Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-20

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6lo WG)
Last updated 2020-03-25 (latest revision 2020-03-09)
Replaces draft-sarikaya-6lo-ap-nd
Stream IETF
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Send notices to Shwetha Bhandari <shwethab@cisco.com>, Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
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RFC Editor RFC Editor state EDIT
6lo                                                      P. Thubert, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Updates: 8505 (if approved)                                  B. Sarikaya
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 10 September 2020                                      M. Sethi
                                                                Ericsson
                                                               R. Struik
                                             Struik Security Consultancy
                                                            9 March 2020

 Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks
                        draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-20

Abstract

   This document updates the 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol
   defined in RFC 6775 and RFC 8505.  The new extension is called
   Address Protected Neighbor Discovery (AP-ND) and it protects the
   owner of an address against address theft and impersonation attacks
   in a low-power and lossy network (LLN).  Nodes supporting this
   extension compute a cryptographic identifier (Crypto-ID) and use it
   with one or more of their Registered Addresses.  The Crypto-ID
   identifies the owner of the Registered Address and can be used to
   provide proof of ownership of the Registered Addresses.  Once an
   address is registered with the Crypto-ID and a proof-of-ownership is
   provided, only the owner of that address can modify the registration
   information, thereby enforcing Source Address Validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2020.

Thubert, et al.         Expires 10 September 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Address Protection ND for LLN           March 2020

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
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   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  BCP 14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Additional References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Updating RFC 8505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  New Fields and Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  New Crypto-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Updated EARO  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Crypto-ID Parameters Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  NDP Signature Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Protocol Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Protocol Flows  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  First Exchange with a 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  NDPSO generation and verification . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Multihop Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Inheriting from RFC 3971  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Related to 6LoWPAN ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  ROVR Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.4.  Implementation Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.5.  Cross-Algorithm and Cross-Protocol Attacks  . . . . . . .  20
     7.6.  Compromised 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.7.  Correlating Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   8.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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