TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records
draft-huque-dane-client-cert-05

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Shumon Huque  , Viktor Dukhovni  , Ash Wilson 
Last updated 2020-10-30
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                Salesforce
Updates: 6698, 7671 (if approved)                            V. Dukhovni
Intended status: Standards Track                               Two Sigma
Expires: 3 May 2021                                            A. Wilson
                                                                Valimail
                                                         30 October 2020

            TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records
                    draft-huque-dane-client-cert-05

Abstract

   The DANE TLSA protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671] describes how to publish
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates or public keys in
   the DNS.  This document updates RFC 6698 and RFC 7671.  It describes
   how to additionally use the TLSA record to publish client
   certificates or public keys, and also the rules and considerations
   for using them with TLS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components

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   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Associating Client Identities in TLSA Records . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Format 1: Service specific client identity  . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Format 2: DevId: IOT Device Identity  . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Authentication Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Client Identifiers in X.509 certificates  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Signaling the Client's DANE Identity in TLS . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Example TLSA records for clients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Format 1: Service Specific Client Identity  . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Format 2: DevID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Changes to Client and Server behavior . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [RFC5246] [RFC8446]
   optionally supports the authentication of clients using X.509
   certificates [RFC5280] or raw public keys [RFC7250].  TLS
   applications that perform DANE authentication of servers using TLSA
   records may also desire to authenticate clients using the same
   mechanism, especially if the client identity is in the form of or can
   be represented by a DNS domain name.  Some design patterns from the
   Internet of Things (IoT) plan to make use of this form of
   authentication, where large networks of physical objects identified
   by DNS names may authenticate themselves using TLS to centralized
   device management and control platforms.

   In this document, the term TLS is used generically to describe both
   the TLS and DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) [RFC6347]
   protocols.

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