Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2019-07-22 (latest revision 2019-01-11) | ||
| Replaces | draft-fiebig-acme-esecacme | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fiebig-security-acme-00.txt
Abstract
Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and (forced) on-path attacks. These attacks can often be mitigated by (selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being more diligent in operating a certificate authority. This document provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an unauthorized party.
Authors
Tobias Fiebig
(t.fiebig@tudelft.nl)
Kevin Borgolte
(kevin@iseclab.org)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)