The Babel Routing Protocol
draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-20
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
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2021-01-07
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20 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48-DONE from AUTH48 |
2020-11-23
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20 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to AUTH48 from RFC-EDITOR |
2020-09-29
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20 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to RFC-EDITOR from EDIT |
2020-09-11
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20 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor |
2020-09-11
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20 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from In Progress |
2020-09-11
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20 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors |
2020-09-10
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20 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress |
2020-09-08
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20 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to EDIT from MISSREF |
2020-09-03
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20 | (System) | RFC Editor state changed to MISSREF |
2020-09-03
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20 | (System) | IESG state changed to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent |
2020-09-03
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20 | (System) | Announcement was received by RFC Editor |
2020-09-03
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20 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2020-09-03
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20 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent |
2020-09-03
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20 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2020-09-03
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20 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2020-09-03
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup |
2020-09-03
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was changed |
2020-09-03
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was generated |
2020-09-03
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was changed |
2020-09-03
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was generated |
2020-08-25
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20 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was generated |
2020-08-24
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20 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-20.txt |
2020-08-24
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20 | (System) | New version approved |
2020-08-24
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20 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: David Schinazi , Juliusz Chroboczek |
2020-08-24
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20 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2020-08-21
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19 | Martin Duke | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Martin Duke has been changed to No Objection from No Record |
2020-08-21
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19 | Martin Duke | [Ballot comment] One nit: 3.7.2 In the last paragraph, selection of a next hop is listed as both a "MAY" and a "SHOULD NOT". I … [Ballot comment] One nit: 3.7.2 In the last paragraph, selection of a next hop is listed as both a "MAY" and a "SHOULD NOT". I suppose that this not logically inconsistent, but the context certainly suggests that's both significant and minor, which doesn't make sense. |
2020-08-21
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19 | Martin Duke | Ballot comment text updated for Martin Duke |
2020-08-19
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19 | Erik Kline | [Ballot comment] [ general ] * I couldn't find where any of the multi-byte numeric fields have their endianness specified. Consider a blanket "everything's … [Ballot comment] [ general ] * I couldn't find where any of the multi-byte numeric fields have their endianness specified. Consider a blanket "everything's network byte order" somewhere appropriate, or maybe spell it out explicitly in: * section 4.2: Body length * section 4.6.3: Interval * section 4.6.5: Seqno * section 4.6.5: Interval * section 4.6.6: Rxcost * section 4.6.6: Interval * section 4.6.9: Interval * section 4.6.9: Seqno * section 4.6.9: Metric * section 4.6.11: Seqno [ section 3.6 ] * s/this kind of instabilities/these kind of instabilities/, I think [ section 3.8.1.2 ] * Perhaps s/it has finite metric/it has a finite metric/ [ section 4.4 ] * Can a sub-TLV have sub-TLVs of its own? [ section 4.5 ] * s/derived derived/derived/ [ Appendix A.3 ] * s/results ;/results;/ maybe |
2020-08-19
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19 | Erik Kline | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Erik Kline |
2020-08-06
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19 | David Schinazi | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-19.txt |
2020-08-06
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19 | (System) | New version accepted (logged-in submitter: David Schinazi) |
2020-08-06
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19 | David Schinazi | Uploaded new revision |
2020-08-03
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18 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot comment] Thank you for the patience and the work put into addressing my DISCUSS. |
2020-08-03
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18 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Alvaro Retana has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2020-08-02
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18 | David Schinazi | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-18.txt |
2020-08-02
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18 | (System) | New version accepted (logged-in submitter: David Schinazi) |
2020-08-02
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18 | David Schinazi | Uploaded new revision |
2020-07-02
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17 | Murray Kucherawy | [Ballot comment] My review is focusing mainly on the diff with RFC6126 for expediency. The technical material seems fine to me, so I just have … [Ballot comment] My review is focusing mainly on the diff with RFC6126 for expediency. The technical material seems fine to me, so I just have some editorial nits to offer: Section 1.2: * "The ability to build such heterogeneous networks makes Babel particularly adapted to the unmanaged and wireless environment." -- The ending feels awkward. Maybe "to unmanaged, wireless environments"? Or maybe "or" in between? Section 3: * "... assigns host IDs, see the definition ..." -- comma splice; "see" should begin a new sentence, or the comma should be a semi-colon Section 3.1: * "... in a previous TLV, (such as in ..." -- remove the comma Section 3.2.1: * "Given a seqno s and a non-negative integer n, the sum ..." -- It feels to me as if things like "s" and "n" should be quoted when in prose. I don't know what the RFC Editor prefers, but I keep thinking this as I read through the whole document; I hit it again in 3.5.2, for example. Section 4.6.5: * "neighbor" is spelled the American way here, but the British way everywhere else. Come to think of it, I think the RFC Editor standardizes on the former (see RFC 7322) if you're not internally consistent. So, if you like your "u"s, don't give them this ammunition to change them. Section 5: * I suggest replacing with "IANA has {registered, created} ..." with "IANA previously {registered, created} ..." to make it clear that the prior RFCs did that work, and that they're simply being restated here and/or that this document is assuming authority over them. * The new registries feel like they're under-specified to me. It's not clear, for example, whether I could register bit 16 in the "Babel Hello Flags Values" registry. Maybe add a sentence making it explicit that registrations can only be made from the "Unassigned" range? Admittedly, this could be experience bias on my part as I typically work with registries that cover unconstrained namespaces, so I'm leaving this only as a comment. Appendix G: * Although it's possibly obvious and perhaps unnecessary, I suggest making it explicit that this appendix is not intended to be published and can be removed by the editor. |
2020-07-02
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17 | Murray Kucherawy | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Murray Kucherawy |
2020-02-07
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17 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot comment] Thanks for all the work to address my discuss points. I still think that it is important for PS spec to normatively define … [Ballot comment] Thanks for all the work to address my discuss points. I still think that it is important for PS spec to normatively define default values as part of the main spec, also because it is rather uncommon to use normative language in the appendix. However, there are references to the appendix in all relevant places in the spec now and I'm okay to clear my discuss on this basis. Please note that the following comment from my discuss ballot is not fully addressed: "In section 4.1.1 the update interval needs a lower limit (e.g. 3 seconds) and a recommend default value would be could as well (Note that there are other part in section 3 where the update value is discussed as well)." We had a long discuss about this value specifically and the recommended default in the appendix is fine with me. However, section 4.1.1 does not have a pointer to the appendix. Further I think it would be appropriate to add a warning here that low values mean higher network load which can have a negative impact in certain networks. ------------------------------- Old comments (here for the record; didn't check these points): 1) While this point might not raise discuss-level, it would probably also be good to provide more concrete advise on how to implement jitter: Sec 3.1.: “ A moderate amount of jitter may be applied to packets sent by a Babel speaker: outgoing TLVs are buffered and SHOULD be sent with a small random delay.” Sec 4: “a Babel node SHOULD buffer every TLV and delay sending a packet by a small, randomly chosen delay [JITTER].” 2) Sec 4.1.2. (Router-Id) should probably state again that the router-id is assumed to be unique within a domain. 3) Sec 4: “The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit, indicates how to handle unknown sub-TLVs.” I would recommend to also indicate this bit in the image. 4) Sec 4.4: “If a TLV has a self-terminating format, then it MAY allow a sequence of sub-TLVs to follow the body.” Initially I wasn’t quite sure what you wanted to say here. I guess you say that the length would indicate a larger value that needed for the body and therefore a subTLV might be present? I recommend to clarify this here a bit. 5) I recommend to move Appendix C (Considerations for protocol extensions) in the body of the document. |
2020-02-07
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17 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Mirja Kühlewind has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2020-02-06
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17 | David Schinazi | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-17.txt |
2020-02-06
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17 | (System) | New version accepted (logged-in submitter: David Schinazi) |
2020-02-06
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17 | David Schinazi | Uploaded new revision |
2019-12-30
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16 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-16.txt |
2019-12-30
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16 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-12-30
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16 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-12-30
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16 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-11-11
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15 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot comment] Thank you for addressing my DISCUSS and COMMENT points, and further explaining the protocol where necessary. |
2019-11-11
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15 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Roman Danyliw has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2019-10-18
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15 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-15.txt |
2019-10-18
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15 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-10-18
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15 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-10-18
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15 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-24
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14 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot comment] Part of the response to my DISCUSS argued that making this specification comply with BCP 61 would harm the reputation of the IETF. … [Ballot comment] Part of the response to my DISCUSS argued that making this specification comply with BCP 61 would harm the reputation of the IETF. I'd rather continue to support BCP 61 than have this protocol standardized in the IETF, if that is what the choice is. If the WG consensus is that deploying this protocol with no MTI security protections is appropriate despite the mountain of evidence that exists showing that deployments of insecure protocols on private networks or in limited domains still often get compromised, I don't see a need to discuss this further. |
