Detection and countermeasure of forged response cache poisoning attacks
draft-fujiwara-dnsop-poisoning-measures-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Kazunori Fujiwara 
Last updated 2015-01-04 (latest revision 2014-07-03)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fujiwara-dnsop-poisoning-measures-00.txt

Abstract

Although the Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions has been implemented, cache poisoning is still a big issue. "ID Guessing and Query Prediction" type cache poisoning is detectable on a full resolver. TCP transport has strong resistance to cache poisoning attacks. This document proposes an improvement of full resolvers about the detection and the measure against forged response cache poisoning attacks.

Authors

Kazunori Fujiwara (fujiwara@jprs.co.jp)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)