Skip to main content

Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8212.
Authors Jared Mauch , Job Snijders , Greg Hankins
Last updated 2016-10-31
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Formats
Reviews
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Became RFC 8212 (Proposed Standard)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
   revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem.  There is a
   need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
   behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem.  Routing leaks
   [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
   misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
   we aim to address.

   Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default.
   This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where
   operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow
   all networks to reach each other.  As the Internet has become more
   densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
   significant risks to Internet routing.

   This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP
   speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation
   boundaries in a base router or VPN instances.  When this solution is
   implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without
   policies configured on EBGP sessions.

Mauch, et al.              Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject               October 2016

2.  Solution Requirements

   The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address
   Family apply to the solution described in this document:

   o  Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no
      import policy was configured.

   o  Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
      export policy was configured.

   o  Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures
      preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes.

   o  Software MUST operate in this mode by default.

   o  Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
      security capability.

3.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
   Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and
   Brian Dickson.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP
   speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without
   policies.  Operators have a need for implementers to address the
   problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible
   attacks from a permissive security behavior.  Attacks and inadvertent
   advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a
   secure default behavior.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Contributors

   The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
   described in this document:

Mauch, et al.              Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 3]
Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject               October 2016

   Jakob Heitz
   Cisco

   Email: jheitz@cisco.com

   Ondrej Filip
   CZ.NIC

   Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jared Mauch
   NTT Communications
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor  Michigan 48103
   US

   Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net

Mauch, et al.              Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 4]
Internet-Draft             BGP Default Reject               October 2016

   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   NL

   Email: job@ntt.net

   Greg Hankins
   Nokia
   777 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com

Mauch, et al.              Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 5]