2019-08-24
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14 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Alissa Cooper has been changed to Abstain from Discuss |
2019-08-22
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14 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot comment] Thank you for addressing my Discuss points! I am happy to see the expanded text on update representation and parser state in Section … [Ballot comment] Thank you for addressing my Discuss points! I am happy to see the expanded text on update representation and parser state in Section 4.5 -- that's enough to clear my discuss point, though I probably would have added even a bit more text if I was writing it myself. Section 4.5 In addition to the above, an Update TLV can omit a prefix of the prefix being announced, which is then extracted from the preceding Update TLV in the same address family (IPv4 or IPv6). Finally, as a nit: from a rhetorical sense, I'd suggest "omit an initial portion of the prefix", to avoid using the word "prefix" with two different meanings in the same sentence. Appendix B Link cost: estimated using ETX on wireless links; 2-out-of-3 with C=96 on wired links. Perhaps "ETX as described in Appendix A.2.2". Appendix C At a minimum, they discard routes with a destination prefix in fe80::/64, ff00::/8, 127.0.0.1/32, 0.0.0.0/32 and 224.0.0.0/8. 127.0.0.1/32 as opposed to /8? Appendix F There are two optioal features that make the new protocol incompatible with its predecessor. First of all, RFC 6126 did not nit: "optional" Two changes need to be made to an implementation of RFCs 6126 and 7557 so that it can safely interoperate in all cases with implementations of this protocol. First, it needs to be modified to either ignore or process Unicast Hellos. Second, it needs to be modified to parse sub-TLVs of all the TLVs that it understands and that allow sub-TLVs, and to ignore the TLV is an unknown mandatory sub-TLV is found. It is not necessary to parse unknown TLVs, since nit: "if an unknown" There are other changes, but these are not of a nature to prevent interoperability: [...] o the compression state is now specific to an address family rather than an address encoding Section 4.5; It seems like an old implementation that decompresses an update to different contents than a new implementation does, would have some effect on routing. Am I missing something? |
2019-08-22
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14 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Benjamin Kaduk has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2019-08-20
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14 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot comment] Thanks for including explanatory text for describing expectations and limitations of Backward Compatibility in Appendix F, in order to address my DISCUSS point … [Ballot comment] Thanks for including explanatory text for describing expectations and limitations of Backward Compatibility in Appendix F, in order to address my DISCUSS point regarding issues with backward compatibility with RFC6126 implementations. |
2019-08-20
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14 | Suresh Krishnan | Ballot comment text updated for Suresh Krishnan |
2019-08-20
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14 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot comment] Thanks for addressing my COMMENT and for including explanatory text for describing expectations and limitations of Backward Compatibility in Appendix F in order … [Ballot comment] Thanks for addressing my COMMENT and for including explanatory text for describing expectations and limitations of Backward Compatibility in Appendix F in order to address my DISCUSS point regarding issues with backward compatibility with RFC6126 implementations. |
2019-08-20
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14 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Suresh Krishnan has been changed to No Objection from Discuss |
2019-08-16
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14 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-14.txt |
2019-08-16
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14 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-08-16
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14 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-08-16
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14 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-10
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13 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed |
2019-08-10
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13 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed |
2019-08-10
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13 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-13.txt |
2019-08-10
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13 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-08-10
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13 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-08-10
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13 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-08
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12 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed from IESG Evaluation |
2019-08-08
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12 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot discuss] I support Roman's DISCUSS. I'm also unclear on the over-arching recommendation this document is making for securely deploying this protocol. Given that the … [Ballot discuss] I support Roman's DISCUSS. I'm also unclear on the over-arching recommendation this document is making for securely deploying this protocol. Given that the protocol itself is insecure, I would have expected some normative requirement for correcting that (e.g., Minimally, Babel deployments MUST be secured using a lower-layer security mechanism, Babel over DTLS, or HMAC-based authentication.) This still would not bring it into line with BCP 61 Section 7, but perhaps there is some argument for making an exception for this protocol. |
2019-08-08
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12 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot comment] I support Suresh's DISCUSS. An explanation of why this document obsoletes RFC 6126 and RFC 7557 needs to appear in the introduction of … [Ballot comment] I support Suresh's DISCUSS. An explanation of why this document obsoletes RFC 6126 and RFC 7557 needs to appear in the introduction of this document. Section 3.2.3: It's a bit odd that the Multicast Hello is introduced here but the difference between the two kinds of hellos is not explained until Section 3.4.1. It makes me wonder if 3.2 should come after 3.4. Section 3.6: s/is not left-distributive Section 3.5.2/is not left-distributive (Section 3.5.2)/ Appendix C: This section should be in the body of the document. |
2019-08-08
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12 | Alissa Cooper | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Alissa Cooper |
2019-08-08
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12 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot discuss] Thanks for your work on this well written document. Most of the issues I found have been covered in the ballot positions of … [Ballot discuss] Thanks for your work on this well written document. Most of the issues I found have been covered in the ballot positions of my esteemed colleagues. I did have one major concern that I would like to see addressed though. This is in regard to backward compatibility with RFC6126 implementations. Due to the addition of the mandatory bit and the processing associated with it, I would think that the new implementations will not be able to properly interoperate with the existing RFC6126 implementations. Is my understanding correct? If so, I would like to see some text explaining what is the expected behavior when deploying into legacy environments. If not, I would greatly appreciate an explanation and I will clear. |
2019-08-08
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12 | Suresh Krishnan | Ballot discuss text updated for Suresh Krishnan |
2019-08-08
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12 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot discuss] Thanks for your work on this well written document. Most of the issues I found have been covered in the ballot positions of … [Ballot discuss] Thanks for your work on this well written document. Most of the issues I found have been covered in the ballot positions of my esteemed colleagues. I did have one major concern that I would like to see addressed though. This is in regard to backward compatibility with RFC6126 implementations. Due to the addition of the mandatory bit and the processing associated with it, I would think that the new implementations will not be able to properly interoperate with the existing RFC6126 implementations. Is my understanding correct? If so, I would like to see some text explaining what is the expected behavior when deploying into legacy environments. |
2019-08-08
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12 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot comment] * Appendix F I think a consolidated change log from RFC6126 would be more helpful in the finished RFC for existing implementers. |
2019-08-08
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12 | Suresh Krishnan | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Suresh Krishnan |
2019-08-08
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12 | Alexey Melnikov | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Alexey Melnikov |
2019-08-07
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12 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot comment] I support the DISCUSS points by Ben and Álvaro. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Barry Leiba | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Barry Leiba |
2019-08-07
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12 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot discuss] I don't think that all of the arithmetic specified in Section 3.2.1 is well defined. Specifcally, the formulations involving bitwise AND assume that … [Ballot discuss] I don't think that all of the arithmetic specified in Section 3.2.1 is well defined. Specifcally, the formulations involving bitwise AND assume that the input to the bitwise AND is nonnegative, which does not seem to be implied by the other stated constraints. (For example, an "integer n" may well be negative.) Some discussion of the representation of negative integers would then be needed, and then whether the mathematical operation is performed in an abstract infinite-precision machine or in a realizable approximation, etc.. It might be simpler to just use the modular arithmetic flavor and avoid any of the issues that can arise when providing two alternative definitions that are intended to be equivalent (since there is always a risk of edge cases). Section 3.5.2 needs to explicitly say that the c and m arguments to M() are the local link cost and the advertised metric, e.g., "the function M(c, m) used for computing a metric from a locally computed link cost c and the metric m advertised by a neighbor". Section 3.8.2.1 notes that "[d]ue to duplicate suppression, only a small number of such requests will actually reach the source." (for seqno requests intending to avoid starvation). But Section 3.8.1.2 only has a SHOULD-level requirement to suppress duplicate seqno requests, so I think there is an internal inconsistency. I think we may need to have a discussion about the feasibility of multicast acknowledgment requests with only a 16-bit nonce. With random assignment of nonces the risk of birthday collisions becomes uncomfortably large, and non-random assignments are likely to have worse pathologies. (A pointer to a previous discussion of this topic would, of course, short-circuit a lot of it if not all of it.) Are we willing to make hard assumptions about the maximum size of a multicast domain and the risk of collision we are willing to accept? The discussion in Section 4.6.9 of computing the prefix from an Update message (and parser state) seems a little underspecified when the prefix length is not a multiple of 8 bits. (Additionally, "Plen" is not described as measuring bits, explicitly, for any of the PDU descriptions that I remember.) Specifically, the "Prefix" description does not mention that any trailing bits must be set to zero, but the subsequent discussion about the prefix is "computed as follows" refers to assembling the prefix as a collection of octets, including trailing zero octets, implying that the computed prefix is the full length of the address type. I appreciate that we have some discussion in Section 4.5 about the need for a stateful parser for the babel packet body; this seems like one of the riskiest areas of the protocol from the implementation perspective. However, I think it would be even more helpful to explicitly call out what pieces of state are needed, what protocol elements affect the state, and what ordering requirements (or non-requirements) there are for the interactions between the different protocol elements that affect parser state. Can we have a discussion about whether it's appropriate to add some text along these lines? |
2019-08-07
