar with a particular variant to distinguish
those parameters that are specific to a variant from those that are
more generally applicable.

Examples of the URI scheme include:

jms:jndi:SomeJndiNameForDestination?
jndiInitialContextFactory=
com.example.jndi.JndiFactory&priority=3

jms:queue:ExampleQueueName?timeToLive=1000

4.1. Shared Parameters

In addition to the required particles, the "jms" URI scheme supports
the following shared parameters, which are available to all variants.
These parameters correspond to headers and properties on the JMS
Messages to be sent. For the parameters deliveryMode, timeToLive,
and priority, the default values might be specified in the context of
a specific use, for example by environment variables, or in the
configuration of a particular network application. JMS also defines
default values for these properties. The context default is hereby
defined as the default value in the context of a specific use, or the
JMS default for a particular property if the context does not define
a default.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 6]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

4.1.1. deliveryMode

Indicates whether the request message is persistent or not. This
property corresponds to the JMS message header field
"JMSDeliveryMode" defined in Section 3.4.2 of the JMS 1.1
specification [JMS]. The value of this parameter MUST be
"PERSISTENT" or "NON_PERSISTENT". If this parameter is not
specified, then the context default MUST be used.

4.1.2. timeToLive

The lifetime, in milliseconds, of the request message, specified as a
decimal number. This property corresponds to the JMS Time-To-Live
value defined in Section 4.8 of the JMS 1.1 specification. If this
parameter is not specified, then the context default MUST be used.

4.1.3. priority

The JMS priority associated with the request message. As per
Section 3.4.10 of the JMS 1.1 specification, this MUST be a value
between 0 and 9 inclusive, specified as a decimal number. This
corresponds to the JMS message header field "JMSPriority". If this
parameter is not specified, then the context default MUST be used.

4.1.4. replyToName

This property corresponds to the JMS message header field
"JMSReplyTo" defined in Section 3.4.6 of the JMS 1.1 specification.
As interpreted by the particular variant, this property value
specifies the JMS Destination object to which a response message
ought to be sent.

4.2. "jndi" Variant

The "jndi" variant implies the use of JNDI for discovering the
Destination object. When this is specified as the variant, the
<jms-dest> portion of the syntax is the name for JNDI lookup
purposes. Additional JNDI-specific parameters can be specified. The
JNDI-specific parameters SHOULD only be processed when the URI
variant is "jndi".

4.2.1. JNDI Parameters

4.2.1.1. jndiConnectionFactoryName

Specifies the JNDI name of the Java class (see Section 3.8,
"Identifiers", of [JLS] for the specification of a legal Java class
name) providing the connection factory.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 7]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

4.2.1.2. jndiInitialContextFactory

Specifies the fully qualified Java class name of the
"InitialContextFactory" implementation class to use.

4.2.1.3. jndiURL

Specifies the JNDI provider URL, in a form consistent with
javax.naming.spi.NamingManager.getURLContext(String scheme, Hashtable
environment) as defined in the JNDI specification [JNDI].

4.2.1.4. Additional JNDI Parameters

It is possible that connecting to a JNDI provider requires additional
parameters. These parameters can be passed in as custom parameters
(see Section 4.4). To identify a custom parameter as JNDI specific,
the parameter name needs to start with the prefix "jndi-".

For example, if the JNDI provider requires a parameter named
"com.example.jndi.someParameter", you can supply the parameter in the
URI as: jndi-com.example.jndi.someParameter=someValue

4.2.2. Example of Performing a JNDI Lookup

To perform a lookup based on a "jndi" variant URI using Java APIs, an
application might start by creating a JNDI InitialContext object.
The InitialContext object can then be used to look up the JMS
ConnectionFactory object (using the "jndiConnectionFactoryName" URI
parameter), the target JMS Destination object (using the <jms-dest>
portion of the JMS URI), and the "replyToName" JMS Destination object
(if the "replyToName" parameter is specified on the URI). The
application creates the InitialContext object by first setting up two
properties: "Context.INITIAL_CONTEXT_FACTORY", with the value of the
jndiInitialContextFactory JMS URI parameter; and
"Context.PROVIDER_URL", with the value of the jndiURL URI parameter;
and then passing the two properties to the InitialContext
constructor.

To locate a connection factory or Destination object, the application
passes the name of the object into the InitialContext.lookup()
method.

gt;

Defines the source prefix to match.

4.2.3. Type 3 - IP Protocol

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Contains a set of {operator, value} pairs that are used to match
the IP protocol value byte in IP packets.

The operator byte is encoded as:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| e | a | len | 0 |lt |gt |eq |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

Numeric operator

e - end-of-list bit. Set in the last {op, value} pair in the
list.

a - AND bit. If unset, the previous term is logically ORed with
the current one. If set, the operation is a logical AND. It
should be unset in the first operator byte of a sequence. The AND
operator has higher priority than OR for the purposes of
evaluating logical expressions.

len - length of the value field for this operand encodes 1 (00) -
4 (11) bytes. Type 3 flow component values are always encoded as
single byte (len = 00).

lt - less than comparison between data and value.

gt - greater than comparison between data and value.

eq - equality between data and value.

The bits lt, gt, and eq can be combined to produce common relational
operators such as "less or equal", "greater or equal", and "not equal
to".

+----+----+----+----------------------------------+
| lt | gt | eq | Resulting operation |
+----+----+----+----------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | 0 | true (independent of the value) |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | == (equal) |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | > (greater than) |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | >= (greater than or equal) |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | < (less than) |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | <= (less than or equal) |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | != (not equal value) |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | false (independent of the value) |
+----+----+----+----------------------------------+

Table 1: Comparison operation combinations

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

4.2.4. Type 4 - Port

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs that matches source OR
destination TCP/UDP ports. This list is encoded using the numeric
operator format defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are encoded as
1- or 2-byte quantities.

Port, source port, and destination port components evaluate to
FALSE if the IP protocol field of the packet has a value other
than TCP or UDP, if the packet is fragmented and this is not the
first fragment, or if the system in unable to locate the transport
header. Different implementations may or may not be able to
decode the transport header in the presence of IP options or
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) NULL [RFC4303] encryption.

4.2.5. Type 5 - Destination Port

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match the
destination port of a TCP or UDP packet. This list is encoded
using the numeric operator format defined in Section 4.2.3.
Values are encoded as 1- or 2-byte quantities.

4.2.6. Type 6 - Source Port

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match the source
port of a TCP or UDP packet. This list is encoded using the
numeric operator format defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are
encoded as 1- or 2-byte quantities.

