Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-10
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 8783.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K , Mohamed Boucadair , Kaname Nishizuka , Liang Xia , Prashanth Patil , Andrew Mortensen , Nik Teague | ||
| Last updated | 2017-12-08 | ||
| Replaces | draft-reddy-dots-data-channel | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-10
DOTS T. Reddy, Ed.
Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair, Ed.
Expires: June 10, 2018 Orange
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
L. Xia
Huawei
P. Patil
Cisco
A. Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc.
N. Teague
Verisign, Inc.
December 7, 2017
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-10
Abstract
The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not
easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel
under attack conditions.
This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel
specification.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to
this document:
o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Data Channel";
o reference: RFC XXXX
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 10, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. DOTS Server(s) Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Identifier YANG Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Filter YANG Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. DOTS Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Create Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Retrieve Installed Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3. Delete Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. DOTS Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3. Remove Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry . . . 22
8.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
defines two channels: signal and data channels (Figure 1). The DOTS
signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack
to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are
undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. The DOTS data channel is used for
infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to
significantly augment attack response coordination.
+---------------+ +---------------+
| | <------- Signal Channel ------> | |
| DOTS Client | | DOTS Server |
| | <======= Data Channel ======> | |
+---------------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: DOTS Channels
Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS
data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below:
o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
which mitigation may be requested:
A. The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of
prefixes which it would like to refer to by alias when
requesting mitigation. The server can respond to this request
with either with a success or failure response (see
requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] and
Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).
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Refer to Section 6.
o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the
installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-
limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.
Sample use cases for populating black- or white-list filtering
rules are detailed hereafter:
A. If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS
attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its
servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses
that need to be blocked or black-listed for further
investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of
protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway
in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS
server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic
from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by
the DOTS client) is blocked.
B. A network has partner sites from which only legitimate traffic
arrives and the network wants to ensure that the traffic from
these sites is not penalized during DDOS attacks. The DOTS
client uses the DOTS data channel to convey the white-listed
IP addresses or prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS
server. The DOTS server uses this information to white-list
flows from such IP addresses or prefixes reaching the network.
Refer to Section 7.
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
The terminology for describing YANG data modules is defined in
[RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in
[I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams].
For simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf"
as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines
and message-body text within examples throughout the document are
split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line
ends with backslash ('\') as the last character, the line is wrapped
for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the
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next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and
the leading whitespace of the next line.
3. DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview
The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], which must operate nominally even
when confronted with signal degradation due to packets loss, the data
channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with DDoS attack
conditions.
As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect
data delivery success or failure. RESTCONF [RFC8040] over TLS
[RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data channel (Figure 2).
RESTCONF uses HTTP methods to provide CRUD (create, read, update,
delete) operations on a conceptual datastore containing YANG data,
which is compatible with a server implementing NETCONF datastores.
+--------------+
| DOTS |
+--------------+
| RESTCONF |
+--------------+
| TLS |
+--------------+
| TCP |
+--------------+
| IP |
+--------------+
Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over RESTCONF over
TLS
The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data
resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG data models. These
basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running
configuration to be altered by a DOTS client.
DOTS data channel configuration data and state data can be retrieved
with the GET method. HTTP status codes are used to report success or
failure for RESTCONF operations.
The DOTS client will perform the root resource discovery procedure
discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the
RESTCONF API. After discovering the RESTCONF API root, the DOTS
client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request
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URI, in any subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server
may support retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in
[RFC8040]), for example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve
the company proprietary YANG modules supported by the DOTS server.
Note: This document uses RESTCONF, a protocol based on HTTP
[RFC7230], for configuring data defined in YANG version 1
[RFC6020] or YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950], using the datastore
concepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
[RFC6241]. RESTCONF combines the simplicity of the HTTP protocol
with the predictability and automation potential of a schema-
driven API. RESTCONF offers a simple subset of NETCONF
functionality and provides a simplified interface using REST-like
API which addresses the needs of the DOTS data channel and hence
an optimal choice.
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to
propagate data channel specific payload messages that convey request
parameters and response information such as errors. This
specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for
representing DOTS data channel configuration data defined using YANG
(Section 5) as JSON text.
A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set
up DOTS data channel related configuration data and receive state
data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s).
A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to
exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS
client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the same
TLS session. While the communication to the DOTS server is
quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has
maintained cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive
firewall and/or NAT bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies the
DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.
4. DOTS Server(s) Discovery
This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the
reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of
means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP).
These means are out of scope of this document.
Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior
to follow by a DOTS client to place its requests (e.g., contact all
servers, select one server among the list) when multiple DOTS servers
are provisioned.
