DNS Push Notifications
draft-ietf-dnssd-push-25

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 21 and is now closed.

Suresh Krishnan Yes

Barry Leiba Yes

Comment (2019-08-07 for -24)
— Section 6.7 —

   When a
   client terminates an individual subscription (via UNSUBSCRIBE) or all
   subscriptions on that DSO session (by ending the session) it is
   signaling to the server that it is longer interested in receiving
   those particular updates.

Typo: It shoud be “it is no longer interested”.

Alexey Melnikov Yes

Comment (2019-08-05 for -23)
This comment is for RFC Editor:

On page 21, HTML and text version has "TTL⩾0", which gets mangled in PDF version.

Éric Vyncke Yes

Deborah Brungard No Objection

Alissa Cooper No Objection

Roman Danyliw No Objection

Comment (2019-08-07 for -23)
Reference Nits:
-- Section 6.2.1.  Please add a citation for “US-ASCII”

-- Section 6.5.  Please add a citation for “apple dns_sd.h API”

Editorial Nits:
-- Section 2.  Editorial. s/poor imitations/imitation/

-- Section 6.  Typo. s/the the/the/

Benjamin Kaduk No Objection

Comment (2019-08-08 for -24)
Thanks for this well-written document!

What are the privacy considerations to zone content owners (e.g.,
machine owners listed in a zone) about the availability of near-realtime
information tracking their changes?

Can we have a discussion of padding policy to attempt to preserve the
privacy of push transactions?

Section 1.2

Do we need to give a reference for the BSD Sockets API?   (I honestly
forget what we did for other documents referencing it.)

Section 3

Perhaps we should put quotation marks around statements taken from RFC
8490 (so as to avoid the appearance that we are duplicating normative
requirements made in that document).

Section 5

   server in this protocol specification.  Additional security measures
   such as client authentication during TLS negotiation MAY also be
   employed to increase the trust relationship between client and
   server.

Do we want to say anything about the validation procedures for that
client authentication, maybe RFC 6125 with a DNS-ID check, or would that
be too restrictive?

Section 6.1

   In many contexts, the recursive resolver will be able to handle Push
   Notifications for all names that the client may need to follow.  Use
   of VPN tunnels and split-view DNS can create some additional
   complexity in the client software here; the techniques to handle VPN
   tunnels and split-view DNS for DNS Push Notifications are the same as
   those already used to handle this for normal DNS queries.

Is there a good reference discussing these techniques?

Section 6.2.1

   The MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique value, that the client
   is not using for any other active operation on this DSO session.  For

Isn't this already mandated by 8490?

(Hmm, the interaction of TLS early data's replayability and MESSAGE ID
uniqueness might require some thought.  But the MESSAGE ID uniqueness is
within a DSO session, not global, so that may not make a difference.)

Section 6.3.1

   The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO spec-
   ification [RFC8490].  The DNS OPCODE field contains the OPCODE value
   for DNS Stateful Operations (6).  The four count fields MUST be zero,
   and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

We may not need the 2119 terms for the requirements duplicated from
8490.

   For collective remove notifications, if CLASS is not 255 (ANY) and
   TYPE is not 255 (ANY) then for the given name this deletes all
   records of the specified type in the specified class.

(et seq) What does it mean to "delete a record", from the recipient's
point of view?  (How does the server communicate that the RRset's
contents have changed to a completely disjoint value -- delete plus add?)

   a SUBSCRIBE request, subject to the usual established DNS case-
   insensitivity for US-ASCII letters.  If the TYPE in the SUBSCRIBE
   request was not ANY (255) then the TYPE of the record must match the
   TYPE given in the SUBSCRIBE request.  If the CLASS in the SUBSCRIBE

nit: we switch from using the indefinite article to the definite article
with "SUBSCRIBE request", which is a bit jarring since we don't give a
great indication of what distinguishes the definite case.

Section 6.5

It's not entirely clear to me that we need quite this much detail about
discovery proxy operations, in order to motivate RECONFIRM.

If we're going to talka bout Apple's dns_sd.h API (which I have somewhat
mixed feelings about to begin with), we should have a reference for it.

Section 7.1

   Deployment recommendations on the appropriate key lengths and cypher
   suites are beyond the scope of this document.  Please refer to TLS
   Recommendations [RFC7525] for the best current practices.  Keep in

Please cite this as BCP 195.

Section 7.4

   servers.  The server may keep TLS state with Session IDs [RFC8446] or
   operate in stateless mode by sending a Session Ticket [RFC5077] to

5077 was made obsolete by 8446; from the practical side of tings there
is no wire-visible distinction between stateful session IDs and
stateless session tickets.

Section 10.2

I think RFC 7858 needs to be normative.

Likewise, RFC 8310.

Mirja Kühlewind No Objection

Comment (2019-08-05 for -23)
Thanks for this well-written document!

One small comment on the idle handling: The DSO idle timeout does not "apply" as long as there is at least one active subscription. That mean the connection can be idle for a long time if not change appears. Should this document say something about use of keep-alives in this situation? RFC8490 specifies keep-alives handling as well but it could be good to mention this explicitly in this document as well. Further I was wondering if actually DSO keep-alives should be used or if the lower layer TCP keep-alives would be more efficient/appropriate.

Other, smaller comments:

1) Minor comment on normative language in section 3:
   "Generally, as described in the DNS Stateful Operations specification
   [RFC8490], a client must not keep a session to a server open
   indefinitely if it has no subscriptions (or other operations) active
   on that session.  A client MAY close a session as soon as it becomes
   idle, and then if needed in the future, open a new session when
   required.  Alternatively, a client MAY speculatively keep an idle
   session open for some time, subject to the constraint that it MUST
   NOT keep a session open that has been idle for more than the
   session's idle timeout (15 seconds by default) [RFC8490]."
I assume the first "must" is not normative because this is normatively specified in RCC8490. However, if this is reason the last "MUST NOT" should also be lower case.

2) Section 5: Tail Loss Probe (TLP) [I-D.dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe]"
dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe was merged into draft-ietf-tcpm-rack-05. Maybe mention TCP RACK instead of TLP anyway.

3) Section 6.7:
   "If the session is forcibly closed at the TCP level by sending a RST
   from either end of the connection, data may be lost and TLS session
   resumption of this session will not be possible."
I would think that TLS session resumption might still be possible even if a RST is received (as long as the TLS handshake was completed and the client received a session ticket). Or what's the assumption here?

4) Section 6.8:
"The interval between successive DNS queries for the same name, type and
   class SHOULD be at least the minimum of: 900 seconds (15 minutes), or
   two seconds more than the TTL of the answer RRset."
Would it maybe make sense to specify also a hard limit, e.g. "MUST NOT be less than 3 seconds (see RFC8085)", or would that maybe give a wrong impression that 3 seconds seems to be an acceptable value...?

5) One minor comment/question on the references:
And why is draft-ietf-dnssd-hybrid not cited by draft name but as [DisProx] instead?

Alvaro Retana No Objection

Martin Vigoureux No Objection