Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Last updated 2019-11-17
Replaces draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs
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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                K. Norrman
Updates: RFC5448 (if approved)                               V. Torvinen
Intended status: Informational                                  Ericsson
Expires: May 21, 2020                                  November 18, 2019

   Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
       Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)
                       draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-02

Abstract

   Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations
   associated with pervasive surveillance.  Some of the reported attacks
   involved compromising smart cards, such as attacking SIM card
   manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise shared secrets
   stored on these cards.  Since the publication of those reports,
   manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny
   and have improved.  However, the danger of resourceful attackers for
   these systems is still a concern.

   This specification is an optional extension to the EAP-AKA'
   authentication method which was defined in [I-D.ietf-emu-rfc5448bis].
   The extension, when negotiated, provides Perfect Forward Secrecy for
   the session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-
   AKA'.  This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-
   term pre-shared secret in a SIM card from being able to decrypt any
   past communications.  In addition, if the attacker stays merely a
   passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future
   sessions.  This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2020.

Arkko, et al.             Expires May 21, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                EAP-AKA' PFS                 November 2019

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Protocol Design and Deployment Objectives . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  EAP-AKA' Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Attacks Against Long-Term Shared Secrets in Smart Cards .   8
   4.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Extensions to EAP-AKA'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  AT_PUB_ECDHE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  AT_KDF_PFS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  New Key Derivation Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  ECDHE Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.5.  Message Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.5.1.  EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.5.2.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.3.  EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.4.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.5.  EAP-Request/AKA'-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.5.6.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Reauthentication  . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.5.7.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Synchronization-Failure . . . . . .  17
       6.5.8.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Authentication-Reject . . . . . . .  17
       6.5.9.  EAP-Response/AKA'-Client-Error  . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       6.5.10. EAP-Request/AKA'-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
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