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Mathematical Mesh Part VII: Security Considerations
draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-01

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draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-01
Network Working Group                                    P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                              July 8, 2019
Intended status: Informational
Expires: January 9, 2020

          Mathematical Mesh Part VII: Security Considerations
                   draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-01

Abstract

   The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
   infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
   credential data between multiple user devices.  The core protocols of
   the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
   reference data.

   This document is also available online at
   http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html
   [1] .

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Related Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Shared Classes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.1.  Classes describing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.2.  Structure: PublicKey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.3.  Structure: KeyComposite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.4.  Structure: KeyOverlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.5.  Structure: EscrowedKeySet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.5.6.  Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Assertion classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.6.1.  Structure: Assertion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.6.2.  Structure: Condition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.6.3.  Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.6.4.  Structure: Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.6.5.  Structure: ProfileMaster  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.6.6.  Structure: ProfileDevice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.6.7.  Structure: ProfileService . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.6.8.  Structure: ProfileAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.6.9.  Structure: ProfileGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.6.10. Structure: ProfileHost  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.6.11. Connection Classes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.6.12. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.6.13. Structure: Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.6.14. Structure: ConnectionDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.6.15. Structure: ConnectionAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.6.16. Structure: ConnectionService  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.17. Structure: ConnectionHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.18. Structure: ConnectionApplication  . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.19. Activation Classes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.20. Structure: Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.21. Structure: ActivationDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.22. Structure: ActivationAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.7.  Cataloged items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.7.1.  Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.7.2.  Structure: Contact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.7.3.  Structure: Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       2.7.4.  Structure: Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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       2.7.5.  Structure: Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.7.6.  Structure: Reference  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.7.7.  Structure: Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.8.  Catalog Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.8.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.8.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.8.3.  Structure: CatalogedCredential  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.8.4.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.8.5.  Structure: CatalogedContact . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.8.6.  Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption . . . . . . . .  17
       2.8.7.  Structure: CatalogedBookmark  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       2.8.8.  Structure: CatalogedTask  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       2.8.9.  Structure: CatalogedApplication . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       2.8.10. Structure: CatalogedApplicationAccount  . . . . . . .  18
       2.8.11. Structure: CatalogedMember  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.8.12. Structure: CatalogedGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.8.13. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH  . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork  . . . . . . .  19
     2.9.  Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.9.1.  Structure: Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.9.2.  Structure: MessageComplete  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.9.3.  Structure: MessagePIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.9.4.  Structure: RequestConnection  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.9.5.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection  . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.9.6.  Structure: RequestContact . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.9.7.  Structure: RequestConfirmation  . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.9.8.  Structure: ResponseConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.9.9.  Structure: RequestTask  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   3.  Mesh Portal Service Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.1.  Request Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.1.1.  Message: MeshRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.2.  Response Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.2.1.  Message: MeshResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.3.  Imported Objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.4.  Common Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.4.1.  Structure: KeyValue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.4.2.  Structure: SearchConstraints  . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.5.  Transaction: Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.6.  Transaction: ValidateAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.6.1.  Message: ValidateRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.6.2.  Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.7.  Transaction: CreateAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       3.7.1.  Message: CreateRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       3.7.2.  Message: CreateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     3.8.  Transaction: DeleteAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.8.1.  Message: DeleteRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.8.2.  Message: DeleteResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

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     3.9.  Transaction: Get  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       3.9.1.  Message: GetRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       3.9.2.  Message: GetResponse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     3.10. Transaction: Publish  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.10.1.  Message: PublishRequest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.10.2.  Message: PublishResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     3.11. Transaction: Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       3.11.1.  Message: StatusRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.11.2.  Message: StatusResponse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.12.1.  Message: ConnectStartRequest . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.12.2.  Message: ConnectStartResponse  . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       3.13.1.  Message: ConnectStatusRequest  . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       3.13.2.  Message: ConnectStatusResponse . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     3.14. Transaction: ConnectPending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.14.1.  Message: ConnectPendingRequest . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.14.2.  Message: ConnectPendingResponse  . . . . . . . . . .  31
     3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.15.1.  Message: ConnectCompleteRequest  . . . . . . . . . .  32
       3.15.2.  Message: ConnectCompleteResponse . . . . . . . . . .  32
     3.16. Transaction: Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       3.16.1.  Message: TransferRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       3.16.2.  Message: TransferResponse  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   4.  Assets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     4.1.  Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     4.2.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     4.3.  Reputation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       4.3.1.  Outbound Messaging Abuse () . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   5.  Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.1.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       5.1.1.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.2.  Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     5.3.  Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.3.1.  Data loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       5.3.2.  Partial data survivability  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.4.  Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   6.  Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     6.1.  End point Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     6.2.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   7.  Controls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     7.1.  Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.1.1.  Triple lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.1.2.  Key Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.1.3.  Key and Nonce Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       7.1.4.  Key Escrow and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       7.1.5.  Profile Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       7.1.6.  Identity Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36

