Detection and countermeasure of forged response cache poisoning attacks
draft-fujiwara-dnsop-poisoning-measures-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Kazunori Fujiwara | ||
| Last updated | 2015-01-04 (Latest revision 2014-07-03) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Although the Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions has been implemented, cache poisoning is still a big issue. "ID Guessing and Query Prediction" type cache poisoning is detectable on a full resolver. TCP transport has strong resistance to cache poisoning attacks. This document proposes an improvement of full resolvers about the detection and the measure against forged response cache poisoning attacks.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)