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12 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot comment] Should there be a "changes since RFC 6126" section that is retained in the published RFC? (I assume that Appendix F is … [Ballot comment] Should there be a "changes since RFC 6126" section that is retained in the published RFC? (I assume that Appendix F is going to be dropped.) The secdir review has some good thoughts (e.g., tracking "link-local" IPv4 addresses, discussion of non-protection from hostile insiders), but I don't see a response to it. We use the phrase "a small multiple of" a few times, but I don't remember seeing any concrete guidance for what factor to use. Is it intended to be closer to 1.1 or to 4? In a related vein, there are many places in the document where the precise details of processing are left intentionally underspecified (e.g., computing a link's cost). I understand that due to the protocol guarantees the needed routing will still be achieved even if nodes use different parameters and algorithms in these cases, but do we expect the details to be chosen on a per-implementation basis, or in profile documents, or even left up to operator configuration on a per-node basis? Section 1 The introduction should mention obsoleting 6126 and 7557, in addition to doing so in the abstract. Section 1.1 Finally, Babel is a hybrid routing protocol, in the sense that it can carry routes for multiple network-layer protocols (IPv4 and IPv6), whichever protocol the Babel packets are themselves being carried over. nit: I think "regardless of which" is better than "whichever", since the latter might erroneously imply that there is a consistency requirement of the carried routes and the carrying protocol. Section 1.2 Second, unless the optional algorithm described in Section 3.5.5 is implemented, Babel does impose a hold time when a prefix is Similarly to my comment on the applicability doc, I'm not sure if there's one or two things in Section 3.5.5 that would match this description. Section 2 Conceptually, Bellman-Ford is executed in parallel for every source of routing information (destination of data traffic). In the following discussion, we fix a source S; the reader will recall that the same algorithm is executed for all sources. Just to check my understanding: this "source S" is a source of routing information, not a source of data-plane traffic being routed? Section 2.4 Is there a reference for AODV? To show that this feasibility condition still guarantees loop- freedom, recall that at the time when A accepts an update from B, the metric D(B) announced by B is no smaller than FD(B); since it is smaller than FD(A), at that point in time FD(B) < FD(A). Since this property is preserved when A sends updates, it remains true at all times, which ensures that the forwarding graph has no loops. I'm trying to walk through this and missing a step or two. "the metric D(B) announced by B is no smaller than FD(B)" is pretty clear, since FD(B) is just the minimum value of D(B) over time thus far. But I'm not sure I follow how A can preserve the property FD(B) < FD(A) when A sends updates. Clearly FD(B(T')) <= FD(B(T0)) for any time T' after T0, but suppose FD(B) remains constant but A is off interacting with some other node C and finds a great path via C, which correspondingly causes D(A) to reduce. Can I get into a situation where D(A) < FD(B) <= D(A) + C(A,B) (and thus, the subsequent FD(A) < FD(B) <= FD(A) + C(A,B)) if A does not interact with B during that time? Section 2.5 Using the minusculeu and majuscule forms of the same letter to mean different things (e.g., source S and sequence number s) is something of a readability anti-pattern. Section 3.2.6 It would probably be helpful to readers to note that "neighbor that advertised" and "next-hop" can be different due to being different address families. (For the same address family, they are generally going to be the same, modulo weird network-layer technologies, right?) Section 3.5.1 (side note: I got a bit confused reading this section and had to go double-check several definitions, due to the qualitative difference between the "metric" and "metric'" under comparison. Namely, the "metric" is for the path from neighbor to S, but the "metric'" is for the path from the current node to S, and so in some sense they are "measuring different things". Perhaps using "FD" instead of "metric'" would help disambiguate. I understand that this a fairly common pattern for routing protocols, though, so don't necessarily expect any change to the text.) router-id. Feasibility distances are maintained in the source table, the exact procedure is given in Section 3.7.3. nit: this is a comma splice. Section 3.5.2 Note that while strict monotonicity is essential to the integrity of the network (persistent routing loops may arise if it is not satisfied), left distributivity is not: if it is not satisfied, Babel will still converge to a loop-free configuration, but might not reach a global optimum (in fact, a global optimum may not even exist). I might even go so far as to say that a global optimum "will likely not exist", though this is fairly qualitative/intuitive since we don't define a configuration space or metric over it in which to evaluate the probability. Section 3.5.4 We don't seem to use the "link cost value equal to cost" anywhere in this section, so maybe it is superfluous. If such an entry exists: o if the entry is currently selected, the update is unfeasible, and the router-id of the update is equal to the router-id of the entry, then the update MAY be ignored; I guess the idea is that we can keep the old one around until it would time out, since the initial timeout value for it means it should still be workable until our timer expires, but it's only a MAY in case we want to be more proactive about noticing that the advertised metric is now unfeasible? It might be worth saying a bit about when we might/might not want to heed the MAY. Section 3.5.5 o sending a retraction with an acknowledgment request (Section 3.3) to every reachable neighbour that has not explicitly retracted prefix P and waiting for all acknowledgments. nit(?): I'd suggest a comma before "and waiting for all acknowledgments", since that's the final gating factor to achieve the goal. The former option is simpler and ensures that at that point, any routes for prefix P pointing at the current node have expired. However, since the expiry time can be as high as a few minutes, doing that prevents automatic aggregation by creating spurious black-holes for aggregated routes. The latter option is RECOMMENDED as it dramatically reduces the time for which a prefix is unreachable in the presence of aggregated routes. nit: I don't think this "prevents automatic aggregation" at a technical level, but rather that it "makes automatic aggregation rather unusable in practice" since if automatic aggregation is used, any route retraction will result in a spurious blackhole for the (minutes) expiry time, which is unacceptable for most environments. Section 3.7 Additionally, in order to ensure that any black-holes are reliably cleared in a timely manner, a Babel node sends retractions (updates with an infinite metric) for any recently retracted prefixes. Is the sending of retractions the one described by the SHOULDs in 3.7.2? If so, I'm not sure that "a Babel node sends retractions for any recently retracted prefixes" is quite accurate (since SHOULD is not a mandatory requirement); "can send" or "will generally send" might be better. Section 3.7.1 Every Babel speaker periodically advertises all of its selected routes on all of its interfaces, including any recently retracted routes. Since Babel doesn't suffer from routing loops (there is no "counting to infinity") and relies heavily on triggered updates (Section 3.7.2), this full dump only needs to happen infrequently. Part of the need for the full dump stems from the potential for unreliable links, right? Do we want to mention that relationship here, (and that if there are particularly unreliable links the frequency may need to be more often)? Section 3.8.1.2 We haven't introduced "hop count" yet and just mention it in passing here as "[if the] hop count is 2 or more". Intuitively, it seems like the routr should send an update if the router-ids match and the requested seqno is equal to the route entry's seqno, but I don't see this case covered in the current text. o otherwise, if the node has one or more (not necessarily feasible) routes to the requested prefix with a next hop that is not the nit: I think the parenthetical can just be "not feasible", as any feasible routes in question would have matched the previous bullet point. neighbours. However, if a seqno request is resent by its originator, the subsequent copies MAY be forwarded to a different neighbour than the initial one. Is MAY the appropriate level of strength? Trying the same neighbor would be effective if the original was unsuccessful due to packet loss, but is it possible for a routing pathology to occur that directs the request in the "wrong direction" with respect to a link or node failure? Section 3.8.2.4 Is it worth giving some informal guidance about not sending multicast wildcard requests if a node observes others doing the same around the same time (or similar) to avoid the "serious congestion" issues? Section 4.2 A Babel packet consists of a 4-octet header, followed by a sequence of TLVs (the packet body), optionally followed by a second sequence of TLVs (the packet trailer). Without mention of the 'body length' field here, a reader might be confused at what distinguishes the body TLVs from the trailer TLVs. The packet body and trailer are both sequences of TLVs. The packet Ibody is the normal place to store TLVs; the packet trailer only contains specialised TLVs that do not need to be protected by cryptographic security mechanisms. I think we need a more explicit statement that the body structure is subject to change when security mechanisms are in use, to allow for potential confidentiality-protecting cryptographic mechanisms. Section 4.3 Length is still in octets, right? Section 4.4 Every TLV carries an explicit length in its header; however, most TLVs are self-terminating, in the sense that it is possible to determine the length of the body without reference to the explicit Length field. If a TLV has a self-terminating format, then it MAY allow a sequence of sub-TLVs to follow the body. This seems like a statement of fact, for which a lowercase "may" is perfectly adequate. Sub-TLVs have the same structure as TLVs. With the exception of PAD1, all TLVs have the following structure: I was going to complain that it's somewhat unfortunate to use the same name for a thing that's a TLV and a thing that's a sub-TLV, even if they have identical encodings. But then I noticed that in this (sub-TLV) section we spell it "PAD1" and in the previous (TLV) section we spell it "Pad1", which are different. On the gripping hand, Sections 4.6.1 and 4.7.1 both spell it "Pad1", which are the same. So a little bit of effort rationalizing things would go a long way. The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit, Just to be clear: this is the MSB of the 'type' octet? Also, for similar features in other protocols I've suggested the clarifying language of "comprehension-mandatory" which seems to more accurately reflect the corresponding behavior. Section 4.5 Since the parser state is separate from the bulk of Babel's state, and since for correct parsing it must be identical across implementations, it is updated before checking for mandatory TLVs: nit: "mandatory sub-TLVs" (right?) Section 4.6.2 MBZ Set to 0 on transmission. Is it legal for a receiver to check and abort if any bits are nonzero? Section 4.6.3 Sixteen bits of nonce does not provide much unguessability (I note that LISP's rfc6830bis is recommending that their 24-bit nonce echo functionality not be relied on for return-routability checks over the public Internet). However, since these acknowledgment exchanges are only between direct neighbors, it seems that they are only needed for correlating responses to requests and not for unguessability. (In this case it seems a sequence number would work just as well as a random number, and we might want to discourage random assignment in the text to avoid the risk of birthday collisions.) On the other hand, multicast acknowledgment requests could be problematic (and especially so when sequential nonces are used), and if they are intended to be allowed then we may need to consider using a larger and random nonce. Section 4.6.6 I'm getting some sever cognitive dissonance between the "Rxcost" field and the "carrying a link's transmission cost" statement. Also, in Rxcost The rxcost according to the sending node of the interface whose address is specified in the Address field. The value FFFF hexadecimal (infinity) indicates that this interface is unreachable. if I insert commas to get "The rxcost, according to the sending node [of the TLV], of the interface whose address is specified in the Address field", does that preserve the intended meaning? nit/aside: It also feels like there's a bit of a mismatch here, in that the "rxcost of the interface" probably means the local interface (from the perspective of the sender), but that interface is being identified by the *remote* address (again, from the perspective of the sender of the TLV). So maybe "whose remote address" could resolve the mismatch I'm perceiving? (Or maybe I'm completely misunderstanding, of course.) Interval An upper bound, expressed in centiseconds, on the time after which the sending node will send a new IHU; this MUST NOT be 0. [...] To check my understanding: are the IHUs conceptually a reply to Hellos, such that if the Hellos stopped arriving then the peer would stop sending IHUs in response? I understand that their intervals are set completely independently, so there is not a direct causal relationship, but I'm trying to check whether the quoted sentence is a strict commitment by the sender of the IHU or could be rescinded due to external events. Section 4.6.9 If the Metric field is finite, the router-id of the originating node for this announcement is taken from the prefix advertised by this Update if the Router-Id flag is set, computed as described above. Otherwise, it is taken either from the preceding Router-Id packet, or the preceding Update packet with the Router-Id flag set, whichever comes last, even if that TLV is otherwise ignored due to an unknown mandatory sub-TLV. Both cases of "packet" here should be "TLV", right? Otherwise we have to scope what set of previous packets are applicable to this route (since we get a lot of packets, for a lot of different routes). Section 5 "Specification Required" also requires Expert Review. What guidance can we provide to the experts