4.2.7. Type 7 - ICMP type

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match the type
field of an ICMP packet. This list is encoded using the numeric
operator format defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are encoded
using a single byte.

The ICMP type specifiers evaluate to FALSE whenever the protocol
value is not ICMP.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

4.2.8. Type 8 - ICMP code

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match the code
field of an ICMP packet. This list is encoded using the numeric
operator format defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are encoded
using a single byte.

The ICMP code specifiers evaluate to FALSE whenever the protocol
value is not ICMP.

4.2.9. Type 9 - TCP flags

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, bitmask]+>

Bitmask values can be encoded as a 1- or 2-byte bitmask. When a
single byte is specified, it matches byte 13 of the TCP header
[RFC0793], which contains bits 8 though 15 of the 4th 32-bit word.
When a 2-byte encoding is used, it matches bytes 12 and 13 of the
TCP header with the data offset field having a "don't care" value.

This component evaluates to FALSE for packets that are not TCP
packets.

This type uses the bitmask operand format, which differs from the
numeric operator format in the lower nibble.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| e | a | len | 0 | 0 |not| m |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

Bitmask format

e, a, len - Most significant nibble: (end-of-list bit, AND bit, and
length field), as defined for in the numeric operator format in
Section 4.2.3.

not - NOT bit. If set, logical negation of operation.

m - Match bit. If set, this is a bitwise match operation defined
as "(data AND value) == value"; if unset, (data AND value)
evaluates to TRUE if any of the bits in the value mask are set in
the data

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

4.2.10. Type 10 - Packet length

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, bitmask]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match on the
total IP packet length (excluding Layer 2 but including IP
header). This list is encoded using the numeric operator format
defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are encoded using 1- or 2-byte
quantities.

4.2.11. Type 11 - DSCP (Diffserv Code Point)

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, value]+>

Defines a list of {operator, value} pairs used to match the 6-bit
DSCP field [RFC2474]. This list is encoded using the numeric
operator format defined in Section 4.2.3. Values are encoded
using a single byte. The two most significant bits are zero and
the six least significant bits contain the DSCP value.

4.2.12. Type 12 - Fragment

Encoding:<type (1 octet), [op, bitmask]+>

Uses bitmask operand format defined in Section 4.2.9.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Reserved |LF |FF |IsF|DF |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

Bitmask values:

Bit 7 - Don't fragment (DF)

Bit 6 - Is a fragment (IsF)

Bit 5 - First fragment (FF)

Bit 4 - Last fragment (LF)

4.3. Examples of Encodings

An example of a Flow Specification encoding for: "all packets to
10.0.1/24 and TCP port 25".

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

+------------------+----------+----------+
| destination | proto | port |
+------------------+----------+----------+
| 0x01 18 0a 00 01 | 03 81 06 | 04 81 19 |
+------------------+----------+----------+

Decode for protocol:

+-------+----------+------------------------------+
| Value | | |
+-------+----------+------------------------------+
| 0x03 | type | |
| 0x81 | operator | end-of-list, value size=1, = |
| 0x06 | value | |
+-------+----------+------------------------------+

An example of a Flow Specification encoding for: "all packets to
10.1.1/24 from 192/8 and port {range [137, 139] or 8080}".

+------------------+----------+-------------------------+
| destination | source | port |
+------------------+----------+-------------------------+
| 0x01 18 0a 01 01 | 02 08 c0 | 04 03 89 45 8b 91 1f 90 |
+------------------+----------+-------------------------+

Decode for port:

+--------+----------+------------------------------+
| Value | | |
+--------+----------+------------------------------+
| 0x04 | type | |
| 0x03 | operator | size=1, >= |
| 0x89 | value | 137 |
| 0x45 | operator | "AND", value size=1, <= |
| 0x8b | value | 139 |
| 0x91 | operator | end-of-list, value-size=2, = |
| 0x1f90 | value | 8080 |
+--------+----------+------------------------------+

This constitutes an NLRI with an NLRI length of 16 octets.

5. Traffic Filtering

Traffic filtering policies have been traditionally considered to be
relatively static. Limitations of the static mechanisms caused this
mechanism to be designed for the three new applications of traffic
filtering (prevention of traffic-based, denial-of-service (DOS)

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

attacks, traffic filtering in the context of BGP/MPLS VPN service,
and centralized traffic control for SDN/NFV networks) requires
coordination among service providers and/or coordination among the AS
within a service provider. Section 8 has details on the limitation
of previous mechanisms and why BGP Flow Specification version 1
provides a solution for to prevent DOS and aid BGP/MPLS VPN filtering
rules.

This Flow Specification NLRI defined above to convey information
about traffic filtering rules for traffic that should be discarded or
handled in manner specified by a set of pre-defined actions (which
are defined in BGP Extended Communities). This mechanism is
primarily designed to allow an upstream autonomous system to perform
inbound filtering in their ingress routers of traffic that a given
downstream AS wishes to drop.

In order to achieve this goal, this draft specifies two application
specific NLRI identifiers that provide traffic filters, and a set of
actions encoding in BGP Extended Communities. The two application
specific NLRI identifiers are:

o IPv4 Flow Specification identifier (AFI=1, SAFI=133) along with
specific semantic rules for IPv4 routes, and

o BGP NLRI type (AFI=1, SAFI=134) value, which can be used to
propagate traffic filtering information in a BGP/MPLS VPN
environment.

Distribution of the IPv4 Flow Specification is described in section
6, and distibution of BGP/MPLS traffic Flow Specification is
described in section 8. The traffic filtering actions are described
in section 7.

5.1. Ordering of Traffic Filtering Rules

With traffic filtering rules, more than one rule may match a
particular traffic flow. Thus, it is necessary to define the order
at which rules get matched and applied to a particular traffic flow.
This ordering function must be such that it must not depend on the
arrival order of the Flow Specification's rules and must be
consistent in the network.

The relative order of two Flow Specification rules is determined by
comparing their respective components. The algorithm starts by
comparing the left-most components of the rules. If the types
differ, the rule with lowest numeric type value has higher precedence
(and thus will match before) than the rule that doesn't contain that
component type. If the component types are the same, then a type-

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 14]
Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 8]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

For example, the JMS URI...

jms:jndi:REQ_QUEUE
?jndiURL=file:/C:/JMSAdmin
&jndiInitialContextFactory
=com.sun.jndi.fscontext.RefFSContextFactory
&jndiConnectionFactoryName=CONNFACT
&replyToName=RESP_QUEUE

...would be used by the following (non-normative) code sample to
locate and retrieve a JMS ConnectionFactory called "CONNFACT", and
JMS Destinations called "REQ_QUEUE" and "RESP_QUEUE", from a file-
system JNDI context called "c:/JMSAdmin".

