Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-use-cases-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dots WG)
Authors Yuhei Hayashi  , chenmeiling  , Li Su 
Last updated 2020-11-18
Replaces draft-hayashi-dots-telemetry-use-cases
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                                   M. Chen
Expires: May 22, 2021                                             Li. Su
                                                                    CMCC
                                                       November 18, 2020

       Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
                 draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-use-cases-01

Abstract

   Denial-of-service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry enriches the
   base DOTS protocols to assist the mitigator in using efficient DDoS-
   attack-mitigation techniques in a network.  This document presents
   sample use cases for DOTS Telemetry: what components are deployed in
   the network, how they cooperate, and what information is exchanged to
   effectively use these techniques.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Hayashi, et al.           Expires May 22, 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          DOTS Telemetry Use Cases           November 2020

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Traffic Bandwidth . . . .   3
       3.1.1.  Mitigating Attack Flow of Top-talker Preferentially .   3
       3.1.2.  Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation  . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.3.  Best-path Selection for Redirection . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.4.  Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation  . . .   8
     3.2.  DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Type  . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  Selecting Mitigation Technique  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Setting up for Detection Based on Attack Detail or
           Baseline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.3.1.  Supervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector . . . .  11
       3.3.2.  Unsupervised Machine Learning of Flow Collector . . .  12
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   Denial-of-Service (DDoS), attacks such as volumetric attacks and
   resource-consumption attacks, are critical threats to be handled by
   service providers.  When such DDoS attacks occur, service providers
   have to mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their
   services.

   Therefore, for service providers to immediately protect their network
   services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be automated.
   To automate DDoS-attack mitigation, multi-vendor components involved
   in DDoS-attack detection and mitigation should cooperate and support
   standard interfaces to communicate.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data filtering between the
   multi-vendor elements
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel][I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
   Furthermore, DOTS Telemetry enriches the DOTS protocols with various
Show full document text