X.509v3 Extension: OCSP Stapling Required
draft-hallambaker-tlssecuritypolicy-03

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Phillip Hallam-Baker 
Last updated 2013-05-18 (latest revision 2012-11-14)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hallambaker-tlssecuritypolicy-03.txt

Abstract

The purpose of the TLS Security Policy extension is to prevent downgrade attacks that are not otherwise prevented by the TLS protocol. In particular, the TLS Security Policy extension may be used to mandate support for revocation checking features in the TLS protocol such as OCSP stapling. Informing clients that an OCSP status response will always be stapled permits an immediate failure in the case that the response is not stapled. This in turn prevents a denial of service attack that might otherwise be possible.

Authors

Phillip Hallam-Baker (philliph@comodo.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)