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       7.1.7.  Trust Broker Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     7.2.  Mesh Messaging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.2.1.  Ingress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.2.2.  Egress Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.2.3.  Security Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.2.4.  Accountability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     8.1.  Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.1.  DNS Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.2.  TLS Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.3.  TLS Service Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.4.  Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.5.  Response Replay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     8.2.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.2.1.  Side Channel Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.2.2.  Session Key Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     11.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38

1.  Introduction

2.  Definitions

   This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
   terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
   terms used as requirements language.

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .

2.2.  Defined Terms

   The terms of art used in this document are described in the Mesh
   Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] .

2.3.  Related Specifications

   The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the Mesh
   Architecture Guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] . The Mesh

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   documentation set and related specifications are described in this
   document.

2.4.  Implementation Status

   The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
   the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] .

2.5.  Shared Classes

   The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
   specifications.

2.5.1.  Classes describing keys

2.5.2.  Structure: PublicKey

   The PublicKey class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
   assertions associated with a public key.

   UDF: String (Optional)  UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters/

   X509Certificate: Binary (Optional)  List of X.509 Certificates

   X509Chain: Binary [0..Many]  X.509 Certificate chain.

   X509CSR: Binary (Optional)  X.509 Certificate Signing Request.

2.5.3.  Structure: KeyComposite

   Service: String (Optional)  Service holding the additional
      contribution

2.5.4.  Structure: KeyOverlay

   UDF: String (Optional)  Fingerprint of the resulting composite key
      (to allow verification)

   BaseUDF: String (Optional)  Fingerprint specifying the base key

2.5.5.  Structure: EscrowedKeySet

   A set of escrowed keys.

   [No fields]

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2.5.6.  Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey

   UDF: String (Optional)  The fingerprint of the encryption key

   RecryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional)  The recryption key

   EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The decryption
      key encrypted under the user's device key.

2.6.  Assertion classes

   Classes that are derived from an assertion.

2.6.1.  Structure: Assertion

   Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived

   Names: String [0..Many]  Fingerprints of index terms for profile
      retrieval.  The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
      name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
      forms of abuse.

   Updated: DateTime (Optional)  The time instant the profile was last
      modified.

   NotaryToken: String (Optional)  A Uniform Notary Token providing
      evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
      created.

2.6.2.  Structure: Condition

   Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.

   [No fields]

2.6.3.  Profile Classes

   Profiles are self signed assertions.

2.6.4.  Structure: Profile

   Inherits: Assertion

   Parent class from which all profile classes are derived

   KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional)  The permanent signature key used
      to sign the profile itself.  The UDF of the key is used as the
      permanent object identifier of the profile.  Thus, by definition,

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      the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any
      circumstance.  The only case in which a

   OnlineSignatureKeys: PublicKey [0..Many]  A Personal profile contains
      at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration
      application profiles.

2.6.5.  Structure: ProfileMaster

   Inherits: Profile

   Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal
   profile.

   MasterEscrowKeys: PublicKey [0..Many]  A Personal Profile MAY contain
      one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for
      stored data.

   KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to pass encrypted data
      to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry

2.6.6.  Structure: ProfileDevice

   Inherits: Profile

   Describes a mesh device.

   Description: String (Optional)  Description of the device

   KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to pass encrypted data
      to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry

   KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      requests made by the device.

2.6.7.  Structure: ProfileService

   Inherits: Profile

   Profile of a Mesh Service

   AuthenticationKey: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      service connections.

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2.6.8.  Structure: ProfileAccount

   Inherits: Profile

   Account assertion.  This is signed by the service hosting the
   account.

   ServiceIDs: String [0..Many]  Service address(es).

   MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional)  Master profile of the account
      being registered.