for making registration decisions? Section 6 It's a little disappointing that we provide four different PDUs for padding but then have no discussion of privacy considerations related to (potentially encrypted) packet length, and when (else) one might want to pad, and what padding policy might look like. I understand that padding policy remains something of an open research question, but even acknowledging that can still be useful. Is an attacker's capability limited to misdirecting traffic? Can it cause traffic to be blackholed or cause routing loops by falsifying protocol data either modified in transit or originating false data? What are the effects of an attacker completely or selectively dropping protocol data? In essence, please flesh out "completely insecure" with a bit more detail. The information that a Babel node announces to the whole routing domain is often sufficient to determine a mobile node's physical location with reasonable precision. The privacy issues that this causes can be mitigated somewhat by using randomly chosen router-ids and randomly chosen IP addresses, and changing them periodically. "periodically" may not be the best advice; coupling such changes to mobility events is likely to be more effective at preserving privacy. (QUIC has discussed related topics quite extensively, though there's enough traffic in the archives that I can neither point you at a specific thread or recommend searching for it.) Section 8.2 I think at least BABEL-HMAC needs to be normative, since it is RECOMMENDED. Section A.1 If we're talking about "appending bits" to the history fields, maybe describing them as fixed-length queues or something makes more sense than vectors. If the field is maintained in a 16-bit integer, what is done for the previously erased bits when we "undo history"? Whenever either Hello timer associated to a neighbour expires, the local node adds a 0 bit to this neighbour's Hello history, and We keep two hello histories; we should clarify that the one in question is the one corresponding to the timer that expired. Section A.2.2 I don't understand the origin of the '256' in the MIN(1, 256/txcost) formula (described as a probability estimate). I think a lot more work is needed to convince me that the two given formulae for "cost" are equivalent (especially given that 'rxcost' only appears once in the entire section, in the second formula). Section A.3.2 Is k "allowed to" (I know this section is just informative) vary on non-external data, such as the route or link in question? Appendix C I could see this content in the main body of the document. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Benjamin Kaduk | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Benjamin Kaduk |
2019-08-07
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12 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot discuss] Security Considerations. While the high level statement of Babel being “an insecure protocol” is accurate and clear, precisely enumerating the threats is needed … [Ballot discuss] Security Considerations. While the high level statement of Babel being “an insecure protocol” is accurate and clear, precisely enumerating the threats is needed to motivate the selection of the appropriate mitigations. (1) Per “Any attacker can misdirect data traffic by advertising routes with a low metric or a high seqno.”: -- Can the "any" of the attacker be scoped any more? -- Explain why this is possible – because Babel peers are not authenticated and Babel messages aren’t integrity/replay protected -- Discuss the impact of this misdirection: denial of service (dropping the traffic and against a given target), eavesdropping, or allowing for the possibility of traffic modification (depending on upper level security mechanisms) – RFC4593 covers a number of them -- Note that because Babel messages aren’t encrypted any on-path attacker can gather the routing topology (2) The rest of this paragraph describes the security properties conveyed by link-layer security, IPSec, BABEL-HMAC and BABEL-TLS. They all make sense. Please be explicit that IPSec or BABEL-TLS address all of the above described attacks. BABEL-HMAC addresses only somet. (3) Per “HMAC is simpler and does not depend on DTLS, and therefore its use is RECOMMENDED whenever both mechanisms are applicable”, can you explain this recommendation and the circumstances where “both mechanisms are applicable”. If one wants to ensure confidentiality, it can’t be realized with HMAC – they aren’t equal. (4) Per “The privacy issues that this causes can be mitigated somewhat by using randomly chosen router-ids and randomly chosen IP addresses, and changing them periodically, who’s IP address should be randomly chosen the Babel node or the mobile device? In other sections: (5) Appendix C: Per the last paragraph, “The packet trailer is intended to carry cryptographic signatures …”, to what security mechanism is that referring? Where is that defined? (6) Appendix D: Is the stub implementation guidance normative? If so, will it satisfy all of the RFC2119 language in this document? (7) Appendix E. Please explicitly state that the sample implementation is non-normative. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot comment] (8) Section 1.1. What is a “network diameter”? Calculated how? (9) Section 3.6. Recommend avoiding the phrase “protocol’s correctness” (10) Section 3.7.2, Per … [Ballot comment] (8) Section 1.1. What is a “network diameter”? Calculated how? (9) Section 3.6. Recommend avoiding the phrase “protocol’s correctness” (10) Section 3.7.2, Per the guidance to send updates with acknowledgement requests to a small, but not a large number of neighbors. Is there guidance to provide on what is a large number? (11) Section 3.8.2.4. Is there any guidance on what a “small number of multicast” requests constitutes? (12) Section 4. Per “Both the source and destination UDP port are set to a well-known port number”, the same one? (13) Section 4.2. What is the “carefully chosen” rational for the magic number being 42 (unless this is a Hitchhikers Guide reference)? (14) Section 4.6.4. What are the properties needed for this nonce? (15) Section 6. Per the concern that Babel packets might escape into the wild and “No such natural protection exists when Babel packets are carried over IPv4”, doesn’t setting the TTL=1 per Section 4 help? (16) Appendix D: Per “Nonetheless, in some very constrained environments, such as … abacuses”, what does it mean to implement Babel on an analog device? (17) Did the WG consider renaming the title of this draft “Babel Routing Protocol v2” (as this is a distinct and new protocol)? (18) Editorial nits: -- Section 1.1. Editorial. s/Babel never/Babel does not/ -- Section 1.2 Editorial. s/Babel does impose/Babel imposes/ -- Section 2. Editorial. s/venerable RIP/RIP/ -- Section 2.3. Editorial. s/It is well known that a/A/ -- Section 4.1.2. Typo. s/ones ones/ones/ |
2019-08-07
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12 | Roman Danyliw | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Roman Danyliw |
2019-08-07
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12 | Amanda Baber | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from Version Changed - Review Needed |
2019-08-07
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12 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot discuss] I really enjoyed reading this document! Thank you for the work and time that has gone into it. However, I don't think that … [Ballot discuss] I really enjoyed reading this document! Thank you for the work and time that has gone into it. However, I don't think that this specification is ready to be published as a Proposed Standard. In general, I don't think that the document is clear or specific enough to be considered in the Standards Track -- that is the main reason for this DISCUSS. (A) Clear Defaults and Operational Guidance While I appreciate Babel's flexibility in terms of the ability to use different strategies, I believe that both defaults and clear guidance should be provided. Given that "not all...strategies will give good results" and that in most cases these are listed as possible choices, I don't think that this document "has resolved known design choices" [BCP9/rfc7127]. The cost/metric computation and route selection specially concern me because I believe that a robust/clear specification is at the heart of any routing protocol. In general what I am looking for to resolve this part of the DISCUSS are two items: (A1) Clear defaults. For example, Appendix B talks about constants/default values. I would assume that, given the existing experience, that the values there are probably sensible defaults. Is that not the case? (A2) Operational Considerations. Given that Babel can be (and is) used in different environments, I would like to see guidance to operators as they deploy the protocol in their networks. An example of the type of discussion I would like to see expanded is: "a mobile node that is low on battery may choose to use larger time constants (hello and update intervals, etc.) than a node that has access to wall power" (§1.1). Consider §2 in rfc5706 (Operational Considerations - How Will the New Protocol Fit into the Current Environment?). I believe that both items are important, specially in a protocol as flexible as Babel. Some of this guidance could have been included in draft-ietf-babel-applicability -- but this information is not there either. (B) Error Handling Many sections of the document describe functionality, or even Normatively mandate it, but there is no discussion about Error Handling. (B1) Router-Id Setting §4.5: o the current router-id; this is undefined at the start of the packet, and is updated by each Router-ID TLV (Section 4.6.7) and by each Update TLV with Router-Id flag set. It took me some time to figure out the reason for being able to carry the router-id in two different places inside the same packet, which is my interpretation of the "and" above. Let me see if I understood: a packet can carry multiple updates...updates contain routes that were either originated by the local node, OR, learned from other routers...the router-id matches the originator... So...if a packet carries multiple updates, some locally originated and some learned, then it is possible for the packet to first include (for example) a Router-ID TLV (indicating router-id_A), followed by some Update TLVs (without the R-bit set), than then some other Update TLVs (with the R-bit set)... Did I understand correctly? If so, I think there are significant pieces of this operation that are not clearly specified in the document. There is mention of the effect of the Router-ID TLV (or the Update TLV w/R=1) on subsequent Update TLVs...there is an very subtle hint (for my taste) in §4.5 (Parser state) about the state learned for each packet from those TLVs...but there is no explicit text that talks about the need for strict ordering when sending and later when processing...it is all simply implied. What should happen if no Router-Id has been defined? For example, an Update (R = 0) is received but no Router-ID TLV is present... What if the Router-ID TLV is present, but *after* the Update? There are many possible combinations... (B2) Default Prefix Similar comments as above... "P (Prefix) flag...establishes a new default prefix for subsequent Update TLVs with a matching address encoding within the same packet" (§4.6.9). What if an update with an AE that allows compression is received *before* the one that sets the new default prefix? (B3) Next Hop §4.6.9: The next-hop address for this update is taken from the last preceding Next Hop TLV with a matching address family (IPv4 or IPv6) in the same packet even if it was otherwise ignored due to an unknown mandatory sub-TLV; if no such TLV exists, it is taken from the network-layer source address of this packet. What if the Next Hop TLV doesn't exist and the network-layer doesn't correspond to the address family in the Update? For example, let's say IPv6 is used as the network-layer protocol and the Update contains IPv4 prefixes... (B4) For the Normative behavior listed here (I may have missed other instances), I have basically the same question: what should a receiver do if it is not the case? - §3.8.1.2: "A node MUST NOT increase its sequence number by more than 1 in response to a seqno request." - §4: "A Babel packet MUST be sent as the body of a UDP datagram, with network-layer hop count set to 1..." - §4.6.9: "If the metric is finite, AE MUST NOT be 0. If the metric is infinite and AE is 0, Plen and Omitted MUST both be 0." - §4.6.10: "...if AE is 0 (in which case Plen MUST be 0 and Prefix is of length 0)." - §4.6.10/§4.6.11: Is AE 3 a valid value in a request? I assume it isn't. What should a receiver do if AE = 3. (C) Mandatory Bit §4.4: "The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit..." The most significant bit of which part of the sub-TLV? As written, that bit would be the first one in the Type, which corresponds to the text in the IANA section. Please be specific. In the IANA considerations section, please include the whole registry in the table to avoid confusion. Note that because of the mandatory bit, the 128-239 range should be Reserved...but it is currently marked as Unassigned. Even worse, value 128 is assigned already [draft-ietf-babel-source-specific]. The impact may not be too bad because I doubt that Pad1 would need to be mandatory, but it at least causes confusion and inconsistency, and (as currently specified) there would be no way to differentiate between Pad1 and the Source Prefix sub-TLV. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Alvaro Retana | Ballot discuss text updated for Alvaro Retana |
2019-08-07
