Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')
draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-10

[Ballot comment]
One minor comment: I wasn't convinced that this paragraph was needed in the abstract, and thought that it might be better if this was contained in the introduction instead:

  EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a key derivation function
  that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the
  access network.  The key derivation function has been defined in the
  3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).  EAP-AKA' allows its use
  in EAP in an interoperable manner.  EAP-AKA' also updates the
  algorithm used in hash functions, as it employs SHA-256 / HMAC-
  SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 / HMAC-SHA-1 as in EAP-AKA.

[Ballot comment]
Why isn't this document on the standards track? I understand that it updates and obsoletes informational documents and I'm assuming there are historical 3GPP-related reasons why those documents were informational, but couldn't that be fixed in this update? This certainly seems like it is specifying normative behavior.

== Section 5.3.2 ==

"Otherwise, the peer SHOULD employ IMSI, SUPI, or a NAI as it is
  configured to use."

It may be that I'm missing context, but 5.3.1.1 says "A SUPI is either an IMSI or a Network Access Identifier," which makes me wonder what it means to employ a SUPI that is neither an IMSI nor an NAI.

== Section  7.1 ==

"The use of the null scheme is NOT RECOMMENDED where identity privacy
  is important."

I think it might be better to say "The use of the null scheme is NOT RECOMMENDED where the SUCI can be linked to a human user."

"The pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities MUST
      also not be used for other purposes (e.g. in other protocols)."

The normative language is not right. I think what you want is:

The pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities MUST NOT be used for other purposes (e.g. in other protocols).

s/will available/will be available/

It would be good to provide citation(s) for "tunneled EAP methods" since their security  properties are not discussed here.

[Ballot comment]
I mostly only read the diff and skimmed the rest.

Section 1

  The rest of this specification is structured as follows.  Section 3
  defines the EAP-AKA' method.  Section 4 adds support to EAP-AKA to
  prevent bidding down attacks from EAP-AKA'.  Section 5 specifies
  requirements regarding the use of peer identities, including how EAP-
  AKA' identifiers are used in 5G context.  Section 6 specifies what

I'm not sure if it's "EAP-AKA' identifiers being used in 5G context" or
"5G identifiers being used in an EAP-AKA' context" -- which way does the
causality go?

Section 4

  Note that we assume (Section 7) that EAP-AKA' is always stronger than
  EAP-AKA.  As a result, there is no need to prevent bidding "down"
  attacks in the other direction, i.e., attackers forcing the endpoints
  to use EAP-AKA'.

I'd prefer to say something like "we do not provide" rather than "there
is no need".

Section 5.2

I agree with the IoTdir reviewer's concerns about over-stating the need
for a secure PRNG in pseudonym generation.

Section 5.3.1

  In all other cases, the following applies:

      The identity used in the key derivation formula MUST be exactly
      the one sent in EAP-AKA' AT_IDENTITY attribute, if one was sent,
      regardless of the kind of identity that it may have been.  If no
      AT_IDENTITY was sent, the identity MUST be the exactly the one
      sent in the generic EAP Identity exchange, if one was made.
      Again, the identity MUST be used exactly as sent.

      If no identity was communicated inside EAP, then the identity is
      the one communicated outside EAP in link layer messaging.

      In this case, the used identity MUST be the identity most recently
      communicated by the peer to the network, again regardless of what
      type of identity it may have been.

Just to check: there's a strong message sequencing, so that there cannot
be ambiguity between peers about the "most recently communicated"
identity?

Section 5.3.1.1

    234150999999999@nai.5gc.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org

Should this be using an example domain name instead of 3gppnetwork.org?
(I think "no", but have to check.)

Section 5.3.2.1

    For the null-scheme:

      type0.rid678.schid0.userid0999999999@nai.5gc.mnc015.
      mcc234.3gppnetwork.org

    For the Profile protection scheme:

      type0.rid678.schid1.hnkey27.ecckey.
      cip.mac@nai.5gc.
      mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org

[ditto]

Section 6

  The EAP-AKA' Session-Id is the concatenation of the EAP Type Code
  (0x32, one byte) with the contents of the RAND field from the AT_RAND
  attribute, followed by the contents of the AUTN field in the AT_AUTN
  attribute:

        Session-Id = 0x32 || RAND || AUTN

  When using fast re-authentication, the EAP-AKA' Session-Id is the
  concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x32) with the contents of the
  [...]

nit: the second paragraph contradicts the first, since the first one
does not disclaim that it's only for "regular authentication"
(non-fast-reauthentication).

Section 7

      In general, it is expected that the current negotiation
      capabilities in EAP-AKA' are sufficient for some types of
      extensions and cryptographic agility, including adding Perfect
      Forward Secrecy ([I-D.ietf-emu-aka-pfs]) and perhaps others.  But
      as with how EAP-AKA' itself came about, some larger changes may
      require a new EAP method type.

Could we mention that we are not agile with respect to the use of
SHA256/HMAC-SHA256?

