RPKI Autonomous Systems Cones: A Profile To Define Sets of Autonomous Systems Numbers To Facilitate BGP Filtering
draft-ietf-grow-rpki-as-cones-01
Global Routing Operations J. Snijders
Internet-Draft NTT
Intended status: Informational M. Stucchi
Expires: September 6, 2019 RIPE NCC
March 5, 2019
RPKI Autonomous Systems Cones: A Profile To Define Sets of Autonomous
Systems Numbers To Facilitate BGP Filtering
draft-ietf-grow-rpki-as-cones-01
Abstract
This document describes a way to define groups of Autonomous System
numbers in RPKI [RFC6480]. We call them AS-Cones. AS-Cones provide
a mechanism to be used by operators for filtering BGP-4 [RFC4271]
announcements.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Format of AS-Cone objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Policy definition object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Naming convention for Policy definition objects . . . 3
2.1.2. ASN.1 format of a Policy Definition object . . . . . 3
2.1.3. Naming convention for neighbour relationships . . . . 4
2.2. AS-Cone definition object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. Naming convention for AS-Cone objects . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.2. ASN.1 format of an AS-Cone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Validating an AS-Cone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Recommendations for use of AS-Cones at Internet Exchange
points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Publication of AS-Cones as IRR objects . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
The main goal of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system
[RFC6480] is to support improved security for the global routing
system. This is achieved through the use of information stored in a
distributed repository system comprised of signed objects. A
commonly used object type is the Route Object Authorisation (ROAs),
which describe the prefixes originated by ASNs.
There is however no way for an operator to assert the routes for its
customer networks, making it difficult to use the information carried
by RPKI to create meaningful BGP-4 filters without relying on RPSL
[RFC2622] as-sets.
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