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5. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module
5.1. Identifier YANG Tree Structure
This document defines a YANG module (ietf-dots-data-channel) for
creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may be used in
subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to
the resources under attack. The tree structure for DOTS identifiers
is as follows:
+--rw identifier
+--rw client-identifier* binary
+--rw alias* [alias-name]
+--rw alias-name string
+--rw target-ip* inet:ip-address
+--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
+--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
| +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
+--rw target-protocol* uint8
+--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
+--rw target-uri* inet:uri
This structure is aligned with [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
5.2. Filter YANG Tree Structure
This document augments the "ietf-access-control-list" Access Control
List (ACL) YANG module [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] for managing
filtering rules. ACL is explained in Section 1 of
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].
Examples of ACL management include, but not limited to,:
o Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be suppressed.
o White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be
accepted.
o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the
installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-
limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.
This document defines the DOTS Data Channel YANG to augment the
"ietf-access-control-list" module to support filters based on the
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client identifier (client-identifier), to support rate-limit action
(rate-limit), and to handle fragmented packets (fragments).
Filtering fragments adds an additional layer of protection against a
DoS attack that uses only non-initial fragments. When there is only
Layer 3 information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is
present, for non-initial fragments matching the ACL entry, the deny
or permit action associated with the ACL entry will be enforced and
for initial or non-fragment matching the ACL entry, the next ACL
entry will be processed. When there is both Layer 3 and Layer 4
information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is present,
the ACL action is conservative for both permit and deny actions. The
actions are conservative to not accidentally deny a fragmented
portion of a flow because the fragments do not contain sufficient
information to match all of the filter attributes. In the deny
action case, instead of denying a non-initial fragment, the next ACL
entry is processed. In the permit case, it is assumed that the Layer
4 information in the non-initial fragment, if available, matches the
Layer 4 information in the ACL entry.
The tree structure for DOTS filtering rules is as follows:
augment /ietf-acl:access-lists:
+--rw client-identifier* binary
augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions:
+--rw rate-limit? decimal64
augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv4-acl:
+--rw fragments? empty
augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv6-acl:
+--rw fragments? empty
augment /ietf-acl:access-lists:
+--rw dots-acl-order
+--rw acl-set* [set-name type]
+--rw set-name -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-name
+--rw type -> /ietf-acl:access-lists/acl/acl-type
5.3. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel@2017-12-08.yang"
module ietf-dots-data-channel {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel";
prefix "data-channel";
import ietf-inet-types {prefix "inet";}
import ietf-access-control-list {prefix "ietf-acl";}
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organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";
contact
"Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Kaname Nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for configuring
identifiers for resources and filtering rules using DOTS
data channel.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-12-08 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel";
}
container identifier {
description "Top level container for identifiers";
leaf-list client-identifier {
type binary;
description
"A client identifier conveyed by a
DOTS gateway to a remote DOTS server.";
reference
"I-D.itef-dots-signal-channel: Distributed Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
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}
list alias {
key alias-name;
description
"List of identifiers";
leaf alias-name {
type string;
description "alias name";
}
leaf-list target-ip {
type inet:ip-address;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the target.";
}
leaf-list target-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
}
list target-port-range {
key "lower-port upper-port";
description
"Port range. When only lower-port is
present, it represents a single port.";
leaf lower-port {
type inet:port-number;
mandatory true;
description "Lower port number.";
}
leaf upper-port {
type inet:port-number;
must ". >= ../lower-port" {
error-message
"The upper port number must be greater than
or equal to lower port number.";
}
description "Upper port number.";
}
}
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leaf-list target-protocol {
type uint8;
description
"Identifies the target protocol number.
The value '0' means 'all protocols'.
Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
protocol-numbers.xhtml
For example, 6 for a TCP or 17 for UDP.";
}
leaf-list target-fqdn {
type inet:domain-name;
description "FQDN identifying the target.";
}
leaf-list target-uri {
type inet:uri;
description "URI identifying the target.";
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists" {
description "client-identifier parameter.";
leaf-list client-identifier {
type binary;
description
"A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
to a remote DOTS server.";
}
}
augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
"/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions" {
description "rate-limit action";
leaf rate-limit {
when "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/" +
"ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions/" +
"ietf-acl:forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" {
description
"rate-limit valid only when accept action is used";
}
type decimal64 {
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fraction-digits 2;
}
description "rate-limit traffic";
}
}
augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
"/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv4-acl" {
description
"Handle non-initial and initial fragments for IPv4 packets.";
leaf fragments {
type empty;
description "Handle fragments.";
}
}
augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces" +
"/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:matches/ietf-acl:ipv6-acl" {
description
"Handle non-initial and initial fragments for IPv6 packets.";
leaf fragments {
type empty;
description
"Handle fragments.";
}
}
augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists" {
description
"Handle ordering of ACLs from a DOTS client";
container dots-acl-order {
description
"Enclosing container for ordering
the ACLs from a DOTS client";
list acl-set {
key "set-name type";
ordered-by user;
description
"List of ACLs";
leaf set-name {
type leafref {
path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +
"/ietf-acl:acl-name";
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}
description
"Reference to the ACL set name";
}
leaf type {
type leafref {
path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl" +
"/ietf-acl:acl-type";
}
description
"Reference to the ACL set type";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
6. DOTS Identifiers
6.1. Create Identifiers
A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or
aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such
identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel
exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack
(Figure 3).