Section 7.2

  Basin et al [Basin2018] have performed formal analysis and concluded
  that the AKA protocol would have benefited from additional security
  requirements, such as key confirmation.

This feels a bit like a teaser -- what would be gained/prevented by
using key confirmation?  Is there a path towards performing key
confirmation in the future?

Section 7.3

  As described Section 7.2, after the publication of RFC 5448, new

nit: "As described in"

  In particular, it is crucial that manufacturers limit access to the
  secret information and the cards only to necessary systems and
  personnel.  It is also crucial that secure mechanisms be used to
  communicate the secrets between the manufacturer and the operator
  that adopts those cards for their customers.

No recommendation for encryption at rest?

  Beyond these operational considerations, there are also technical
  means to improve resistance to these attacks.  One approach is to
  provide Perfect Forwards Secrecy (PFS).  This would prevent any
  passive attacks merely based on the long-term secrets and observation
  of traffic.  Such a mechanism can be defined as a backwards-
  compatible extension of EAP-AKA', and is pursued separately from this
  specification [I-D.ietf-emu-aka-pfs].  Alternatively, EAP-AKA'
  authentication can be run inside a PFS-capable tunneled
  authentication method.  In any case, the use of some PFS-capable
  mechanism is recommended.

My preference would be to drop the "Perfect" and also discuss forward
secrecy with respect to specific event(s).  See also the discussion at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/81XWrBZiLNoPg7kfnAdaxIB8da8/

Section 7.4

  The server receives the EAP transaction from a given access network,
  and verifies that the claim from the access network corresponds to
  the name that this access network should be using.  It becomes
  impossible for an access network to claim over AAA that it is another
  access network.  In addition, if the peer checks that the information
  it has received locally over the network-access link layer matches
  with the information the server has given it via EAP-AKA', it becomes
  impossible for the access network to tell one story to the AAA
  network and another one to the peer.  These checks prevent some

Why is this an "if" the peer checks -- shouldn't it be mandatory?

Appendix 9.2

It looks like the only place we reference [FIPS.180-1] and [FIPS.180-2]
is in the note saying that we updated the references to them :)

[Ballot comment]
doc{draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-07}

ballot{No Objection}

[nits]

S1

* "in 5G context" -> "in a 5G context", "in 5G contexts", "in the 5G context"

S3.1

* "for both non-3GPP access networks for 5G access networks" ->
  "for both non-3GPP access networks and 5G access networks"?

S5.3.2.1

* I assume 23.003 specifies which ECC to use and the encoding of both the
  ephemeral key and the encrypted version of the MSISN?

* Does this NAI risk tripping any length concerns?

S6

* Does the Session-Id for fast re-authentication also need to take into
  consideration the counter?  Please forgive my naivety.

[Ballot comment]
The apostrophe in "EAP-AKA'" makes me think there’s a typo present every time I see it.

I primarily reviewed the diff between this document and RFC 5448.  Nothing stood out to me as needing particular discussion.  The thorough treatment on security, privacy, and vulnerability is appreciated.

Abstract:
* "memo" should really be "document".  (This was beaten into me by a previous AD, but I kind of agree with it.)

Section 5.1:
Nit:
* List item (1)(b) is missing a closing parenthesis.

Section 7.2:
Nit:
* "There has also been attacks …" -- s/has/have/

Section 7.3:
Nit:
* "Perfect Forwards Secrecy …" -- s/Forwards/Forward/

(Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis-06. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

We understand that upon approval of this document, there is a single action which we must complete.

The six references to RFC 5448 at https://www.iana.org/assignments/eapsimaka-numbers and the single reference to that document at https://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers, all of which are named in Sections 8.1-8.3, will be replaced with references to this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed.

Thank you,

Sabrina Tanamal
Senior IANA Services Specialist

The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2020-01-29):

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC: rdd@cert.org, emu@ietf.org, Joseph Salowey , joe@salowey.net, draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis@ietf.org, emu-chairs@ietf.org
Reply-To: last-call@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')) to Informational RFC


The IESG has received a request from the EAP Method Update WG (emu) to
consider the following document: - 'Improved Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile
  Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')'
  as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2020-01-29. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  The 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is the
  primary authentication mechanism for devices wishing to access mobile
  networks.  RFC 4187 (EAP-AKA) made the use of this mechanism possible
  within the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework.  RFC
  5448 (EAP-AKA') was an improved version of EAP-AKA.

  This memo replaces the specification of EAP-AKA'.  EAP-AKA' was
  defined in RFC 5448 and updated EAP-AKA RFC 4187.  As such this
  document obsoletes RFC 5448 and updates RFC 4187.

  EAP-AKA' differs from EAP-AKA by providing a key derivation function
  that binds the keys derived within the method to the name of the
  access network.  The key derivation function has been defined in the
  3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).  EAP-AKA' allows its use
  in EAP in an interoperable manner.  EAP-AKA' is also an algorithm
  update, as it employs SHA-256 / HMAC-SHA-256 instead of SHA-1 / HMAC-
  SHA-1 as in EAP-AKA.