/*
* Preconditions on URI:
* - portion <jms-dest> has been parsed into variable "jms_dest"
* - parameters "jndiConnectionFactoryName",
* "jndiInitialContextFactory", "replyToName", and "jndiURL" have
* been parsed into variables of the same name.
*/
Hashtable environment = new Hashtable();
environment.put(Context.INITIAL_CONTEXT_FACTORY,
jndiInitialContextFactory);
environment.put(Context.PROVIDER_URL, jndiURL);
/*
* Create File-System Initial Context
*/
Context ctx = new InitialContext(environment);
/*
* Now get the JMS ConnectionFactory and Destination. These will
* be used later on in the application to create the JMS
* Connection and send/receive messages.
*/
ConnectionFactory jmsConnFact = (ConnectionFactory)
ctx.lookup(jndiConnectionFactoryName);
Destination requestDest = (Destination) ctx.lookup(jms_dest);
Destination replyDest = (Destination) ctx.lookup(replyToName);

The ConnectionFactory is used to create a Connection, which itself is
used to create a Session. The Session can then be used to create the
MessageProducer, which sends messages to the target Destination; and
the MessageConsumer, which receives messages from the replyToName
Destination (as shown in the following code extract).

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

/*
* Create a producer to send a message to the request Destination
* that was specified in the URI, then create the message, setting
* the replyToName Destination in the message to the one specified
* in the URI, and send it.
*/
MessageProducer producer = sess.createProducer(requestDest);
BytesMessage reqMsg = sess.createBytesMessage();
reqMsg.setJMSReplyTo(replyDest);
producer.send(reqMsg);
/*
* Create a consumer to get a message from the replyToName
* Destination using a selector to get the specific response to
* this request. The responder sets the correlation ID of the
* response to the message ID of the request message.
*/
MessageConsumer consumer = sess.createConsumer(replyDest,
"JMSCorrelationID = '" + reqMsg.getJMSMessageID() + "'");
Message respMsg = (Message) consumer.receive(300000);

4.2.2.1. Performing a JNDI Lookup with Custom Parameters

Any parameters with a prefix of "jndi-" MUST be used to set custom
properties when establishing a connection to the JNDI provider. The
name of the custom property is derived by removing the "jndi-" prefix
from the URI parameter name, and the value of the property is the
value of the parameter.

For example, the JMS URI...

jms:jndi:REQ_QUEUE
?jndiURL=file:/C:/JMSAdmin
&jndiInitialContextFactory
=com.sun.jndi.fscontext.RefFSContextFactory
&jndiConnectionFactoryName=CONNFACT
&jndi-com.example.jndi.someParameter=someValue

...instructs the consumer to use the following properties to connect
to the JNDI provider:

java.naming.provider.url=file:/C:/JMSAdmin
java.naming.factory.initial=
com.sun.jndi.fscontext.RefFSContextFactory
com.example.jndi.someParameter=someValue

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

4.3. Vendor Destination Names -- Variants "queue" and "topic"

The JMS Session object provides a means to directly access Queues and
Topics. Specifically, it has the methods Session.createQueue(String
name) and Session.createTopic(String name). These methods can be
used to "create" the Java representation of an existing JMS Topic or
Queue.

Since the Session interface requires external knowledge about whether
a given name relates to a Queue or Topic, rather than introducing one
new variant, this section defines two variants. A JMS URI can
indicate which of these methods to use by specifying the appropriate
variant -- either "queue" or "topic". For example:

jms:queue:ExampleQueueName

to identify a JMS Queue Destination, and

jms:topic:ExampleTopicName

to identify a JMS Topic Destination.

JMS only specifies one way to obtain the names used by these APIs.
With a JMS Queue or Topic available, an implementation can call
Queue.getQueueName() or Topic.getTopicName(), respectively, both of
which return a String object. To create a correct corresponding URI,
the resulting string MUST use standard URI escape mechanisms so that
the resulting characters conform to the production <jms-dest>.

4.3.1. Treatment of replyToName Parameter

When used with the "queue" and "topic" variants, the replyToName
parameter, specified in Section 4.1.4, always refers to a name of a
JMS Queue to look up via the Session.createQueue() method, or its
equivalent. For either variant, if a JMS Topic is instead required
as a response Destination, a JMS URI can employ the
"topicReplyToName" parameter. This parameter defines a name to look
up with the Session.createTopic() method, or its equivalent.

A JMS URI MUST NOT specify both a "topicReplyToName" and a
"replyToName" parameter.

4.3.2. Obtaining a Session via JNDI

Using the Session.createQueue() and Session.createTopic() methods
assumes that a client program has already obtained a Session object.
Where does that Session object come from -- how does a client get it?
One way to get a Session is simply to access vendor-specific APIs.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 11]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Another way to get a Session object is to simply revert to using
JNDI. That is, if a Session is not available to the client from some
other context, the "queue" and "topic" variants MAY reuse the URL
parameters specified in Section 4.2.1, "JNDI Parameters". Via JNDI,
those parameters will identify a ConnectionFactory, which can then be
used to obtain a Session object.

Combining the "queue" and "topic" variants with JNDI lookup for an
implementation of ConnectionFactory raises an important consideration
for JMS URI clients. Once clients employ JNDI for one part of
discovering a Destination, they almost certainly could use a vendor-
neutral JNDI lookup for a Destination object itself, rather than
using vendor-specific means. As a result, clients need to carefully
consider whether it makes sense to use JNDI for one part of this
problem, without using it for the other.

4.3.3. Limitations of "queue" and "topic"

The JMS specification clearly identifies the two methods on the
Session interface as returning vendor-specific names for
Destinations. Consequently, users of the "jms" URI scheme ought to
carefully consider when these two variants might be employed. If
users plan on switching between JMS vendors, they might also need to
plan on regenerating resources that contain URIs in this vendor-
specific form.

A JMS vendor can provide alternate ways to obtain the names that can
be passed to Session.createQueue() and Session.createTopic(). When
using names derived from those alternate means, users of this URI
specification are encouraged to verify that the obtained names work
as expected in all circumstances.

4.4. Custom Parameters

The set of parameters is extensible. Any other vendor- or
application-defined parameter can be supplied, in the URI, by passing
it as <param-name>=<param-value>, just like the set of well-known
parameters.