   AccountEncryptionKey: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to encrypt data
      under this profile

2.6.9.  Structure: ProfileGroup

   Inherits: Profile

   Describes a group.  Note that while a group is created by one person
   who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
   other administrators over time.

   [No fields]

2.6.10.  Structure: ProfileHost

   Inherits: Profile

   Inherits: Profile

   KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      service connections.

2.6.11.  Connection Classes

2.6.12.  Structure: Connection

   Inherits: Assertion

   Inherits: Assertion

   SubjectUDF: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection target.

   AuthorityUDF: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection source.

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2.6.13.  Structure: Permission

   Name: String (Optional)

   Name: String (Optional)

   Role: String (Optional)

   Role: String (Optional)

   Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Keys or key contributions
      enabling the operation to be performed

2.6.14.  Structure: ConnectionDevice

   Inherits: Connection

   Inherits: Connection

   Permissions: Permission [0..Many]  List of the permissions that the
      device has been granted.

   KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional)  The signature key for use of the
      device under the profile

   KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional)  The encryption key for use of
      the device under the profile

   KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional)  The authentication key for
      use of the device under the profile

2.6.15.  Structure: ConnectionAccount

   Inherits: Connection

   Inherits: Connection

   Permissions: Permission [0..Many]  List of the permissions that the
      device has been granted.

   KeySignature: PublicKey (Optional)  The signature key for use of the
      device under the profile

   KeyEncryption: PublicKey (Optional)  The encryption key for use of
      the device under the profile

   KeyAuthentication: PublicKey (Optional)  The authentication key for
      use of the device under the profile

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2.6.16.  Structure: ConnectionService

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

2.6.17.  Structure: ConnectionHost

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

2.6.18.  Structure: ConnectionApplication

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

2.6.19.  Activation Classes

2.6.20.  Structure: Activation

   Inherits: Assertion

   Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
   running on a specific device

   [No fields]

2.6.21.  Structure: ActivationDevice

   Inherits: Assertion

   Inherits: Assertion

   EnvelopedAssertionDeviceConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The
      signed AssertionDeviceConnection.

   KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional)  The key overlay used to generate
      the account signature key from the device signature key

   KeyEncryption: KeyOverlay (Optional)  The key overlay used to
      generate the account encryption key from the device encryption key

   KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional)  The key overlay used to
      generate the account authentication key from the device
      authentication key

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2.6.22.  Structure: ActivationAccount

   Inherits: Activation

   Inherits: Activation

   AccountUDF: String (Optional)  The UDF of the account

   EnvelopedAssertionAccountConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The
      account connection assertion

   KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional)  The key contribution for the
      decryption key for the device.  NB this is NOT an overlay on the
      device signature key, it is an overlay on the corresponding
      recryption key.

   KeyAuthentication: KeyOverlay (Optional)  The key overlay used to
      generate the account authentication key from the device
      authentication key

   KeySignature: KeyOverlay (Optional)  The key overlay used to generate
      the account signature key from the device signature key

2.7.  Cataloged items

2.7.1.  Data Structures

   Classes describing data used in cataloged data.

2.7.2.  Structure: Contact

   Inherits: Assertion

   Inherits: Assertion

   Identifier: String (Optional)

   Identifier: String (Optional)

   FullName: String (Optional)

   FullName: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   First: String (Optional)

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   First: String (Optional)

   Middle: String (Optional)

   Middle: String (Optional)

   Last: String (Optional)

   Last: String (Optional)

   Suffix: String (Optional)

   Suffix: String (Optional)

   Labels: String [0..Many]

   Labels: String [0..Many]

   AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many]

   AssertionAccounts: ProfileAccount [0..Many]

   Addresses: Address [0..Many]

   Addresses: Address [0..Many]

   Locations: Location [0..Many]

   Locations: Location [0..Many]

   Roles: Role [0..Many]

2.7.3.  Structure: Role

   CompanyName: String (Optional)

   CompanyName: String (Optional)

   Addresses: Address [0..Many]

   Addresses: Address [0..Many]

   Locations: Location [0..Many]

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2.7.4.  Structure: Address

   URI: String (Optional)

   URI: String (Optional)

   Labels: String [0..Many]

2.7.5.  Structure: Location

   Appartment: String (Optional)

   Appartment: String (Optional)

   Street: String (Optional)

   Street: String (Optional)

   District: String (Optional)

   District: String (Optional)

   Locality: String (Optional)

   Locality: String (Optional)

   County: String (Optional)

   County: String (Optional)

   Postcode: String (Optional)

   Postcode: String (Optional)

   Country: String (Optional)

2.7.6.  Structure: Reference

   MessageID: String (Optional)  The received message to which this is a
      response

   ResponseID: String (Optional)  Message that was generated in response
      to the original (optional).