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12 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot discuss] I really enjoyed reading this document! Thank you for the work and time that has gone into it. However, I don't think that … [Ballot discuss] I really enjoyed reading this document! Thank you for the work and time that has gone into it. However, I don't think that this specification is ready to be published as a Proposed Standard. In general, I don't think that the document is clear or specific enough to be considered in the Standards Track -- that is the main reason for this DISCUSS. (A) Clear Defaults and Operational Guidance While I appreciate Babel's flexibility in terms of the ability to use different strategies, I believe that both defaults and clear guidance should be provided. Given that "not all...strategies will give good results" and that in most cases these are listed as possible choices, I don't think that this document "has resolved known design choices" [BCP9/rfc7127]. The cost/metric computation and route selection specially concern me because I believe that a robust/clear specification is at the heart of any routing protocol. In general what I am looking for to resolve this part of the DISCUSS are two items: (1) Clear defaults. For example, Appendix B talks about constants/default values. I would assume that, given the existing experience, that the values there are probably sensible defaults. Is that not the case? (2) Operational Considerations. Given that Babel can be (and is) used in different environments, I would like to see guidance to operators as they deploy the protocol in their networks. An example of the type of discussion I would like to see expanded is: "a mobile node that is low on battery may choose to use larger time constants (hello and update intervals, etc.) than a node that has access to wall power" (§1.1). Consider §2 in rfc5706 (Operational Considerations - How Will the New Protocol Fit into the Current Environment?). I believe that both items are important, specially in a protocol as flexible as Babel. Some of this guidance could have been included in draft-ietf-babel-applicability -- but this information is not there either. (B) Error Handling Many sections of the document describe functionality, or even Normatively mandate it, but there is no discussion about Error Handling. (1) Router-Id Setting §4.5: o the current router-id; this is undefined at the start of the packet, and is updated by each Router-ID TLV (Section 4.6.7) and by each Update TLV with Router-Id flag set. It took me some time to figure out the reason for being able to carry the router-id in two different places inside the same packet, which is my interpretation of the "and" above. Let me see if I understood: a packet can carry multiple updates...updates contain routes that were either originated by the local node, OR, learned from other routers...the router-id matches the originator... So...if a packet carries multiple updates, some locally originated and some learned, then it is possible for the packet to first include (for example) a Router-ID TLV (indicating router-id_A), followed by some Update TLVs (without the R-bit set), than then some other Update TLVs (with the R-bit set)... Did I understand correctly? If so, I think there are significant pieces of this operation that are not clearly specified in the document. There is mention of the effect of the Router-ID TLV (or the Update TLV w/R=1) on subsequent Update TLVs...there is an very subtle hint (for my taste) in §4.5 (Parser state) about the state learned for each packet from those TLVs...but there is no explicit text that talks about the need for strict ordering when sending and later when processing...it is all simply implied. What should happen if no Router-Id has been defined? For example, an Update (R = 0) is received but no Router-ID TLV is present... What if the Router-ID TLV is present, but *after* the Update? There are many possible combinations... (2) Default Prefix Similar comments as above... "P (Prefix) flag...establishes a new default prefix for subsequent Update TLVs with a matching address encoding within the same packet" (§4.6.9). What if an update with an AE that allows compression is received *before* the one that sets the new default prefix? (3) Next Hop §4.6.9: The next-hop address for this update is taken from the last preceding Next Hop TLV with a matching address family (IPv4 or IPv6) in the same packet even if it was otherwise ignored due to an unknown mandatory sub-TLV; if no such TLV exists, it is taken from the network-layer source address of this packet. What if the Next Hop TLV doesn't exist and the network-layer doesn't correspond to the address family in the Update? For example, let's say IPv6 is used as the network-layer protocol and the Update contains IPv4 prefixes... (4) For the Normative behavior listed here (I may have missed other instances), I have basically the same question: what should a receiver do if it is not the case? - §3.8.1.2: "A node MUST NOT increase its sequence number by more than 1 in response to a seqno request." - §4: "A Babel packet MUST be sent as the body of a UDP datagram, with network-layer hop count set to 1..." - §4.6.9: "If the metric is finite, AE MUST NOT be 0. If the metric is infinite and AE is 0, Plen and Omitted MUST both be 0." - §4.6.10: "...if AE is 0 (in which case Plen MUST be 0 and Prefix is of length 0)." - §4.6.10/§4.6.11: Is AE 3 a valid value in a request? I assume it isn't. What should a receiver do if AE = 3. (C) Mandatory Bit §4.4: "The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit..." The most significant bit of which part of the sub-TLV? As written, that bit would be the first one in the Type, which corresponds to the text in the IANA section. Please be specific. In the IANA considerations section, please include the whole registry in the table to avoid confusion. Note that because of the mandatory bit, the 128-239 range should be Reserved...but it is currently marked as Unassigned. Even worse, value 128 is assigned already [draft-ietf-babel-source-specific]. The impact may not be too bad because I doubt that Pad1 would need to be mandatory, but it at least causes confusion and inconsistency, and (as currently specified) there would be no way to differentiate between Pad1 and the Source Prefix sub-TLV. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot comment] (a) §3.1 introduces the term "urgent TLVs". (1) It might be a good idea to explicitly mention/list which are these TLVs. There are … [Ballot comment] (a) §3.1 introduces the term "urgent TLVs". (1) It might be a good idea to explicitly mention/list which are these TLVs. There are some references in subsequent sentences, which may or may not be enough for most readers. (2) There are some Normative actions applied to them, for example "MUST be sent in a timely manner". While the intent may be ok, the Normative enforcement of "in a timely manner" is not clear at all -- how do you comply with that? Appendix B says: The amount of jitter applied to a packet depends on whether it contains any urgent TLVs or not (Section 3.1). Urgent triggered updates and urgent requests are delayed by no more than 200ms; acknowledgments, by no more than the associated deadline; and other TLVs by no more than one-half the Multicast Hello interval. I think it would help if this text is moved to §3.1 to make it explicitly clear what a timely delay is...and the text was changed to (something like) "MUST NOT be delayed more than 200ms". (b) §3.2.2: "SHOULD NOT increment its sequence number (seqno) spontaneously" When it is ok to increase the seqno spontaneously? IOW, why not use MUST NOT? I think it would be better if there was a clear indication of when the seqno is increased. Scanning the rest of the document, it seems that those indications are in place. (c) There seems to be no specific explanation of how the timers are handled, what happens when they expire, etc.. For example, §3.2.4 includes this text: There are three timers associated with each neighbour entry -- the multicast hello timer, which is initialised from the interval value carried by scheduled Multicast Hello TLVs, the unicast hello timer, which is initialised from the interval value carried by scheduled Unicast Hello TLVs, and the IHU timer, which is initialised to a small multiple of the interval carried in IHU TLVs. But there is no explanation (that I could find) about how to manage those timers. The only place where hello timers are mentioned is in Appendix A.1...but that is just an example. (d) §3.7.2 includes two instances of "SHOULD make a reasonable attempt at ensuring that all [reachable] neighbours receive this update/retraction". What does making "a reasonable attempt" mean? How can that be Normatively enforced? (e) §3.7.2 Finally, a node MAY send a triggered update when the metric for a given prefix changes in a significant manner, due to a received update, because a link's cost has changed, or because a different next hop has been selected. A node SHOULD NOT send triggered updates for other reasons, such as when there is a minor fluctuation in a route's metric, when the selected next hop changes, or to propagate a new sequence number (except to satisfy a request, as specified in Section 3.8). How much is "a significant manner"? What about "a minor fluctuation"? Are the modifiers (next hop change, for example) the only conditions to take into account, or are they just examples of when these significant/minor changes may occur? How can these terms be Normatively enforced? (f) §3.8.1.1: "When a node receives a wildcard route request, it SHOULD send a full route table dump." When is it ok to not send a full table dump? IOW, why is MUST not used? (g) §3.8.2.1: "a node SHOULD repeat such a request a small number of times if no route becomes feasible within a short time." What does "a small number of times" and "within a short time" mean? How can that be Normatively enforced? Please be specific. (h) §4.6.9: "Omitted...that should be taken from a preceding Update TLV in the same address family with the Prefix flag set." What if that Update TLV is not in the packet? (i) Security Considerations The initial vulnerability listed ("attacker can misdirect data traffic by advertising routes with a low metric or a high seqno") is only one of several actions an attacker can take. More importantly, if the attacker happens to be in control of an authenticated node, then the mitigation proposed doesn't help. This type of rogue node can, for example, set the mandatory bit in an unknown TLV (as in completely made up!) to cause whole TLVs to be ignored, resulting in loss of routes, etc.. I am not sure what can be done to mitigate this type of vulnerability...but I think it is important that it is at least called out. (j) Are the appendices intended to be Normative or not? I'm assuming the answer is no...but I can base that only on the references in the text to Appendix A.*, pointing to them as examples. What about the others? They are not even referenced in the text. Some comments: - Appendix B talks about constants/default values. See my DISCUSS comments above. - Appendix C "is intended to guide designers of protocol extensions in chosing a particular encoding." I think is is valuable information. It would be very nice if there was a reference (or perhaps several, from where the different extensibility methods are presented) in the main body of the specification. I can see how this is an informative section. - Appendix D defines a "stub implementation". This is also valuable information. But...there's no reference from the text, and Normative language is used... Why is this type of implementation (which I would think might be relatively common) not normative? - Appendix E simply points to the sample implementation. Personally, I would prefer to see an rfc7942 section instead -- it would have been nice to also mention other implementations. (k) "The length of..." is used everywhere in the document, but no units are mentioned. Some seem to obviously be in octets, but others could easily be in bits... (l) §4: s/SHOULD attempt to maximise the size of the packets/SHOULD maximise the size of the packets (m) §4.1.3: The description of AE 1 and 2 says that "Compression is allowed." -- but it looks like the only place where it can happen is in an Update. It might be nice to indicate that...and avoid indicating that compression is not allowed where it can't be done anyway. (n) rfc8126 should be a Normative reference. (o) Please include Informative references to rfc6126 and rfc7557. (p) s/Bellman-Ford protocol/Bellman-Ford algorithm (q) §2.4: Include an Informative reference to AODV (rfc3561). (r) §2.4: "if A has selected B as its successor" This is the only place where "successor" is used. For clarity, perhaps use a different word/description. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Alvaro Retana | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Alvaro Retana |
2019-08-07
|
12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot discuss] (Sorry I forgot two points about the appendix; see one in the discuss section and one in the comment section) I have a … [Ballot discuss] (Sorry I forgot two points about the appendix; see one in the discuss section and one in the comment section) I have a couple of points that needs addressing before this document can move forward. Most of them should the straight forward to address. My main point is about network load. Thanks for discussing network load and correctly adding some warnings at the right places, however, for a PS track document I would like to see more than this. Usually it's good provide default values were suitable (as this often is what people will then pick if there is no good reason to diverge) and more important I really like to see min/max values. Note that RFC8085 recommend a minimal interval of 3 seconds which probably is also a good hard boundary here. More concretely I think there are these cases that need more guidance: - Section 3.7.2. (Triggered Updates) advises to send a message multiple times for redundancy in case of loss. 5 and 2 are mentioned as example values. Please provide a normative default value and a normative maximum value here. Moreover the spec should also require to pace out these messages and avoid "tail loss" by overloading the local queue. (See also section 3.8.2.1) - Section 3.8.1.1. (Route Requests) says: "Full route dumps MAY be rate-limited, especially if they are sent over multicast." I think this should at least be a SHOULD. Please also provide further guidance about to appropriately rate limit and think about other cases where a recommend to implement rate-limiting could make sense. - In section 4.1.1 the update interval needs a lower limit (e.g. 3 seconds) and a recommend default value would be could as well (Note that there are other part in section 3 where the update value is discussed as well). - Section 3.8.2.4. mentions network load when requests are sent to all neighbours after reboot. Please provide more guidance about how to pace out these requests. - Section 3.8.1.2. (Seqno Requests) discusses hop count values but could maybe also give more concrete guidance. I would assume that the hop count value of the current active route is usually know. Maybe that knowledge could be used to pick an appropriate value? Three other smaller discuss points/questions/comments: 1) Sec 4.6.8. (Next Hop): If I interpret this correctly, address compression is allowed for the next hop field and therefore this TLV would actually not be self-terminating. What do I miss? 2) This document needs to specify a registration policy also for each of the already existing registries given this document obsoletes RFC7557. 3) Appendix D (Stub Implementations) contain normative language and therefore should probably be moved into the body of the draft. |
