Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual in sec area)
Authors Fernando Gont  , Ivan Arce 
Last updated 2020-01-09 (latest revision 2019-07-08)
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
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Stream WG state (None)
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state Expired (IESG: Dead)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD Benjamin Kaduk
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/ IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring. The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection of transient numeric identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result of insufficient or misleading specifications. This document formally updates RFC3552, such that RFCs are required to include a security and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers they specify.


Fernando Gont (
Ivan Arce (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)