Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-01
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Security Dispatch T. Fiebig
Internet-Draft TU Delft
Intended status: Informational K. Borgolte
Expires: March 12, 2020 Princeton University
September 09, 2019
Extended Security Considerations for the Automatic Certificate
Management Environment (ESecACME)
draft-fiebig-security-acme-01
Abstract
Most Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates are issued
via the ACME protocol. Recently, several attacks against domain
validation (DV) have been published, including IP-use-after-free and
(forced) on-path attacks. These attacks can often be mitigated by
(selectively) requiring additional challenges, such as DNS
validation, proof of ownership of a prior certificate, and by being
more diligent in operating a certificate authority. This document
provides a list of currently known attacks and describes mitigations
and operational procedures to prevent issuing a certificate to an
unauthorized party.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 12, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
Fiebig & Borgolte Expires March 12, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ESecACME September 2019
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. IP and Resource-use-after-free Attacks . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. (Forced)-On-path Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. DNS Cache Staleness Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Summary of CA Operational Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Hardening Against Attacks Without DNS Control . . . . . . 7
3.2. Multi-Vantage Point Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. BGP Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. DNS Resolver Configuration and Monitoring . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. DNSSEC Validation Failure and Lack of DNSSEC . . . . . . 8
3.6. Recent Domain Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Additional Validation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Proof of Ownership of a Prior Certificate . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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