2019-08-07
|
12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot comment] Other comments: 1) While this point might not raise discuss-level, it would probably also be good to provide more concrete advise on how … [Ballot comment] Other comments: 1) While this point might not raise discuss-level, it would probably also be good to provide more concrete advise on how to implement jitter: Sec 3.1.: “ A moderate amount of jitter may be applied to packets sent by a Babel speaker: outgoing TLVs are buffered and SHOULD be sent with a small random delay.” Sec 4: “a Babel node SHOULD buffer every TLV and delay sending a packet by a small, randomly chosen delay [JITTER].” 2) Sec 4.1.2. (Router-Id) should probably state again that the router-id is assumed to be unique within a domain. 3) Sec 4: “The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit, indicates how to handle unknown sub-TLVs.” I would recommend to also indicate this bit in the image. 4) Sec 4.4: “If a TLV has a self-terminating format, then it MAY allow a sequence of sub-TLVs to follow the body.” Initially I wasn’t quite sure what you wanted to say here. I guess you say that the length would indicate a larger value that needed for the body and therefore a subTLV might be present? I recommend to clarify this here a bit. 5) I recommend to move Appendix C (Considerations for protocol extensions) in the body of the document. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Mirja Kühlewind | Ballot comment and discuss text updated for Mirja Kühlewind |
2019-08-07
|
12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot discuss] I have a couple of points that needs addressing before this document can move forward. Most of them should the straight forward to … [Ballot discuss] I have a couple of points that needs addressing before this document can move forward. Most of them should the straight forward to address. My main point is about network load. Thanks for discussing network load and correctly adding some warnings at the right places, however, for a PS track document I would like to see more than this. Usually it's good provide default values were suitable (as this often is what people will then pick if there is no good reason to diverge) and more important I really like to see min/max values. Note that RFC8085 recommend a minimal interval of 3 seconds which probably is also a good hard boundary here. More concretely I think there are these cases that need more guidance: - Section 3.7.2. (Triggered Updates) advises to send a message multiple times for redundancy in case of loss. 5 and 2 are mentioned as example values. Please provide a normative default value and a normative maximum value here. Moreover the spec should also require to pace out these messages and avoid "tail loss" by overloading the local queue. (See also section 3.8.2.1) - Section 3.8.1.1. (Route Requests) says: "Full route dumps MAY be rate-limited, especially if they are sent over multicast." I think this should at least be a SHOULD. Please also provide further guidance about to appropriately rate limit and think about other cases where a recommend to implement rate-limiting could make sense. - In section 4.1.1 the update interval needs a lower limit (e.g. 3 seconds) and a recommend default value would be could as well (Note that there are other part in section 3 where the update value is discussed as well). - Section 3.8.2.4. mentions network load when requests are sent to all neighbours after reboot. Please provide more guidance about how to pace out these requests. - Section 3.8.1.2. (Seqno Requests) discusses hop count values but could maybe also give more concrete guidance. I would assume that the hop count value of the current active route is usually know. Maybe that knowledge could be used to pick an appropriate value? Two other smaller discuss points/questions/comments: 1) Sec 4.6.8. (Next Hop): If I interpret this correctly, address compression is allowed for the next hop field and therefore this TLV would actually not be self-terminating. What do I miss? 2) This document needs to specify a registration policy also for each of the already existing registries given this document obsoletes RFC7557. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Mirja Kühlewind | Ballot discuss text updated for Mirja Kühlewind |
2019-08-07
|
12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot discuss] I have a couple of points that needs addressing before this document can move forward. Most of them should the straight forward to … [Ballot discuss] I have a couple of points that needs addressing before this document can move forward. Most of them should the straight forward to address. My main point is about network load. Thanks for discussing network load and correctly adding some warnings at the right places, however, for a PS track document I would like to see more than this. Usually it's good provide default values were suitable (as this often is what people will then pick if there is no good reason to diverge) and more important I really like to see min/max values. Note that RFC8085 recommend a minimal interval of 3 seconds which probably is also a good hard boundary here. More concretely I think there are these cases that need more guidance: - Section 3.7.2. (Triggered Updates) advises to send a message multiple times for redundancy in case of loss. 5 and 2 are mentioned as example values. Please provide a normative default value and a normative maximum value here. Moreover the spec should also require to pace out these messages and avoid "tail loss" by overloading the local queue. (See also section 3.8.2.1) -Section 3.8.1.1. (Route Requests) says: "Full route dumps MAY be rate-limited, especially if they are sent over multicast." I think this should at least be a SHOULD. Please also provide further guidance about to appropriately rate limit and think about other cases where a recommend to implement rate-limiting could make sense. - In section 4.1.1 the update interval needs a lower limit (e.g. 3 seconds) and a recommend default value would be could as well (Note that there are other part in section 3 where the update value is discussed as well). - Section 3.8.2.4. mentions network load when requests are sent to all neighbours after reboot. Please provide more guidance about how to pace out these requests. - Section 3.8.1.2. (Seqno Requests) discusses hop count values but could maybe also give more concrete guidance. I would assume that the hop count value of the current active route is usually know. Maybe that knowledge could be used to pick an appropriate value? Two other smaller discuss points/questions/comments: 1) Sec 4.6.8. (Next Hop): If I interpret this correctly, address compression is allowed for the next hop field and therefore this TLV would actually not be self-terminating. What do I miss? 2) This document needs to specify a registration policy also for each of the already existing registries given this document obsoletes RFC7557. |
2019-08-07
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12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot comment] Other comments: 1) While this point might not raise discuss-level, it would probably also be good to provide more concrete advise on how … [Ballot comment] Other comments: 1) While this point might not raise discuss-level, it would probably also be good to provide more concrete advise on how to implement jitter: Sec 3.1.: “ A moderate amount of jitter may be applied to packets sent by a Babel speaker: outgoing TLVs are buffered and SHOULD be sent with a small random delay.” Sec 4: “a Babel node SHOULD buffer every TLV and delay sending a packet by a small, randomly chosen delay [JITTER].” 2) Sec 4.1.2. (Router-Id) should probably state again that the router-id is assumed to be unique within a domain. 3) Sec 4: “The most-significant bit of the sub-TLV, called the mandatory bit, indicates how to handle unknown sub-TLVs.” I would recommend to also indicate this bit in the image. 4) Sec 4.4: “If a TLV has a self-terminating format, then it MAY allow a sequence of sub-TLVs to follow the body.” Initially I wasn’t quite sure what you wanted to say here. I guess you say that the length would indicate a larger value that needed for the body and therefore a subTLV might be present? I recommend to clarify this here a bit. |
2019-08-07
|
12 | Mirja Kühlewind | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded for Mirja Kühlewind |
2019-08-06
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12 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to Version Changed - Review Needed from IANA OK - Actions Needed |
2019-08-06
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12 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-12.txt |
2019-08-06
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12 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-08-06
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12 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-08-06
|
12 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-08-05
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11 | Deborah Brungard | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Deborah Brungard |
2019-08-05
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11 | Éric Vyncke | [Ballot comment] Dear authors, Thank you for the work put into this document and its companion documents. The text is usually clear and explanations are … [Ballot comment] Dear authors, Thank you for the work put into this document and its companion documents. The text is usually clear and explanations are concise and easy to understand. I have nevertheless some COMMENTs and a few NITs. Regards, -éric == COMMENTS == -- Section 1.1 -- In the properties bullet points, "its diameter" is it about the loop diameter or the network diameter? I suspect the latter but this is ambiguous IMHO. -- Section 3 -- It is unclear by reading "The protocol encoding is slightly more compact when router-ids are assigned in the same manner as the IPv6 layer assigns host IDs." whether EUI-64 is referred here. I also fail to see in section 4.6.7 (router-id TLV) what is the encoding benefit? -- Section 3.1 -- Should there be a mention of maximum UDP datagram size? and some words on layer-3 fragmentation ? I understand that section 4 has a section on this, so, perhaps refer already to that section for completeness ? -- Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 -- Does a dual-stack host have to send 2 hello? One on each protocol stack (v6 or v4) ? Unclear from the explanation. -- Section 3.4.2 -- It is unclear to me whether a link to a neighbor (router-id) can have different cost based on the v6 or v4. -- Section 4 -- Is there a reason why the well-known ports and multicast group addresses are not spelled out in this section ? They only appear in the IANA considerations section. Also, should the hello be sent over v6 _AND_ v4 ? -- Section 4.2 -- No a real comment, just an appreciation of your humor: "The arbitrary but carefully chosen value 42" ;-) you made my Monday morning ! -- Section 4.4 -- Is there any reason why the 'mandatory bit' does not appear in the packet structure? -- Section 4.6.2 -- Is there any reason why the "MBZ" is not expanded ? Must Be Zero ? -- Section 4.6.3 -- I wonder how the receiver could estimate the propagation time (in each direction BTW) + queuing time + whatever delay... -- Section 4.6.7 -- Should the router-id field length be repeated here as well ? == NITS == -- Section 1.1 -- Rather than using 'naive' to describe RIP, let's rather use 'trivial' or 'simple' ;-) s/the routers involved participate/the involved routers participate/ ? -- Section 3.2.6 -- Suggest to use '0xffff' rather than 'FFFF' and be consistent in the use of lowercase / uppercase for hexadecimal numbers. -- Section 4.5 -- Parsing "since for correct parsing it must be identical across implementations" is not easy... a comma would be welcome. -- Section 4.6.3 -- s/receiver send/receiver sends/ |
2019-08-05
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11 | Éric Vyncke | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded for Éric Vyncke |
2019-08-01
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11 | Yingzhen Qu | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Yingzhen Qu. Sent review to list. |
2019-07-13
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11 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Yingzhen Qu |
2019-07-13
|
11 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Yingzhen Qu |
2019-07-13
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11 | Min Ye | Assignment of request for Telechat review by RTGDIR to Loa Andersson was withdrawn |
2019-07-13
|
11 | Luc André Burdet | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Loa Andersson |
2019-07-13
|
11 | Luc André Burdet | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Loa Andersson |
