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Resolution of Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) Conflicts among Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Clients
draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-12

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 4703.
Authors Bernie Volz , Mark Stapp
Last updated 2013-03-02 (Latest revision 2006-03-23)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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IESG IESG state Became RFC 4703 (Proposed Standard)
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Responsible AD Margaret Cullen
Send notices to <ogud@ogud.com>, <okolkman@ripe.net>
draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-12
Dynamic Host Configuration                                      M. Stapp
Internet-Draft                                                   B. Volz
Expires: September 23, 2006                          Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                          March 22, 2006

            Resolution of FQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients
                <draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-12.txt>

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   DHCP provides a mechanism for host configuration that includes
   dynamic assignment of IP addresses and fully qualified domain names.
   To maintain accurate name to IP address and IP address to name
   mappings in the DNS, these dynamically assigned addresses and fully
   qualified domain names require updates to the DNS.  This document
   identifies situations in which conflicts in the use of fully
   qualified domain names may arise among DHCP clients and servers, and
   describes a strategy for the use of the DHCID DNS resource record in

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   resolving those conflicts.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Issues with DNS Update in DHCP Environments  . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Client Misconfiguration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Multiple DHCP Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Use of the DHCID RR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Procedures for Performing DNS Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.1.  Error Return Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  Dual IPv4/IPv6 Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.3.  Adding A and/or AAAA RRs to DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.3.1.  Initial DHCID RR Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.3.2.  DNS UPDATE When FQDN in Use  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.3.3.  FQDN in Use by another Client  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.4.  Adding PTR RR Entries to DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.5.  Removing Entries from DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.6.  Updating Other RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 14

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quot;
   list MAY contain other configuration or operational state data
   related to the corresponding logical interface.

4.1.1.  Configuration of IPv6 Router Interfaces

   The module "ietf-ipv6-unicast-routing" augments the definition of the
   data node "/router/interfaces/interface" with definitions of the
   following configuration variables as required by [RFC4861], sec.
   6.2.1:

   o  send-advertisements,

   o  max-rtr-adv-interval,

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   o  min-rtr-adv-interval,

   o  managed-flag,

   o  other-config-flag,

   o  link-mtu,

   o  reachable-time,

   o  retrans-timer,

   o  cur-hop-limit,

   o  default-lifetime,

   o  prefix-list: a list of prefixes to be advertised.  The following
      parameters are associated with each prefix in the list:

      *  valid-lifetime,

      *  on-link-flag,

      *  preferred-lifetime,

      *  autonomous-flag.

   The definitions and descriptions of the above parameters can be found
   in the text of the module "ietf-ipv6-unicast-routing" (Section 8).

   NOTE: The "IsRouter" flag, which is also required by [RFC4861], was
   omitted.  Is is expected that this variable will be implemented in
   another module, either "ietf-interfaces" or "ietf-ip".

4.2.  Route

   Routes are basic units of information in a routing system.  The core
   routing data model defines only the following minimal set of route
   attributes:

   o  destination-prefix - IP prefix specifying the set of destination
      addresses for which the route may be used.  This attribute is
      mandatory.

   o  next-hop - IP address of the adjacent router or host to which
      packets with destination addresses belonging to destination-prefix
      should be sent.

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   o  outgoing-interface - network interface that should be used for
      sending packets with destination addresses belonging to
      destination-prefix.

   The above list of route attributes is sufficient for a simple static
   routing configuration.  It is expected that future modules defining
   routing protocols will add other route attributes such as metrics or
   preferences.

   Routes and their attributes are used in both configuration data, for
   example as manually configured static routes, and in operational
   state data, for example as entries in routing tables.

4.3.  Routing Tables

   Routing tables are lists of routes complemented with administrative
   data, namely:

   o  source-protocol - name of the routing protocol from which the
      route was originally obtained.

   o  last-modified - date and time of last modification, or
      installation, of the route.

   Each routing table may only contain routes of the same address family
   (AFN and SAFI).

   In the core routing data model, the "routing-table" node represents
   configuration while the descendant list of routes is defined as
   operational state data.  The contents of such lists are controlled by
   routing protocol operations which may result in route additions,
   removals and modifications.  This also includes manipulations via the
   "static" pseudo-protocol.