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POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
"client-identifier": [
"string"
],
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "string",
"target-ip": [
"string"
],
"target-prefix": [
"string"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": integer,
"upper-port": integer
}
],
"target-protocol": [
integer
],
"target-fqdn": [
"string"
],
"target-uri": [
"string"
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 3: POST to create identifiers
The header parameters are described below:
client-identifier: This attribute has the same meaning, syntax and
processing rules as the 'client-identifier' attribute defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. This is an optional attribute.
alias-name: Name of the alias. This is a mandatory attribute.
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target-ip: IP addresses are separated by commas. This is an
optional attribute.
target-prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. This is an
optional attribute.
target-port-range: A range of port numbers.
The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number
(lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only
'lower-port' is present, it represents a single port number. For
TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960],
or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], the
range of ports can be, for example, 1024-65535.
This is an optional attribute.
target-protocol: A list of protocols. Values are taken from the
IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].
The value 0 has a special meaning for 'all protocols'.
This is an optional attribute.
target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs). An
FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its
hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and
"venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.
This is an optional attribute.
target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)
[RFC3986].
This is an optional attribute.
In the POST request at least one of the attributes 'target-ip' or
'target-prefix' or 'target-fqdn' or 'target-uri' MUST be present.
DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't
understand.
Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for
HTTP(S) servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and
2001:db8:6401::2 listening on port 443.
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POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
"client-identifier": [
"dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
"iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
],
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "Server1",
"target-protocol": [
6
],
"target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::1",
"2001:db8:6401::2"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 443
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: POST to create identifiers
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if
the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the alias.
Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the response if the
DOTS server has accepted the alias. If the request is missing one or
more mandatory attributes or if the request contains invalid or
unknown parameters, then 400 (Bad Request) will be returned in the
response. The HTTP response will include the JSON body received in
the request.
The DOTS client can use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to
create or modify the aliases in the DOTS server.
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6.2. Retrieve Installed Identifiers
A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers
from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). Figure 5 shows how
to retrieve all the identifiers that were instantiated by the DOTS
client. The content parameter and its permitted values are defined
in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier\
/client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw?\
content=config HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json
Figure 5: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers
Figure 6 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server.
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{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier": {
"client-identifier": [
"dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
"iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
],
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "Server1",
"traffic-protocol": [
6
],
"target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::1",
"2001:db8:6401::2"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 443
}
]
},
{
"alias-name": "Server2",
"target-protocol": [
6
],
"target-ip": [
"2001:db8:6401::10",
"2001:db8:6401::20"
],
"target-port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 80
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 6: Response body
If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the GET
request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not
Found) error response code.
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6.3. Delete Identifiers
A DELETE request is used to delete identifiers maintained by a DOTS
server (Figure 7).
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:identifier\
/client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,\
iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw/alias-name=Server1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Figure 7: DELETE identifier
In RESTCONF, URI-encoded path expressions are used. A RESTCONF data
resource identifier is encoded from left to right, starting with the
top-level data node, according to the 'api-path' rule defined in
Section 3.5.3.1 of [RFC8040]. The data node in the above path
expression is a YANG list node and MUST be encoded according to the
rules defined in Section 3.5.1 of [RFC8040].
If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the
DELETE request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404
(Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully
acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using
204 (No Content) in the response.
7. DOTS Filtering Rules
The DOTS server either receives the filtering rules directly from the
DOTS client or via a DOTS gateway.
If the DOTS client signals the filtering rules via a DOTS gateway,
then the DOTS gateway validates if the DOTS client is authorized to
signal the filtering rules and if the client is authorized propagates
the rules to the DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server validates if
the DOTS gateway is authorized to signal the filtering rules. To
create or purge filters, the DOTS client sends HTTP requests to its
DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules in the requests
and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to a DOTS
server. When the DOTS gateway receives the associated HTTP response
from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS
client.
The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure
filtering rules on a DOTS server.
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7.1. Install Filtering Rules
A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server.
