EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (ERP/AAK)
draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-11

[Ballot comment]
And now for some nits:

1) f1: Is there an extra "[" or is a "]" missing in the following:

  a. | [EAP-Initiate/ |              |                  |

I think a "]" is missing because a is optional. Note this is a total nit and shouldn't require you to post another version.

2) s3: r/thus message/this message

3) s4.1: Should this:

The pMSK label is the 8-bit ASCII string:

      Early-Authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org

be:

The pMSK label is the 8-bit ASCII string:

      EAP Early-Authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org

to match the earlier ASCII string?

4) s4.1: My assumption is that the pMSK ASCII string is coming from the same place and the KDF is also defined in 5295.  Worth repeating for the pMSK?

5) s5.1, s5.2, s5.3: I know this is minor but r/changed parameters/new parameters

6) s5.2 and s5.3: Shouldn't you say something about L? It's mentioned later in s5.3 so something ought to at least be said about it even if it's just "L" see 5296 like for the SEQ field.

7) s5.3: r/HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory/HMAC-SHA256-128 is REQUIRED - just to make it match s5.2

[Ballot comment]
Please think about wether it would be useful to create a registry for
the flags fields in the packets so that it is easier to track them if/
when future extensions come along.

IANA understands that, upon approval of this document, there are two
actions which IANA must complete.

First, in the EAP Initiate and Finish Attributes subregistry of the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Registry located at:

www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml

four new TLV type values will be assigned as follows:

Type: [ tbd ]
Description: Sequence number
Payload Type: TV
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Type: [ tbd ]
Description: ERP/AAK-Key
Payload Type: TLV
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Type: [ tbd ]
Description: pRK Lifetime
Payload Type: TLV
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Type: [ tbd ]
Description: pMSK Lifetime
Payload Type: TLV
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

IANA notes that the authors request types 7 through 10 inclusive for
these four TLV type values and will, if possible, use those values.

Second, in the User Specific Root Keys (USRK) Key Labels subregistry of
the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Parameters registry located at:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/emsk-parameters/emsk-parameters.xml

a new key label will be added as follows:

Label: EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org
Description: Early authentication usage
reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

IANA understands that these are the only actions required to be
completed upon approval of this document.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call:  (EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (ERP/AAK)) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Handover Keying WG (hokey) to
consider the following document:
- 'EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated
  Anticipatory Keying (ERP/AAK)'
  as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-02-07. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework
  supporting multiple types of authentication methods.

  The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP
  and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
  protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
  re-authentication server through any authenticator.

  Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) is a method by which
  cryptographic keying material may be established upon one or more
  candidate attachment points (CAPs) prior to handover.  AAK uses the
  AAA infrastructure for key transport.

  This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK
  support in ERP.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak/


The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:

  http://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1450/

PROTO write up rx'd via email

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
      Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
      document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
      version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

The document shepherd for draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak is Tina Tsou .
I believe this document is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication.


      the document had adequate review both from key WG members
      and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
      any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
      have been performed?

Yes, the review has been adequate. Both the OPS and security people active in the WG has reviewed it.


(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
      needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
      e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
      AAA, internationalization or XML?

No concerns.

  (1.d) Do have any specific concerns or
      issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
      and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
      or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
      has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
      event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
      that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
      concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
      been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
      disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
    &n s issue.

IPR disclosure to this document has been brought to the attention of the working group and is purely for defensive use. There are no other concerns.


(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
      represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
      others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
      agree with it?

It represents the concurrence of a few individuals with others being silent.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
&n bsp;&nbs ;discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
      separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
      should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
      entered into the ID Tracker.)

No.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
      document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
      and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
      not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
      met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
      Doctor, media type and URI tye review

Datatracker finds no issues. Idnits is satisfied.

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
      informative? Are there normative references to documents that
      are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
      state? If such normative references exist, what is the
      strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
      that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
      so, list these downward references to support the Area
      Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

Split as required. No down-references.

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
        consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
        of the document? If the document specifies protocol
        extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
        registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
        the document creates a new registry, does it define the
        proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
        procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
        reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
        document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
        conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
        can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?


The IANA considerations section exists; the registry is identified and there are no other new registries.

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
      document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
      code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
      an automated checker?

Not applicable.

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
      Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
      Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
      "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
      announcement contains the following sections p;

  Technical Summary

  The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework
  supporting multiple types of authentication methods.

  The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP
  and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
  protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
  re-authentication server through any authenticator.

  Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) is a method by which
  cryptographic keying material may be established upon one or more
  candidate attachment points (CAPs) prior to handover.  AAK uses the
  AAA infrastructure for key transport.

  This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK
  support in ERP.



    Working Group Summary
      The document is a product of the Hokey working group. The document has
      working group consensus.


    Document Quality
     

The document develops a series of procedure, protocol for the specific usage scenario identified.
This document has gotten sufficient review from people with both OPS and Security background. The quality of the document is good.