   At least the following two routing tables MUST be configured for each
   router instance and each supported AFN/SAFI pair:

   1.  Forwarding information base (FIB) contains active routes that are
       used by the operating system kernel for forwarding datagrams.

   2.  Main routing table to which all routing protocol instances are
       connected by default, with the exception of the "direct" pseudo-
       protocol (Section 4.4): direct routes only appear in the FIB
       table by default.

   The main routing table SHOULD serve as the default source of active
   routes for the FIB.

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   One or more additional routing tables MAY be configured by creating
   new entries in the "routing-table" list, either being a part of
   factory-default configuration or configured by the client.

   The naming scheme for routing tables, as well as restrictions on the
   number and configurability of routing tables are implementation-
   specific.

   Every routing table can serve as a source of routes for other routing
   tables.  To achieve this, one or more recipient routing tables may be
   specified in the configuration of the source routing table.  In
   addition, a route filter may be configured for each recipient routing
   table, which selects and/or manipulates the routes that are passed on
   between the source and recipient routing table.

4.4.  Routing Protocols

   The core routing data model provides an open-ended framework for
   defining multiple routing protocol instances.  Each of them is
   identified by a name, which MUST be unique within a router instance.
   Each protocol MUST be assigned a type, which MUST be an identity
   derived from the "rt:routing-protocol" base identity.  The core
   routing data model defines two identities for the "direct" and
   "static" pseudo-protocols.

   Each routing protocol instance is connected to exactly one routing
   table.  By default, every routing protocol instance SHOULD be
   connected to the main routing table.  An implementation MAY allow any
   or all routing protocol instances to be configured to use a different
   routing table.

   Routes learned from the network by a routing protocol are passed to
   the connected routing table and vice versa - routes appearing in a
   routing table are passed to all routing protocols connected to the
   table (except "direct" and "static" pseudo-protocols) and advertised
   by that protocol to the network.

   Two independent route filters (see Section 4.5) may be defined for a
   routing protocol instance to control the exchange of routes in both
   directions between the routing protocol instance and the connected
   routing table:

   o  import filter controls which routes are passed from a routing
      protocol instance to the routing table,

   o  export filter controls which routes the routing protocol instance
      may receive from the connected routing table.

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   Note that, for historical reasons, the terms import and export are
   used from the viewpoint of a routing table.

   The core routing data model defines two special routing protocols -
   "direct" and "static".  Both are in fact pseudo-protocols, which
   means that they are confined to the local device and do not exchange
   any routing information with neighboring routers.  Routes from both
   "direct" and "static" protocol instances are passed to the connected
   routing table (subject to route filters, if any), but an exchange in
   the opposite direction is not allowed.

   Every router instance MUST contain exactly one instance of the
   "direct" pseudo-protocol.  It is the source of direct routes which
   are normally supplied by the operating system kernel, based on the
   detected and configured network interfaces, and they SHOULD by
   default appear in the FIB routing table.  However, using the
   framework defined in this document, the target routing table for
   direct routes MAY be changed by connecting the "direct" protocol
   instance to a non-default routing table.  Direct routes can also be
   filtered before they appear in the routing table.

   The "static" routing pseudo-protocol allows for specifying routes
   manually.  It MAY be configured in zero or multiple instances,
   although a typical implementation will have exactly one instance per
   router.

4.4.1.  Defining New Routing Protocols

   It is expected that future YANG modules will create data models for
   additional routing protocol types.  In order to do so, the new module
   has to define the protocol-specific information and fit it into the
   core routing framework in the following way :

   o  A new identity MUST be defined for the routing protocol and its
      base identity MUST be set to "rt:routing-protocol", or to an
      identity derived from "rt:routing-protocol".

   o  Additional route attributes MAY be defined.  Their definitions
      then have to be inserted as operational state data by augmenting
      the definition of "rt:route" inside "rt:routing-table", and
      possibly to other places in the configuration, operational state
      data and RPC input or output.

   o  Per-interface configuration parameters can be added by augmenting
      the data node "rt:interface" (the list of router interfaces).

   o  Other configuration parameters can be defined by augmenting the
      "routing-protocol" data node.  By using the "when" statement, this

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      augment SHOULD be made conditional and valid only if the value of
      the "rt:type" child leaf equals to the new protocol's identity.