WARNING: Vendors and applications MUST NOT include sensitive
information (such as authorization tokens) in a URI. Other means of
authorization, authentication, and identification ought to be used.
Also see the security discussion below about properties that might be
duplicated as JMS message properties.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

5. Encoding Considerations

The "jms" URI scheme distinguishes between <unreserved> characters
and <pct-encoded> characters, as defined in [RFC3986]. Apart from
these encoding considerations, the characters "?" and "&" MUST be
encoded when they appear within the <jms-dest> particle (for example,
a JNDI name) or in query parameters. The character ":" SHOULD be
escaped when appearing in the <jms-dest> portion of the syntax.

Conversions to and from Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)
follow the rules of RFC 3987, Sections 3.1 and 3.2. As per
Sections 1.2-c. and 6.4 of [RFC3987], all parts of the JMS URI MUST
use the UTF-8 encoding when converting to and from the IRI format.

6. Applications/Protocols That Use the JMS URI

A variety of vendors provide implementations of the JMS Service
Provider Interface (SPI). These products interoperate at the API
level, in the Java programming language.

Some vendors have provided additional products that interoperate with
their own SPI implementations. These extensions might also be able
to make use of this URI scheme.

The vendors working on this URI scheme are also working on a
specification for carrying SOAP messages over their respective
implementations of JMS [SOAP-JMS]. In addition, the Service
Component Architecture Bindings technical committee (TC) [SCA-TC] at
OASIS employs the "jms" URI scheme to identify JMS Destinations in
[SCA-JMS].

7. Interoperability Considerations

This "jms" URI scheme focuses on identifying a JMS Destination
object, and some characteristics of communication using that
Destination, and specifically excludes any notion of describing how
JMS itself is implemented and how it delivers messages. As a
consequence of this focus, interoperability concerns are limited to
how implementations obtain and use a Destination object.

This scheme definition describes three variants for obtaining a
Destination. These variants achieve their aims with the use of JNDI
and JMS APIs, with no new APIs or protocols defined here. As a
consequence of using JNDI and JMS, interoperability concerns might
arise if implementations do not conform to the specifications for
those APIs. Further, the use of Java, and JNDI in particular, means
that the configuration of the execution environment and the use of
Java ClassLoaders can affect the interpretation of any given URI.

Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

specific comparison is performed (see below) if the types are equal
the algorithm continues with the next component.

For IP prefix values (IP destination or source prefix): If the
prefixes overlap, the one with the longer prefix-length has higher
precedence. If they do not overlap the one with the lowest IP value
has higher precedence.

For all other component types, unless otherwise specified, the
comparison is performed by comparing the component data as a binary
string using the memcmp() function as defined by the ISO C standard.
For strings with equal lengths the lowest string (memcmp) has higher
precedence. For strings of different lengths, the common prefix is
compared. If the common prefix is not equal the string with the
lowest prefix has higher precedence. If the common prefix is equal,
the longest string is considered to have higher precedence than the
shorter one.

The code below shows a Python3 implementation of the comparison
algorithm. The full code was tested with Python 3.6.3 and can be
obtained at https://github.com/stoffi92/flowspec-cmp [1].

import itertools
import ipaddress

def flow_rule_cmp(a, b):
for comp_a, comp_b in itertools.zip_longest(a.components,
b.components):
# If a component type does not exist in one rule
# this rule has lower precedence
if not comp_a:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
if not comp_b:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
# higher precedence for lower component type
if comp_a.component_type < comp_b.component_type:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
if comp_a.component_type > comp_b.component_type:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
# component types are equal -> type specific comparison
if comp_a.component_type in (IP_DESTINATION, IP_SOURCE):
# assuming comp_a.value, comp_b.value of type ipaddress
if comp_a.value.overlaps(comp_b.value):
# longest prefixlen has precedence
if comp_a.value.prefixlen > comp_b.value.prefixlen:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
if comp_a.value.prefixlen < comp_b.value.prefixlen:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

# components equal -> continue with next component
elif comp_a.value > comp_b.value:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
elif comp_a.value < comp_b.value:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
else:
# assuming comp_a.value, comp_b.value of type bytearray
if len(comp_a.value) == len(comp_b.value):
if comp_a.value > comp_b.value:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
if comp_a.value < comp_b.value:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
# components equal -> continue with next component
else:
common = min(len(comp_a.value), len(comp_b.value))
if comp_a.value[:common] > comp_b.value[:common]:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
elif comp_a.value[:common] < comp_b.value[:common]:
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
# the first common bytes match
elif len(comp_a.value) > len(comp_b.value):
return A_HAS_PRECEDENCE
else:
return B_HAS_PRECEDENCE
return EQUAL

6. Validation Procedure

Flow Specifications received from a BGP peer that are accepted in the
respective Adj-RIB-In are used as input to the route selection
process. Although the forwarding attributes of two routes for the
same Flow Specification prefix may be the same, BGP is still required
to perform its path selection algorithm in order to select the
correct set of attributes to advertise.

The first step of the BGP Route Selection procedure (Section 9.1.2 of
[RFC4271] is to exclude from the selection procedure routes that are
considered non-feasible. In the context of IP routing information,
this step is used to validate that the NEXT_HOP attribute of a given
route is resolvable.

The concept can be extended, in the case of Flow Specification NLRI,
to allow other validation procedures.

A Flow Specification NLRI must be validated such that it is
considered feasible if and only if:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

a) The originator of the Flow Specification matches the originator
of the best-match unicast route for the destination prefix
embedded in the Flow Specification.

b) There are no more specific unicast routes, when compared with
the flow destination prefix, that has been received from a
different neighboring AS than the best-match unicast route, which
has been determined in step a).

By originator of a BGP route, we mean either the BGP originator path
attribute, as used by route reflection, or the transport address of
the BGP peer, if this path attribute is not present.

BGP implementations MUST also enforce that the AS_PATH attribute of a
route received via the External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP)
contains the neighboring AS in the left-most position of the AS_PATH
attribute. While this rule is optional in the BGP specification, it
becomes necessary to enforce it for security reasons.

The best-match unicast route may change over the time independently
of the Flow Specification NLRI. Therefore, a revalidation of the
Flow Specification NLRI MUST be performed whenever unicast routes
change. Revalidation is defined as retesting that clause a and
clause b above are true.

Explanation:

The underlying concept is that the neighboring AS that advertises the
best unicast route for a destination is allowed to advertise flow-
spec information that conveys a more or equally specific destination
prefix. Thus, as long as there are no more specific unicast routes,
received from a different neighboring AS, which would be affected by
that filtering rule.

The neighboring AS is the immediate destination of the traffic
described by the Flow Specification. If it requests these flows to
be dropped, that request can be honored without concern that it
represents a denial of service in itself. Supposedly, the traffic is
being dropped by the downstream autonomous system, and there is no
added value in carrying the traffic to it.

