Support of asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI
draft-fries-anima-brski-async-enroll-02

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ANIMA WG                                                        S. Fries
Internet-Draft                                              H. Brockhaus
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Siemens
Expires: May 6, 2020                                             E. Lear
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                        November 3, 2019

              Support of asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI
                draft-fries-anima-brski-async-enroll-02

Abstract

   This document discusses an enhancement of automated bootstrapping of
   a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI) to operate in domains
   featuring no or only timely limited connectivity to backend services
   offering enrollment functionality, specifically a Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI).  In the context of deploying new devices the
   design of BRSKI allows for online (synchronous object exchange) and
   offline interactions (asynchronous object exchange) with a
   manufacturer's authorization service.  For this it utilizes a self-
   contained voucher to transport the domain credentials as a signed
   object to establish an initial trust between a pledge and the target
   deployment domain.  The currently supported enrollment protocol for
   request and distribution of deployment domain specific device
   certificates provides only limited support for asynchronous PKI
   interactions.  This memo motivates the enhancement of supporting
   self-contained objects for certificate management by using an
   abstract notation.  This allows off-site operation of PKI services
   outside the deployment domain of the pledge.  This addresses
   specifically scenarios, in which the final authorization of
   certification request of a pledge cannot be made in the deployment
   domain and is therefore delegated to a operator backend.  The goal is
   to enable the usage of existing and potentially new PKI protocols
   supporting self-containment for certificate management.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Fries, et al.              Expires May 6, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  BRSKI-AE                   November 2019

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  History of changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Supported environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Application Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  Rolling stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.2.  Building automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.3.  Substation automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.4.  Electric vehicle charging infrastructure  . . . . . .   9
       4.2.5.  Infrastructure isolation policy . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.2.6.  Less operational security in the deployment domain  .   9
     4.3.  Requirement discussion and mapping to solution elements .  10
   5.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Behavior of a pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Addressing Scheme for the Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . .  16
       5.3.1.  Discovery of Enrollment Protocol Support  . . . . . .  17
   6.  Protocol Flows  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
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