Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values
draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (6man WG)
Last updated 2013-09-23 (latest revision 2013-03-22)
Replaces draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Reviews
Additional URLs
- Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-00.txt

Abstract

IPv6 specifies the Fragment Header, which is employed for the fragmentation and reassembly mechanisms. The Fragment Header contains an "Identification" field which, together with the IPv6 Source Address and the IPv6 Destination Address of the packet, identifies fragments that correspond to the same original datagram, such that they can be reassembled together at the receiving host. The only requirement for setting the "Identification" value is that it must be different than that of any other fragmented packet sent recently with the same Source Address and Destination Address. Some implementations simply use a global counter for setting the Fragment Identification field, thus leading to predictable values. This document analyzes the security implications of predictable Identification values, and updates RFC 2460 specifying additional requirements for setting the Fragment Identification, such that the aforementioned security implications are mitigated.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fgont@si6networks.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)