   It is recommended that both per-interface and other configuration
   data specific to the new protocol be encapsulated in an appropriately
   named container.

   The above steps are implemented by the example YANG module for the
   RIP routing protocol in Appendix A.  First, the module defines a new
   identity for the RIP protocol:

   identity rip {
     base rt:routing-protocol;
     description "Identity for the RIP routing protocol.&Internet-Draft        Resolution of FQDN Conflicts            March 2006

1.  Introduction

   "The Client FQDN Option" [8] includes a description of the operation
   of [4] clients and servers that use the DHCPv4 client FQDN option.
   And, "The DHCPv6 Client FQDN Option" [9] includes a description of
   the operation of [5] clients and servers that use the DHCPv6 client
   FQDN option.  Through the use of the client FQDN option, DHCP clients
   and servers can negotiate the client's FQDN and the allocation of
   responsibility for updating the DHCP client's A and/or AAAA RRs.
   This document identifies situations in which conflicts in the use of
   FQDNs may arise among DHCP clients and servers, and describes a
   strategy for the use of the DHCID DNS resource record [2] in
   resolving those conflicts.

   In any case, whether a site permits all, some, or no DHCP servers and
   clients to perform DNS updates ([3], [10]) into the zones that it
   controls is entirely a matter of local administrative policy.  This
   document does not require any specific administrative policy, and
   does not propose one.  The range of possible policies is very broad,
   from sites where only the DHCP servers have been given credentials
   that the DNS servers will accept, to sites where each individual DHCP
   client has been configured with credentials that allow the client to
   modify its own FQDN.  Compliant implementations MAY support some or
   all of these possibilities.  Furthermore, this specification applies
   only to DHCP client and server processes; it does not apply to other
   processes that initiate DNS updates.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].

   This document assumes familiarity with DNS terminology defined in [6]
   and DHCP terminology defined in [4] and [5].

   FQDN, or Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system,
   rather than just its hostname.  For example, "venera" is a hostname
   and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.  See [7].

   DOCSIS, or Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, is
   defined by CableLabs (www.cablelabs.com).

3.  Issues with DNS Update in DHCP Environments

   There are two DNS update situations that require special

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   consideration in DHCP environments: cases where more than one DHCP
   client has been configured with the same FQDN and cases where more
   than one DHCP server has been given authority to perform DNS updates
   in a zone.  In these cases, it is possible for DNS records to be
   modified in inconsistent ways unless the updaters have a mechanism
   that allows them to detect anomalous situations.  If DNS updaters can
   detect these situations, site administrators can configure the
   updaters' behavior so that the site's policies can be enforced.  This
   specification describes a mechanism designed to allow updaters to
   detect these situations, and suggests that DHCP implementations use
   this mechanism by default.

3.1.  Client Misconfiguration

   Administrators may wish to maintain a one-to-one relationship between
   active DHCP clients and FQDNs, and to maintain consistency between a
   client's A, AAAA, and PTR RRs.  Clients that are not represented in
   the DNS, or clients that inadvertently share an FQDN with another
   client may encounter inconsistent behavior or may not be able to
   obtain access to network resources.  Whether each DHCP client is
   configured with a FQDN by its administrator or whether the DHCP
   server is configured to distribute the clients' FQDN, the consistency
   of the DNS data is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the
   configuration procedure.  Sites that deploy [10] may configure
   credentials for each client and its assigned FQDN in a way that is
   more error-resistant, as both the FQDN and credentials must match.

   Consider an example in which two DHCP clients in the "example.com"
   network are both configured with the hostname "foo".  The clients are
   permitted to perform their own DNS updates.  The first client, client
   A, is configured via DHCP.  It adds an A RR to "foo.example.com", and
   its DHCP server adds a PTR RR corresponding to its assigned IP
   address.  When the second client, client B, boots, it is also
   configured via DHCP, and it also begins to update "foo.example.com".