Figure 8 shows a POST request example to block traffic from
192.0.2.0/24, destined to 198.51.100.0/24. The ACL JSON
configuration for the filtering rule is generated using the ACL YANG
data model defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] and the ACL
configuration XML for the filtering rule is specified in Section 4.3
of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: "application/yang-data+json"
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists": {
"client-identifier": [
"dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
"iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
],
"acl": [
{
"acl-name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
"acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"ipv4-acl": {
"source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24",
"destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding" : "drop"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 8: POST to install filterng rules
The header parameters defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] are
discussed below:
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acl-name: The name of access-list. This is a mandatory attribute.
acl-type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria
(e.g., IPv4, IPv6). This is a mandatory attribute.
protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional
attribute.
source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix. This is an optional
attribute.
destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. This is an
optional attribute.
actions: "drop" or "accept" or "rate-limit". "accept" action is
used to white-list traffic. "drop" action is used to black-list
traffic. "rate-limit" action is used to rate-limit traffic, the
allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated
in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985]. This is an
optional attribute.
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if
the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of configuring the
filtering rules. Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the
response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the
request is missing one or more mandatory attributes or contains
invalid or unknown parameters, then 400 (Bad Request) will be
returned in the response.
The "insert" query parameter discussed in Section 4.8.5 of [RFC8040]
can be used to specify how a ACE is inserted within an ACL and how a
ACL is inserted within an ACL list.
The DOTS client can use the PUT request to create or modify the
filtering rules in the DOTS server.
7.2. Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules
The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the
counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to
retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. Figure 9 shows how to
retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client and
the number of matches for the installed filtering rules.
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GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists\
/client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw?\
content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json
Figure 9: GET to retrieve the configuration data and state data for
the filtering rules
If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
type conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it
responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code.
7.3. Remove Filtering Rules
A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server
(Figure 10).
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists\
/client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,\
iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw/acl-name=sample-ipv4-acl&\
acl-type=ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Figure 10: DELETE to remove the filtering rules
If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
type conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then
it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS
server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw
the filtering rules using 204 (No Content) response code, and removes
the filtering rules as soon as possible.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry
The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS
Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry". The structure of
this registry is provided in Section 8.1.1.
The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 8.1.2.
Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review
[RFC8126].
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8.1.1. Registration Template
JSON Attribute:
JSON attribute name.
Description:
Brief description of the attribute.
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
o JSON Attribute: "client-identifier"
o Description: Client identifier.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "alias-name"
o Description: Name of alias.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-protocol"
o Description: Internet protocol numbers.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-port-range"
o Description: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and
upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: a
range of ports can be, e.g., 80 to 8080.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "lower-port"
o Description: Lower port number for the port range.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
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o JSON Attribute: "upper-port"
o Description: Upper port number for the port range.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-ip"
o Description: IP address.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-prefix"
o Description: IP prefix
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-fqdn"
o Description: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a
system, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a
hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "target-uri"
o Description: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
8.2. YANG Module
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].
name: ietf-dots-data-channel
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
prefix: data-channel
reference: RFC XXXX
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9. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
Dan Wing
Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
10. Security Considerations
Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
message integrity. TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for
mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents
requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering
confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST
be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.
An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application
segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used.
Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result
in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS
on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an
attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore
will never reach the TLS layer.
In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-
domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal
the identity of internal DOTS clients (client-identifier) unless
explicitly configured to do so.
Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
network).
Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
exchange instructions and notification over a secure and
authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid
that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as
deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated
from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted.
Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.
RESTCONF security considerations are discussed in [RFC8040].
All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created,
modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are
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considered sensitive. Write operations applied to these data nodes
without proper protection can negatively affect network operations.
Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate
users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives. Nevertheless, an
attacker who is able to access to a DOTS client can undertake various
attacks, such as:
o Set an arbitrarily low rate-limit that may lead to discarding
legitimate traffic to be forwarded (rate-limit).
o Set an arbitrarily high rate-limit that may lead to allowing
illegitimate DDoS traffic to be forwarded (rate-limit).
o Communicate invalid aliases to the server (alias) that will lead
to failure to associate both data and signal channels.
o Set invalid ACL entries that may lead to discard legitimate
traffic from being forwarding. Likewise, invalid ACL entries may
lead to forward DDoS traffic.
11. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Roman Danyliw, Ehud
Doron, Russ White, Jon Shallow, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion
and comments.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-05 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel", draft-ietf-dots-signal-
channel-09 (work in progress), November 2017.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Jethanandani, M., Huang, L., Agarwal, S., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-14 (work in progress), October
2017.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
12.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-07 (work in
progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft-
ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-02 (work in progress),
October 2017.
[IEEE.754.1985]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August
1985.
[proto_numbers]
"IANA, "Protocol Numbers"", 2011,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
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[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
Tokyo 108-8118
Japan
Email: kaname@nttv6.jp
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Liang Xia
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
China
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Prashanth Patil
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Email: praspati@cisco.com
Andrew Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc.
2727 S. State St
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
United States
Email: amortensen@arbor.net
Nik Teague
Verisign, Inc.
United States
Email: nteague@verisign.com
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