Threat to BGP Policies : limited-scope more specific prefix injection
draft-francois-limited-scope-specifics-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Pierre Francois , Bruno Quoitin | ||
| Last updated | 2009-10-26 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This draft describes potential threats to the respect of Internet routing policies by the routers of one ISP, that are due to a restricted propagation of more specific BGP prefixes by its neighboring domains.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)