   At this point, the "example.com" administrators may wish to establish
   some policy about DHCP clients' FQDNs.  If the policy is that each
   client that boots should replace any existing A RR that matches its
   FQDN, Client B can proceed, though Client A may encounter problems.
   In this example, Client B replaces the A RR associated with
   "foo.example.com".  Client A must have some way to recognize that the
   RR associated with "foo.example.com" now contains information for
   Client B, so that it can avoid modifying the RR.  When Client A's
   assigned IP address expires, for example, it should not remove a RR
   that reflects Client B's DHCP assigned IP address.

   If the policy is that the first DHCP client with a given FQDN should
   be the only client associated with that FQDN, Client B needs to be

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   able to determine if it is not the client associated with
   "foo.example.com".  It could be that Client A booted first, and that
   Client B should choose another FQDN.  Or it could be that B has
   booted on a new subnet, and received a new IP address assignment, in
   which case B should update the DNS with its new IP address.  It must
   either retain persistent state about the last IP address it was
   assigned (in addition to its current IP address) or it must have some
   other way to detect that it was the last updater of "foo.example.com"
   in order to implement the site's policy.

3.2.  Multiple DHCP Servers

   It is possible to arrange for DHCP servers to perform A and/or AAAA
   RR updates on behalf of their clients.  If a single DHCP server
   manages all of the DHCP clients at a site, it can maintain a database
   of the FQDNs in use, and can check that database before assigning a
   FQDN to a client.  Such a database is necessarily proprietary,
   however, and the approach does not work once more than one DHCP
   server is deployed.

   When multiple DHCP servers are deployed, the servers require a way to
   coordinate the identities of DHCP clients.  Consider an example in
   which DHCPv4 Client A boots, obtains an IP address from Server S1,
   presenting the hostname "foo" in a Client FQDN option [8] in its
   DHCPREQUEST message.  Server S1 updates the FQDN "foo.example.com",
   adding an A RR containing the IP address assigned to A. The client
   then moves to another subnet, served by Server S2.  When Client A
   boots on the new subnet, Server S2 will assign it a new IP address,
   and will attempt to add an A RR containing the newly assigned IP
   address to the FQDN "foo.example.com".  At this point, without some
   communication mechanism which S2 can use to ask S1 (and every other
   DHCP server that updates the zone) about the client, S2 has no way to
   know whether Client A is currently associated with the FQDN, or
   whether A is a different client configured with the same FQDN.  If
   the servers cannot distinguish between these situations, they cannot
   enforce the site's naming policies.

4.  Use of the DHCID RR

   A solution to both of these problems is for the updater (a DHCP
   client or DHCP server) to be able to determine which DHCP client has
   been associated with a FQDN, in order to offer administrators the
   opportunity to configure updater behavior.

   For this purpose, a DHCID RR, specified in [2], is used to associate
   client identification information with a FQDN and the A, AAAA, and
   PTR RRs associated with that FQDN.  When either a client or server

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   adds A, AAAA, or PTR RRs for a client, it also adds a DHCID RR that
   specifies a unique client identity, based on data from the client's
   DHCP message.  In this model, only one client is associated with a
   given FQDN at a time.

   By associating this ownership information with each FQDN, cooperating
   DNS updaters may determine whether their client is currently
   associated with a particular FQDN and implement the appropriately
   configured administrative policy.  In addition, DHCP clients which
   currently have FQDNs may move from one DHCP server to another without
   losing their FQDNs.

   The specific algorithm utilizing the DHCID RR to signal client
   ownership is explained below.  The algorithm only works in the case
   where the updating entities all cooperate -- this approach is
   advisory only and is not a substitute for DNS security, nor is it
   replaced by DNS security.

5.  Procedures for Performing DNS Updates

5.1.  Error Return Codes

   Certain RCODEs defined in [3] indicate that the destination DNS
   server cannot perform an update, i.e., FORMERR, SERVFAIL, REFUSED,
   NOTIMP.  If one of these RCODEs is returned, the updater MUST
   terminate its update attempt.  Other RCODEs [13] may indicate that
   there are problems with the key being used and may mean to try a
   different key, if available, or to terminate the operation.  Because
   some errors may indicate a misconfiguration of the updater or the DNS
   server, the updater MAY attempt to signal to its administrator that
   an error has occurred, e.g. through a log message.