7. Traffic Filtering Actions

This specification defines a minimum set of filtering actions that it
standardizes as BGP extended community values [RFC4360]. This is not
meant to be an inclusive list of all the possible actions, but only a
subset that can be interpreted consistently across the network.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Additional actions can be defined as either requiring standards or as
vendor specific.

Implementations SHOULD provide mechanisms that map an arbitrary BGP
community value (normal or extended) to filtering actions that
require different mappings in different systems in the network. For
instance, providing packets with a worse-than-best-effort, per-hop
behavior is a functionality that is likely to be implemented
differently in different systems and for which no standard behavior
is currently known. Rather than attempting to define it here, this
can be accomplished by mapping a user-defined community value to
platform-/network-specific behavior via user configuration.

The default action for a traffic filtering Flow Specification is to
accept IP traffic that matches that particular rule.

This document defines the following extended communities values shown
in Table 2 in the form 0x8xnn where nn indicates the sub-type.
Encodings for these extended communities are described below.

Table 2: Traffic Action Extended Communities

Some traffic action communities may interfere with each other.
Section 7.6 of this specification provides rules for handling
interference between specific types of traffic actions, and error
handling based on [RFC7606]. Any additional definition of a traffic
actions specified by additional standards documents or vendor
documents MUST specify if the traffic action interacts with an
existing traffic actions, and provide error handling per [RFC7606].

Multiple traffic actions may be present for a single NLRI. The
traffic actions are processed in ascending order of the sub-type
found in the BGP Extended Communities. If not all of them can be
processed the filter SHALL NOT be applied at all (for example: if for
a given flow there are the action communities rate-limit-bytes and

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

traffic-marking attached, and the plattform does not support one of
them also the other shall not be applied for that flow).

All traffic actions are specified as transitive BGP Extended
Communities.

7.1. Traffic Rate in Bytes (traffic-rate-bytes) sub-type 0x06

The traffic-rate-bytes extended community uses the following extended
community encoding:

The first two octets carry the 2-octet id, which can be assigned from
a 2-byte AS number. When a 4-byte AS number is locally present, the
2 least significant bytes of such an AS number can be used. This
value is purely informational and should not be interpreted by the
implementation.

The remaining 4 octets carry the maximum rate information in IEEE
floating point [IEEE.754.1985] format, units being bytes per second.
A traffic-rate of 0 should result on all traffic for the particular
flow to be discarded.

Interferes with: No other BGP Flow Specification traffic action in
this document.

7.2. Traffic Rate in Packets (traffic-rate-packets) sub-type TBD

The traffic-rate-packets extended community uses the same encoding as
the traffic-rate-bytes extended community. The floating point value
carries the maximum packet rate in packets per second. A traffic-
rate-packets of 0 should result in all traffic for the particular
flow to be discarded.

Interferes with: No other BGP Flow Specification traffic action in
this document.

7.3. Traffic-action (traffic-action) sub-type 0x07

The traffic-action extended community consists of 6 bytes of which
only the 2 least significant bits of the 6th byte (from left to
right) are currently defined.

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| reserved | S | T |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

where S and T are defined as:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

o T: Terminal Action (bit 47): When this bit is set, the traffic
filtering engine will apply any subsequent filtering rules (as
defined by the ordering procedure). If not set, the evaluation of
the traffic filter stops when this rule is applied.

o S: Sample (bit 46): Enables traffic sampling and logging for this
Flow Specification.

o reserved: should always be set to 0 by the originator and not be
evaluated by the receiving BGP speaker.

The use of the Terminal Action (bit 47) may result in more than one
filter-rule matching a particular flow. All the flow actions from
these rules shall be collected and applied. If interfering actions
have been collected only the first occurence SHALL be applied.
However, if a single rule contains interfering actions this rule
SHALL still be handled as described in Section 7.6.

Interferes with: No other BGP Flow Specification traffic action in
this document.

7.4. RT Redirect (rt-redirect) sub-type 0x08

The redirect extended community allows the traffic to be redirected
to a VRF routing instance that lists the specified route-target in
its import policy. If several local instances match this criteria,
the choice between them is a local matter (for example, the instance
with the lowest Route Distinguisher value can be elected). This
extended community allows 3 different encodings formats for the
route-target (type 0x80, 0x81, 0x82). Is uses the same encoding as
the Route Target extended community [RFC4360].

It should be noted that the low-order nibble of the Redirect's Type
field corresponds to the Route Target Extended Community format field
(Type). (See Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 4 of [RFC4360] plus Section 2 of
[RFC5668].) The low-order octet (Sub-Type) of the Redirect Extended
Community remains 0x08 for all three encodings of the BGP Extended
Communities (AS 2-byte, AS 4-byte, and IPv4 address).

Interferes with: All other redirect functions. All redirect
functions are mutually exclusive. If this redirect function exists,
then no other redirect functions can be processed.

7.5. Traffic Marking (traffic-marking) sub-type 0x09

The traffic marking extended community instructs a system to modify
the DSCP bits of a transiting IP packet to the corresponding value.
This extended community is encoded as a sequence of 5 zero bytes

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

followed by the DSCP value encoded in the 6 least significant bits of
6th byte.

Interferes with: No other BGP Flow Specification traffic action in
this document.

7.6. Rules on Traffic Action Interference

Traffic actions may interfere with each other. If interfering
traffic actions are present for a single Flow Specification NLRI the
entire Flow Specification (irrespective if there are any other non
conflicting actions associated with the same Flow Specification)
SHALL be treated as BGP WITHDRAW.

This document defines 7 traffic actions which are interfering in the
following way:

1. Redirect-action-communities (0x8008, 0x8108, 0x8208):

The three redirect-communities are mutually exclusive. Only a
single redirect community may be associated with a Flow
Specification otherwise they are interfering.

2. All traffic-action communities (including redirect-actions):

Multiple occurences of the same (sub-type and type) traffic-
action associated with a Flow Specification are always
interfering.

When a traffic action is defined in a standards document the handling
of interaction with other/same traffic actions MUST be defined as
well. Invalid interactions between actions SHOULD NOT trigger a BGP
NOTIFICATION. All error handling for error conditions based on
[RFC7606].

7.6.1. Examples

(rt-redirect vrf-a, rt-redirect vrf-b, traffic-rate-bytes 1Mbit/s)

RT-redirect vrf-a and rt-redirect vrf-b are interfering: The BGP
UPDATE is treated as WITHDRAW.

