Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-00
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tobias Fiebig , Kevin Borgolte | ||
| Last updated | 2019-07-22 (Latest revision 2019-01-11) | ||
| Replaces | draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and (forced) on-path attacks. These attacks can often be mitigated by (selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being more diligent in operating a certificate authority. This document provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)