   Relationship: String (Optional)  The relationship type.  This can be
      Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.

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2.7.7.  Structure: Task

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Start: DateTime (Optional)

   Start: DateTime (Optional)

   Finish: DateTime (Optional)

   Finish: DateTime (Optional)

   StartTravel: String (Optional)

   StartTravel: String (Optional)

   FinishTravel: String (Optional)

   FinishTravel: String (Optional)

   TimeZone: String (Optional)

   TimeZone: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Description: String (Optional)

   Description: String (Optional)

   Location: String (Optional)

   Location: String (Optional)

   Trigger: String [0..Many]

   Trigger: String [0..Many]

   Conference: String [0..Many]

   Conference: String [0..Many]

   Repeat: String (Optional)

   Repeat: String (Optional)

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   Busy: Boolean (Optional)

2.8.  Catalog Entries

2.8.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry

   Base class for cataloged Mesh data.

   [No fields]

2.8.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Public device entry, indexed under the device ID

   AccountIDs: String [0..Many]  The accounts to which this device is
      bound.

   UDF: String (Optional)  UDF of the signature key of the device in the
      Mesh

   DeviceUDF: String (Optional)  UDF of the signature key of the device

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The device profile

   EnvelopedDeviceConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The public
      assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh

   EnvelopedDevicePrivate: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The device profile

2.8.3.  Structure: CatalogedCredential

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

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   Password: String (Optional)

2.8.4.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Password: String (Optional)

2.8.5.  Structure: CatalogedContact

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Self: Boolean (Optional)  If true, this catalog entry is for the user
      who created the catalog.  To be valid, such an entry MUST be
      signed by an administration key for the Mesh profile containing
      the account to which the catalog belongs.

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Permissions: Permission [0..Many]  List of the permissions that the
      contact has been granted.

   EnvelopedContact: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The (signed) contact data.

2.8.6.  Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption

   Inherits: CatalogedContact

   [No fields]

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2.8.7.  Structure: CatalogedBookmark

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Path: String (Optional)

2.8.8.  Structure: CatalogedTask

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional)

   EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional)

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

2.8.9.  Structure: CatalogedApplication

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Key: String (Optional)

2.8.10.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationAccount

   Wrapper for a signed AccountAssertion

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   EnvelopedAccountAssertion: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The account
      assertion

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2.8.11.  Structure: CatalogedMember

   UDF: String (Optional)

   UDF: String (Optional)

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

2.8.12.  Structure: CatalogedGroup

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

2.8.13.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

2.8.14.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

2.8.15.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

2.9.  Messages

2.9.1.  Structure: Message

   MessageID: String (Optional)

   MessageID: String (Optional)

   Sender: String (Optional)

   Sender: String (Optional)

   Recipient: String (Optional)

   Recipient: String (Optional)

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   References: Reference [0..Many]

2.9.2.  Structure: MessageComplete

   Inherits: Message

   [No fields]

2.9.3.  Structure: MessagePIN

   Account: String (Optional)

   Account: String (Optional)

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

   PIN: String (Optional)

2.9.4.  Structure: RequestConnection

   Connection request message.  This message contains the information

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   ServiceID: String (Optional)

   ServiceID: String (Optional)

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Device profile of
      the device making the request.

   ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)

   ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)

   PinUDF: String (Optional)  Fingerprint of the PIN value used to
      authenticate the request.

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2.9.5.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection

   Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
   valid MessageConnectionRequestClient

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   EnvelopedMessageConnectionRequest: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The
      client connection request.

   ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)

   ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)

   Witness: String (Optional)

2.9.6.  Structure: RequestContact

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   Reply: Boolean (Optional)

   Reply: Boolean (Optional)

   Self: DareEnvelope (Optional)  The contact data.