(rt-redirect vrf-a, traffic-rate-bytes 1Mbit/s, traffic-rate-bytes
2Mbit/s)

Duplicate traffic-rate-bytes are interfering: The BGP UPDATE is
treated as WITHDRAW.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

(rt-redirect vrf-a, traffic-rate-bytes 1Mbit/s, traffic-rate-
packets 1000)

No interfering action communities: The BGP UPDATE is subject to
further processing.

8. Dissemination of Traffic Filtering in BGP/MPLS VPN Networks

Provider-based Layer 3 VPN networks, such as the ones using a BGP/
MPLS IP VPN [RFC4364] control plane, may have different traffic
filtering requirements than Internet service providers. But also
Internet service providers may use those VPNs for scenarios like
having the Internet routing table in a VRF, resulting in the same
traffic filtering requirements as defined for the global routing
table environment within this document. This document proposes an
additional BGP NLRI type (AFI=1, SAFI=134) value, which can be used
to propagate traffic filtering information in a BGP/MPLS VPN
environment.

The NLRI format for this address family consists of a fixed-length
Route Distinguisher field (8 bytes) followed by a Flow Specification,
following the encoding defined above in Section 4.2 of this document.
The NLRI length field shall include both the 8 bytes of the Route
Distinguisher as well as the subsequent Flow Specification.

+------------------------------+
| length (0xnn or 0xfn nn) |
+------------------------------+
| Route Distinguisher (8 bytes)|
+------------------------------+
| NLRI value (variable) |
+------------------------------+

Flow-spec NLRI for MPLS

Propagation of this NLRI is controlled by matching Route Target
extended communities associated with the BGP path advertisement with
the VRF import policy, using the same mechanism as described in "BGP/
MPLS IP VPNs" [RFC4364].

Flow Specification rules received via this NLRI apply only to traffic
that belongs to the VRF(s) in which it is imported. By default,
traffic received from a remote PE is switched via an MPLS forwarding
decision and is not subject to filtering.

Contrary to the behavior specified for the non-VPN NLRI, flow rules
are accepted by default, when received from remote PE routers.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

8.1. Validation Procedures for BGP/MPLS VPNs

The validation procedures are the same as for IPv4.

8.2. Traffic Actions Rules

The traffic action rules are the same as for IPv4.

9. Limitations of Previous Traffic Filtering Efforts

9.1. Limitations in Previous DDoS Traffic Filtering Efforts

The popularity of traffic-based, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,
which often requires the network operator to be able to use traffic
filters for detection and mitigation, brings with it requirements
that are not fully satisfied by existing tools.

Increasingly, DoS mitigation requires coordination among several
service providers in order to be able to identify traffic source(s)
and because the volumes of traffic may be such that they will
otherwise significantly affect the performance of the network.

Several techniques are currently used to control traffic filtering of
DoS attacks. Among those, one of the most common is to inject
unicast route advertisements corresponding to a destination prefix
being attacked (commonly known as remote triggered blackhole RTBH).
One variant of this technique marks such route advertisements with a
community that gets translated into a discard Next-Hop by the
receiving router. Other variants attract traffic to a particular
node that serves as a deterministic drop point.

Using unicast routing advertisements to distribute traffic filtering
information has the advantage of using the existing infrastructure
and inter-AS communication channels. This can allow, for instance, a
service provider to accept filtering requests from customers for
address space they own.

There are several drawbacks, however. An issue that is immediately
apparent is the granularity of filtering control: only destination
prefixes may be specified. Another area of concern is the fact that
filtering information is intermingled with routing information.

The mechanism defined in this document is designed to address these
limitations. We use the Flow Specification NLRI defined above to
convey information about traffic filtering rules for traffic that is
subject to modified forwarding behavior (actions). The actions are
defined as extended communities and include (but are not limited to)

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

rate-limiting (including discard), traffic redirection, packet
rewriting.

9.2. Limitations in Previous BGP/MPLS Traffic Filtering

Provider-based Layer 3 VPN networks, such as the ones using a BGP/
MPLS IP VPN [RFC4364] control plane, may have different traffic
filtering requirements than Internet service providers.

In these environments, the VPN customer network often has traffic
filtering capabilities towards their external network connections
(e.g., firewall facing public network connection). Less common is
the presence of traffic filtering capabilities between different VPN
attachment sites. In an any-to-any connectivity model, which is the
default, this means that site-to-site traffic is unfiltered.

In circumstances where a security threat does get propagated inside
the VPN customer network, there may not be readily available
mechanisms to provide mitigation via traffic filter.

But also Internet service providers may use those VPNs for scenarios
like having the Internet routing table in a VRF. Therefore,
limitations described in Section 9.1 also apply to this section.

The BGP Flow Specification version 1 addresses these limitations.

10. Traffic Monitoring

Traffic filtering applications require monitoring and traffic
statistics facilities. While this is an implementation-specific
choice, implementations SHOULD provide:

o A mechanism to log the packet header of filtered traffic.

o A mechanism to count the number of matches for a given flow
specification rule.

11. IANA Considerations

This section complies with [RFC7153].

11.1. AFI/SAFI Definitions

IANA maintains a registry entitled "SAFI Values". For the purpose of
this work, IANA updated the registry and allocated two additional
SAFIs:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Table 3: Registry: SAFI Values

11.2. Flow Component Definitions

A Flow Specification consists of a sequence of flow components, which
are identified by a an 8-bit component type. IANA has created and
maintains a registry entitled "Flow Spec Component Types". This
document defines the following Component Type Codes:

Table 4: Registry: Flow Spec Component Types

In order to manage the limited number space and accommodate several
usages, the following policies defined by [RFC5226] used:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

+--------------+-------------------------------+
| Range | Policy |
+--------------+-------------------------------+
| 0 | Invalid value |
| [1 .. 12] | Defined by this specification |
| [13 .. 127] | Specification required |
| [128 .. 255] | First Come First Served |
+--------------+-------------------------------+

Table 5: Flow Spec Component Types Policies

The specification of a particular "Flow Spec Component Type" must
clearly identify what the criteria used to match packets forwarded by
the router is. This criteria should be meaningful across router hops
and not depend on values that change hop-by-hop such as TTL or Layer
2 encapsulation.

11.3. Extended Community Flow Specification Actions

The Extended Community Flow Specification Action types defined in
this document consist of two parts:

Type (BGP Transitive Extended Community Type)

Sub-Type

For the type-part, IANA maintains a registry entitled "BGP Transitive
Extended Community Types". For the purpose of this work (Section 7),
IANA updated the registry to contain the values listed below:

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Table 6: Registry: Generic Transitive Experimental Use Extended
Community Types

Note-1: This document replaces [RFC7674].

