Hardening DNSSEC against collision weaknesses in SHA-1 and other cryptographic hash algorithms
draft-fanf-dnsop-sha-ll-not-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Tony Finch 
Last updated 2020-09-10 (latest revision 2020-03-09)
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-fanf-dnsop-sha-ll-not-00.txt

Abstract

DNSSEC deployments have often used the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm to provide authentication of DNS data. This document explains why SHA-1 is no longer secure for this purpose, and deprecates its use in DNSSEC signatures. This document updates RFC 8624.

Authors

Tony Finch (dot@dotat.at)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)