Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-imp-status-04

Former DISCUSS, leaving it here for the record.

In principle, I like the idea of preventing fragmentation of the documentation by keeping the Section 2.2 table in one place, and by always replacing the document that has it with another, in its entirety.

Only... isn't that what the IANA registry is supposed to be for?  Why isn't that table just added to the IANA registry, and then maintained there?  Doesn't this document now require us to OBSOLETE this document and replace it every time we want to change the registry?

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Update 1
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I had no idea of the history of this, until Andrew pointed me at this:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes/ballot/

I need to talk this over with Pete, Robert, and Russ, at least, on the telechat, and understand why we think we can't use the IANA registry the way registries are meant to be used.

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Update 2
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After more discussion with the chairs, here's what I understand...

1. The conformance table needs to be normative, stable, and with maintained history.  It needs to be clear, when you say you conform as of [date X], what it is that you claimed to conform to.  You can conform to an RFC, because once it's published, you have a stable, immutable reference, and you can give the RFC number.  But if I asked you whether something conformed to the RRTYPEs registry, you'd have to ask "at what date?"  And IANA doesn't maintain a history.

2. The conformance table is necessary in the first place because as things stand, you can say you "implement DNSSEC" when (for instance) you don't do NSEC3.  That's not going to be very useful, given that .com, .net, and .org are all using NSEC3.  We need a single document to which people can point and say, "We do it the way that says to."

3. If it takes an RFC to update the registry, then any change to the table needs an RFC anyway.  Thus, I suppose there's no *harm* in just publishing the table in the RFC and not in the registry.  I do like that the basic table is still in the registry, and that this just extracts the conformance criteria into an RFC-maintained table.

There's no point now, but it would have helped if, especially given the history of the earlier document, some of this information had been in the shepherd writeup.  But now that I understand the issues, I'm OK with this method of handling it.

I agree with Barry that a discussion is needed as to why an IANA registry cannot capture the necessary information.

A nit:
Section 2.1., paragraph 2:

>    Likewise, ECDSA with the two identified curves (ECDSAP256SHA256 and
>    ECDSAP384SHA384) are algorithms that may see widespread use due to
>    the precieved similar level of security offered with smaller key size
>    compared to the key sizes of algorithms such as RSA.

  s/precieved/perceived/

Thanks for addressing all of my comments.

I support Pete's suggestion to make this standards track.

I can't parse this: "It is believed that RSA/SHA-256 or
RSA/SHA-512 algorithms will replace older algorithms (e.g.
RSA/SHA-1) that have a perceived weakness or these
recommended algorithms are seen in major deployments." I
guess something's wrong but hard to know what, maybe
s/or/or as/