Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-23
6lo P. Thubert, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cisco
Updates: 8505 (if approved) B. Sarikaya
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 1 November 2020 M. Sethi
Ericsson
R. Struik
Struik Security Consultancy
30 April 2020
Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd-23
Abstract
This document updates the 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol
defined in RFC 6775 and RFC 8505. The new extension is called
Address Protected Neighbor Discovery (AP-ND) and it protects the
owner of an address against address theft and impersonation attacks
in a low-power and lossy network (LLN). Nodes supporting this
extension compute a cryptographic identifier (Crypto-ID) and use it
with one or more of their Registered Addresses. The Crypto-ID
identifies the owner of the Registered Address and can be used to
provide proof of ownership of the Registered Addresses. Once an
address is registered with the Crypto-ID and a proof-of-ownership is
provided, only the owner of that address can modify the registration
information, thereby enforcing Source Address Validation.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 November 2020.
Thubert, et al. Expires 1 November 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Address Protection ND for LLN April 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. BCP 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Additional References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Updating RFC 8505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. New Fields and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. New Crypto-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Updated EARO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Crypto-ID Parameters Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. NDP Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Extensions to the Capability Indication Option . . . . . 11
5. Protocol Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Protocol Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. First Exchange with a 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. NDPSO generation and verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. Multihop Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Brown Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Inheriting from RFC 3971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Related to 6LoWPAN ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.4. Compromised 6LR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.5. ROVR Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.6. Implementation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7. Cross-Algorithm and Cross-Protocol Attacks . . . . . . . 21
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