Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-14
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (emu WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | John Preuß Mattsson , Mohit Sethi | ||
| Last updated | 2021-02-02 | ||
| Replaces | draft-mattsson-eap-tls13 | ||
| Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Joseph Salowey | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-05-17) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation - Defer::AD Followup | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Has a DISCUSS. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved. |
||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK | ||
Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved) Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track February 2, 2021
Expires: August 6, 2021
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-14
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. This document specifies the use of EAP-Transport Layer
Security (EAP-TLS) with TLS 1.3 while remaining backwards compatible
with existing implementations of EAP-TLS. TLS 1.3 provides
significantly improved security, privacy, and reduced latency when
compared to earlier versions of TLS. EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 further
improves security and privacy by always providing forward secrecy,
never disclosing the peer identity, and by mandating use of
revocation checking. This document also provides guidance on
authorization and resumption for EAP-TLS in general (regardless of
the underlying TLS version used). This document updates RFC 5216.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Mattsson & Sethi Expires August 6, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 February 2021
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Ticket Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.5. No Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.6. Hello Retry Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.7. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.8. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.9. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 19
2.5. EAP State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol . . . . . . . . 20
4. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Peer and Server Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.6. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.7. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.9. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.10. Discovered Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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