Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8212.
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Authors | Jared Mauch , Job Snijders , Greg Hankins | ||
Last updated | 2016-10-31 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Reviews |
GENART Telechat review
(of
-07)
by Dale Worley
Ready w/nits
GENART Last Call review
(of
-04)
by Dale Worley
Ready w/nits
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Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 8212 (Proposed Standard) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability we aim to address. Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default. This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow all networks to reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses significant risks to Internet routing. This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions. Mauch, et al. Expires May 4, 2017 [Page 2] Internet-Draft BGP Default Reject October 2016 2. Solution Requirements The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address Family apply to the solution described in this document: o Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no import policy was configured. o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no export policy was configured. o Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes. o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this security capability. 3. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the following people for their comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and Brian Dickson. 4. Security Considerations This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without policies. Operators have a need for implementers to address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible attacks from a permissive security behavior. Attacks and inadvertent advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a secure default behavior. 5. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 6. Contributors The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution described in this document: Mauch, et al. Expires May 4, 2017 [Page 3] Internet-Draft BGP Default Reject October 2016 Jakob Heitz Cisco Email: jheitz@cisco.com Ondrej Filip CZ.NIC Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. 7.2. Informative References [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. Authors' Addresses Jared Mauch NTT Communications 8285 Reese Lane Ann Arbor Michigan 48103 US Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net Mauch, et al. Expires May 4, 2017 [Page 4] Internet-Draft BGP Default Reject October 2016 Job Snijders NTT Communications Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 Amsterdam 1065 SZ NL Email: job@ntt.net Greg Hankins Nokia 777 E. Middlefield Road Mountain View, CA 94043 USA Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com Mauch, et al. Expires May 4, 2017 [Page 5]