5.2.  Dual IPv4/IPv6 Client Considerations

   At the time of publication of this document, a small minority of DHCP
   clients support both IPv4 and IPv6.  We anticipate, however, that a
   transition will take place over a period of time, and more sites will
   have dual-stack clients present.  IPv6 clients require updates of
   AAAA RRs; IPv4 client require updates of A RRs.  The administrators
   of mixed deployments will likely wish to permit a single FQDN to
   contain A and AAAA RRs from the same client.

   Sites that wish to permit a single FQDN to contain both A and AAAA
   RRs MUST make use of DHCPv4 clients and servers that support using
   the DHCP Unique Identifier (DUID) for DHCPv4 client identifiers such
   that this DUID is used in computing the RDATA of the DHCID RR by both
   DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 for the client, see [11].  Otherwise, a dual-stack

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   client that uses older-style DHCPv4 client identifiers (see [4] and
   [12]) will only be able to have either its A or AAAA records in DNS
   under a single FQDN because of the DHCID RR conflicts that result.

5.3.  Adding A and/or AAAA RRs to DNS

   When a DHCP client or server intends to update A and/or AAAA RRs, it
   starts with the UPDATE request in Section 5.3.1.

   As the update sequence below can result in loops, implementers SHOULD
   limit the total number of attempts for a single transaction.

5.3.1.  Initial DHCID RR Request

   The updater prepares a DNS UPDATE request that includes as a
   prerequisite the assertion that the FQDN does not exist.  The update
   section of the request attempts to add the new FQDN and its IP
   address mapping (A and/or AAAA RRs) and the DHCID RR with its unique
   client identity.

   If the UPDATE request succeeds, the A and/or AAAA RR update is now
   complete (and a client updater is finished, while a server would then
   proceed to perform a PTR RR update).

   If the response to the UPDATE returns YXDOMAIN, the updater can now
   conclude that the intended FQDN is in use and proceeds to
   Section 5.3.2.

   If any other status is returned, the updater SHOULD NOT attempt an
   update (see Section 5.1).

5.3.2.  DNS UPDATE When FQDN in Use

   The updater next attempts to confirm that the FQDN is not being used
   by some other client by preparing an UPDATE request in which there
   are two prerequisites.  The first prerequisite is that the FQDN
   exists.  The second is that the desired FQDN has attached to it a
   DHCID RR whose contents match the client identity.  The update
   section of the UPDATE request contains:
   1.  A delete of any existing A RRs on the FQDN if this is an A update
       or an AAAA update and the updater does not desire A records on
       the FQDN or this update is adding an A and the updater only
       desires a single IP address on the FQDN.
   2.  A delete of the existing AAAA RRs on the FQDN if the updater does
       not desire AAAA records on the FQDN or this update is adding an
       AAAA and the updater only desires a single IP address on the
       FQDN.

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   3.  An add (or adds) of the A RR that matches the DHCP binding if
       this is an A update.
   4.  Adds of the AAAA RRs that match the DHCP bindings if this is an
       AAAA update.

   Whether A or AAAA RRs are deleted depends on the updater or updater's
   policy.  For example, if the updater is the client or configured as
   the only DHCP server for the link on which the client is located, the
   updater may find it beneficial to delete all A and/or AAAA RRs and
   then add the current set of A and/or AAAA RRs, if any, for the
   client.

   If the UPDATE request succeeds, the updater can conclude that the
   current client was the last client associated with the FQDN, and that
   the FQDN now contains the updated A and/or AAAA RRs.  The update is
   now complete (and a client updater is finished, while a server would
   then proceed to perform a PTR RR update).

   If the response to the UPDATE request returns NXDOMAIN, the FQDN is
   no longer in use and the updater proceeds back to Section 5.3.1.

   If the response to the UPDATE request returns NXRRSET, there are two
   possibilities - there are no DHCID RRs for the FQDN or the DHCID RR
   does not match.  In either case, the updater proceeds to
   Section 5.3.3.

