Nimble out-of-band authentication for EAP (EAP-NOOB)
draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-03
Network Working Group T. Aura
Internet-Draft Aalto University
Intended status: Standards Track M. Sethi
Expires: June 16, 2021 Ericsson
A. Peltonen
Aalto University
December 13, 2020
Nimble out-of-band authentication for EAP (EAP-NOOB)
draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-03
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) provides support for
multiple authentication methods. This document defines the EAP-NOOB
authentication method for nimble out-of-band (OOB) authentication and
key derivation. The EAP method is intended for bootstrapping all
kinds of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices that have no pre-configured
authentication credentials. The method makes use of a user-assisted
one-directional OOB message between the peer device and
authentication server to authenticate the in-band key exchange. The
device must have an input or output interface, such as a display,
microphone, speaker or blinking light, which can send or receive
dynamically generated messages of tens of bytes in length.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Aura, et al. Expires June 16, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft EAP-NOOB December 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. EAP-NOOB protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Protocol messages and sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. Common handshake in all EAP-NOOB exchanges . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Initial Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. OOB Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. Completion Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.5. Waiting Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3. Protocol data fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.1. Peer identifier and NAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.2. Message data fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4. Fast reconnect and rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4.1. Persistent EAP-NOOB association . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4.2. Reconnect Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4.3. User reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.5. Key derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6. Error handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6.1. Invalid messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6.2. Unwanted peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6.3. State mismatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6.4. Negotiation failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6.5. Cryptographic verification failure . . . . . . . . . 34
3.6.6. Application-specific failure . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1. Cryptosuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2. Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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