2.9.7.  Structure: RequestConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   Text: String (Optional)

2.9.8.  Structure: ResponseConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Inherits: Message

   ResponseID: String (Optional)

   ResponseID: String (Optional)

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   Accept: Boolean (Optional)

2.9.9.  Structure: RequestTask

   Inherits: Message

   [No fields]

3.  Mesh Portal Service Reference

   HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm

   Every Mesh Portal Service transaction consists of exactly one request
   followed by exactly one response.  Mesh Service transactions MAY
   cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh
   itself but do not cause changes to the connection state.  The
   protocol itself is thus idempotent.  There is no set sequence in
   which operations are required to be performed.  It is not necessary
   to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or
   any other transaction.

3.1.  Request Messages

   A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that
   inherits from the MeshRequest class.  When using the HTTP binding,
   the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host
   field.

3.1.1.  Message: MeshRequest

   Base class for all request messages.

   Portal: String (Optional)  Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which
      the request is directed.

3.2.  Response Messages

   A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that
   inherits from the MeshResponse class.  When using the HTTP binding,
   the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP
   response message.  However the response code returned in the payload
   object MUST always be considered authoritative.

3.2.1.  Message: MeshResponse

   Base class for all response messages.  Contains only the status code
   and status description fields.

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   [No fields]

3.3.  Imported Objects

   The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the
   JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications.

3.4.  Common Structures

   The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:

3.4.1.  Structure: KeyValue

   Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records
   matching one or more selection criteria.

   Key: String (Optional)  The data retrieval key.

   Value: String (Optional)  The data value to match.

3.4.2.  Structure: SearchConstraints

   Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result.  These allow
   a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of
   data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.

   NotBefore: DateTime (Optional)  Only data published on or after the
      specified time instant is requested.

   Before: DateTime (Optional)  Only data published before the specified
      time instant is requested.  This excludes data published at the
      specified time instant.

   MaxEntries: Integer (Optional)  Maximum number of data entries to
      return.

   MaxBytes: Integer (Optional)  Maximum number of data bytes to return.

   PageKey: String (Optional)  Specifies a page key returned in a
      previous search operation in which the number of responses
      exceeded the specified bounds.

      When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters
      except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service
      returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query.

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3.5.  Transaction: Hello

   Request: HelloRequest

   Request: HelloRequest

   Response: HelloResponse

   Report service and version information.

   The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol
   versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by
   the service.

3.6.  Transaction: ValidateAccount

   Request: ValidateRequest

   Request: ValidateRequest

   Response: ValidateResponse

   Request validation of a proposed name for a new account.

   For validation of a user's account name during profile creation.

3.6.1.  Message: ValidateRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Describes the proposed account properties.  Currently, these are
   limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions
   of the protocol.

   Account: String (Optional)  Account name requested

   Reserve: Boolean (Optional)  If true, request a reservation for the
      specified account name.  Note that the service is not obliged to
      honor reservation requests.

   Language: String [0..Many]  List of ISO language codes in order of
      preference.  For creating explanatory text.

3.6.2.  Message: ValidateResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

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   States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and
   (optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid.

   Note that receiving a 'Valid' responseto a Validate Request does not
   guarantee creation of the account.  In addition to the possibility
   that the account namecould be requested by another user between the
   Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more
   stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being
   created.  For example, checking with the authoritative list of
   current accounts rather than a cached copy.

   Valid: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the specified account identifier
      is acceptable.  If false, the account identifier is rejected.

   Minimum: Integer (Optional)  Specifies the minimum length of an
      account name.

   Maximum: Integer (Optional)  Specifies the maximum length of an
      account name.

   InvalidCharacters: String (Optional)  A list of characters that the
      service does not accept in account names.  The list of characters
      MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in
      the proposed account name.

   Reason: String (Optional)  Text explaining the reason an account name
      was rejected.

3.7.  Transaction: CreateAccount

   Request: CreateRequest

   Request: CreateRequest

   Response: CreateResponse

   Request creation of a new portal account.

   Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh
   portal.  A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile
   can be published.

3.7.1.  Message: CreateRequest

   Request creation of a new portal account.  The request specifies the
   requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated
   with the account.

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   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Account: String (Optional)  Account identifier requested.

3.7.2.  Message: CreateResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Create transaction.

   [No fields]

3.8.  Transaction: DeleteAccount

   Request: DeleteRequest

   Request: DeleteRequest

   Response: DeleteResponse

   Request deletion of a portal account.

   Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile.  Once
   registered, profiles are permanent.

3.8.1.  Message: DeleteRequest

   Request deletion of a new portal account.  The request specifies the
   requested account identifier.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Account: String (Optional)  Account identifier to be deleted.

3.8.2.  Message: DeleteResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Delete transaction.

   [No fields]

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3.9.  Transaction: Get

   Request: GetRequest

   Request: GetRequest

   Response: GetResponse

   Search for data in the mesh that matches a set of properties
   described by a sequence of key/value pairs.

3.9.1.  Message: GetRequest

   Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Identifier: String (Optional)  Lookup by profile ID

   Account: String (Optional)  Lookup by Account ID

   KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many]  List of KeyValue pairs specifying the
      conditions to be met

   SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional)  Constrain the search
      to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
      size of data records returned.

   Multiple: Boolean (Optional)  If true return multiple responses if
      available

   Full: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the client requests that the full
      Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself
      and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the
      publication of the Mesh entry to be verified.

3.9.2.  Message: GetResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction.  If a Mesh entry
   matching the specified profile is found, containsthe list of entries
   matching the request.

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

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   DataItems: DataItem [0..Many]  List of mesh data records matching the
      request.

   PageKey: String (Optional)  If non-null, indicates that the number
      and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
      SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
      limits.

3.10.  Transaction: Publish

   Request: PublishRequest

   Request: PublishRequest

   Response: PublishResponse

   Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh.

3.10.1.  Message: PublishRequest

   Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   [No fields]

3.10.2.  Message: PublishResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction.

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   [No fields]

3.11.  Transaction: Status

   Request: StatusRequest

   Request: StatusRequest

   Response: StatusResponse

   Request the current status of the mesh as seen by the portal to which
   it is directed.

   The response to the status request contains the last signed
   checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have
   been checkpointed.

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   [Not currently implemented]

3.11.1.  Message: StatusRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Initiates a status transaction.

   [No fields]

3.11.2.  Message: StatusResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction.

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional)  Time that the last write update
      was made to the Mesh

   LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional)  Time that the last Mesh
      checkpoint was calculated.

   NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional)  Time at which the next Mesh
      checkpoint should be calculated.

   CheckpointValue: String (Optional)  Last checkpoint value.

3.12.  Transaction: ConnectStart

   Request: ConnectStartRequest

   Request: ConnectStartRequest

   Response: ConnectStartResponse

   Request connection of a new device to a mesh profile

3.12.1.  Message: ConnectStartRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Initial device connection request.

   SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional)  Device connection
      request signed by thesignature key of the device requesting
      connection.

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   AccountID: String (Optional)  Account identifier of account to which
      the device is requesting connection.

3.12.2.  Message: ConnectStartResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   [No fields]

3.13.  Transaction: ConnectStatus

   Request: ConnectStatusRequest

   Request: ConnectStatusRequest

   Response: ConnectStatusResponse

   Request status of pending connection request of a new device to a
   mesh profile

3.13.1.  Message: ConnectStatusRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Request status information for a pending request posted previously.

   AccountID: String (Optional)  Account identifier for which pending
      connection information is requested.

   DeviceID: String (Optional)  Device identifier of device requesting
      status information.

3.13.2.  Message: ConnectStatusResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional)  The signed
      ConnectionResult object.

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3.14.  Transaction: ConnectPending

   Request: ConnectPendingRequest

   Request: ConnectPendingRequest

   Response: ConnectPendingResponse

   Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile.

3.14.1.  Message: ConnectPendingRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Specify the criteria for pending requests.

   AccountID: String (Optional)  The account identifier of the account
      for which pending connection requests are requested.

   SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional)  Constrain the search
      to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
      size of data records returned.

3.14.2.  Message: ConnectPendingResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many]  A list of pending
      requests satisfying the criteria set out in the request.

   PageKey: String (Optional)  If non-null, indicates that the number
      and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
      SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
      limits.

3.15.  Transaction: ConnectComplete

   Request: ConnectCompleteRequest

   Request: ConnectCompleteRequest

   Response: ConnectCompleteResponse

   Post response to a pending connection request.

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3.15.1.  Message: ConnectCompleteRequest

   Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional)  The connection result to
      be posted to the portal.  The result MUST be signed by a valid
      administration key for the Mesh profile.