2019-07-12
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11 | Martin Vigoureux | Requested Telechat review by RTGDIR |
2019-07-12
|
11 | Martin Vigoureux | IESG state changed to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup |
2019-07-12
|
11 | Cindy Morgan | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2019-08-08 |
2019-07-12
|
11 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot has been issued |
2019-07-12
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11 | Martin Vigoureux | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Martin Vigoureux |
2019-07-12
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11 | Martin Vigoureux | Created "Approve" ballot |
2019-07-12
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11 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot writeup was changed |
2019-07-07
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11 | Min Ye | Closed request for Telechat review by RTGDIR with state 'Withdrawn' |
2019-07-07
|
11 | Luc André Burdet | Assignment of request for Telechat review by RTGDIR to Nicolai Leymann was withdrawn |
2019-07-07
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11 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Nicolai Leymann |
2019-07-07
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11 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Nicolai Leymann |
2019-07-07
|
11 | Min Ye | Assignment of request for Telechat review by RTGDIR to Yingzhen Qu was marked no-response |
2019-07-04
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11 | (System) | IESG state changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call |
2019-07-03
|
11 | (System) | IANA Review state changed to IANA OK - Actions Needed from IANA - Review Needed |
2019-07-03
|
11 | Sabrina Tanamal | (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-10. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let … (Via drafts-lastcall@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs: The IANA Functions Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-10. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know. The IANA Functions Operator understands that, upon approval of this document, there are seven actions which we must complete. IANA also understands that it is to replace all references to RFCs 6126 and 7557 in all of the registries mentioned below by references to [ RFC-to-be ]. First, in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/ there is an existing registration for port 6696 for both TCP and UDP. The existing reference is RFC6126. It will be changed to [ RFC-to-be ]. Second, in the Local Network Control Block (224.0.0.0 - 224.0.0.255 (224.0.0/24)) on the IPv4 Multicast Address Space Registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/multicast-addresses/ the address 224.0.0.111 is registered for Babel. The existing reference is RFC6126. It will be changed to [ RFC-to-be ]. Third, in the Link-Local Scope Multicast Addresses on the IPv6 Multicast Address Space Registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-multicast-addresses/ the address FF02:0:0:0:0:0:1:6 is registered for Babel. The existing reference is RFC6126. It will be changed to [ RFC-to-be ]. Fourth, IANA understands that, in the registry called Babel TLV Types, on the Babel Routing Protocol registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/babel/ no changes are to be made to any of the values currently registered there. Fifth, in the Babel sub-TLV Types registry also on the Babel Routing Protocol registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/babel/ the registry is to be changed as follows: - all existing references to RFC 7557 are changed to [ RFC-to-be ] - values 4-111 are to be marked "Unassigned" - values 112 - 126 are to be marked "Reserved for Experimental Use" - value 127 is to be marked "Reserved for expansion of the type space" - values 129-239 are to be marked "Unassigned" - values 240-254 are to be marked "Reserved for Experimental Use" - value 255 is to be marked "Reserved for expansion of the type space" Sixth, the existing registry called the Babel Flags Values also on the Babel Routing Protocol registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/babel/ will have its name changed to Babel Update Flags Values. Seventh, a new registry is to be created called the Babel Hello Flags Values registry. The new registry will be located on the Babel Routing Protocol registry page located at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/babel/ The new registry will be managed via Specification Required as defined in RFC 8126. There are initial registrations in the new registry as follows: Bit Name Reference --------+------------------------+----------------- 0 Unicase [ RFC-to-be ] 1-15 Unassigned The IANA Functions Operator understands that these are the only actions required to be completed upon approval of this document. Note: The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is meant only to confirm the list of actions that will be performed. Thank you, Sabrina Tanamal Senior IANA Services Specialist |
2019-06-29
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11 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-11.txt |
2019-06-29
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11 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-06-29
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11 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-06-29
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11 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-06-28
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10 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Charlie Kaufman. |
2019-06-23
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10 | Luc André Burdet | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Yingzhen Qu |
2019-06-23
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10 | Luc André Burdet | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Yingzhen Qu |
2019-06-23
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10 | Luc André Burdet | Assignment of request for Telechat review by RTGDIR to Julien Meuric was rejected |
2019-06-22
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10 | Russ Housley | Request for Last Call review by GENART Completed: Ready with Nits. Reviewer: Russ Housley. Sent review to list. |
2019-06-22
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10 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Charlie Kaufman |
2019-06-22
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10 | Tero Kivinen | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Charlie Kaufman |
2019-06-20
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10 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Julien Meuric |
2019-06-20
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10 | Min Ye | Request for Telechat review by RTGDIR is assigned to Julien Meuric |
2019-06-20
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10 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Russ Housley |
2019-06-20
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10 | Jean Mahoney | Request for Last Call review by GENART is assigned to Russ Housley |
2019-06-20
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10 | Cindy Morgan | IANA Review state changed to IANA - Review Needed |
2019-06-20
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10 | Cindy Morgan | The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2019-07-04): From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis@ietf.org, babel-chairs@ietf.org, babel@ietf.org, Donald Eastlake , … The following Last Call announcement was sent out (ends 2019-07-04): From: The IESG To: IETF-Announce CC: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis@ietf.org, babel-chairs@ietf.org, babel@ietf.org, Donald Eastlake , d3e3e3@gmail.com, martin.vigoureux@nokia.com Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org Sender: Subject: Last Call: (The Babel Routing Protocol) to Proposed Standard The IESG has received a request from the Babel routing protocol WG (babel) to consider the following document: - 'The Babel Routing Protocol' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-07-04. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract Babel is a loop-avoiding distance-vector routing protocol that is robust and efficient both in ordinary wired networks and in wireless mesh networks. This document describes the Babel routing protocol, and obsoletes RFCs 6126 and 7557. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis/ IESG discussion can be tracked via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis/ballot/ No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. |
2019-06-20
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10 | Cindy Morgan | IESG state changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | Requested Telechat review by RTGDIR |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | Last call was requested |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot approval text was generated |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | Ballot writeup was generated |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | IESG state changed to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::AD Followup |
2019-06-20
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10 | Martin Vigoureux | Last call announcement was generated |
2019-06-07
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10 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed |
2019-06-07
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10 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-10.txt |
2019-06-07
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10 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-06-07
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10 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-06-07
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10 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-05-24
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09 | Martin Vigoureux | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed from AD Evaluation |
2019-05-07
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09 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-09.txt |
2019-05-07
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09 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-05-07
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09 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-05-07
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09 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2019-04-12
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08 | Martin Vigoureux | IESG state changed to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested |
2019-03-27
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08 | Donald Eastlake | PROTO for draft-ietf-rfc6126bis-07.txt Final review and initial PROTO entries done by Russ White. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet … PROTO for draft-ietf-rfc6126bis-07.txt Final review and initial PROTO entries done by Russ White. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? Proposed Standard. This is the base protocol document for the mandatory to implement Homenet routing protocol. Title page header says "Standards Track". It obsoletes the experimental standard specified in RFCs 6126 and 7557. (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary: Babel is a loop-avoiding distance-vector routing protocol that is designed to be robust and efficient both in networks using prefix- based routing and in networks using flat routing ("mesh networks"), and both in relatively stable wired networks and in highly dynamic wireless networks. This document describes the Babel routing protocol, and obsoletes RFCs 6126 and 7557 Working Group Summary: Nothing of note -- all WG discussions over the changes between 6126 and 6126bis were resolved. Document Quality: The document is of good quality. There are multiple implementations. Also, there are RFC 6126 implementations not yet updated but experience has shown these are easily updated to rfc6126bis. http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/babeld.html https://github.com/fingon/pybabel https://bird.network.cz And a "reference" implementation, as well. No "vendors" are currently planning to implement BABEL at this time (that I know of), but there are enough open source implementations to show the protocol is both implementable and deployable in the kinds of environments for which it is intended. Personnel: Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director? Donald Eastlake is shepherd Martin Vigoureux is the responsible area director (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. Reviewed for correctness and with authors. Checked for grammar, completeness of sections, etc. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? No. (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. The document has been reviewed by security and routing specialists; no other reviews appear to be necessary. See https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/AzjslHG1bVLksmXMs62gLDqeN_M https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/sz2u4ZZZZu1FBAYRyV8CB-VjU8g https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/mQAu74mdYzrdqKHVdmLOqztzE1Y (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. None. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why? Yes. See https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/vXQjuxjwrZCvyqt5FRwscFDJM1I https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/Y-Gb0pEZmyz9ZTXUp-fpligyHNQ (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. No IPR has been filed. (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? Consensus is good, with solid last call participation from normally active working group members. (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No. (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. id-nits and manual nit checks were performed; there are two outdated references, but otherwise the nit checks appear to be good. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. No formal reviews should be required beyond what has already been completed. (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? Yes. (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? No. (15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. No. (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. This document will obsolete RFC 6126 and 7557 as noted on the title page. (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). The IANA considerations section is clear and complete; there are some actions to be taken in consideration of this draft, but they are reasonable and clear. (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. None. (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. id-nits was run across the document; no other automated tools seem to apply. |