5.3.3.  FQDN in Use by another Client

   As the FQDN appears to be in use by another client or is not
   associated with any client, the updater SHOULD either choose another
   FQDN and restart the update process with this new FQDN or terminate
   the update with a failure.

   Techniques that may be considered to disambiguate FQDNs include
   adding some suffix or prefix to the hostname portion of the FQDN or
   randomly generating a hostname.

5.4.  Adding PTR RR Entries to DNS

   The DHCP server submits a DNS UPDATE request that deletes all of the
   PTR RRs associated with the client's assigned IP address, and adds a
   PTR RR whose data is the client's (possibly disambiguated) FQDN.  The
   server MAY also add a DHCID RR as specified in Section 4, in which
   case it would include a delete of all of the DHCID RRs associated
   with the client's assigned IP address, and adds a DHCID RR for the
   client.

   There is no need to validate the DHCID RR for PTR updates as the DHCP

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   server (or servers) only assigns an address to a single client at a
   time.

5.5.  Removing Entries from DNS

   The most important consideration in removing DNS entries is to be
   sure that an entity removing a DNS entry is only removing an entry
   that it added, or for which an administrator has explicitly assigned
   it responsibility.

   When an address' lease time or valid lifetime expires or a DHCP
   client issues a DHCPRELEASE [4] or Release [5] request, the DHCP
   server SHOULD delete the PTR RR that matches the DHCP binding, if one
   was successfully added.  The server's UPDATE request SHOULD assert
   that the domain name (PTRDNAME field) in the PTR record matches the
   FQDN of the client whose address has expired or been released and
   should delete all RRs for the FQDN.

   The entity chosen to handle the A or AAAA records for this client
   (either the client or the server) SHOULD delete the A or AAAA records
   that were added when the address was assigned to the client.
   However, the updater should only remove the DHCID RR if there are no
   A or AAAA RRs remaining for the client.

   In order to perform this A or AAAA RR delete, the updater prepares an
   UPDATE request that contains a prerequisite that asserts that the
   DHCID RR exists whose data is the client identity described in
   Section 4 and contains an update section that deletes the client's
   specific A or AAAA RR.

   If the UPDATE request succeeds, the updater prepares a second UPDATE
   request that contains three prerequisites and contains an update
   section that deletes all RRs for the FQDN.  The first prerequisite
   asserts that the DHCID RR exists whose data is the client identity
   described in Section 4.  The second prerequisite asserts that there
   are no A RRs.  The third prerequisite asserts that there are no AAAA
   RRs.

   If either request fails, the updater MUST NOT delete the FQDN.  It
   may be that the client whose address has expired has moved to another
   network and obtained an address from a different server, which has
   caused the client's A or AAAA RR to be replaced.  Or, the DNS data
   may have been removed or altered by an administrator.

5.6.  Updating Other RRs

   The procedures described in this document only cover updates to the
   A, AAAA, PTR, and DHCID RRs.  Updating other types of RRs is outside

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   the scope of this document.

6.  Security Considerations

   Administrators should be wary of permitting unsecured DNS updates to
   zones, whether or not they are exposed to the global Internet.  Both
   DHCP clients and servers SHOULD use some form of update request
   authentication (e.g., TSIG [13]) when performing DNS updates.

   Whether a DHCP client may be responsible for updating an FQDN to IP
   address mapping, or whether this is the responsibility of the DHCP
   server is a site-local matter.  The choice between the two
   alternatives may be based on the security model that is used with the
   Dynamic DNS Update protocol (e.g., only a client may have sufficient
   credentials to perform updates to the FQDN to IP address mapping for
   its FQDN).

   Whether a DHCP server is always responsible for updating the FQDN to
   IP address mapping (in addition to updating the IP to FQDN mapping),
   regardless of the wishes of an individual DHCP client, is also a
   site-local matter.  The choice between the two alternatives may be
   based on the security model that is being used with dynamic DNS
   updates.  In cases where a DHCP server is performing DNS updates on
   behalf of a client, the DHCP server should be sure of the FQDN to use
   for the client, and of the identity of the client.