   AccountID: String (Optional)  The account identifier to which the
      connection result is posted.

3.15.2.  Message: ConnectCompleteResponse

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.

   [No fields]

3.16.  Transaction: Transfer

   Request: TransferRequest

   Request: TransferRequest

   Response: TransferResponse

   Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
   identifiers.  Requires appropriate authorization

   [Not currently implemented]

3.16.1.  Message: TransferRequest

   Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction
   identifiers.  Requires appropriate authorization

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   Inherits: MeshRequest

   SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional)  Constrain the search
      to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total
      size of data records returned.

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3.16.2.  Message: TransferResponse

   Inherits: MeshResponse

   Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction.  If
   successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred.

   DataItems: DataItem [0..Many]  List of mesh data records matching the
      request.

   PageKey: String (Optional)  If non-null, indicates that the number
      and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the
      SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server
      limits.

4.  Assets

4.1.  Data

4.2.  Credentials

4.3.  Reputation

4.3.1.  Outbound Messaging Abuse ()

5.  Risks

5.1.  Confidentiality

   Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA

5.1.1.  Privacy

   Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use

   Unintended use within an organization may put it in default

   GDPR

   HIPPA

5.2.  Integrity

   Modification of data enables control breaches

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5.3.  Availability

5.3.1.  Data loss

   Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5

5.3.2.  Partial data survivability

   Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried
   Aunt Agatha.

5.4.  Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam)

6.  Threats

6.1.  End point Compromise

6.2.

7.  Controls

7.1.  Cryptographic

7.1.1.  Triple lock

7.1.1.1.  Transport Security

   Traffic analysis protection

7.1.1.2.  Message Security

   Access control

   Authentication / Integrity

7.1.1.3.  Data Level Security

   Data Confidentiality

   Non-Repudiation

7.1.2.  Key Protection

   Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the
   Device profile to the device is highly desirable.  Ideally, private
   keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques
   presenting a high degree of resistance.

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7.1.2.1.  Windows

   Use encrypted key store

   Preferably use BitLocker

7.1.2.2.  OSX

   Use Key Ring

7.1.2.3.  iOS

   Use ???

7.1.2.4.  Linux

   Use the DBUS mechanism

7.1.2.5.  Android

   Hope and prayers.

7.1.3.  Key and Nonce Generation

   Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC???

   Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised

7.1.4.  Key Escrow and Recovery

   Master profile keys should be escrowed

   Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users
   may want some but not all their data assets to survive them.

7.1.5.  Profile Verification

   Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration
   device and that the administration device was properly authorized by
   the master profile.

   Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device.

   Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks.

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7.1.6.  Identity Validation

   See the separate document on the trust model

7.1.7.  Trust Broker Accountability

   Cert transparency type techniques

7.2.  Mesh Messaging

7.2.1.  Ingress Control

   Every message is subject to access control

   Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail

   Mesh Services MUST apply user specified ingress control as specified
   in their contacts catalog.

7.2.2.  Egress Control

   Some applications may require egress control

   For example, classified environments

   Mail too stupid to send

7.2.3.  Security Signal

   Confirmation messages requiring payments

   Need Accountability

   Need to know the source of the accountability assertions

   Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message

7.2.3.1.  Brand

   If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this
   should be signaled to both sender and receiver

   Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another
   party

   Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique.

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7.2.4.  Accountability

   Authentication and consequences

8.  Security Considerations

   This document comprises the security considerations for the use and
   implementation of the Mathematical Mesh.

8.1.  Integrity

8.1.1.  DNS Spoofing

8.1.2.  TLS Downgrade

8.1.3.  TLS Service Impersonation

8.1.4.  Request Replay Attack

8.1.5.  Response Replay Attack

8.2.  Confidentiality

8.2.1.  Side Channel Attack

8.2.2.  Session Key Leakage

9.  IANA Considerations

   All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
   this document

10.  Acknowledgements

   A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
   presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture] .

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
              Architecture Guide", draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              architecture-08 (work in progress), July 2019.

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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.

11.2.  Informative References

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
              Implementation", draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer-08 (work
              in progress), April 2019.

11.3.  URIs

   [1] http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
       security.html

Author's Address

   Phillip Hallam-Baker

   Email: phill@hallambaker.com

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