2019-03-27
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08 | Donald Eastlake | Responsible AD changed to Martin Vigoureux |
2019-03-27
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08 | Donald Eastlake | IETF WG state changed to Submitted to IESG for Publication from WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up |
2019-03-27
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08 | Donald Eastlake | IESG state changed to Publication Requested from I-D Exists |
2019-03-27
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08 | Donald Eastlake | IESG process started in state Publication Requested |
2019-03-27
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08 | David Schinazi | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-08.txt |
2019-03-27
|
08 | (System) | New version approved |
2019-03-27
|
08 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2019-03-27
|
08 | David Schinazi | Uploaded new revision |
2019-03-26
|
07 | Donald Eastlake | PROTO for draft-ietf-rfc6126bis-07.txt Final review and initial PROTO entries done by Russ White. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet … PROTO for draft-ietf-rfc6126bis-07.txt Final review and initial PROTO entries done by Russ White. (1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard, Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)? Why is this the proper type of RFC? Is this type of RFC indicated in the title page header? Proposed Standard. This is the base protocol document for the mandatory to implement Homenet routing protocol. Title page header says "Standards Track". It obsoletes the experimental standard specified in RFCs 6126 and 7557. (2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections: Technical Summary: Babel is a loop-avoiding distance-vector routing protocol that is designed to be robust and efficient both in networks using prefix- based routing and in networks using flat routing ("mesh networks"), and both in relatively stable wired networks and in highly dynamic wireless networks. This document describes the Babel routing protocol, and obsoletes RFCs 6126 and 7557 Working Group Summary: Nothing of note -- all WG discussions over the changes between 6126 and 6126bis were resolved. Document Quality: The document is of good quality. There are multiple implementations. Also, there are RFC 6126 implementations not yet updated but experience has shown these are easily updated to rfc6126bis. http://docs.frrouting.org/en/latest/babeld.html https://github.com/fingon/pybabel https://bird.network.cz And a "reference" implementation, as well. No "vendors" are currently planning to implement BABEL at this time (that I know of), but there are enough open source implementations to show the protocol is both implementable and deployable in the kinds of environments for which it is intended. Personnel: Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area Director? Donald Eastlake is shepherd Martin Vigoureux is the responsible area director (3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by the Document Shepherd. If this version of the document is not ready for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to the IESG. Reviewed for correctness and with authors. Checked for grammar, completeness of sections, etc. (4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? No. (5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS, DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that took place. The document has been reviewed by security and routing specialists; no other reviews appear to be necessary. See https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/AzjslHG1bVLksmXMs62gLDqeN_M https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/sz2u4ZZZZu1FBAYRyV8CB-VjU8g https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/mQAu74mdYzrdqKHVdmLOqztzE1Y (6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. None. (7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why? Yes. See https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/vXQjuxjwrZCvyqt5FRwscFDJM1I https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/babel/Y-Gb0pEZmyz9ZTXUp-fpligyHNQ (8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document? If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR disclosures. No IPR has been filed. (9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? Consensus is good, with solid last call participation from normally active working group members. (10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.) No. (11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this document. (See http://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. id-nits and manual nit checks were performed; there are two outdated references, but otherwise the nit checks appear to be good. (12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews. No formal reviews should be required beyond what has already been completed. (13) Have all references within this document been identified as either normative or informative? Yes. (14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the plan for their completion? No. (15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure. No. (16) Will publication of this document change the status of any existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the part of the document where the relationship of this document to the other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document, explain why the WG considers it unnecessary. This document will obsolete RFC 6126 and 7557 as noted on the title page. (17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries. Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226). The IANA considerations section is clear and complete; there are some actions to be taken in consideration of this draft, but they are reasonable and clear. (18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries. None. (19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc. id-nits was run across the document; no other automated tools seem to apply. |
2019-03-23
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07 | Donald Eastlake | IETF WG state changed to WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up from In WG Last Call |
2018-11-14
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07 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-07.txt |
2018-11-14
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07 | (System) | New version approved |
2018-11-14
|
07 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: babel-chairs@ietf.org, Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2018-11-14
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07 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2018-10-24
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06 | Donald Eastlake | Added to session: IETF-103: babel Wed-1540 |
2018-10-23
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06 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-06.txt |
2018-10-23
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06 | (System) | New version approved |
2018-10-23
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06 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2018-10-23
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06 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2018-07-17
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05 | Donald Eastlake | Added to session: IETF-102: babel Tue-0930 |
2018-05-29
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05 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-05.txt |
2018-05-29
|
05 | (System) | New version approved |
2018-05-29
|
05 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek , David Schinazi |
2018-05-29
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05 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2018-05-15
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR Completed: Has Issues. Reviewer: Nicolai Leymann. |
2018-05-02
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04 | (System) | Document has expired |
2018-04-20
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04 | Mehmet Ersue | Request for Early review by OPSDIR Completed: Has Nits. Reviewer: Mehmet Ersue. Sent review to list. |
2018-04-05
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Nicolai Leymann |
2018-04-05
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Nicolai Leymann |
2018-04-04
|
04 | Christian Hopps | Assignment of request for Early review by RTGDIR to Christian Hopps was rejected |
2018-03-26
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04 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Early review by OPSDIR is assigned to Mehmet Ersue |
2018-03-26
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04 | Gunter Van de Velde | Request for Early review by OPSDIR is assigned to Mehmet Ersue |
2018-03-22
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Christian Hopps |
2018-03-22
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Christian Hopps |
2018-03-21
|
04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Susan Hares |
2018-03-21
|
04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Susan Hares |
2018-03-21
|
04 | Alia Atlas | Requested Early review by RTGDIR |
2018-03-21
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04 | Alia Atlas | Requested Early review by OPSDIR |
2018-01-03
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR Completed: Not Ready. Reviewer: Susan Hares. |
2017-11-02
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Susan Hares |
2017-11-02
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04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Susan Hares |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Donald Eastlake | See https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/babel/current/msg00908.html |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Donald Eastlake | IETF WG state changed to In WG Last Call from WG Document |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Eric Gray |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Min Ye | Request for Early review by RTGDIR is assigned to Eric Gray |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Donald Eastlake | Added to session: IETF-100: babel Fri-0930 |
2017-10-29
|
04 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-04.txt |
2017-10-29
|
04 | (System) | New version approved |
2017-10-29
|
04 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: babel-chairs@ietf.org, Juliusz Chroboczek |
2017-10-29
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04 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2017-10-28
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03 | Donald Eastlake | Requested Early review by RTGDIR |
2017-10-28
|
03 | Donald Eastlake | Notification list changed to Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> |
2017-10-28
|
03 | Donald Eastlake | Document shepherd changed to Donald E. Eastlake 3rd |
2017-07-03
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03 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-03.txt |
2017-07-03
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03 | (System) | New version approved |
2017-07-03
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03 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek |
2017-07-03
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03 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2017-06-18
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02 | Donald Eastlake | Added to session: IETF-99: babel Mon-1740 |
2017-05-24
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02 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-02.txt |
2017-05-24
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02 | (System) | New version approved |
2017-05-24
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02 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: Juliusz Chroboczek |
2017-05-24
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02 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2017-03-26
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01 | Donald Eastlake | Added to session: IETF-98: babel Tue-1300 |
2017-01-31
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01 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-01.txt |
2017-01-31
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01 | (System) | New version approved |
2017-01-31
|
01 | (System) | Request for posting confirmation emailed to previous authors: babel-chairs@ietf.org, "Juliusz Chroboczek" |
2017-01-31
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01 | Juliusz Chroboczek | Uploaded new revision |
2016-08-08
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00 | Donald Eastlake | This document now replaces draft-chroboczek-babel-rfc6126bis instead of None |
2016-08-08
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00 | Donald Eastlake | Changed consensus to Yes from Unknown |
2016-08-08
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00 | Donald Eastlake | Intended Status changed to Proposed Standard from None |
2016-08-01
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00 | Juliusz Chroboczek | New version available: draft-ietf-babel-rfc6126bis-00.txt |