   Currently, it is difficult for DHCP servers to develop much
   confidence in the identities of their clients, given the absence of
   entity authentication from the DHCP protocol itself.  There are many
   ways for a DHCP server to develop a FQDN to use for a client, but
   only in certain relatively rare circumstances will the DHCP server
   know for certain the identity of the client.  If [14] becomes widely
   deployed this may become more customary.

   One example of a situation that offers some extra assurances is when
   the DHCP client is connected to a network through a DOCSIS cable
   modem, and the Cable Modem Termination System (head-end) of the cable
   modem ensures that MAC address spoofing simply does not occur.
   Another example of a configuration that might be trusted is when
   clients obtain network access via a network access server using PPP.
   The Network Access Server (NAS) itself might be obtaining IP
   addresses via DHCP, encoding client identification into the DHCP
   client-id option.  In this case, the NAS as well as the DHCP server
   might be operating within a trusted environment, in which case the
   DHCP server could be configured to trust that the user authentication
   and authorization processing of the NAS was sufficient, and would
   therefore trust the client identification encoded within the DHCP

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   client-id.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Mark Beyer, Jim Bound, Ralph Droms, Robert Elz, Peter
   Ford, Olafur Gudmundsson, Edie Gunter, Andreas Gustafsson, David W.
   Hankins, R. Barr Hibbs, Kim Kinnear, Stuart Kwan, Ted Lemon, Ed
   Lewis, Michael Lewis, Josh Littlefield, Michael Patton, Pekka Savola,
   and Glenn Stump for their review and comments.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]  Stapp, M., Gustafsson, A., and T. Lemon, "A DNS RR for Encoding
        DHCP Information (draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-*)", February 2006.

   [3]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, "Dynamic
        Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136,
        April 1997.

   [4]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
        March 1997.

   [5]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M.
        Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
        RFC 3315, July 2003.

8.2.  Informative References

   [6]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
         specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [7]   Malkin, G., "Internet Users' Glossary", RFC 1983, August 1996.

   [8]   Stapp, M. and Y. Rekhter, "The DHCP Client FQDN Option
         (draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-*.txt)", February 2006.

   [9]   Volz, B., "The DHCPv6 Client FQDN Option
         (draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-fqdn-*.txt)", February 2006.

   [10]  Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
         Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

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   [11]  Lemon, T. and B. Sommerfeld, "Node-specific Client Identifiers
         for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Version Four (DHCPv4)",
         RFC 4361, February 2006.

   [12]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
         Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.

   [13]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B. Wellington,
         "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)",
         RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [14]  Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages",
         RFC 3118, June 2001.

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Authors' Addresses

   Mark Stapp
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   1414 Massachusetts Ave.
   Boxborough, MA  01719
   USA

   Phone: 978.936.1535
   Email: mjs@cisco.com

   Bernie Volz
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   1414 Massachusetts Ave.
   Boxborough, MA  01719
   USA

   Phone: 978.936.0382
   Email: volz@cisco.com

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Intellectual Property Statementquot;;
   }

   New route attributes specific to the RIP protocol ("metric" and
   "tag") are defined in a grouping and then added to the route
   definitions appearing in "routing-table" and in the output part of
   the "get-route" RPC method:

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   grouping route-content {
     description
       "RIP-specific route content.";
     leaf metric {
       type rip-metric;
     }
     leaf tag {
       type uint16;
       default "0";
       description
         "This leaf may be used to carry additional info, e.g. AS
          number.";
     }
   }

   augment "/rt:routing/rt:router/rt:routing-tables/rt:routing-table/"
         + "rt:routes/rt:route" {
     when "../../../../rt:routing-protocols/"
        + "rt:routing-protocol[rt:name=current()/rt:source-protocol]/"
        + "rt:type='rip:rip'" {
       description
         "This augment is only valid if the source protocol from which
          the route originated is RIP.";
     }
     description
       "RIP-specific route components.";
     uses route-content;
   }

   augment "/rt:get-route/rt:output/rt:route" {
     description
       "Add RIP-specific route content.";
     uses route-content;
   }

   Per-interface configuration data are defined by the following
   "augment" statement:

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   augment "/rt:routing/rt:router/rt:interfaces/rt:interface" {
     when "../../rt:routing-protocols/rt:routing-protocol/rt:type  = "
        + "'rip:rip'";
     container rip {
       description
         "Per-interface RIP configuration.";
       leaf enabled {
         type boolean;
         default "true";
       }
       leaf metric {
         type rip-metric;
         default "1";
       }
     }
   }

   Finally, global RIP configuration data are integrated into the "rt:
   routing-protocol" node by using the following "augment" statement,
   which is valid only for routing protocol instances whose type is
   "rip:rip":

   augment "/rt:routing/rt:router/rt:routing-protocols/"
         + "rt:routing-protocol" {
     when "rt:type = 'rip:rip'";
     container rip {
       leaf update-interval {
         type uint8 {
           range "10..60";
         }
         units "seconds";
         default "30";
         description
           "Time interval between periodic updates.";
       }
     }
   }

4.5.  Route Filters

   The core routing data model provides a skeleton for defining route
   filters that can be used to restrict the set of routes being
   exchanged between a routing protocol instance and a connected routing
   table, or between a source and a recipient routing table.  Route
   filters may also manipulate routes, i.e., add, delete, or modify
   their properties.

   By itself, the route filtering framework defined in this document

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   allows to establish only the two extreme routing policies in which
   either all routes are allowed or all routes are rejected.  It is
   expected that real route filtering frameworks will be developed
   separately.

   Each route filter is identified by a name which MUST be unique within
   a router instance.  Its type MUST be specified by the "type" identity
   reference - this opens the space for multiple route filtering
   framework implementations.  The default value for route filter type
   is the identity "deny-all-route-filter" defined in the "ietf-routing"
   module, which represents a route filtering policy in which all routes
   are rejected.

4.6.  RPC Operation

   The "ietf-routing" module defines the "get-route" RPC operation.  It
   is used for querying the forwarding information base of a router
   instance.  The first input parameter is the name of the router
   instance whose FIB is to be queried, and the second parameter is a
   destination address.  Modules for particular address families are
   expected to augment the "destination-address" container with the
   "address" leaf, as it is done in the "ietf-ipv4-unicast-routing" and
   "ietf-ipv6-unicast-routing" modules.

   The server replies with an active route which is used for forwarding
   datagrams to the destination address within the selected router
   instance.  Again, modules for particular address families are
   expected to augment the definition of output parameters with AFN/
   SAFI-specific contents.

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5.  IANA AFN and SAFI YANG Module

   RFC Ed.: In this section, replace all occurrences of 'XXXX' with the
   actual RFC number and all occurrences of the revision date below with
   the date of RFC publication (and remove this note).

   <CODE BEGINS> file "iana-afn-safi@2012-02-20.yang"

   module iana-afn-safi {

     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-afn-safi";

     prefix "ianaaf";

     organization
       "IANA";

     contact
       "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

        Postal:
        ICANN
        4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
        Marina del Rey, CA 90292
        U. S. A.

        Tel: +1 310 823 9358
        E-Mail: iana&iana.org
       ";

     description
       "This YANG module provides two typedefs containing YANG
        definitions for the following IANA-registered enumerations:

        - Address Family Numbers (AFN)

        - Subsequent Address Family Identifiers (SAFI)

        The latest revision of this YANG module can be obtained from the
        IANA web site.

        Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code. All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
        the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set

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        forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the
        RFC itself for full legal notices.
       ";

     revision 2012-02-20 {
       description
         "Initial revision.";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Routing Configuration";
     }

     typedef address-family {
       type enumeration {
         enum other {
           value "0";
           description
             "none of the following";
         }
         enum ipV4 {
           value "1";
           description
             "IP Version 4";
         }
         enum ipV6 {
           value "2";
           description
             "IP Version 6";
         }
         enum nsap {
           value "3";
           description
             "NSAP";
         }
         enum hdlc {
           value "4";
           description
             "(8-bit multidrop)";
         }
         enum bbn1822 {
           value "5";
           description
             "BBN Report 1822";
         }
         enum all802 {

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   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

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   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

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