For the sub-type part of the extended community actions IANA
maintains and updated the following registries:

Table 7: Registry: Generic Transitive Experimental Use Extended
Community Sub-Types

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Note-2: This document replaces both [RFC7674] and [RFC5575].

Table 8: Registry: Generic Transitive Experimental Use Extended
Community Part 2 Sub-Types

Table 9: Registry: Generic Transitive Experimental Use Extended
Community Part 3 Sub-Types

Note-3: This document replaces [RFC7674], and becomes the only
reference for this table.

The "traffic-action" extended community (Section 7.3) defined in this
document has 46 unused bits, which can be used to convey additional
meaning. IANA created and maintains a new registry entitled:
"Traffic Action Fields". These values should be assigned via IETF
Review rules only. The following traffic-action fields have been
allocated:

+-----+-----------------+-----------------+
| Bit | Name | Reference |
+-----+-----------------+-----------------+
| 47 | Terminal Action | [this document] |
| 46 | Sample | [this document] |
+-----+-----------------+-----------------+

Table 10: Registry: Traffic Action Fields

12. Security Considerations

Inter-provider routing is based on a web of trust. Neighboring
autonomous systems are trusted to advertise valid reachability
information. If this trust model is violated, a neighboring

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

autonomous system may cause a denial-of-service attack by advertising
reachability information for a given prefix for which it does not
provide service.

As long as traffic filtering rules are restricted to match the
corresponding unicast routing paths for the relevant prefixes, the
security characteristics of this proposal are equivalent to the
existing security properties of BGP unicast routing.

Where it is not the case, this would open the door to further denial-
of-service attacks.

Enabling firewall-like capabilities in routers without centralized
management could make certain failures harder to diagnose. For
example, it is possible to allow TCP packets to pass between a pair
of addresses but not ICMP packets. It is also possible to permit
packets smaller than 900 or greater than 1000 bytes to pass between a
pair of addresses, but not packets whose length is in the range 900-
1000. Such behavior may be confusing and these capabilities should
be used with care whether manually configured or coordinated through
the protocol extensions described in this document.

13. Original authors

Barry Greene, MuPedro Marques, Jared Mauch, Danny McPherson, and
Nischal Sheth were authors on [RFC5575], and therefore are
contributing authors on this document.

14. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Yakov Rekhter, Dennis Ferguson, Chris
Morrow, Charlie Kaufman, and David Smith for their comments for the
comments on the original [RFC5575]. Chaitanya Kodeboyina helped
design the flow validation procedure; and Steven Lin and Jim Washburn
ironed out all the details necessary to produce a working
implementation in the original [RFC5575].

Additional the authors would like to thank Alexander Mayrhofer,
Nicolas Fevrier and Job Snijders for their comments and review.

15. References

15.1. Normative References

[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 29]
Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Consumers of these URIs are urged to consider the scope and
consistency of the environment across which these URIs will be
shared.

As described in Section 4, others can define additional variants,
which provide the means to describe how to look up JMS Destination
objects in a manner specific to some environment. For any new
variant, the shared parameters defined in Section 4.1 MUST have the
same meaning in that variant as they do here. That way, tools and
people can safely copy these parameters between environments. Note
that while additional variants might seem more flexible, employing
variants not defined here might make it more difficult to switch to
an alternate JMS provider.

8. Security Considerations

Section 7 of [RFC3986] identifies some of the security concerns that
ought to be addressed by this specification.

8.1. Reliability and Consistency

This specification identifies only the variant (<jms-variant>) and
variant-specific details (<jms-dest>) as an essential part of the
URI. For reliability and consistency purposes, these variants are
the only part that can reasonably be expected to be stable. Other
optional JMS configuration and message properties indicated as URI
parameters, like "timeToLive", can reasonably be determined by the
sender of a message, without affecting the recipient. Insofar as a
recipient might wish to dictate certain parameters, such as the
"jndiConnectionFactoryName", those parameters can be specified.

8.2. Malicious Construction

8.2.1. Recipient Concerns

A malicious consumer of a service using a JMS URI could send, as part
of a JMS message, a URI with a parameter such as "timeToLive" with a
value specified in the URI that differs from the corresponding JMS
message property ("JMSExpiration" header field, in this example). In
the case of such messages with such URIs, recipients are strongly
cautioned to avoid applying processing logic based on particular URI
parameters. Discrepancies in the message could be used to exploit
differences in behavior between the selectors that a JMS-based
application might use to affect which messages it sees, and the
processing of the rest of the application. As defined in this
document, the parameters of concern include:

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

deliveryMode

timeToLive

priority

Message senders are strongly urged to remove from the URI extra
parameters like the above in environments where the data will be
redundant with information specified elsewhere in the JMS message.

Any use of additional parameters, either as a part of a definition of
a new variant or for more general use, SHOULD also specify whether
those parameters ought to be removed by a sender as specified here.
If a recipient is aware of the "jms" URI scheme, and it receives a
message containing a JMS URI, it MUST ignore or discard parameters
that it does not recognize.

8.2.2. Sender Concerns

A third party could intercept and replace a URI containing any of the
JMS/JNDI configuration parameters, such as
"jndiConnectionFactoryName", "jndiInitialContextFactory", or
"jndiURL". As these parameters can affect how an implementation
establishes an initial connection, such parameters could be used as a
means to subvert communications. This could possibly result in
re-routing communications to third parties, who could then monitor
sent messages. Clients SHOULD NOT use these URI parameters unless
assured of their validity in trusted environments.

8.3. Back-End Transcoding

This specification, in using the URI specification and building
around the JMS specification, has no particular transcoding issues.
Any such issues are problems with the underlying implementation of
Java and the Java Messaging Service being employed.

8.4. Semantic Attacks

A possible semantic attack on the "jndi" variant could be
accomplished by replacing characters of the JMS URI from one language
with equivalent-looking characters from another language, known as an
"Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) homograph attack" [HOMOGRAPH].
This kind of attack could occur in a variety of ways. For example,

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 15]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

if an environment allows for the automatic registration of JNDI
Destination names, a malicious actor could register and then
publicize an alternate of an existing Destination name. Such an
environment ought to prevent the use of homograph equivalents,
perhaps by restricting allowed characters, so that clients do not
accidentally send their requests to unintended Destinations.

The "queue" and "topic" variants are subject to the same concerns as
the "jndi" variant. In addition, because the Destination names are
vendor defined, URIs employing these two variants might employ
special characters that significantly change the meaning of the URI.
It is possible that the introduction of a single character --
difficult for a human to notice -- might dramatically change the
intended meaning of a URI. In situations where this might be an
issue, users of this URI are urged to strongly consider the "jndi"
variant instead.