  This version of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol
  behaviour for 5G deployments as well.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

This is a revision of an existing informational document

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  This memo replaces the specification of EAP-AKA'.  EAP-AKA' was
  defined in RFC 5448 and updated EAP-AKA RFC 4187.  As such this
  document obsoletes RFC 5448 and updates RFC 4187.    This version
  of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol behaviour for 5G
  deployments as well.

Working Group Summary

  There was consensus for the document in the working group. 
 

Document Quality

  This document is used by 3GPP standards including 5G standards and
  has had review from members of that community.

Personnel

  Joe Salowey is the document shepherd and Roman Danyliw is the
  Responsible AD.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document has been reviewed by the document shepherd and is
ready for publication.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

NA

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

No Specific concerns

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Confirmation received from authors.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

The documents predecessor (RFC-5448)  has an IPR disclosure
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?rfc=5448&submit=rfc which applies
to this document as well. 

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

The document has working group consensus behind it.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threat of appeal

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

No nits found

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

NA

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

Yes

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

No

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

NA

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

The document will update RFC 4187 and obsolete RFC 5448.
These documents are listed in the header, abstract and introduction

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 8126).

The document does not make changes to the IANA considerations section

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

The document does not define any new registries and there are designated
experts for the existing registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

NA

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

This is a revision of an existing informational document

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  This memo replaces the specification of EAP-AKA'.  EAP-AKA' was
  defined in RFC 5448 and updated EAP-AKA RFC 4187.  As such this
  document obsoletes RFC 5448 and updates RFC 4187.    This version
  of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol behaviour for 5G
  deployments as well.

Working Group Summary

  There was consensus for the document in the working group. 
 

Document Quality

  This document is used by 3GPP standards including 5G standards and
  has had review from members of that community.

Personnel

  Joe Salowey is the document shepherd and Roman Danyliw is the
  Responsible AD.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document has been reviewed by the document shepherd and is
ready for publication.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

NA

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

No Specific concerns

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Confirmation received from authors.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

The documents predecessor (RFC-5448)  has an IPR disclosure
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?rfc=5448&submit=rfc which applies
to this document as well. 

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

The document has working group consensus behind it.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threat of appeal

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

No nits found

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

NA

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

Yes

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

No

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

NA

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

The document will update RFC 4187 and obsolete RFC 5448.
These documents are listed in the header, abstract and introduction

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 8126).

The document does not make changes to the IANA considerations section

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

The document does not define any new registries and there are designated
experts for the existing registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

NA

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

This is a revision of an existing informational document

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  This memo replaces the specification of EAP-AKA'.  EAP-AKA' was
  defined in RFC 5448 and updated EAP-AKA RFC 4187.  As such this
  document obsoletes RFC 5448 and updates RFC 4187.    This version
  of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol behaviour for 5G
  deployments as well.

Working Group Summary

  There was consensus for the document in the working group. 
 

Document Quality

  This document is used by 3GPP standards including 5G standards and
  has had review from members of that community.

Personnel

  Joe Salowey is the document shepherd and Roman Danyliw is the
  Responsible AD.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document has been reviewed by the document shepherd and is
ready for publication.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

NA

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

No Specific concerns

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Message sent to authors, most have confirmed

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

The documents predecessor (RFC-5448)  has an IPR disclosure
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?rfc=5448&submit=rfc which applies
to this document as well. 

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

The document has working group consensus behind it.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threat of appeal

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

There are a few references that need to be updated.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

NA

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?
Yes

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

No

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

NA

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

The document will update RFC 4187 and obsolete RFC 5448.
These documents are listed in the header, abstract and introduction

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 8126).

The document does not make changes to the IANA considerations section

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

The document does not define any new registries and there are designated
experts for the existing registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

NA

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

This is a revision of an existing informational document

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  This memo replaces the specification of EAP-AKA'.  EAP-AKA' was
  defined in RFC 5448 and updated EAP-AKA RFC 4187.  As such this
  document obsoletes RFC 5448 and updates RFC 4187.    This version
  of EAP-AKA' specification specifies the protocol behaviour for 5G
  deployments as well.

Working Group Summary

  There was consensus for the document in the working group. 
 

Document Quality

  This document is used by 3GPP standards including 5G standards and
  has had review from members of that community.

Personnel

  Joe Salowey is the document shepherd and Roman Danyliw is the
  Responsible AD.

(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

The document has been reviewed by the document shepherd and is
ready for publication.

(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

No

(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

NA

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

No Specific concerns

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.



(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.

The documents predecessor (RFC-5448)  has an IPR disclosure
https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?rfc=5448&submit=rfc which applies
to this document as well. 

(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

The document has working group consensus behind it.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No threat of appeal

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.



(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

The document will update RFC 4187 and obsolete RFC 5448.
These documents are listed in the header, abstract and introduction

(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 8126).

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.
NA