Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-01

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Security Dispatch                                              T. Fiebig
Internet-Draft                                                  TU Delft
Intended status: Informational                               K. Borgolte
Expires: March 12, 2020                             Princeton University
                                                      September 09, 2019

     Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate
                   Management Environment (ESecACME)
                     draft-fiebig-security-acme-01

Abstract

   Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued
   via the ACME protocol.  Recently, several attacks against domain
   validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and
   (forced) on-path attacks.  These attacks can often be mitigated by
   (selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS
   validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being
   more diligent in operating a certificate authority.  This document
   provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations
   and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an
   unauthorized party.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 12, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Fiebig & Borgolte        Expires March 12, 2020                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                  ESecACME                  September 2019

   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  IP and Resource-use-after-free Attacks  . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.1.  Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  (Forced)-On-path Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.2.1.  Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.1.  Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.2.  Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  DNS Cache Staleness Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.4.1.  Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.4.2.  Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Summary of CA Operational Improvements  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Hardening Against Attacks Without DNS Control . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Multi-Vantage Point Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  BGP Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  DNS Resolver Configuration and Monitoring . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  DNSSEC Validation Failure and Lack of DNSSEC  . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  Recent Domain Transfer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Additional Validation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Proof of Ownership of a Prior Certificate . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10