Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)
draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation-01

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-02-14 (latest revision 2012-02-02)
Replaced by draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation-01.txt

Abstract

The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA- Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. However, some implementations of RA-Guard have been found to be prone to circumvention by employing IPv6 Extension Headers. This document describes the evasion techniques that affect the aforementioned implementations, and provides advice on the implementation of RA-Guard, such that the RA-Guard evasion vectors are eliminated.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fgont@si6networks.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)