8.5. Other Security Concerns

This specification does not define or anticipate any use for IP
addresses as part of the URI, so no issues around IP addresses, rare
or otherwise, are raised by this specification.

This specification does not define any characteristics of a "jms"
scheme URI that contain sensitive information.

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. URI Scheme Registration

IANA registered the Java Message Service URI scheme described in this
document, according to the following scheme registration request,
using the template from [RFC4395]:

o URI scheme name: jms

o Status: Provisional

o URI scheme syntax: See Section 3

o URI scheme semantics: See Section 4

o Encoding considerations: See Section 5

o Applications/protocols that use this URI scheme name: See
Section 6

o Interoperability considerations: See Section 7

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 16]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

o Security considerations: See Section 8

o Contact: See the Authors' Addresses section

o References: See the References section

9.2. "jms" URI Scheme Registries

Per this URI scheme, IANA has created a registry for possible
"variants". IANA can reject obviously bogus registrations.

9.2.1. JMS URI Variants

This registry provides a listing of "jms" URI scheme variants.
Variant names beginning with "vnd." are reserved for vendor
extensions. Such variants should follow a pattern of
vnd.<vendorname>.<label>. The <vendorname> corresponds to the
iana-vendor-tag production from [RFC6075], and vendor.<vendorname>
must already be registered in the Application Configuration Access
Protocol (ACAP) Vendor Subtree. The <label> is chosen by said
vendor.

All variant names are to be registered on a first come, first served
basis.

Variants must conform to the "jms-variant" production above. Since
variants occur in URIs, they ought to be short, and MUST NOT be more
than forty characters in length.

This document defines the "jndi", "queue", and "topic" variants
initially included in the registry.

9.2.2. "jms" URI Scheme Variant Registration Template

This template describes the fields that must be present to register a
new variant for use in a JMS URI.

To: iana@iana.org
Subject: Registration of JMS URI variant name

JMS URI variant name: Variants must conform to the "jms-variant"
production above. Since variants occur in URIs, they ought to be
short, and MUST NOT be more than forty characters in length.

Description: A description of the purpose of the variant being
registered.

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 17]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Contact Information: Name(s) and email address(es) to contact for
more information about this registration.

Description URL: If available, a URL for a document describing the
details of how the variant works.

Comments: Any comments the requester thinks are relevant to this
request.

Change Controller: Contact information for the person who controls
further changes to this variant definition.

9.2.3. Change Control

Once a JMS URI variant registration has been published by IANA, the
change controller can request a change to its definition. The change
request follows the same procedure as the registration request.

The change controller of a JMS URI variant can pass responsibility
for the JMS URI variant to another person or agency by informing
IANA; this can be done without discussion or review.

JMS URI variant registrations MUST NOT be deleted; mechanisms that
are no longer believed appropriate for use can be marked as obsolete
in the Comment field.

In exceptional circumstances, the IESG can reassign responsibility
for a JMS URI variant.

The IESG is considered to be the owner of all JMS URI variants that
are on the IETF Standards Track.

10. Contributors

The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of:

Phil Adams
International Business Machines Corporation
EMail: phil_adams@us.ibm.com

Glen Daniels
WSO2
EMail: glen@wso2.com

Peter Easton
Progress Software
EMail: peaston@progress.com

Phillips, et al. Informational [Page 18]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.

[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

[RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.

[RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>.

[RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and
Signaling", RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/RFC4761, January 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4761>.

[RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)
Signaling", RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/RFC4762, January 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4762>.

[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

[RFC5575] Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

[RFC5668] Rekhter, Y., Sangli, S., and D. Tappan, "4-Octet AS
Specific BGP Extended Community", RFC 5668,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5668, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5668>.

[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

[RFC7153] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "IANA Registries for BGP
Extended Communities", RFC 7153, DOI 10.17487/RFC7153,
March 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7153>.

[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

[RFC7674] Haas, J., Ed., "Clarification of the Flowspec Redirect
Extended Community", RFC 7674, DOI 10.17487/RFC7674,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7674>.

15.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-idr-flow-spec-v6]
McPherson, D., Raszuk, R., Pithawala, B.,
akarch@cisco.com, a., and S. Hares, "Dissemination of Flow
Specification Rules for IPv6", draft-ietf-idr-flow-spec-
v6-08 (work in progress), March 2017.

[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

15.3. URIs

[1] https://github.com/stoffi92/flowspec-cmp

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Appendix A. Comparison with RFC 5575

This document includes numerous editorial changes to [RFC5575]. It
is recommended to read the entire document. The authors, however
want to point out the following technical changes to [RFC5575]:

Section 4.2.3 defines a numeric operator and comparison bit
combinations. In [RFC5575] the meaning of those bit combination
was not explicitly defined and left open to the reader.

Section 4.2.3 - Section 4.2.8, Section 4.2.10, Section 4.2.11 make
use of the above numeric operator. The allowed length of the
comparison value was not consistently defined in [RFC5575].

Section 7 defines all traffic action extended communities as
transitive extended communities. [RFC5575] defined the traffic-
rate action to be non-transitive and did not define the
transitivity of the other action communities at all.

Section 7.2 introduces a new traffic filtering action (traffic-
rate-packets). This action did not exist in [RFC5575].

Section 7.4 contains the same redirect actions already defined in
[RFC5575] however, these actions have been renamed to "rt-
redirect" to make it clearer that the redirection is based on
route-target.

Section 7.6 introduces rules how updates of Flow Specifications
shall be handled in case they contain interfering actions.
Section 7.3 also cross-references this section. [RFC5575] did not
define this.

Authors' Addresses

Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA

Email: shares@ndzh.com

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft RFC5575bis October 2017

Christoph Loibl
Next Layer Communications
Mariahilfer Guertel 37/7
Vienna 1150
AT

Phone: +43 664 1176414
Email: cl@tix.at

Robert Raszuk
Bloomberg LP
731 Lexington Ave
New York City, NY 10022
USA

Email: robert@raszuk.net

Danny McPherson
Verisign
USA

Email: dmcpherson@verisign.com

Martin Bacher
T-Mobile Austria
Rennweg 97-99
Vienna 1030
AT

Email: mb.ietf@gmail.com

Hares, et al. Expires April 27, 2018 [Page 33]
RFC 6167 jms" URI Scheme April 2011

Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules draft-ietf-idr-rfc5575bis-06

Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules
draft-ietf-idr-rfc5575bis-06